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AB S T R A C T -  SU M M A RY: 
 
This thesis is an exploration of the concept of evil. It attempts to define what we mean 
by this elusive concept and its relevance to human behaviour. The thesis then 
develops an operational definition of evil that is distilled from the writings of various 
social scientists. The thesis argues, however, that in addition to merely defining evil, 
there are three emotive elements that also go towards our preparedness to label an act 
as evil. 
 
The thesis then examines the causes of evil acts. The thesis argues that the interactive 
causation, of situation and disposition, is the most robust explanation of evil acts. The 
thesis rejects the notion of the evil person, instead arguing that it is ordinary people 
who commit evil acts.  
 
The thesis then examines the causes of genocide, the most evil of acts, and links this 
back to the previous discussion of causal factors of evil acts. Germany’s war against 
the Soviet Union in World War II, in particular the role of the Waffen-SS is then 
discussed. The death and destruction during this conflict would result not just from 
military operations, but also from the systematic killing and abuse that the Waffen-SS 
directed against Jews, Communists and ordinary citizens. This thesis provides a clear, 
concise history of the Waffen-SS campaign of conquest and genocide in Russia. By 
drawing on the best of military and Holocaust scholarship, this thesis dispels the 
myths that have distorted the role of the Waffen-SS, in both the military operations 
themselves and the unthinkable crimes that were part of them. 
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The thesis then utilises the case study of the Waffen-SS to highlight the application of 
the interactive causation explanation in regards to evil acts. The conventional wisdom 
that the Waffen-SS in WWII fought a relatively clean fight, unsullied by the atrocities 
committed by the Nazis, is challenged—and largely demolished. Focusing on the 
Eastern Front, the thesis contends that the Nazi vision of a racial-ideological death 
struggle against Slavic hordes and their Jewish-Bolshevik commissars resonated with 
soldiers of the Waffen-SS, steeped in traditional anti-Semitic and racist dogmas. In 
doing so the thesis clearly shows that the Waffen-SS was an organisation that 
committed widespread atrocities. The thesis then applies the operational definition of 
evil to the case study and determines that the acts committed by the Waffen-SS were 
in fact evil. It also contends that the concept of evil is useful in explaining human 
atrocity. In conducting this examination the thesis provides some insight into the 
challenges facing society from preventing future broad-scale acts of evil. 
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IN T R O D U C T I O N : DE F I N I N G T H E  
PR O B L E M  
 
Aims and importance of the study 
 
Our time, this decade even, has shown us that man's capacity for evil knows no limits.  
(Annan, 1997) 2 
 
What do we mean when we use the term “evil”? What form does it take? What is the 
nature of evil? Why do people commit evil acts? Is evil just a word with no real 
meaning or use in helping us to understand extreme human behaviour? These 
questions and more have fascinated humankind for centuries and still today we are 
struggling to find acceptable answers. Yet despite the difficulty that the concept 
presents, evil is regaining popularity to describe terrible events, events that defy 
human understanding and comprehension. As Morton poses in his excellent review of 
the concept of evil: “How should we think about the atrocities around us? What 
concepts do we need, if we are to know how to explain and how to react?” (Morton, 
2004:ix). 
 
World leaders frequently use the term, and once again the concept of evil is prominent 
in intellectual and academic circles (Miller, 2005; Wolfe, 2003). This resurgence in 
                                                 
2 Statement of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the International Bar Association in 
New York on 11 June 1997. 
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use and acceptance is due perhaps to the fact that evil is now seen by some as a useful 
explanatory concept regarding human behaviour, rather then being used to demonise 
individuals as something beyond human comprehension. However, we have also seen 
the use of the term in recent times as a political tool, where it has been used to 
strengthen the interests of governments. An example of this is the terminology used 
by United States (US) President George W Bush to describe perceived enemies of the 
US as an “axis of evil” after the attacks of September 11th. This word was not chosen 
at random, rather it was calculated to have a specific effect in describing the acts and 
the persons who committed them; “… as rhetoric Axis of Evil had just the right cloud 
of dark smoke around it” (Morrow, 2003:52). An examination of headlines in the 
Australian media revealed that the use of the word evil “… is common place, 
especially when describing criminal behaviour” (Ruffles, 2004:113). 
 
Theorists in various disciplines have attempted to deal with, and explain what evil is 
and why evil acts occur. Indeed the “… thread of evildoing is intricately woven 
throughout the history of human existence; as a result, laypeople bear the same burden 
of comprehension” (J. E. Waller, 1996:11).  Theorists have been critical of the 
inadequate attempts made to understand and explain in realistic terms how events 
such as the Holocaust could have occurred (Zukier, 1994). Christopher Browning3 has 
commented “… in recent years there has been another surge of interest by social and 
now evolutionary psychologists in studies relevant to understanding how ordinary 
people commit extraordinary evil” (J. Waller, 2002:viii). As one Jewish survivor 
                                                 
3 Browning authored the well-received examination of the genocidal actions of the 101st German Police 
Battalion on the Eastern Front during World War II. 
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commented events such as the Holocaust seem to be beyond words and human power 
to comprehend and this is what stimulates our interest (Zukier, 1994). Certainly it is a 
“… very difficult task indeed…” to define what we mean by evil (Wilson, 2003:1). 
This is supported by Morton who acknowledges that “We find the origins of atrocity 
so puzzling that we label the mystery Evil, and we grope desperately for explanations 
of it” (Morton, 2004:2). 
 
Yet even today it is recognised that “… society wants a benchmark for evil, hard as it 
is to explain” (Murray, 2004:28). While our legal system has been fairly successful in 
dealing with individual acts, events on a broad scale have created uncertainty and a 
sense of helplessness in our response. At least one author suggests that: 
The growing attention to genocide in the popular media, among scholars, and even in some 
political circles is itself an indication of the failure of the United Nations to enforce its own 
policy of mobilising the international community against mass murder.  (Weitz, 2003a:76) 
 
Evidence of this can be seen in the recent creation of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which is a response by the international community to finally deal with these 
broad-scale events. It is argued that a greater understanding of the concept of evil will 
provide a better behavioural and sociological framework to explain and understand 
how groups can commit mass atrocities. It is my contention that there is still a 
considerable knowledge gap in relation to the concept of evil and this provides the 
basis for my study. I will now discuss in detail some of the justifications for the 
methodology I have adopted in approaching this study. 
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The problem of Evil 
This study approaches the problem of understanding evil from a criminological and 
social science perspective and attempts to use this perspective to increase our insight 
into the concept. The study explores the concept of evil through the use of a case 
study selected for its usefulness in examining group actions and also the relationship 
between the concepts of evil, war and genocide.  
 
It is not the aim nor is it possible for this study to provide a definition of evil that 
would allow each and every act of evil to be adequately determined. This is because 
there are a number of grey areas when talking about evil (such as the role of 
bystanders), the various causes of evil and exactly what can be seen to constitute an 
evil act. While most people acknowledge the notion of evil, few citizens are able to 
actually clearly define what is meant by the use of the term. As Waller outlines even 
“… social scientists have had a hard time wrapping their minds around exactly what 
evil is and is not” (J. Waller, 2002:11). As noted by Petman (2003:239), “Evil such as 
terrorism resists definition: a definition becomes either too bureaucratic to be credible, 
or then it merely refers back to the moral impulse that we hope to bind with it”. 
Clearly parameters need to be set as to what is and is not an evil act. Cultural 
differences can also make what would appear an evil act in one society to be 
acceptable behaviour in another (for example, honour killings in India). I will attempt 
to explore and clarify these areas so as to provide a clear basis for my arguments. 
 
This difficulty in applying universal standards of behaviour is overcome by relying on 
the newly constituted ICC as a basis for some propositions put forward. This assists in 
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providing a starting point in determining the type of actions that are objectively 
viewed as being unacceptable (and it will be contended, evil). This study, however, 
expands the approach adopted by Baumeister (1999:8) who acknowledged that his 
social science approach and analysis of evil was based on “... fuzzy sets and grey 
areas”. It is the intention of this study to try and limit those areas. The focus of the 
study is on intentional human evil acts.  It seeks to answer the question of what 
ordinary people see and mean by the concept of evil and how evil acts occur. I will 
provide a robust operational definition that assists in the important distinction 
between acts that are merely wrong and acts that are evil.  
 
So why worry about evil? What use is it to us in understanding human behaviour? I 
would argue that the concept of evil is more then a dismissive classification, that fails 
to explain why people act in certain ways. The notion that by the use of evil we are 
removing human behaviour beyond the human domain is also rejected (Clendinnen, 
1999; Garrard, 2002). Rather the concept of evil is useful in defining and describing 
significant acts of human harm that are beyond bad or wrong (Haybron, 2002).  
 
The issue of whether pure or radical evil exists (i.e. evil or demonic people) is also 
discussed. I see this as important as it relates back to the evil for the sake of evil 
arguments for the commission of such acts. The notion of evil people can give rise to 
demonisation and remove the actions from the realm of personal motivations and 
situational influences. This I would argue is an easy way to dismiss actions that we 
find reprehensible and unexplainable. I contend we need to look beyond this and 
attempt to identify the rational motivations (note that these motivations may only 
appear to be subjectively rational to the perpetrator) that drive people to commit these 
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types of acts. The discussion of evil is undertaken by considering the various 
explanations and causes of evil. These include the situational and dispositional 
approaches, and a combination of these two approaches, the interactional approach. 
These approaches have been selected as they allow an analysis to be conducted by 
looking at both individual and group aspects of evil acts. 
 
Why the Waffen-SS? 
The examination of the Waffen-SS4 will allow the study of gross organisational 
behaviour within historical frameworks. As well as this the operational definition 
arrived at will be applied to the case study. The Waffen-SS has been chosen as the 
case study as “… there is no meaningful and objective discussion of the criminal 
activities of the Waffen-SS” (Stein, 1966:258).5 Buchler (1986) also notes that 
research on the atrocities of the Waffen-SS is sparse. However, the few studies 
available on the Waffen-SS point to a “… high frequency of crimes” (Christensen, 
Smith, & Poulsen, 2003:9). Wegner notes that: 
If one surveys the literature on the history of the SS and the Waffen-SS, it becomes obvious how 
immense the discrepancy is between the veritable avalanche of titles and the quite modest yield 
of credible and scholarly insights. The reason for this discrepancy is clear; more than a 
generation after the collapse of the Third Reich, the SS as a historical phenomenon has 
exercised a powerful emotional attraction. At the same time it demands that we come to terms 
with it morally, and both of these factors are the leitmotivs of public discussion. (Wegner, 
1990:1) 
                                                 
4 The term Waffen meant fighting or armed SS. The term SS was derived from the formation of 
protection squads or SchutzStaffeln. The Schutzstaffeln were protection squads set up by the Nazi 
Party in the 1930s for the protection of Hitler and other leading Nazis. 
 
5 Although this study would appear to be dated, it is still considered one of the most important studies 
to ever examine the Waffen-SS. 
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This absence of real discussion in relation to the crimes and criminality of the 
Waffen-SS has allowed proponents both for and against the Waffen-SS to create 
various myths about who and what the Waffen-SS actually were.  
The Waffen-SS possesses a surprisingly wide cult following among military buffs. The status of 
a military elite within the German armed forces … the impressive combat record and aura of 
toughness that surrounded the force: all hold enormous fascination for modellers and 
collectors alike, as the huge volume of post-war photographic and illustrated material relating 
to the Waffen-SS attests. (Mackenzie, 1997:135) 
 
It is for this reason that the Waffen-SS is “… one of the most frequently discussed and 
persistently controversial subjects of that era” (Sydnor, 1973:339). Indeed the “… SS 
poses sociological and psychological questions to political science that go far beyond 
the still existing need to furnish documentary proof for the functions assigned to 
certain formations of the SS” (Paetel, 1959:34). One of the most pressing social and 
psychological questions is the “… extraordinary power to accomplish pure evil that 
helps to make the SS an endlessly fascinating subject to study” (Kren & Rappoport, 
1976:87). During this study I will use the term Waffen-SS apologists. This is a loose 
grouping of proponents supportive of a positive image for the Waffen-SS. By this 
term I am referring to those organisations, veterans and writers who have 
determinedly undertaken efforts to rehabilitate the image of the Waffen-SS and 
separate it from the SS organisation as a whole, and the crimes committed by such. 
The motivations of these apologists are many and varied, but the most common 
underlying theme would seem to be that the military achievements of the Waffen-SS 
far outweigh any crimes committed by such, and therefore any elements that may 
tarnish the fighting reputation of the Waffen-SS should be discounted or ignored. 
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Since Stein’s seminal examination there have be some analyses of the crimes of 
individual units as well as a major work by Theile (1997) in defence of the Waffen-
SS. It is not that this study is seeking to show that the Waffen-SS as an organisation 
was any more or less evil in comparison to other military formations during or since 
World War II. As pointed out by Knopp the Waffen-SS were “… not unique in their 
brutal behaviour, and the difference between the Wehrmacht6 and the Waffen-SS was 
by no means as great as has been claimed” (Knopp, 2002:xiii).  
 
This organisation has been examined by a number of authors with its formation and 
structure being the main focus (Hohne, 1969; Koehl, 1983; Krausnick, Buchheim, 
Broszat, & Jacobsen, 1965; Reitlinger, 1957; Stein, 1966; Sydnor, 1990; Wegner, 
1990). The purpose of this study is to draw upon these studies and others to explore 
the concept of evil and its application to the Waffen-SS within the framework of the 
criminal liability of the Waffen-SS for actions undertaken on the Eastern Front. The 
study will determine what cultural or organisational supports existed within and 
without the Waffen-SS to aid understanding of this elusive concept of evil. 
 
The role of the Waffen-SS on the Eastern Front was something akin to a holy crusade; 
its purpose was to destroy those groups who were abhorrent to the ideals of the Nazi 
Party. These included Slavs, Jews and Bolsheviks (Williamson, 1995a). During the 
conflict the Waffen-SS were to prove themselves to be excellent soldiers and became 
known as the Fuhrer’s fire brigade, with the result that Waffen-SS units were rushed 
                                                 
6 Name for the combined German Army, Air Force and Navy during World War II. 
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wherever the fighting was fiercest (C. Mann, 2001; Quarrie, 1991; Ripley, 2000; 
Williamson, 1995a). In his extensive work on the war as a global conflict Weinberg 
(1994:458) describes the Waffen-SS on the Eastern front as follows; “… the armed 
formations of the SS. Fanatical in spirit, favoured over the regular army in delivery of 
weapons, and not always particularly obedient, these contingents were in the process 
of becoming a kind of fire brigade from critical points on the front”. But this group 
was also employed in other roles. In fact, clear links can be drawn between the 
Waffen-SS and the concentration-camp system and the Einsatzgruppen7 (Arad, 
Krakowski, & Spector, 1989; MacLean, 1999a, 1999b; Stein, 1966).  
 
This military formation was peculiar in that it was integrated into the overall system 
of violence that was the SS and as such did not possess the professional autonomy of 
the army. For this reason it cannot be seen as a pure military force, but also had all the 
hallmarks of being a political tool of the Nazi regime (Wegner, 1990). When Italy 
began to withdraw from the war after the fall of Mussolini, Waffen-SS units were 
rushed to Italy despite the fact they were desperately needed on the Eastern Front 
(Butler, 2001). Foremost among them being the 1st Waffen-SS Panzer Division 
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. The reasoning given by Hitler to his generals at a 
military conference on the 26th July 1943 was: 
 … I have to take units that are politically reliable .… In Italy I can only accomplish something 
with crack formations that are politically close with fascism. If it weren’t for that I could take a 
couple of army divisions. But as it is, I need a magnet to gather the people together ... I must 
have units that come under a political banner (Gilbert, 1950:106-109). 
                                                                                                                                            
 
7 Mobile killing groups that followed the combat forces and operated behind the front lines carrying out 
“cleansing” operations. 
  20 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
 
These political aspects are important as they provide a background against which the 
actions of the Waffen-SS can be examined to determine the perceived liability for 
their actions, and they have particular pertinence relating to the recent developments 
in international law. The recent actions of the United Nations shows how important it 
is to try and gain some understanding of conditions that predispose soldiers and others 
to commit war crimes.  McGoldrick (2000) argues that adoption of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court in Rome in 1998 was a milestone in the fight against 
war criminals. This statute had the intention of establishing a permanent ICC. 
McConvill and Smith (2000) argue that the ICC will provide a forum in which 
individuals can be held accountable for breaches of International Humanitarian Law. 
When initially formed it was intended that the ICC would be a permanent body with 
investigative powers to bring war criminals to justice (International Scientific and 
Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations, 1999).  
 
In order to examine this case study it is necessary to limit the scope of the 
investigation to the specific actions of the Waffen-SS in the East. This is due to the 
enormity of the conflict itself and the need to examine a defined and specific group 
for the purpose of this study. To examine more is simply beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The Eastern Front, in particular the actions of the Waffen-SS, provide an 
excellent case study of the total war doctrine and genocidal actions. The examination 
of this selected and limited section of the German armed forces (namely the Waffen-
SS), allows development of a more complete picture of the factors that can cause 
soldiers to commit acts of evil. Since the close of World War II it has been actively 
involved in the denial of its involvement and responsibility for these acts on the basis 
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that its members were simple soldiers with no links to the terrible actions that took 
place on and behind the front lines. 
 
To complete this examination the nature of the conflict on the Eastern Front is studied 
to place the actions of the Waffen-SS in an overall context. Specific actions of the 
Waffen-SS are examined and analysed by applying the concept of evil to these actions 
and examining them in the light of the post-war War Crime Trials. The study of this 
military formation allows a close examination of situational, dispositional and 
interactional factors that helped to promote the growth and occurrence of evil in the 
context of the genocidal barbarity of the Eastern Front. As has been noted “… both 
modern genocide and modern ethnic cleansing have usually taken place during time 
of war under circumstances closely related to war conditions” (Weitz, 2003a:77). 
 
The importance of Genocide 
The crime of genocide continues to haunt human society. No other species has so 
determinedly attempted to destroy others of its race. Despite our acceptance and 
acknowledgement of genocide and its horrors, they continue to happen, often with the 
full knowledge of the international community as was the case in Rwanda. It almost 
seems that “… we are failing as a species …” in our efforts to understand and combat 
genocide (Dugger, 1996:61). The examination of genocide focuses on evil at the 
group/socio-political level, raising broader issues such as collective versus personal 
responsibility, the need for evil in warfare, and the institutionalisation of evil through 
the use of nationalistic and racial doctrines. One of the problems criminological 
theory has had in dealing with crimes such as genocide is a tendency to adopt a 
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localistic approach to the study of crime, rather then an international approach 
(Yacoubian, 2000). There has been a failure to pose and answer the question as to 
how millions of people can become perpetrators, helpers and witnesses to genocidal 
actions. 
 
There can be no mistaking that warfare and genocide are intimately linked. This 
linkage is controversial and has not been the subject of much study. At least one 
author argues that “… this relationship is much closer than some scholars have been 
willing to admit” (Markussen, 1996:76). The comments of UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan (2004)8 recognised this link and stated that “… preventing armed 
conflict” and the “… protection of civilians in armed conflict” are two of the most 
important steps in preventing genocide. It has been recognised that “… woven 
through and wrapped around wars both large and small were … the internments, 
deportations, killings, and, ultimately genocides” (Weitz, 2003b:53). The examination 
of genocidal aspects of the Eastern Front are important; at least one criminologist has 
drawn attention to the paucity of genocide as a subject of criminological concern 
(Yacoubian, 2000). As some criminologists argue, the study of genocide has in fact 
been impeded by criminology. 
The history of American criminology, and the wider world of events beyond its disciplinary 
borders, has often impeded the pursuit of answers to the questions about genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes more generally. Confronting such questions and the absence 
of answers to them is important in defining the boundaries of modern criminology. (Hagan, 
Rymond-Richmond, & Parker, 2005:526) 
 
                                                 
8 Speech given by the Secretary-General to the UN Commission on Human Rights on the 7th April 
2004 to mark the 10th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. 
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This is where a case study of the Waffen-SS is valuable, for it allows for 
incorporation of criminological understandings of the concept of evil and its 
relationship to the crime of genocide. While the discussion of theoretical aspects of 
evil help to illustrate points that are raised, the study will also rely upon the case study 
of the Waffen-SS and other historically documented examples to support my 
arguments and provide behavioural examples of evil in action. From these varied 
examples I hope to be able to draw an accurate picture and reach a defendable 
conclusion as to the actions of the Waffen-SS and the application of the concept of 
evil. 
 
The Eastern Front – An introduction 
The formation of the Nazi Party and it’s ascension to power under the guidance of it’s 
leader, Adolf Hitler, was an event that would begin the German revolution and in a 
matter of 12 years bring to an end what was going to be the 1000-year Reich (Shirer, 
1987). World War II was one of the most pivotal events of the 20th century. The 
conflict on the Eastern Front was seen as the most important phenomenon of the 
conflict and its political repercussions lasted for decades after the war ended (Forster, 
1997). But of even more importance is the impact that the Eastern Front had on the 
course of the war and its eventual outcome. It was a war that unleashed unparalleled 
genocidal barbarity and resulted in a death toll in excess of 30 million people (Rees, 
1999). Indeed it has been argued that “… even before it began Hitler insisted it was to 
be a Vernichtungskrieg, or war of annihilation unlike any other in history” (Gellately, 
2003:259). In his directive number 21 issued on the 18th of December 1940 to the 
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armed forces, Hitler made clear that the aim of Operation Barbarossa9 was to “… 
crush Soviet Russia in a rapid campaign” (Trevor-Roper, 1964:93). It was envisaged 
that the East would see a different kind of occupation from the type used in the 
conquered countries in the West. The occupation policies would see the brutal 
imposition of German interests (Dallin, 1981; Mollo, 1982; Rees, 1999; Umbreit, 
1997). It was part of the plan that the conquered territory was to be resettled by 
Germans and the current population used as slave labour where possible (Birn, 1997; 
Trevor-Roper, 2000).  
 
The seeds for this barbarity stemmed from Hitler’s rambling view of the world. His 
policies sprung from a political ideology that mixed the ideas of living space 
(lebensraum), racism, anti-Semitism, economic independence and the vision of 
Germany being a world power (Buchler, 1986; Forster, 1997; Gonen, 2000). Hitler 
perceived Germany as a nation without space and she needed to conquer land in the 
East to obtain living space and extension of German resources (Gonen, 2000; Noakes 
& Pridham, 1988). Certainly Hitler saw the conflict in Russia as being a war with two 
outcomes, either victory or annihilation (Forster, 1997:116).  It has been suggested 
that Hitler invaded Russia to crush a political and ideological system, that was 
abhorrent to the National Socialist ideals. Further he envisaged a Nazi style 
colonialism that would gain living space for the racially superior Germans and reduce 
the Slavs living in Russia to the status of subhumans with the result that “… in the 
military sphere too, the bloodiness and barbarity of the struggle owed much to its 
                                                 
9 During the invasion of Russia codenamed Operation “Barbarossa” there were initially three main 
German Army Groups called North, South and Centre. 
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ideological character” (Stein, 1966:121). This view of the Russian as a subhuman is 
reflected in the post-war comments of Waffen-SS general Max Simon: 
All have in greater or lesser degree the Asiatic characteristics of frugality, cunning, cruelty, 
hatred of foreigners and indifference to death. The fact that, as Asiatics, they have little or no 
will of their own, indulging only in mass thinking, but at the same time can face mass death, 
facilitated Communist education and uniformity.  (Simon, 1953:4) 
 
During one of his private conversations in August 1941 Hitler outlined his thoughts 
on the way in which these German colonists would live: 
The German colonist ought to live on handsome, spacious farms. The German services will be 
lodged in marvellous buildings, the governors in palaces. Beneath the shelter of the 
administrative services, we shall gradually organise all that is indispensable to the maintenance 
of a certain standard of living. Around the city, to a depth of 30 to 40 kilometres, we shall have 
a belt of handsome villages connected by the best roads. What exists beyond that will be 
another world, in which we mean to let the Russians live as they like. It is merely necessary that 
we should rule them. (Trevor-Roper, 2000:24). 
 
The nature of the Russo-German conflict was distinct in that not only was it a battle of 
racial origins and ideology, but it was also seen as a war of economic survival. Hitler 
needed the land of Russia for three main reasons: living space for the German people, 
food to feed the German people, and resources to drive German industry. Without 
these Germany, in Hitler’s view, would be unable to conduct a lengthy conflict and 
would be at risk both from a military and economic standpoint (Pool, 1997).  
 
Without a doubt Hitler was driven by strategic and ideological motives, which 
resulted in his perceived need to destroy the racially inferior Slavs and take their land 
while at the same time destroying the Jewish-Bolshevik threat to Germany (Buchler, 
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1986; Noakes & Pridham, 1988). The International Military Tribunal (IMT) 
recognised that this conflict was to be conducted in a manner conducive to 
committing war crimes.  
… war crimes were deliberately planned long in advance. In the case of the Soviet Union, the 
plunder of the territories to be occupied, and the ill-treatment of the civilian population, were 
settled in minute detail before the attack was begun. As early as the autumn of 1940, the 
invasion of the territories of the Soviet Union was being considered. From that date onwards, 
the methods to be employed in destroying all possible opposition were continuously under 
discussion.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946 Vol 1:227) 
 
During the trial of the major war criminals by the IMT it was held that Germany had 
conducted an aggressive war against Russia. 
The plans for the economic exploitation of the U.S.S.R., for the removal of masses of the 
population, for the murder of Commissars and political leaders, were all part of the carefully 
prepared scheme launched on the 22nd June without warning of any kind, and without the 
shadow of legal excuse. It was plain aggression.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946 Vol 1:215) 
 
 Hitler saw the opportunity of a quick blow against Russia as being imperative in 
1941, as once Russia was out of the war it would allow Germany to focus on the still-
defiant Britain, and America should it decide to enter the war (Forster, 1997; Noakes 
& Pridham, 1988).  
 
Upon his rise to power Hitler had always seen his destiny and that of the German 
Reich being decided in the East. For it was there that he saw his true enemy. At dinner 
on the 17th of September 1941 Hitler commented on the struggle in the East: 
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The struggle for the hegemony of the world will be decided in favour of Europe by possession of 
the Russian space … the essential thing, for the moment is to conquer. After that everything will 
be simply a question of organisation … The Slavs are a mass of born slaves who feel the need of 
a master. (Trevor-Roper, 2000:33) 
 
From a purely military standpoint conflict on the scale of the Eastern Front had not 
been seen prior to or since World War II. Indeed Operation Barbarossa, the invasion 
of Russia, pitted the largest national armies ever assembled against each other 
(Winchester, 1998). The recent exhibition “The German Army and Genocide” by the 
Hamburg Institute for Social Research provided clear evidence that: 
 
The war in the East was not simply a particularly ruthless, ideologically charged war, but it now 
appeared as a destructive war against entire populations – a war which aimed at the total 
annihilation of some groups of people and the decimation and enslavement of others. (Bartov, 
1999:7) 
 
For the purpose of this paper the 
Eastern Front shall be deemed to 
include front-line actions and 
occupied areas that were to the East 
of the German Reich borders prior to 
the beginning the World War II. The 
time period being taken into 
consideration is from the 22nd of June 
1941 until the taking of Berlin by 
Russian forces in May 1945.  
This soldier of the Waffen-SS 
reflects the difficult climatic 
conditions of the Eastern Front.
This soldier of the Waffen-SS 
reflects the difficult climatic 
conditions of the Eastern Front.
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On the 22nd of June 1941 Hitler unleashed three German Army Groups upon the 
Soviet Union. Army Group North eventually advanced to Leningrad and besieged that 
city for some 900 days, but failed to take the city. Army Group Centre advanced upon 
Moscow and came within view of the golden spires of the Kremlin. This was as close 
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as the Germans would come to taking the city. Army Group South advanced into the 
Ukraine and Crimea until the disaster of Stalingrad in 1942 where an entire Army was 
lost. In 1943 the Germans gambled on a strategic victory at Kursk, but ultimately 
failed, being beaten by thorough Russian preparation for the offensive and German 
vacillation. From the end of the Kursk offensive, with few exceptions, the next few 
years would be ones of constant retreat by the German forces until their ultimate 
defeat before the gates of Berlin. As noted by SS-Gruppenführer Max Simon in a 
post-war statement: 
Very soon, we realised that we had underestimated our opponent … the flower of our shock 
troops had been irretrievably lost by then, and today I feel justified in saying that a complete 
misjudgement and underrating of the Russian power of resistance was one of the reasons for 
the failure of Germany’s campaign against Russia.  (Simon, 1949:3) 
 
Sources of information on the Waffen-SS 
To build a picture of the operations and nature of the Waffen-SS I have referred to a 
number of sources to give an accurate account. The primary sources include the 
military trials held after the war by the Allies, and later by Germany itself.  
• These being the trials of the Major War Criminals conducted by the 
International Military Tribunal (hereafter referred to as the IMT – commonly 
referred to as the Blue series), a comprehensive 42-volume set of documents 
and testimony from the first war crimes trial at Nuremberg. In particular 
volumes IV and XX, which deal with various aspects of the Waffen-SS. 
• As well as this, the eight-volume set of the decision of the International 
Military Tribunal against the defendants at Nuremberg (commonly referred to 
as the Red Series), summarises the crimes for which the defendants were put 
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on trial and explains the Court’s decision against each defendant. It also 
includes the dissenting verdicts and the sentences handed down to the 
criminals. This set was published in the United States by the Office of Chief of 
Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality. It is generally referred to as 
the Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression set.  
• The Nuremberg Military Trials (hereafter referred to as the NMT – commonly 
referred to as the Green series) a 15 volume set of documents and testimony 
from the last 12 Nuremberg trials. This was a series of 12 trials for war crimes 
the U.S. authorities held in their occupation zone in Germany in Nuremberg 
after the end of World War II. The trials that I shall refer to include the 
Doctors’ Trial, which examined medical experiments on concentration-camp 
prisoners. The Einsatzgruppen Trial, which looked at the actions of the SS 
mobile killing groups in the East, and the Pohl Trial, which examined the role 
of the SS Main Economic and Administrative Office (WVHA) in various 
crimes against humanity. 
• The German post-war trials include those conducted in West Germany in the 
Federal Republic (here after referred to as the FR series) and; 
• East Germany in the German Democratic Republic (hereafter referred to as the 
GDR series).  
• Manuscripts prepared by former Waffen-SS officers for the Historical 
Division, United States Army, Europe.10 The manuscripts deal with various 
facets of the armed conflict involving the Waffen-SS. The Studies consist of 
seven series as follows: ETHINT (European Theatre Interrogations) 1-80; A 
                                                 
10 These manuscripts will be referenced under the individual officer’s name, e.g. Max Simon C-058. 
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855-1000; B 001-850; C 1-102d; D 001-431; P 001-217 and T 1a-123K3. 
There are 1,737 items in English and 2,169 items in German. Copies of the 
manuscripts are held at the National Archives, Washington (catalogue 
available on paper and microfilm).  
• There are also a number of SS publications referred to throughout the trials 
that provide an insight into the ideology and political outlook of the SS and its 
members. A number of these documents of this nature have also been 
translated into English and published in recent times. 
 
I have also relied upon unit histories written by veterans and also interviews given by 
such veterans for video productions and books, etc. This allows a view from below in 
contrast to the views of the command and control level, the difficulties with these 
being that while they provide first-hand accounts, naturally few of the veterans are 
going to disclose if any atrocities were committed. Indeed there has been a concerted 
campaign to rehabilitate the image of the Waffen-SS in post-war years. To this end 
organisations, such as the Mutual Aid Society of the Waffen-SS (HAIG organisation) 
have financed a multitude of memoirs and units histories that focus purely on the 
military role of the Waffen-SS (Mackenzie, 1997; Paetel, 1959; Sydnor, 1973). 
 
There has been an interest both in popular journalism and contemporary history as to 
the actions of the Waffen-SS (Paetel, 1959). As noted by Sydnor there has been “… 
an outpouring of scholarly literature recording, and analysing the personalities, 
agencies, and institutions of the SS…” (Sydnor, 1989:249). One of the difficulties in 
dealing with the Waffen-SS is that often studies tend to be polarised in that they either 
portray the Waffen-SS as a terror organisation or they adopt an apologetic tone and 
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focus purely on the military achievements of the Waffen-SS (Koehl, 1962; Wegner, 
1985). As such: 
… its achievements on the battlefield are isolated from the context of the history of the SS and 
National Socialism and presented as it were in a historical vacuum. In this way members of the 
Waffen-SS appear to have been just like other soldiers. (Wegner, 1985:221) 
 
As noted by one author, sensationalist journalism has been responsible for many 
stories about the SS where “… the emphasis is on the gory atrocity, the cloak and 
dagger story, the sexually abnormal, the idiosyncrasies of personalities and the 
fantastic plans and dreams of individuals” (Koehl, 1962:276).  It is my intent to pierce 
this veil of military achievement and look at the systematic abuses that were 
committed by the Waffen-SS.  
 
Other sources have, however, become available to assist in any analysis of the 
Waffen-SS. In recent years a number of new books and scholarly articles have been 
published that assist with understanding and exploring the actions of the Waffen-SS 
on the Eastern Front and its association with other aspects of the SS state. I have also 
by choice decided to include a number of first-hand accounts in my arguments.  
 
I have done this first because of the value of these as primary sources and second 
because direct quotes from some of the main actors give a clear insight into their 
intentions and reasons for their actions. As noted by former Waffen-SS officer Georg 
Maier in his history of the 6th SS Panzer Army: “Contemporary witnesses are able to 
provide essential insight for the course or events and evaluation of them. The can help 
fill in the obvious gaps and frequently bring important informative facts to light, 
clarifying them for the historian” (G. Maier, 2004:1). To this end I have utilised the 
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accounts of many Waffen-SS veterans. As well as this I have relied on such crucial 
sources of information as the private conversations of Hitler (Trevor-Roper, 2000) 
and the transcripts of Hitler’s military conferences and the military directives issued 
from such (Gilbert, 1950; Heiber & Glantz, 2003; Trevor-Roper, 1964).  From these 
varied sources I hope to be able to draw an accurate picture and reach a defendable 
conclusion as to the actions of the Waffen-SS and the application of the concept of 
evil. This thesis is also accompanied by extensive appendices that will assist the 
reader in acquiring the knowledge required in such a specialised area such as the 
Waffen-SS. 
 
Methodology 
This study is guided by three main questions. The first being, what is meant by the 
concept of evil, in particular how do we define or decide if an act is evil? The second 
is how and why do ordinary people commit acts of evil? I see the aspects of how and 
why as being closely entwined and almost mutually inclusive in the explanation of 
evil acts. Because of my own background and academic orientation I have decided to 
approach the problem of evil from a sociological and criminological viewpoint. Given 
this, the method of explanation will not seek to address theological or philosophical 
arguments except as a short background to the main discussion on the concept of evil. 
The basic hypothesis of this study is that the concept of evil and its causes are useful 
criminological concepts for explaining intentional acts of significant harm, in 
particular the crime of genocide. The methodology also examines the concept of evil 
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in detail and arrives at an operational definition that can be used in practical 
applications.  
 
The third major question relates to the above and also concerns the case study for this 
examination; the Waffen-SS. Was the Waffen-SS an organisation committing evil acts 
or simply just innocent soldiers doing their duty? It is envisaged that this study will 
fill a large current void in relation to examinations of the Waffen-SS and the 
perception of evil from a criminological perspective. This examination will allow a 
greater understanding of the concept of evil and the identification of a more 
sophisticated definition of evil (to be arrived at). 
 
Outline of the study 
This study is structured in the following manner. In the first chapter I examine the 
nature of evil and its origins and value as a sociological/criminological tool in 
explaining human behaviour. I do this so as to provide background to my central 
argument. I then seek to identify what constitutes an evil act and the elements of such 
an act. Following this, a definition of an evil act is arrived at with the aim of 
determining how actions can be judged to be evil. 
 
Chapter 2 puts forward my central argument that it is indeed ordinary people who 
commit acts of evil. The study rejects the argument of evil people as such and seeks to 
explain human actions in less demonic ways. Essentially this chapter aims to answer 
the question of why ordinary people commit acts of evil. To this end the study looks at 
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the causes of evil actions. This includes looking at situational, dispositional and 
interactive causes. These are the factors that can lead some of us to perpetrate evil 
while others stand by uncaringly or occasionally resist evil. They are important as evil 
is often perceived as an individual characteristic or trait, and is difficult to apply to a 
group. Genocide is examined as it relates to the concept of evil. This discussion 
allows me to investigate the commission of evil acts in the context of armed conflict. 
 
Chapter 3 essentially examines who the Waffen-SS were and why they were created 
from an organisational standpoint. The chapter also studies the logic of the Nazis and 
the ideological purpose behind the Waffen-SS. The chapter examines the structure, 
organisation, training, ideology and sociological makeup of the Waffen-SS to some 
degree. From this discussion I hope to be able to give the reader a good understanding 
of who the Waffen-SS were as an organisation. 
 
Chapter 4 looks at the actions of the Waffen-SS on the Eastern Front by looking at 
links to the concentration-camps, involvement in the Einsatzgruppen, anti-partisan 
operations and general combat actions. The chapter is essentially answering the what 
part of the question; that being, what crimes did the Waffen-SS commit? In this 
chapter I describe the violence and atrocity that were undertaken by the Waffen-SS. 
 
In Chapter 5 I analyse the causes of this violence and apply the concept of evil to the 
actions of the Waffen-SS. This is done so that one can understand why the acts were 
committed. This will aid in the understanding and application of the concept of evil to 
the case study. I examine a number of areas that are relevant in explaining (without 
condoning) why the Waffen-SS committed the crimes they did. These issues include 
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obedience to orders, the factors of devaluing the enemy, and responsibility of the 
individual soldier. The role of difficult life conditions is then explored as an 
background context to the actions of the Waffen-SS. The actions of the Waffen-SS are 
then scrutinised to see if the definition I have proposed can be applied and the result 
of such application is discussed. In essence I will use the Waffen-SS case study to test 
the utility of the operational definition that I have developed. 
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CH A P T E R  1:  TH E  CO N C E P T O F 
EV I L –  AR R I V I N G AT A D E F I N I T I O N  
 
“Today our nation saw evil”  
 These were the words spoken by President George W Bush to describe the attacks of 
September 11th 2001 on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon during his address 
to the American people. But what exactly did the American nation see on this day that 
Bush described as evil and what justification is there for calling it evil? From these 
acts several factors could be considered, such as the nature of the act carried out, the 
particular personalities of the individuals who carried out the act, the context or 
motivation for which the acts were carried out and the result of the acts. Any of these 
factors could perhaps be seen as the evil aspect of the terrorist attacks on this day. For 
instance, if only two or three people had died rather then 3000 would the President 
have uttered these words?  
 
The very character of the acts dismayed and puzzled the citizens of the US (Borum, 
2003). In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September 2001 the 
American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) News program asked for the American 
people to put forward their views online as to what they thought evil was. Of interest 
were some of the responses recorded, these included “Evil is the absence of good”, 
“… evil pursues self-interest, fame and profit, it blames others and does not look 
within”, and “Evil is when innocent people are targeted in high visible acts of 
violence…”. These opinions are interesting, but their varied nature shows the 
difficulty in defining the concept. The concept of evil can be used when referring to a 
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variety of themes such as an individual person, an act, dispositions of individuals and 
states of affairs (H. Steiner, 2002). Society has used the concept of evil at various 
times to “... mean everything adverse in human lives, embracing both moral evils such 
as wars and massacres and natural evils such as droughts and plague. On other 
occasions we use it more specifically to refer to the whole range of human 
immorality” (Garrard, 2002:320; Morrow, 2003). In essence, the notion of evil would 
appear to be a fairly fluid concept, as the above examples would illustrate. This can 
perhaps be related to the grey and fuzzy areas that Baumeister talks about. 
 
A sociological and criminological approach to 
understanding evil 
This approach by its nature is one that is based on factual examples to illustrate its 
major points. To echo the words of Baumeister (1999:viii) “I have not made a 
systematic effort to cover what theorists have to say about evil”. Indeed in 
undertaking this study “To explain the causes and processes of evil, it is sufficient to 
identify the main, prototypical cases” (Baumeister, 1999:8). Some may argue that the 
discussion of evil could be either theoretical or case based. I would argue that a 
theoretical approach would make it easy to construct situations that will fit within the 
arguments that I am developing. To rely on cases or factual examples makes my 
arguments more cogent as they have been applied to realistic situations and not just 
expedient scenarios. 
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There will undoubtedly be atypical cases or exceptions to the arguments that are put 
forward in this study. These are the grey and fuzzy areas that Baumeister refers to. 
Some exceptions as outlined above are acceptable as what the study aims to provide is 
a robust discussion and definition of evil that will withstand application to monstrous 
actions. Any attempt to provide a discussion or meaning for each and every act of 
perceived evil would result in a convoluted and tortuous route of scientific 
exploration. As Waller (J. Waller, 2002:99) states, “… such a sweeping judgement 
can lose the important distinctions, exceptions, qualifications and nuances that are 
inherent in the complexity of understanding perpetrators of extraordinary evil”.  It 
should be noted, however, that there is some legitimacy in looking at the fuzzy or 
grey areas as a separate exercise for the light they shed on the dynamics of evil, but I 
have chosen not to go down this path for the purpose of this study. 
 
Staub (1999b) suggests that the concept of evil is a useful concept for psychologists as 
it can lead to a more thorough exploration of personal characteristics, cultures and 
situations, where acts that are considered evil occur. Often when looking at evil acts 
we need to be able to answer the following questions. Is there some distinctive feature 
that evil acts possess and how do we rationally account for these actions on behalf of 
the perpetrator? Events such as genocidal actions that we have seen recently in the 
former Yugoslavia or the actions of serial killers require us to be able to explain and 
explore beyond traditional approaches of a person just being bad. We can question the 
validity of the concept of evil by asking does the concept designate a significant moral 
category of harm, or is it merely a vehicle for poor thinking, serving no other purpose 
than to demonise those we find most distasteful? (Haybron, 2002:260). A prerequisite 
for a crime to be considered evil is the element of gratuitous violence or harm to the 
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victim, it is not the case that criminality and evil are mutually inclusive. Indeed at 
least one author argues that there is a danger in the use of the concept of evil in 
criminal trials and the use of the term in such matters merely adds an evocative aspect 
to the trial (Greig, 1996). 
 
The words of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan11 support the proposition that 
humanity has a need to elevate the most serious and grave crimes and acts of human 
behaviour to a special category. One of the guiding principles of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is to protect against such serious actions: 
We have before us an opportunity to take a monumental step in the name of human rights and 
the rule of law. We have an opportunity to create an institution that can save lives and serve as 
a bulwark against evil. We have also witnessed, time and again in this century, the worst crimes 
against humanity have an opportunity to bequeath to the next century a powerful instrument of 
justice. Let us rise to the challenge. Let us give succeeding generations this gift of hope. They 
will not forgive us if we fail. (Annan, 2004) 
 
Certainly one of the grounds on which the ICC was formed was that it was created to 
deal with only the most serious of crimes, which include genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. These crime categories include such acts as torture, rape, 
murder, causing great suffering, extermination, enslavement, causing serious bodily 
or mental harm, the list is extensive. The preamble of the ICC makes it clear that the 
                                                 
11 Speech by United Nations General-Secretary Kofi Annan to the inaugural meeting of the United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International Criminal 
Court. 
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court is designed to deal with the crimes that have appalled humanity.12 Other authors 
also agree that when talking about crimes there are certain crimes that go beyond the 
normal. “At the extreme end of this spectrum sit those crimes that are so disturbing 
that they seem intrinsically different from the more usual crimes” (Ruffles, 2004:114). 
 
We all commit bad acts during our lives, but rarely do we, or those around us, 
consider those acts to be evil. It is this differentiation that is important in the 
application of the concept of evil. Evil acts can be seen as “… a more or less broad 
category that marks off the worst region on the scale of good and bad...” (Haybron, 
2002).   An example of this can be found in the actions of Colonel Dr. Oscar 
Dirlewanger, a PhD scholar and Waffen-SS Oberführer13, who commanded an SS-
Sonderkommando (special commando group used for actions behind the front lines) 
on the Eastern Front that was responsible for the hunting down of Jews and Russian 
partisans: 
Then he made so-called scientific experiments, which involved stripping the victims of their 
clothes. Then they (the victims) were given an injection of strychnine. Dirlewanger looked on, 
smoked a cigarette, as did his friends, and they saw how these girls were dying. Immediately 
after that the corpses were cut into small pieces, mixed with horsemeat and boiled into soap. 
(MacLean, 1998:61) 
 
                                                 
12 The preamble to the Rome Statute states that “Mindful that during this century millions of children, 
women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of 
humanity. Recognising that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world. 
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not 
go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national 
level and by enhancing international cooperation. Determined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.” 
13 Ranks attained as at the end of World War II shall be used when referring to individuals. Waffen-SS 
nomenclature shall be used throughout the study. A chart of rank structure in the Waffen-SS as 
compared to the German army and British army is available as an appendix to this study. 
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It needs to be remembered that in war there will always be some form of harm 
inflicted to 
achieve the 
goals of the 
conflict. But 
generally the 
international 
laws regulating 
war seek to 
ensure that 
minimum or reasonable force is used to achieve these aims. Clearly the conduct of 
Dirlewanger would go outside these limits and could be claimed to be evil. After all, 
if the death of the girls was the outcome desired it could have been achieved in a more 
humane manner. The actions of Dirlewanger would appear to go beyond the bounds 
of what we would consider to be bad. His actions are more than just the application of 
harm to another. They display the “… pleasures of absolute control inherent in the 
ability to harm another” (Alford, 1997:21). Some may argue that it is this pleasure in 
hurting and a lack of remorse that makes his actions evil (Alford, 1997).  Further, the 
actions can be more easily quantified as evil given that the manner of death seemed to 
be expressive (this is the pleasure aspect that Alford alludes to) rather then 
instrumental. This can cause us to have difficulty in understanding the act, which in 
turn can allow us to more readily see the act as evil. 
 
Compare the actions of Dirlewanger to the case of a husband who murdered his wife 
in a fit of rage during a domestic incident. The man claimed to have murdered his 
SS-Oberführer Oscar Dirlewanger (on the 
left) and his officers.
SS-Oberführer Oscar Dirlewanger (on the 
left) and his officers.
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wife with one punch in a fit of anger during a discussion over access to the child of 
the relationship. While the murder of the wife cannot be condoned, it can perhaps be 
rationalised or explained, whereas the actions of Dirlewanger (perhaps better termed 
as his method of killing) would seem to defy objective moral rationalisation. The 
actions of the husband may have involved pleasure in satisfying his rage. This can be 
contrasted to Dirlewanger’s in that his actions, while involving pleasure, seem to be 
cold and calculated in the manner in which they were done. The spousal homicide 
may not create the need within us to place it at a higher level of wrongfulness, as the 
actions of Dirlewanger do (however, if the wife had of been tortured and demeaned 
prior to death this may not be the case).  
 
There is difficulty in raising any objective rational moral argument in defence of 
Dirlewanger’s actions. One could also suggest that the actions of Dirlewanger could 
be considered psychopathic perhaps due to the prolonged and degrading suffering 
inflicted upon the victims and the total lack of empathy. His intent was to kill, but his 
method of killing causes us the difficulty in understanding or accepting his actions. 
The core issue here is that while the result of both examples in each case was as 
absolute in their consequences (i.e. death of the victim), the crucial differences are the 
motive/provocation/justification for and manner of achieving these consequences. 
 
This need to categorise certain crimes at a higher level in terms of the manner of the 
crime and the nature of the victim is reflected in the Rome Statute of the ICC 
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(Elements of Crimes rule 145)14, which outlines circumstances of aggravation that 
elevates the punishment of offenders: 
In addition to the factors mentioned above, the Court shall take into account, 
as appropriate...  (b) As aggravating circumstances:  
(iii) Commission of the crime where the victim is particularly defenceless15; 
(iv) Commission  of  the  crime  with  particular  cruelty16  or  where  there  were 
multiple victims...  
 
It is often this ability of an act to defy imagination and reason that invokes a horrified 
response from society and creates a need to place these particular cases of harm above 
and beyond the norm. The important aspect here is that the ICC has seen fit to draw 
attention to those acts, which involve particular or exceptional innocence of the victim 
or cruelty on behalf of the offender. Indeed, evil can be seen to be “…particularly 
onerous or egregious acts…” (Miller, 2005:3). The acts are elevated above normal or 
more mundane acts of harm. As such the application of the term evil seems to place 
the act in a realm that is morally indefensible (Fisher, 2003). 
 
In his study of serial killers Hickey (2002) states that we reserve the label of evil for 
persons who are worse than bad. As alluded to by Hickey there is need for the use of 
the term evil, as we tend to judge people in terms of goodness or badness. A further 
concern is that the words bad and wrong have a broad usage and as such do not 
convey the sense of repulsion that we feel towards an act that we might consider evil 
                                                 
14 An Elements of Crimes document has been developed and is to be read in conjunction with the Rome 
Statute.  Its purpose is to assist the ICC in the interpretation of Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute. 
The aim being to provide clearer definitional content of the elements of each offence and the required 
mens rea. 
 
15 My italics. 
 
16 My italics. 
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(Berkowitz, 1999). At this point there is clearly a need to be able to utilise and fully 
explain this concept of higher wrongdoing, which can be seen as the concept of evil. 
We are in effect trying to unpack and spell out this wrongful act that is “something 
more” (Fisher, 2003:34). Indeed it is this need to rationalise actions that are perceived 
as grossly wrongful actions that makes the concept of evil useful in trying to explain 
actions of wrongfulness.  
 
The three emotive agents 
There are other factors that contribute to an act being seen as evil. These factors can 
be called the three emotive agents. They include the perceived senselessness of the 
act, the perceived innocence of the victim of the act, the uniqueness of the act. There 
is a need to expand upon why these emotive agents can assist us in classifying why an 
act is evil.  
 
When referring to the senselessness of the act we are suggesting that the evilness lies 
in the ability of the act to defy imagination and reason (Prins 1994; Darley 1992). In 
his discussion of primordial evil Katz (1988:288) examines a number of “cold-
blooded” killers and suggests, “… the senseless nature of their killings creates a crisis 
of understanding”. Evil events such as the holocaust and the tribal massacres in Africa 
instil a sense of the crime being incomprehensible (Jones 2000). In R v Norrie17 the 
Victorian Supreme Court stated that “… the motiveless and unpremeditated murder of 
two men was labelled as an objectively evil deed” (Ruffles, 2004:115). The 
justification, provocation or instigation of an act can provide us with some ability to 
                                                 
17 R v Norrie (2001) VSC 478. 
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understand the rationale or reason for the act. This allows us to place such acts within 
the confines of everyday life, thus we do not perceive the acts as evil. We can perhaps 
rationalise to some degree the murder of a spouse by their partner in a fit of rage or 
jealousy. We find it hard to rationalise the rape and sodomy of a nine-month-old baby.  
 
We also take account of the innocence of the victim. It is this factor of innocence and 
the victim’s lack of capacity to have caused justification, provocation or instigation 
for the act that can provide us with grounds for classifying acts as evil. Take for 
instance the murder of the two English schoolgirls Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman, 
the so-called Soham murders in 2002 in England, which raised worldwide 
condemnation. The case was prime time international news and gained more exposure 
than other crimes that occurred locally. What was the reason for this? It can be argued 
that one of the main factors contributing to this attention was the innocence of the 
victims. The crime committed against the two young girls struck some kind of chord 
in society that demanded our attention and raised feelings in us that this crime was 
above the ordinary. Perhaps this can be explained by the insight given by author 
Lance Morrow: 
When I have asked Americans and Europeans to tell me the most evil act they could imagine 
anyone committing, they have almost always spoken of acts against children – torture, rape, 
and murder. It would be difficult, in their reading, to surpass in evil a father who a few years 
ago set fire to his eight-year-old son, not killing him but disfiguring him horribly. (Morrow, 
2003:49) 
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This sense of evil can relate back to the innocence of the victim. In R v Frazer18 the 
murder of a nine-year-old girl gave cause to the crime to be described as “… an 
exceptionally evil crime” (Ruffles, 2004:115). The ICC (in Rule 145) has also 
recognised that the circumstances of the victim (i.e. being defenceless) are influential 
when it comes to judging the gravity and punishment of a crime. The crimes of the SS 
against children would seem to easily fall into what we would term evil actions. 
Evidence was given by a camp inmate as to their treatment upon arrival at the 
concentration-camps: 
All we could hear were the screams and we could see the pile of smoke coming out of the 
chimney of the crematoriums, and we also used some sort of a camouflage — that was in 1944; 
that was when the Hungarian Jews arrived — we used a music camouflage. At the time the 
children were burned on big piles of wood. The crematoriums could not work at the time, and 
therefore, the people were just burned in open fields with those grills, and also children were 
burned among them. Children were crying helplessly and that is why camp administration 
ordered that an orchestra be made by a hundred inmates and should play. They played very 
loud all the time… Without the orchestra they would have heard the screams of horror; they 
would have been horrible screams. The people two kilometres from there could even hear those 
screams, namely, that came from the transports of children. The children were separated from 
their parents, and then they were put to section III camp. Maybe the number of children was 
several thousand. And then, on one special day they started burning them to death. The gas 
chambers at the time were out of order, at least one of them was out of order, namely, the one 
near the crematorium; it was destroyed by mutiny in a special commando in August 1944. The 
other three gas chambers were full of the adults and therefore the children were not gassed, but 
just burned alive. When one of the SS people sort of had pity with the children, he took the 
child and beat the head against a stone first before putting it on the pile of fire and wood, so 
that the child lost consciousness. However, the regular way they did it was by just throwing the 
children on to the pile.   
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:663) 
                                                 
18R v Frazer (2000) QCA 187. 
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The aspect of uniqueness allows us to put acts that are above and beyond ordinary 
daily events into the higher category of wrongfulness. For example, a gang shooting 
in Sydney will not generate much public interest or concern, whereas the abduction 
and murder of two little girls in England was cause for international media attention 
and portrayal of the offenders as evil beings. The judges at Nuremberg acknowledged 
that uniqueness of the acts of the Holocaust was one of the main factors in the 
creation of the category of crimes against humanity (Ball, 1999; Gaita, 1995).  
 
This sense of the crime being unusual can display itself in the sadism of the act or the 
callous way in which the act is carried out (Mansberg, 2002). It should be noted here 
that while the act may not be unique or rare in absolute terms (e.g. Genocide or serial 
killers), the uniqueness of the act lies in the evilness of the act. By uniqueness I am 
referring to the ability of an event to create a sense of novelty and create a need to 
explain the rare or unexpected. In essence, the act can cause psychological shock 
upheaval or confusion in bystanders as to how such an act could be committed. Our 
moral conscience is shocked. As a society we tend to readily categorise as evil unique 
or expressive violence, as against instrumental violence. As previously mentioned, 
Rule 145 of the Elements of Crime of the Rome Statute specifically singles out crimes 
that involve a particular cruelty. I interpret this as unique actions above and beyond 
normal crimes.  
 
We can see all three of these agents present in the actions of Waffen-SS Colonel, SS-
Standartenführer Franz Ziereis. Ziereis was a soldier who was accepted into the 
Waffen-SS as a training officer and later rose to be camp commandant of the 
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Mauthausen Concentration-camp (MacLean, 1999a; J. Waller, 2002)19. Upon arrival 
of new prisoners to the camp Ziereis “… would sometimes stand on a convenient 
vantage point from which to view a newly received transport and select random 
prisoners as targets for his own shooting practice” (J. Waller, 2002:7). These actions 
strike one as senseless in that the actions resulted in the death of human beings for 
mere target practice, the innocence of the victims is highlighted by the arbitrary 
manner in which they were selected for no apparent valid reason and last the very 
method of the crime makes it unique in nature. In short, the presence of the emotive 
agents allows us to more readily accept his actions as evil. 
 
While not all of these agents are present in every evil act, it is usually the case that at 
least one or more of the agents is present. The presence of one of these agents is the 
releaser that allows us to place the act in the category of evil, as above just being bad. 
The greater the degree one or any of these agents is present then the more prepared 
are we to label the act as evil. 
 
The element of intentionally causing serious harm 
The element of harm is an important element of an evil act. It has been argued that 
evil is the intentional infliction of interpersonal harm on other people (Baumeister, 
1999; Shore, 1995; Staub, 1999b; J. Waller, 2002; Wilson, 2000a; Zimbardo, 2005). 
Indeed harm has been seen as an essential element of sociological definitions of what 
crime is (Fattah, 1997). Baumeister (1999) goes further to suggest that there are two 
                                                 
19 Note that Maclean in his study of camp officers does not indicate that Ziereis completed any active 
military service with the Waffen-SS. 
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core aspects to evil; first there is the infliction of harm upon the victim; second, there 
is a creation of chaos within the orderly world of the victim. In fact, during his speech 
to the nation on September 11th President Bush made specific mention of the terrorist 
acts being “… acts of mass murder intended to frighten our nation into chaos and 
retreat”. This feeling of chaos or confusion can arise from human reactions to dealing 
with events that occur, especially events that are outside the normal expectations. 
Staub (1989) initially suggests that evil is intentional extreme human destructiveness, 
but he later expands upon this to include a number of elements. These elements 
include intentional extreme harm that is not commensurate with any instigation or 
provocation, and last, persistence or repetition of this harm (Staub, 1999b).  
 
The term extreme harm is important as it differentiates evil acts from more common 
acts of harm. Indeed society itself defines the level of harm applied in certain 
situations through its criminal legislation (Jones, 2000). Society sees the intentional 
infliction of personal harm as including a broad scale of offences. In Queensland, for 
instance, the offence of assault is divided up into a number of different offences. The 
greater the harm, the greater the punishment. The offences vary from the minor 
assault occasioning bodily harm to the most serious of crimes including rape and 
murder. The offence of common assault may only result in a fine, the offence of 
grievous bodily harm may well result in several years’ imprisonment. Both offences 
involve the application of harm, yet society clearly sees the need to differentiate 
between the various degrees of harm for punishment purposes.  
 
This process can also be applied in separating evil acts from other acts of harm. This 
attempt to classify certain crimes as evil is reflected in the current work of forensic 
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psychiatrist Michael Welner, who is attempting to develop a depravity scale to 
determine which crimes are criminal and which fall into society’s perception of evil 
(Libaw, 2002; Mansberg, 2002). It is hoped that the depravity scale will aid in the 
determination of punishment by producing “A numerical scale which will grade a 
particular crime as more or less depraved or evil. Welner stresses he is not measuring 
evil people, rather evil actions” (Libaw, 2002:1). The purpose of the scale is to 
determine “not who is depraved, but rather, whether a specific crime reflects depraved 
intent, actions and/or attitudes” (Welner, 2005). 
 
It has been suggested that the concept of evil should encompass events from the most 
minor to the most serious (Baumeister, 1999; Darley, 1992; Katz, 1993). In my view 
this approach would seem to be flawed. Indeed one failure that I see in the definition 
provided by Waller is that he sees evil acts including such things as theft and 
vandalism. These I would argue are not evil acts. This flaw can perhaps be seen by 
Waller attempting to explain that his book is focusing on extraordinary evil, which is 
a subset if you like in the broad range of acts that comprise human evil (J. Waller, 
2002:13). If there is a failure to differentiate conceptually between truly gratuitous 
acts of violence or harm and minor misdeeds (for example, the shooting of Jewish 
women and children as against someone taking your food without consent) we run the 
risk of devaluing the objective nature of the concept of evil (Berkowitz, 1999). If this 
were to occur then it would undermine the fundamental concept that an evil act is 
something that is above and beyond the normal sense of wrongfulness. 
 
What is important here is that there is a further dimension put on the infliction of 
harm for an act to be considered evil. For example, daily one can see Israeli soldiers 
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killing Palestinians and vice versa. These actions perhaps could be seen as not being 
evil. Certainly they are bad and cause for concern, but as an objective third party there 
is not a need to categorise them at the higher levels of wrongfulness. Alan 
Dershowitz, who is an American civil rights libertarian, Harvard University law 
professor and a leading defence attorney, was interviewed on the Australian Channel 
Nine Sunday program (interview conducted on the 28th of March 2004) and gave the 
following insight into the conflict in response to the assassination of Hamas leader 
Sheik Ahmed Yassin in an Israeli missile strike on the 22nd of March 2004: 
If the (Israeli)20 Cabinet had decided not to kill Sheik Yassin, they would have been deciding 
essentially to allow the killing of their own civilians. These are tough choices, there was no 
option to simply not kill anybody, the option was kill or be killed. That’s what self-defence is 
about, in military terms that’s what military pre-emption or pre-emptive self-defence is about. 
It’s permitted by international law as long as it’s limited to combatants and a reasonable 
number of non-combatants are killed in the process with an attempt to minimise… There is a 
debate about whether it’s counter-productive. That’s a tactical decision in a democracy 
appropriately made by the Cabinet. It is not an appropriate decision to condemn that on moral 
grounds or legal grounds, when, in fact, the decision was both moral and legal but, maybe, 
unwise – and that's for political people, who were elected officials, to make the decision, and 
the decision was made, and it was, I think, the correct decision. (Wendt, 2004) 
 
Compare the above to the events of September 11th, which would seem to fall within 
the meaning of evil as argued. Both actions involve intentional extreme harm to 
others, so why can one action be seen as an evil event and not the other? What then is 
the crucial difference? The crucial difference being that in the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th the extreme interpersonal harm appears to lack moral justification; 
there is a difficulty in raising an objectively rational moral defensive argument to 
                                                 
20 My italics and insertion. 
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support the actions undertaken by the terrorists (this aspect of an objective test will be 
dealt with shortly). Of course the terrorists would hold a subjective view that the act 
was justified. The people targeted on September 11th were clearly not combatants, 
whereas in the conflict in the Middle East we see the combatants of each side as being 
involved in a recognised conflict that we can accept or rationalise (although the 
actions of suicide bombers against civilian targets may strain this rationalisation). The 
actions of the terrorists on September 11th would seem to be more extreme, 
indiscriminate and morally unjustifiable. Indeed Professor Dershowitz touched on a 
salient point in which he clearly outlines the respective approaches of the two 
combatants in the Middle East conflict: 
Israel has, I think, over the years managed to minimise the number of deaths. The first time 
they went after Yassin they used a 500-pound bomb and missed him because they didn’t want 
to use a two-tonne bomb that could have killed him because they wanted to minimise civilian 
casualties. That’s been the approach – minimisation as opposed to maximisation of civilian 
casualties among Palestinian terrorists. There’s simply no moral comparison. (Wendt, 2004) 
 
But should the element of harm be merely limited to physical harm? Is there a place 
for mental harm to feature in acts of evil? 
 
Mental harm 
Throughout this discussion so far attention has focused on perceived evils acts that 
have involved physical harm or personal violence (Baumeister & Campbell, 1999; 
Darley, 1992; Prins, 1994). It should be noted, however, the infliction of mental or 
psychological harm can also be seen to be evil. Indeed evil can be said to be the “… 
creation of conditions that materially or psychologically destroy or diminish…” 
(Staub, 1989:25). This concept of evil being inclusive of mental harm can also be seen 
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to be part of Darley’s (1992) negative state concept, where the negative state can 
include either physical or mental harm. The example of fighting undertaken by the 
Dirlewanger SS-Sonderkommando21 during the Polish Home Army revolt in Warsaw 
in 1944 highlights this: 
Fighting in the area was fierce. Dirlewanger’s men spread out along the square and with 
armour support rooted out several insurgent positions. Then the Sonderkommando attempted 
to advance further using a shield of Polish women and children in front of them – but the Poles 
fired anyway and drove them back. (MacLean, 1998:182) 
  
In this case the evilness of the act arises out of two distinct aspects, the physical harm 
being inflicted upon the women and children and the mental harm being inflicted 
upon the Polish resistance fighters by being forced to shoot and kill the innocents. 
Von Trotha (1999:422) argues that violence is “… never limited to the physical injury 
of people ... violence is a psychological weapon”. The resistance fighters are suffering 
no direct physical harm from the death of the innocent women and children; any 
dispassionate objective observer would agree they would, however, have suffered 
enormous mental or psychological harm in being forced to defend themselves in this 
way.  
 
There has been recognition of psychological harm in modern society. This is reflected 
in the Rome Statute of the ICC given that the United Nations included mental harm as 
an element to the crime of genocide. In particular article 6 (b) of the statute, which 
states the following are elements of crimes: “The perpetrator caused serious bodily or 
                                                 
21 The Dirlewanger Sonderkommando formed the 36th Waffen-SS Division. 
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mental harm to one or more persons.” The element of serious or severe mental harm 
or suffering is included in many of the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity under the Rome Statute. 
 
In recent years the crime of stalking has risen to prominence (see section 359 of the 
Queensland Criminal Code). This is often an offence where there is no physical harm 
done to the victim. In some cases the offender and victim never even meet. It can raise 
issues of uncertainty, tension, fear and anxiety in the victim because the normal 
controllable boundaries of behaviour are violated. The mental harm done to the victim 
nonetheless can still be enormous. Some cases of stalking have occurred over a period 
of years and can totally disrupt the lives of the victims.  
 
The fact that society has been prepared to recognise and accept this kind of offence is 
proof that mental harm is now seen to be as important as physical harm. The 
following example can illustrate how the mental element of harm can be a major 
factor in a crime. An offender picked up a young woman at a bar. Upon returning to 
his unit the woman was drugged, sexually assaulted and subjected to sadistic 
ritualised beating. The woman spent several days in hospital, but recovered from her 
physical injuries in a matter of weeks. However, when called to give evidence a year 
later the victim was physically ill and in a state of high anxiety from the mental 
trauma she had suffered and was incapable of giving evidence in the same room as the 
offender. Baumeister  (1999:2) states, “… the direct and practical effects of some 
trauma or crime are often minor, whereas the psychological effects go on 
indefinitely”.  In sentencing offenders, judges often seek out victim impact statements 
to decide on the punishment to be imposed. In many cases this is years after the 
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physical scars or injuries have healed. The mental harm, however, is often still present 
and impacting on the victim’s life. Of note, however, is that victim-impact statements 
are usually only obtained for the most serious of crimes. They are not obtained for 
petty thefts and the like. 
 
The decision to include mental harm as an element in deciding if an act is evil may 
raise the debate that someone could be exposed to a minor act and yet suffer serious 
mental harm and seem to fall within the category of an evil act. Objectively we may 
not see the act as having that effect or gravity to be seen as evil, yet subjectively the 
victim may well be suffering extreme mental anguish and consider the act evil.  Take 
an example used by Baumeister (1999). He outlines how a woman is eating a packet 
of chips and a man without asking takes one of her chips. He puts forward the 
argument that this woman felt such dread and fear that this act could be considered 
evil. On the face of it taking a potato chip off someone would not seem an evil act. 
However, the impact of mental harm is not always easy to predict and can be 
influenced by the resilience and personality of the victim.  These factors are 
subjective to the victim. 
 
There is, however, a danger in relying on subjective evaluations to determine if acts 
are evil. It is argued that an objective determination needs to be made as to the 
possible mental harm suffered so as to avoid the problem of trivialisation of evil acts 
by the inclusion of minor acts. One way to avoid this is to adopt the approach of the 
ICC. The ICC links the element of mental harm back to the actual act perpetrated. The 
Rome Statute (see Elements of Crimes Article 6(b) footnote 3) restricts the conduct 
that caused the serious mental harm to serious type of acts: “This conduct may 
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include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or 
inhuman or degrading treatment.” 
 
In other words the mental harm must derive from serious or grave causal conduct. In 
outlining the offence of crimes against humanity the ICC again refers the serious 
mental harm back to the characteristics of the causal act. For example, the below 
section refers to a general provision for crimes against humanity: 
Article 7 (1) (k) 
Crime against humanity or other inhumane acts 
Elements 1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health, by means of an inhumane act.  
2. Such act was of a character similar to any other act referred to in article 722, paragraph 1, of 
the Statute. 
 
Take particular note of section 2 of the above section, which states that such act was 
of a certain character; this is referring to the nature and gravity of the act. The 
character of acts referred to in Article 7 include such acts as murder, extermination, 
torture and rape. So therefore, for the purpose of this study, where a person suffers 
serious mental harm, to be considered evil the causal act must be of a serious nature 
and not minor or trivial. This approach is reinforced by the manner in which the 
Australian Criminal Code Act Dictionary 1995 (Commonwealth) defines harm as 
being: 
Harm means physical harm or harm to a person’s mental health, whether temporary or 
permanent. However, it does not include being subjected to any force or impact that is within 
the limits of what is acceptable as incidental to social interaction or to life in the community. 
                                                 
22 My italics. 
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Harm to a person’s mental health23 includes significant psychological harm, but does not 
include mere ordinary emotional reactions such as those of only distress, grief, fear or anger.  
 
Again the notion of harm is extended to include both physical and mental elements. 
 
Acts and omissions 
So far the argument around evil has centred on positive acts or omissions when 
referring to the concept of evil. The reason for this is that when looking at intentional 
harm to others it is easy to infer intent from actions undertaken by persons. Staub 
(1999b), however, raises the argument that evil acts can also be seen as being 
committed through omissions, that is, a lack of action. He uses the example of a 
bystander watching someone drown in a nearby lake, the only connection being that 
the bystander is in the same location at the time of the crisis. I have trouble with this 
concept; it is difficult to infer or demonstrate intention when relying on omissions or 
lack of action on behalf of a person.  
 
It should be noted that Staub (1999b) nominated intention as one of the possible 
elements of evil. Not only is there a lack of intention, but there is also difficulty in 
apportioning the harm to the swimmer to the bystander. After all, the bystander is not 
drowning the swimmer; the swimmer’s own actions have caused this. One could ask 
if the bystander were not there, would the person still drown? The affirmative answer 
shows us that the predicament of the person swimming is independent of any input 
from the bystander. They are not the causal factor in the harm being suffered. 
                                                 
23 My italics. 
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In essence it could be suggested that to adopt the position suggested by Staub would 
mean that people can be held accountable for the actions undertaken by others; 
something that goes against the idea of evil being a positive/intentional act. Indeed 
when attempting to determine legal responsibility for evil acts we should only look at 
those persons who counsel the act, do the act, enable or aid the act, or to put it another 
way, people actively involved in the offence (this draws upon Section 7 of the 
Queensland Criminal Code in relation to parties to offences and criminal 
responsibility). The general experience of the criminal law in Australian States is to 
recognise that those elements included in the determination of legal responsibility 
subsume those who play an active part in committing offences as outlined in the roles 
above. The issues here are complex when talking about omissions, for example the 
question of whether a person is owed a duty of care by another may well be important 
in deciding whether or not a failure to act could amount to evil doing. For example a 
surgeon who deliberately fails to stop a patient bleeding to death could be considered 
to have committed an evil act. 
 
Further support for the element of intention to be present in evil acts can be found in 
the United Nations Rome Statute of the ICC. In the general introduction to Elements 
of Crimes Part 2 (b) the Rome Statute states that,  “As stated in article 30 a person 
shall, unless otherwise stated, be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for 
a crime ... only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge... ”. 
The ICC has been designed to examine and judge some of the most evil crimes known 
to society, yet they make no allowance for acts committed or omitted without intent or 
knowledge. This reinforces the notion that it is broadly accepted that intention is a 
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necessary element of an evil act. For someone to be considered responsible for an evil 
act there is a need for a causal connection to be present. In other words, the 
bystander’s actions must have caused or contributed to the victim’s current position. 
 
It is also arguable that an act of evil may well consist of a number of smaller acts that 
go to the totality of the evil act. For example, the actions of German soldiers of the 
101st Reserve Police Battalion in Poland during World War II serve as a good 
example. The soldiers were ordered to attend the Polish village of Jozefow and 
liquidate the Jewish population there24 (Browning, 1998). One soldier avoided taking 
part in the shootings: 
It was in no way the case that those who did not want to or could not carry out the shooting of 
human beings with their own hands could not keep themselves out of the task … I therefore 
remained by the arriving trucks and kept myself busy at the arrival point. (Browning 1992:65) 
 
It could be argued that by not including omissions as suggested by Staub that soldiers 
such as the above could not be held accountable for the massacre of the 1500 Jews at 
Jozefow. This is clearly not the case as the soldier has taken part in the action by 
herding the Jews and then transporting the Jews to the execution site. Further, he has 
assisted in organising the Jews upon their arrival at the site. The soldier, while not 
participating in the final act of shooting, has aided the others in the chain of events (or 
acts) without which it would not be possible to complete the overall evil act, and as 
                                                 
24 After the World War I the German Army was limited to a theoretical strength of 100,000 men. To 
circumnavigate this restriction a number of soldiers were drafted into the Police Forces of the German 
States. These organisations were run along military lines. Upon the outbreak of war the police units 
were utilised as military units for security duties behind the front lines. Many were also utilised in 
combat duties. Police units later helped form the 4th and 35th Waffen-SS Polizei Grenadier Divisions. 
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such should bear responsibility as much as the soldiers who were pressing the 
triggers. In a study of SS concentration-camp guards and Gestapo25 killers, it was 
noted that for every person who committed an evil act: 
There were instigators and accomplices in ever widening circles, from the bureaucratic 
armchair administrators to the shunters and drivers of trains and trucks and all the 
technicians, doctors, petty officials and clerks who were essential to the enterprise. (Dicks, 
1972:232)  
 
Indeed, in post-war accounts the Wehrmacht26 is portrayed as an apolitical force that 
was not involved in the crimes of the Nazis. However, it has been argued and shown 
that it was only with support and tacit approval of the military and the general 
German population were the SS mass murders of Jews and others able to be carried 
out (Boll & Safrian, 1999; Heer, 1999; Zukier, 1994).  
 
The element of moral justification/provocation for the act 
Throughout the discussion so far there has been a common theme that justification of 
an act can lead to the act not being considered evil. To move further upon the example 
used previously, it could be argued that the actions of September 11th were evil due to 
the fact that they are objectively morally unjustified. Certainly there are attempts at 
moral justification on both sides of the conflict that is taking place in Israel and 
perhaps it is this that prevents it from being seen as an evil event. Indeed it has been 
argued that evil can be seen to be the intentional, planned and morally unjustified 
                                                 
25 Secret State Police. 
 
26 The name given to given to the combined German Army, Navy and Air Force during the Third 
Reich. 
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harm done to others (Berkowitz, 1999). The disparity between this intent and the 
grounds that give justification to this intent can be seen to determine the evilness of 
an act (Darley, 1992).  
 
This issue of moral justification is interesting in that perhaps it can be seen to equate 
to the terms provocation or instigation as used by Staub. This justification, 
provocation or instigation can provide us with some ability to understand the rationale 
or reason for the act and this allows us to place such acts within the confines of 
everyday life, thus they are not seen as evil (Hickey, 2002). What criteria are used, 
however, to determine the rationale of certain actions? In the examples used an 
Israeli, Palestinian or Islamic fundamentalist understanding would vary enormously. I 
indicated earlier that I intend to use the principles and statutes of the ICC as a basis 
for making these types of assessments in an objective manner so as to avoid 
subjective influences. 
 
It is worth comparing the acts of a wife murderer against the actions of a serial killer. 
We may see some rational motivation for spousal homicides, regardless of whether 
that motivation is morally justifiable. We have difficulty, however, in accepting the 
acts of a serial killer, who murders strangers for no apparent reason apart from 
psychological gratification. There appears to be no obvious instrumental aspect to the 
actions of the serial killer, rather they seem expressive and unnecessary. The evilness 
lies in the senselessness of the act and in certain actions that defy imagination and 
explanation (Darley, 1992; Prins, 1994). Indeed I would argue that the aspect of 
instrumentality in certain actions allows us to more readily understand and accept 
what has been done, and make us less inclined to call the act evil.   
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Let us now look at another important aspect of evil acts. It was mentioned earlier that 
there is often a disparity between what may be perceived as the provocation by the 
victim and the responding act by the perpetrator that will often lead us to classify an 
act as evil. It has been argued that an evil act happens when the victim has a negative 
state imposed and there is no balancing negative state imposed on the perpetrator 
(Darley, 1992). This disparity can be linked to the concept of the magnitude gap 
(Baumeister, 1999). The magnitude gap refers to the difference in perspectives 
between the victim and the perpetrator as to the importance of the act (I see this as 
subjective importance from a perspective of how evil the act is perceived by each 
party). Baumeister uses this concept in understanding why evil acts occur. 
 
This can also be seen to be referring to the loss for the victim against the gain for the 
perpetrator (Berkowitz, 1999). For example, the terrorists who undertook the attacks 
on September 11th might have seen their attacks as merely a continuation of the holy 
war against perceived American imperialism. While important from a military or 
religious perspective, perhaps the terrorists would not see the importance arising from 
the perspective of it being an evil act. The victims, on the other hand, may well have 
seen the acts as gratuitous harm that was completely unwarranted and defying logical 
explanation. Again this can be linked back to the earlier discussion on moral 
justification being a key element in determining if an act is evil (Berkowitz, 1999; 
Prins, 1994). This study would argue that there is in fact a direct correlation between 
the moral justification of an act and its perceived importance or its ability to be 
classified as an evil act. If an act can be objectively morally justified or rationalised 
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then its importance as an evil act declines. For this reason “… evil is a moral 
judgement” (Peck, 1988:255). 
 
The objective assessment 
The discussion of the magnitude gap brings us to another important point when 
defining or attempting to decide which acts are evil. The magnitude gap by its very 
nature is subjective; one must take the viewpoint of either the victim or the perpetrator 
(Baumeister, 1999). This presents a dilemma to anyone approaching the problem of 
evil as “… to specifically define the judgmental and moralistic concept of evil which 
seems to threaten the academic ideal of ethical and value neutrality. To be sure, any 
definition includes, in part, a value statement reflecting one’s own perspective” (J. 
Waller, 2002:11). While subjectivity may be unavoidable to some degree, the aim of 
this study and definition is to reduce it as much as possible by adopting an objective 
approach. As noted by at least one author when examining the crimes of the SS, “The 
magnitude of its crimes also has posed problems for the historian by making it, at 
least initially, difficult to maintain a certain requisite intellectual and emotional 
distance from the subject” (Ziegler, 1989:9). 
 
This study adopts the approach that in deciding if an act is evil an objective 
assessment should be undertaken to determine if the act is evil and the degree of 
evilness of the act by looking at the act in the context of universal standards of right 
and wrong to determine what is morally acceptable behaviour. Baumeister supports 
this objective or outsider approach in determining if acts are evil: 
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The reliance on the judgments by others is essential. Indeed if we limited our examination of 
evil to acts that perpetrators themselves acknowledge as evil, there would be hardly any such 
acts to examine. (Baumeister, 1999:6) 
 
Some may argue that in determining if an act is evil, one should consider the 
motivation of the perpetrator. There is no doubt that motivation of a person could go 
towards just how evil we see the act. Often, however, motivations are not clear or can 
be falsely represented by the perpetrator. As such I would argue is only necessary to 
consider motivation of the perpetrator inasmuch as it is needed to determine if the act 
can rationally and objectively be seen as being justified or provoked, etc. For 
example, if a stranger walks into a shopping mall and approaches an unknown toddler 
and slits the baby’s throat in full view of the public, do we really need to know why 
the offender did it to decide if the act was evil?  
 
I would argue no. Not knowing the motivation of the offender does not reduce the 
evilness of the act in absolute terms. In other words, the act itself is not changed by 
the motivation of the person committing the act. This approach is further reinforced 
by the Rome Statute of the ICC. Elements of Crimes, General Introduction paragraph 
4 states that: 
With respect to mental elements associated with elements involving value 
judgment, such as those using the terms inhumane or severe, it is not necessary 
that  the  perpetrator  personally  completed  a  particular  value  judgment,27  unless 
otherwise indicated. 
 
                                                 
27 My italics. 
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Decision Process for evaluating 
Evil Actions
Victim
Subjective perception of 
harm inflicted
Offender
Subjective perception of 
gravity of action
Objective Assessment
Of action
Evil Action
Application of 
Definition of Evil Act 
to event
Disparity between states of each- Magnitude Gap
Even though I have argued in the negative it should be recognised that it could well be 
important to understand the offender’s motivation for such an act as described above, 
if for no other reason then to attach liability. There may be cases such as insanity or 
persons suffering from mental illness where such considerations may become of 
import. 
 
To take the approach of an objective assessment may seem fraught with danger. After 
all, what is acceptable behaviour in one culture may not be acceptable in another 
culture. How does one ensure the assessment is objective? To use the terms universal 
standards of right and wrong would also seem to attract criticism. After all, how do 
you determine what is universally acceptable behaviour?  
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To assist in this the principles of the ICC will be relied upon. This court has been 
established as an international safeguard against the gravest and most horrific of 
crimes. As of the 14 November 2005, 100 countries are States Parties to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Out of them 27 are African States, 12 are 
Asian States, 15 are from Eastern Europe, 21 are from Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and 25 are from Western Europe and other States. By anchoring the 
objective assessment of behaviour in the boundaries put forward by this court, 
defence of the objective assessment is made easier. For example, some may argue that 
the actions of the terrorists on September 11th are justified as the terrorists considered 
themselves at war with America. By reliance on the ICC Statute of Rome and its 
incumbent representation of a broad range of countries this argument can be refuted. 
This rejection is based on the fact that the attacking of civilians is expressly listed as a 
war crime in article 8(2)(b)(i). 
War crime of attacking civilians. Elements –  
1. The perpetrator directed an attack.  
2. The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking 
direct part in hostilities. 28 
3. The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking 
direct part in hostilities to be the objects of the attack.  
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an international armed 
conflict. 
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an 
armed conflict. 
 
                                                 
28 My italics. 
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Once the act has been objectively determined to be evil then subjective perspectives 
can be examined to determine the chain of causation and the effect of the act. It is 
important to remain objective in this determination of whether acts are evil or not. 
Failing to do so may run the risk of trivialising the concept of evil.  
 
Arriving at a definition of Evil 
As a result of the proceeding analysis I have come to the following operational 
definition regarding the concept of evil. For the purpose of this study the following 
operational definition can be applied when attempting to determine if an act is evil. 
An objective assessment needs to be carried out by looking for the following 
elements: an evil act can be said to consist of: 
1. A serious intentional act or omission;  
2. Which causes severe mental or physical harm and;  
3. This harm is unnecessary or disproportionate to any instigation or 
provocation. 
 
The definition is not meant to be all encompassing and there may be situations or acts 
that warrant being called evil that do not fit perfectly within the bounds of this 
definition. As stated at the outset these will be the grey, fuzzy areas that a robust 
definition may not always cater for. What this definition does provide is a baseline or 
starting point at which to objectively determine the evilness of certain acts. One then 
needs to consider if one of the three emotive agents is present to truly be able to call 
the act evil. 
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Conclusion 
In review it can be seen that the concept of evil does indeed have relevant application 
as a criminological tool with which to examine certain events. There is a need to be 
able to classify wrongful actions, that go beyond just being wrong or bad. For this 
reason the concept of evil is both relevant and realistic. It should be noted that the 
discussion so far has centred on evil acts rather then evil persons per se. A clear 
difference needs to be made between the two phenomena and this will be addressed in 
the next chapter.  
 
While it is difficult to encapsulate what is meant by the term evil, it is nonetheless 
crucial that some kind of starting point is recognised. The ability to clearly and 
concisely delineate what we mean by the term allows us to apply the concept more 
readily to a variety of situations The concept of evil can be broken down into 
elements that clearly allow us to examine and classify certain human actions. It is 
important in this examination, however, to remain objective in arriving at our 
conclusions. 
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CH A P T E R  2:  OR D I N A RY PE O P L E  
A N D  T H E  CA U S E S  O F EV I L  
 
Evil people and Demonisation: A rational argument 
against them 
 
The average reader of this book is not unimaginably different from many of the perpetrators of 
evil deeds, and a large proportion of the evil in the world is the result of the actions of people 
well within the range of normal routines of social life.  (Morton, 2004:4) 
 
Morton in his review of evil clearly enunciates that evil actions do not necessarily 
mean that there are evil people. Human actions are often understood in terms of their 
explanations. The ability of evil acts to defy rational explanation has often led to the 
power of evil being invoked in an attempt to explain these acts as the result of some 
kind of pure or radical force, for instance “... the person did it because they are evil” 
(Prins, 1994). When talking of genocide and other atrocities: 
It is probably difficult to read or hear about accounts of genocide without at least fleetingly 
concluding that the killers were twisted and evil human beings who bear very little resemblance 
to oneself or one’s friends, neighbours and loved ones.  (Newman, 2002:43) 
 
There has been a tendency to explain away atrocious behaviour as being the actions of 
someone outside the norm, a them who have no implications for the rest of society 
(Morton, 2004; Zukier, 1994). When trying to deal with massive human rights 
violations such as genocide, we often see these people as evil, an aberration from the 
norm:  
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Thus the preference for attributing participation in atrocities to an evil, hateful, or even 
obedient nature is entirely consistent with the way human beings typically explain events. As a 
result, people may be predisposed by their cognitive makeup to endorse such personality-based 
explanations even when there is little evidence to support them.  (Kressel, 2002:148) 
 
Some authors have rejected the appeal to evil as an explanation for acts as it takes 
human behaviour and puts it beyond human explanation. It explains the action as the 
result of some “… sinister and metaphysical…” force (Clendinnen, 1999:87). When 
referring to the concept of evil; “A theory that requires a satanically depraved 
character to qualify as evil seems too demanding. A theory that insists on an extra-
satanic dedication to malevolence is just silly” (Haybron, 2002:261). The argument 
against evil people per se was reinforced by Milgram’s research29, the result being 
that “… few psychologists would confidently assert that monstrous acts required 
monstrous actors” (Kressel, 2002:146). 
 
Certainly demonological criminal explanations, where the offender was seen as being 
pure evil or in the grip of Satan or some demon, while popular in the earlier centuries, 
have lost importance as an explanation in modern times, with many criminologists 
seeing no value in the approach. Indeed the use of demonological theories of crime is 
criticised “… in seeing demonology as a political process of scapegoating misfortune 
on to innocent but different others or on to uncontrollable forces” (Einstadter & 
Henry, 1995:41).  
                                                 
29 Milgram’s research involved submitting a group of students to an experiment in which the supervisor 
would require them to administer electric shocks to an unknown person. In reality the shocks were not 
delivered but the victims acted as if they were. Milgram found that most of his students were prepared 
to deliver the shocks to quite high levels if instructed to do so by the supervisor. 
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After the war this process was undertaken against the SS. They were made to appear 
different to ordinary Germans, so in this way Germany could account for the crimes 
that were committed. The SS in fact became the alibi for Germany (Reitlinger, 1957). 
Indeed after the war when looking at the phenomenon of the Nazis “… it was more 
comforting to believe that no normal or healthy person would be able to engage in 
such atrocities against humanity” (J. Waller, 2002:58). In regards to the SS an overly 
simplistic view was held. It was “… commonly assumed that these persons 
completely identified with their roles and in fact enjoyed them. As a consequence the 
SS are viewed as utterly evil and sadistic…”, and, no allowance for explanations other 
than the evil personality was made (J. M. Steiner, 1963:406). In the past it has been 
easy to dismiss evil actions as the result of evil personalities however as Waller points 
out; 
Most of the perpetrators of the Holocaust and other cases of mass killing and genocide were 
extraordinary only by what they did, not by who they were. They could not be identified, a 
priori, as having the personalities of killers. Most were not mentally impaired. Nor were they 
identified as sadists at home or in their social environment. Nor were they victims of an abusive 
background. They defy easy demographic categorisation … In short the majority of perpetrators 
of extraordinary evil were not distinguished by background, personality, or previous political 
affiliation or behaviour as having been men or women unusually likely or fit to be genocidal 
executioners. (J. Waller, 2002:8) 
 
The logic of the demonic individual diminishes when one considers that the majority 
of Waffen-SS members showed an “… exceedingly low crime rate” after the war (J. 
M. Steiner, 1963:441). In other words, when placed in the situation of an ideological 
war they were capable of great crimes, yet when returned to a normal societal 
situation they behaved normally. The argument on the demonic individual would 
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dictate that these soldiers should have continued their depraved behaviour into their 
civilian lives; but they did not. 
 
Indeed, “The vast majority of men and women responsible for the slaughter of their 
fellow human beings have not been sadistic or psychopathic”, rather they are just 
ordinary people capable of evil acts (Markussen, 1996:75). Society finds that hard to 
accept as people want psychological distance from the perpetrators of atrocities; “… 
they did not want to believe that the potential to act like a Nazi could exist in them or 
their neighbour” (J. Waller, 2002:63).  
 
Public perceptions “… require our evildoers to be major figures, with something of 
the demonic about them, rather than pathetic figures in the grip of impulse” (Darley, 
1992:202). It has been argued, however, that even “… raw impulses are mediated, 
inhibited and transformed…”, in other words the “… image of a group of sadists 
overwhelmed by aggressive instincts just waiting to be discharged is psychological 
fantasy” (Zukier, 1994:427). Certainly “… ideation motivates behaviour for good or 
evil”, criminal behaviour is created in the thoughts and ideas of criminal minds and 
even “… criminals acting on impulse ideate … ideation provides forethought that 
enables people to regulate their behaviour or serves to rationalise criminal behaviour” 
(Navarro & Schafer, 2003:22). 
 
This need for demonising of the perpetrator can lead to the erroneous assumption that 
behind an evil act must lay an evil individual. This assumption has been clearly 
rejected by a number of authors; it is also rejected by this study. 
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Do not bother to demonise people as being inherently evil. That’s not how it works. Instead, we 
should view evil as opportunistic, passing like an electrical current through the world and 
through people: or wandering like an infection that takes up residence in individuals or cultures 
from time to time. (Morrow, 2003:17) 
 
This need to demonise has led to some people being classified as being the 
embodiment of evil, such as Hitler or Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler (Berkowitz, 
1999). Himmler was one of the main architects of the Holocaust and other mass 
atrocities that were committed by the SS; as such it is easy to demonise him as an evil 
person. 
However, as soon as we peel off a few layers from the demonised image we lay bare the far 
simpler features of a romantically eccentric petty bourgeois who, under the specific conditions 
of a totalitarian system of government, attained exceptional power and hence found himself in 
a position to put his policies into bloody practice. (Fest, 1970:172) 
 
This quote encapsulates two core arguments of this study, first that evil is an 
interaction between personality and situation, and second, the evil person does not 
exist. Indeed the case of Himmler can lead to a whole host of questions: 
Was Heinrich Himmler mad, bad or just confused when he complimented his SS Generals in 
1943 for remaining “decent fellows” while overseeing the slaughter of the Jews? What concept 
of decency could the SS Reichsführer possibly have in mind here? How could he describe the 
deaths of thousands of men, women and children as simply a means of cleansing the soil to 
allow new fruit to grow? (Scarre, 1998:436) 
 
His actions seem to defy rational understanding and this makes it easy to use the label 
evil in dealing with Himmler. However, in contrast to the main players in the Nazi 
Party we have the thousands that joined the Nazi Party; “By all accounts … the Nazis 
were not crazed bloodthirsty monsters” (Zukier, 1994:427). This view can be seen 
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after World War II when the argument was raised that many of the German soldiers 
were just following orders when they were liquidating the Jews. Some, however, 
seemed to derive a specific pleasure from the act: 
Even before the shooting began, First Lieutenant Gnade had personally picked out some 20 to 
25 elderly Jews. They were exclusively men with full beards. Gnade made the old men crawl on 
the ground in the area before the grave. Before he gave them the order to crawl, they had to 
undress. While the totally naked Jews crawled … Gnade screamed to those around “Where are 
my non-commissioned officers? Don’t you have any clubs yet?” The non-commissioned officers 
went to the edge of the forest, fetched themselves clubs and vigorously beat the Jews with them. 
(Browning, 1998:82)  
 
The actions of First Lieutenant Gnade of the 101st Police Battalion would seem to 
indicate that Gnade might be possessed of an evil power given the extreme pleasure 
he took from unnecessarily demeaning the Jewish men prior to their execution. The 
beating of the Jews would appear to a rational person to serve no purpose; they were 
going to be killed very shortly anyway. This would have us believe that some people 
undertake actions for no other purpose than to be evil, or in other words, evil for the 
sake of evil. Baumeister (1999) refers to this as the myth of pure evil. However,  
The disturbing psychological truth is that participation in mass murder need not require 
emotions as extreme or demonic as would seem appropriate for such a malignant project. Or to 
put the matter another way, ordinary people can commit demonic acts.  (Lifton, 2000:5)  
 
During World War II, German soldiers on the Eastern Front “… engaged in heinous 
and repugnant acts of slaughter …. they (the German soldiers30) looked perfectly 
normal, but committed extraordinary atrocities” (Bartov, 1999:9). One Waffen-SS 
veteran of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division, Gerhard Stiller, outlined how 
                                                 
30 My italics and insertion. 
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some of his fellow soldiers came to be able to commit horrendous acts: “After a few 
years they became so desensitised that they did not even notice anymore. Given that 
they were capable of just bumping someone off without batting an eyelid. Let’s just 
say they would need to develop a lot of their humanity again” (Halliley, 2003).    
 
Katz (1993:7) goes further and suggests, “Ordinary people using ordinary behaviour 
can produce extraordinary evil”. One can argue that the high level of participation in 
various atrocities of the 20th century forces society to look for an explanation “... of 
evil under which evil acts can be committed by agents who do not necessarily have 
evil characters” (Garrard, 2002:321). This concept of ordinariness or banality of 
perpetrators was the conclusion reached in Arendt’s (1963) study of Nazi bureaucrat 
Adolf Eichmann: He was just an normal person who carried out extraordinary acts of 
evil. The comment by Cyasa Habimana, one of the militia leaders responsible for the 
genocide in Rwanda, is chilling; he is recounting the preparations made at the meeting 
about the killing of Tutsis: 
The most important thing discussed in all those meetings was how to create hatred between 
ordinary people, how to get ordinary people to hate the Rwandan Patriotic Front31 and what 
they called their accomplices, the Tutsis, inside the country. (Keane, 2004:4) 
 
Of importance is that Habimana, one of the perpetrators of the genocide himself, 
recognises that it was ordinary people who carried out such extraordinary evil. Indeed, 
one of the ordinary people who took part in the killings in Rwanda admitted, “I’d 
never killed anyone before. All of this came like madness, I’d never had any mental 
problems before.” (Keane, 2004:8). A Hutu teacher calmly spoke after the genocide 
                                                 
31 A Tutsi guerrilla group that attacked the Rwandan Government in 1990. 
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of the murder of Tutsi children in his class; “I killed some of the children … we had 
80 kids in the first year. There are 25 left. All the others we killed them or they ran 
off” (Ball, 1999:167). 
 
The idea of a pure or radical evil personality or person is rejected by this study. A 
perusal of the résumés of the leaders of Einsatzgruppen reveal that the officers came 
from all walks of life, including doctors, lawyers, policemen, soldiers and even priests 
(MacLean, 1999b). To this end it has been noted that there “may not be one type of 
predisposition that inclines a person to participate in acts of evil against others” 
(Kressel, 2002:184). 
 
To illustrate this point let me return to the SS officers of the Einsatzgruppen, the 
mobile killing groups that operated behind the front lines on the Eastern Front 
liquidating Jews and others (Arad et al., 1989; Headland, 1992; MacLean, 1999b). 
MacLean (1999b) identified 30 Waffen-SS officers32 who had performed service in 
these death units. An analysis of the details provided by him shows the following. Of 
the 28 officers examined some 93 per cent were agnostic with 7 per cent being of 
Protestant religion. As far as occupations were concerned 31 per cent were 
businessmen, 20 per cent were lawyers, 11 per cent were each doctors or police. Other 
occupations held included university student and professor, farmer and an engineer, 
with three officers of unknown occupation prior to joining the Einsatzgruppen. 
Regarding education, 57 per cent had high school or equivalent, 14 per cent had 
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tertiary-level qualifications and some 29 per cent possessed doctorate-level education. 
As for political affiliation some 89 per cent were members of the Nazi Party, the rest 
were non-members. Of the Nazi Party members, some 52 per cent joined the Nazi 
Party prior to them coming to power in 1933.  
 
What this analysis shows is that this group of officers were diverse in occupation and 
overall well-educated. Indeed many came from occupations where you just would not 
think genocidal killers would come from, such as doctors, police officers and lawyers. 
The political affiliations to the Nazi Party would appear strong. However, of note is 
that only 46 per cent of the officers overall could be classified as old party members 
(i.e. pre 1933). Nothing stands out among this group of officers: Their backgrounds 
do not appear out of the ordinary. Certainly there is nothing to suggest that they 
would readily become mass murderers. 
 
 Indeed, as Bartov noted  “… a great deal has been said, and some written, on the 
potential of everyone to become a serial killer under certain circumstances, as well as 
the potential of all human societies to develop genocidal trends” (Bartov, 2003b:82). 
For example, the serial killer is depicted in the popular media as being the arch 
manifestation of evil. This would have us believe that the serial killer exists for no 
other purpose but to inflict evil acts for no apparent reason. This can often be referred 
to as the myth of pure evil. Baumeister (1999; , 2002) argues against this by stating 
that evil is the intentional infliction of harm and chaos on another that is done for a 
                                                                                                                                            
32 Of these, two Waffen-SS officers were identified, but no accurate records re their Waffen-SS service 
could be located. As a result they have not been included in this analysis. Therefore the total for the 
analysis is 28 officers. 
  79 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
number of reasons, which can include greed, lust, egotism, revenge, ideals and 
enjoyment. The Green River killer, Gary Ridgway, admitted to killing some 49 
women, many of them prostitutes, in Washington State between 1982 and 1984. 
Many of the victims were found near the Green River just south of Seattle; others 
were from Washington, but were found in Oregon. He stated in his police interview 
that his reasons for killing: 
I hate most prostitutes and I did not want to pay them for sex … I also picked prostitutes as 
victims because they were easy to pick up without being noticed. I knew they would not be 
reported missing right away and might never be reported missing. I picked prostitutes because 
I thought I could kill as many of them as I wanted without getting caught.  (Johnson, 2003)  
 
While it may seem extreme to kill the women to avoid payment, his motivations of 
hate and wanting to avoid payment are not demonic or outside the bounds of human 
understanding. As stated, the motivations of serial killers may not appear rational to 
the normal person, but none the less, these motivations are rational to the serial killer 
(Wilson & Pinto, 1990).  
 
Demonisation of an individual is one way in which society has attempted to cope with 
people who commit acts that defy normal explanation. Often there is a need for 
society to visualise people who commit evil acts as being in possession of some 
demonic force, rather than an individual who undertakes acts that are quite rational to 
their own subjective logic (Darley, 1992). The actions of the warring factions in the 
former Yugoslavia may seem incomprehensible to the ordinary person yet, 
There is no credible evidence that those who inhabit the former Yugoslavia possess some 
natural attribute of beastliness the most of the rest of the human race, thankfully, lacks. Those 
who committed the atrocities ... were not members of a pack of werewolves, driven by natural 
forces to rape, torture, mutilate and murder. (Wilkins, 2001:31) 
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The account of a former Serbian soldier, 21-year-old Borislav Herak, shows us how 
normal the motivations of people who commit these acts can be. In 1992 Herak had 
gone on a killing spree that resulted in the murder of 35 people and the rape of 16 
women with which he has been charged (Kressel, 2002).  
Little from what we know of Borislav Herak’s background suggests a particular propensity for 
him to have acted as he did … When asked about how he felt after killing three villagers … 
Herak showed little remorse. “I was not sorry because they had a colour television set” (Colour 
televisions brought a good price on the black market). (Kressel, 2002:4) 
 
Author Lance Morrow met Herak in person and asked him why he committed the acts 
that he did: 
He did not deny the crime  with which he had been charged – raping and murdering some 17 
Muslim women. He said his captain had ordered him to do it. The claim was half-credible; 
Serbian officers did sometimes order their men to commit atrocities. But I doubted that the 
captain ordered him to do it 17 times. That much zealotry suggests that evil in the boy had 
become autonomous. (Morrow, 2003:73) 
 
What is of interest is that many other seemingly normal persons such as Herak could 
commit so many acts of evil during the Bosnian conflict. Certainly social 
psychologists by and large do not see evil actions as the result of evil personalities 
(Berkowitz, 1999). There is agreement with Baumeister’s dismissal of the myth of 
pure evil and the proposition that people exist for pure evil per se. Rather, 
When one probes behind evil actions one normally finds, not an evil individual viciously 
forwarding diabolical schemes, but instead ordinary individuals who have done acts of evil 
because they were caught up in complex social events. (Darley, 1992:204)  
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The above quote raises the question why do only some ordinary individuals act in this 
way? Is there something about their personality or the particular dynamics of the 
complex social events that they found themselves in that causes them to act this way?  
Criminals will often rationalise their behaviour in such a way so as to reduce the 
apparent immorality of the act they are committing (Day & Vandiver, 2000). It has 
been suggested that most criminals are normal people motivated by the same desires 
as the rest of society (Fattah, 1997). This can be linked to the banality or ordinariness 
concept put forward by a number of authors (Arendt, 1963; Browning, 1998), 
however, the criminal chooses a different means to attain their goals (Fattah, 1997). 
The difficulty in accepting the concept of an evil person is clear given that as a society 
we have two contradictory approaches to responsibility for the commission of evil 
acts.  The first being that evil is an overpowering force that possesses individuals and 
the second is that the perpetrators of evil acts should be held accountable for their 
actions (Babuta & Bragard, 1988).  
 
To be sure, many writers have commented on the fact that many of the most notorious 
evil acts have not been committed by demonic individuals, but rather by ordinary 
human beings (Arendt, 1963; Browning, 1998). It has been suggested that to rely on a 
concept of evil being derived from some kind of satanic metaphysical force is a akin 
to “... an intellectual hangover from a religious past” (Garrard, 2002:326). It can be 
argued that “… as long as one believes that the evil man wears horns, one will not 
discover an evil man” Fromm (1973:480). This comment reinforces the view that 
often it is indeed ordinary people who carry out acts of evil for quite mundane reasons 
(the causes of evil acts will be discussed in the next chapter, but they can include 
situational, dispositional and interactional influences).  
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It has been argued that “… ordinary people, simply doing their jobs and without any 
particular hostility of their part, can become agents in a terrible destructive process” 
(Milgram, 1974:6). In fact, a number of studies have shown that ordinary human 
beings have the capacity to kill other human beings and experience the event as being 
nothing extraordinary (Lifton, 2000). It should be noted that though the individuals 
are banal (Arendt, 1963), in committing demonic acts “In doing so, or, in order do so, 
the men themselves changed; and in carrying out their actions, they themselves were 
no longer banal” (Lifton, 2000:12). This comment can perhaps be interpreted as 
meaning that while the individuals were not demonic, they were ordinary individuals, 
who upon committing their evil acts lost their moral innocence. 
 
In summary I would argue that the notion of an evil individual is not conducive to 
understanding human behaviour in the light of evil acts. The sense of evilness should 
attach to the act and not the actor. To put forward the concept of an evil individual 
may impinge on our understanding and attempts to find rational causes for the 
behaviour of people who commit evil acts. 
 
The causes of evil 
Having explored what evil is, the next question that needs to be addressed is why do 
people commit evil acts? This question is posed in relation to the Holocaust by Blass 
who asks: 
What psychological mechanism transformed the average, and presumably normal, citizens of 
Germany and its allies into people who would carry out or tolerate unimaginable acts of cruelty 
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against their fellow citizens who were Jewish, resulting in the death of six million of them? 
(Blass, 2002:92) 
 
Some have argued that attempting to explain evil actions may in fact lead to 
condoning those actions (Friedrichs, 2000; Lifton, 2000; Miller, Buddie, & 
Kretschmar, 2002; Miller, Gordon, & Buddie, 1999). It can be argued that there are 
flaws with this view; to understand why something is done does not by right condone 
that action. The explanation does not necessarily provide justification for the act. As 
Waller states: 
To offer a psychological explanation for the atrocities committed by perpetrators is not to 
forgive, justify or condone their behaviours. Instead the explanation simply allows us to 
understand the conditions under which many of us could be transformed into killing machines. 
(J. Waller, 2002:xiv)  
 
This problem of understanding progressing to condoning can be avoided by remaining 
aware of the moral context of the actions and ensuring that attempts to explain and 
understand are not equated with denial or tacit excusal of the act (Friedrichs, 2000; 
Lifton, 2000). Care needs to be taken to make sure that while talking about the 
banality of evil it is not made to appear that evil acts are natural and inevitable given 
the right circumstances (Darley, 1992; Rochat & Modigliani, 1995).  Examine the 
actions of some Waffen-SS soldiers during the invasion of Poland in 1939: 
The rubble made progress difficult, so we tried to infiltrate round the flanks but came under 
fire … I ran forward with my men firing our weapons and suddenly the Poles threw up their 
hands (in surrender) around their machine gun, but we were still firing and all of them were 
killed. (Blandford, 1994:49) 
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The actions of these soldiers in killing the surrendering Polish soldiers could perhaps 
be explained as battle lust, excitement, etc. While these are all plausible explanations, 
they provide understanding as to why the act happened, not justification of the act, 
which is the crucial difference. The criminal act is a useful example here. If to explain 
were to condone, then there would be no point in seeking to establish or identify 
motives for crimes committed. The motive provides a rationale for the actions 
committed. By investigating an offence and determining the motive, it helps law 
enforcement officers understanding why the offence was committed. They do not 
excuse the crime that has been committed. 
 
Much of the discussion into the causes of evil centres around organisational supports 
or situations that produce conditions conductive to evil acts taking place. The 
theoretical explanations of harm doing can be categorised in two main approaches, 
situational and dispositional (Kressel, 2002; Miller, 1999). It has been argued, 
however, that this is a false dichotomy (Newman, 2002). There is a third approach, 
which sees acts of evil being the result of an interaction between situational pressures 
and personal dispositions. This can be referred to as an interactional approach, which 
acknowledges the dynamic and convergent relationship between situational and 
dispositional factors that contribute to human behaviour (Blass, 1993; Newman, 
2002). 
 
Situational Approach 
Let us first look at the situational causes of evil. Milgram (1974:205) argues “The 
disposition that a person brings to the experiment is probably less important a cause of 
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his behaviour”. The role of individual differences has been seen to be of less 
importance in a variety of obedience-type experiments (Berkowitz 1999). Certainly it 
has been suggested that both “… divided and unitary self-understandings of evildoing 
agree on the power of situational or organisational influences…” (J. E. Waller, 
1996:12). It has been suggested that individuals often undertake acts of evil on behalf 
of an organisation in the pursuit of what are perceived as overall good goals (Darley, 
1992). In essence, perhaps this is referring to the paradigm that the end justifies the 
means.  
 
This service to higher ideals in the pursuit of beneficial outcomes can often serve as 
motivation for the perpetrator in the committing of evil acts (Staub, 1999a). It has 
been noted that this “idealistic evil is nearly always fostered in groups, as opposed to 
individuals” (Baumeister, 1999:190). The fact that an individual is part of a group 
situation can often validate the beliefs and opinions of the individual, who may then 
use them to justify violent actions (Baumeister, 1999). The influence of authority can 
have an insidious effect on some individuals by diffusing responsibility (perhaps this 
could also be termed as guilt) and allowing an individual’s innate ability to perform 
destructive acts, dehumanising fellow beings, to come to the fore (Babuta & Bragard, 
1988). The proposition is that those social pressures (such as pressure exerted by 
authority) can build to such a point that they cause people to behave in ways that are 
not normal and result in harsh actions (Blass, 1993; Milgram, 1974; J. M. Steiner, 
2000). It has been shown that individuals involved in evil acts in a group scenario are 
often authority orientated and are attracted to being part of a hierarchical system 
(Staub, 1999b). 
 
  86 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
Anti-partisan operations were common during the war on the Eastern Front, as a large 
number of civilians and Russian soldiers trapped behind the front lines took up arms 
against the German invaders. It was a war often fought with little pity on either side as 
seen by the experience of one Waffen-SS soldier: 
Our lines of communication were overextended and had to be kept open to supply the great 
armies at the front … all we could do was mount the occasional sweep with what men we had … 
We let fly with grenades and went in firing and several men and three women threw out their 
guns and surrendered. They were searched and marched off out of the wood, taken back to base 
and interrogated. All were roughly handled and then shot. (Blandford, 1994:95-96) 
 
In this case the shooting of the surrendered partisans was seen as necessary to enable 
the German war effort to be successful, a small evil for a greater good. When placed 
in a situation in which an individual is required to perform evil acts on behalf of the 
state or an organisation there are a number of issues facing the individual. Using the 
above example it has often been suggested that if the soldier were to refuse to carry 
out the order another would likely take his place. Second, if he refused he would 
probably be sent to a worse assignment, such as a combat unit on the front lines. 
Darley (1992) suggests that this was the type of choice that confronted Nazi doctors in 
the concentration-camps and was a cause of them undertaking their actions, as 
examined in Lifton (2000).  
 
Lifton (2000) puts forward the concept that when called upon to perform evil acts 
individuals will undergo a process called doubling. In essence this process involves 
the individual creating a self (perhaps termed as the evil self) that operates within the 
sphere of evil acts performed within the organisation, and a normal self that remains 
attached to the pre-existing normal life of the individual.  
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An Auschwitz doctor could, through doubling, not only kill and contribute to killing, but 
organise silently on behalf of that evil project, an entire self-structure (or self-process) 
encompassing virtually all aspects of his behaviour. (Lifton, 2000:418) 
 
From this concept two propositions have been drawn. The first is that “situations can 
be created in which it is possible to enlist the ordinary participant in the commission 
of evil”, where the participant commits the acts of their own volition and with full 
knowledge (Darley, 1992:206). The second proposition is that the process creates a 
second or doubled personality that “is designed to cope with the exigencies of the 
killing situation, but one which can and does access the skills and knowledge of the 
prior personality” (Darley, 1992:206). Dicks (1972:231) also alludes to this and refers 
to a capacity for an ordinary person to operate in a murderous fashion under given 
conditions. However, when these conditions cease the person returns to an 
“inconspicuous, ordinary, law-abiding, reasonable existence”.  Of note is that not all 
individuals when placed under such situational pressures will succumb. This issue of 
resistance to evil will be discussed more fully shortly. 
 
The above concepts can be further linked to Milgram’s (1974:130) concept of the 
agentic state in which the individual’s conscience is not operational, rather the 
individual functions are part of an organisational system and “directions that come 
from a higher-level component are not assessed against the internal standards of moral 
judgement”. When operating alone the individual can allow their conscience to 
impede their impulses. However, as part of an organisation any inhibitory 
mechanisms to directions from higher components in the organisation can adversely 
impact on the ability of the organisation to function properly (Milgram, 1974). Hence 
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the conscience of the individual is repressed when functioning as part of the 
organisation. The individuals see themselves as being part of a social situation in 
which the organisation regulates the behaviour of the individual. The individuals 
therefore no longer view themselves as being responsible for their actions (Milgram, 
1974).  
 
For the individuals to see themself in this way Milgram argues that critical releasers 
need to be present, such as the individual voluntarily entering into a transaction that is 
controlled by a legitimate authority (Darley, 1992). This repression of the individual’s 
conscience is important, as guilt is seen as an important moderator that prevents 
people from committing acts of evil (Baumeister & Campbell, 1999). Guilt originates 
from a person’s ability to feel empathy and is “a highly socialised emotion that 
depends on cognitive processing” (Baumeister & Campbell, 1999:214). Guilt can be 
prevented from acting as a moderator in situations where morality is less opposed to 
harm-doing, such as officially sanctioned punishments or combat situations, 
(Baumeister & Campbell, 1999). It has been observed that during the heat of battle 
soldiers can experience a type of separation of the self that allows them to suppress 
feelings of moral guilt for actions that they commit (Bourke, 1999). 
 
There is one crucial difference between the concepts put forward by Milgram and 
Lifton. Milgram does not see the individual’s moral persona fundamentally altered by 
the evil actions; Lifton, however, argues that an individual who undertakes this 
process will be morally altered (Darley, 1992). Certainly it would be hard to accept 
that a person who knowingly and willingly commits acts of evil, even if they are 
justified by a legitimate authority and conducted in discontinuous state, does not 
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suffer some moral harm or change from doing these acts. Indeed Darley (1992) argues 
that a person who has participated in the process and commits acts intelligently and 
autonomously is an individual who has become evil. This paper would contend that 
rather then seeing the person as evil, it should be argued that the person has become 
one capable of performing evil acts. 
 
Two criticisms of Milgram’s experiment are that the conditions of the experiment did 
not accurately reflect certain historical situations such as the Holocaust, to which the 
experiment has been likened. The second is that in the experiment it can be argued 
that the subjects, while expecting the victim to be in pain, did not expect the victims 
would be harmed (Blass, 1993). This is an important differentiation, as the Nazis 
working in the concentration-camps could hardly have the same expectation. In other 
words, they knew that their actions were destructive, whereas it could be argued that 
the subjects of Milgram’s experiment did not (Blass, 1993). A further criticism of the 
divided self-approaches is that while these may adequately explain the short-term 
committing of evil acts, they struggle to explain sustained evil doing (J. E. Waller, 
1996). 
 
Of interest is that the acts of harm in Milgram’s experiment only occurred after some 
momentum had been built-up. This was also seen as a critical releaser (Darley, 1992). 
When one performs a brief examination of the Germans’ treatment of the Jews during 
World War II one can see the same process taking place. At first the Jews were 
harassed in financial ways. They were then ostracised from society. Then later they 
were deported. The next stage was the shooting of the Jews (outside of Germany), and 
the final stage was the production lines of death at the various concentration-camps. 
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While this is a simplistic view of an important part of history, it does serve to 
reinforce the issue of momentum. The Nazis did not just get straight down to the 
business of killing Jews en masse as soon as they gained power; rather they went 
about creating legitimate grounds for undertaking punitive acts towards Jews, which 
only rose in violence as momentum grew. They moved “… forward not against 
society, but with its backing” (Gellately, 2003:241). Hitler quite clearly undertook a 
process of conditioning that allowed him to build up an effective momentum: 
Associates of Hitler said the arrests after the Reichstag fire, The Röhm purge, and anti-Semitic 
measures of the 1930s were experiments. They served to condition him to escalating 
aggression, to condition his followers and the nation for the mass destruction to come and to 
find out how far he could go … by the time systematic government killing was extended to 
people not to be feared, Hitler’s power was so great that opposition was ineffective. (Victor, 
1998:80). 
 
Indeed Himmler used a process of conditioning and momentum to ensure compliance 
of the Wehrmacht as well as ensuring that the men of SS killing groups, such as the 
Einsatzgruppen, were capable and prepared to conduct the killings as they became 
harder to rationalise (i.e. moving from recognisable targets such as communists and 
partisans to innocent women and children) (Rhodes, 2002). 
 
When looking at situational causes of evil inevitably the discussion leads to the 
subject of obedience and its role in causing evil actions. Most human beings operate 
as a part of society. Indeed, to function as part of an organisation we have developed 
an ability to be obedient (Darley, 1992; Milgram, 1974). Some of the critical releasers 
as put forward by Milgram have already been mentioned. Of note is that they centre 
on the basic premise that they are necessary to ensure an individual’s obedience to 
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authority. To achieve this obedience Milgram (1974) suggests there needs to be a 
legitimate authority, a voluntary entry by the individual into this system of authority, 
a link between the authority and the commands given by it, and finally the actions 
undertaken by the individual are ideologically justified. 
 
The Nazi system is an example of this. The Nazis were a legitimate authority in that 
they were a government voted into power by the German people, who then voluntarily 
accepted the Nazis march to war. Of note is the fact that Hitler was at first very 
cautious about exceeding the trust of the German people and he undertook minor 
conflicts such as the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938. This can be 
seen to be a building of momentum for greater conflicts (Davidson & Manning, 1999; 
Kershaw, 2000). The Nazis were interested in the furtherance and protection of the 
German state and as such the creation of these conflicts could be seen as being 
necessary to achieve these goals. There was then an extensive propaganda campaign 
undertaken by Goebbels, the German propaganda minister, aimed at providing moral 
justification for actions undertaken against enemies of the Reich, such as Jews and 
communists.  
 
The high command of the Wehrmacht issued guidelines for the “Conduct of Troops in 
Russia” in which it was stated that Bolshevism was the mortal enemy of the German 
people and the fight against this enemy demanded “… ruthless measures against 
Bolshevists agitators, irregulars, saboteurs and Jews” (Heer, 1999:126). This allowed 
individuals to commit acts that, could then be ideologically and morally justified (note 
that this would be subjective moral justification) in that context. An example of this 
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was the shooting of Russian Army political commissars33 on sight when captured. The 
Waffen-SS soldiers of the Totenkopf division readily executed Commissars and the 
records of the division indicate that the “…men zealously carried out Hitler’s 
Commissar order” (Sydnor, 1990:314). 
 
It is in this sense that 
the responsibility of the 
individual is to some 
extent taken over by the 
system, which allows 
persons to “… morally 
justify the harm-doing, 
find euphemistic labels 
for the action, minimise 
the harmful consequences, and dehumanise and blame the victim” (Darley, 
1992:207). It is argued that there is a conversion process, which can perhaps be 
likened to Milgram’s concept of momentum building (Darley, 1992; Milgram, 1974). 
This process involves placing the individual under pressure and increasing 
incrementally the ability of the individual to commit evils acts with the final outcome 
being a person who can commit every-day acts of evil, such as the Greek Army 
torturers (Darley, 1992; Haritos-Fatouros, 1988). Haritos-Fatouros (1988) conducted a 
                                                 
33 Hitler issued the Commissar Decree to the top military command of the German armed forces in 
1941 stating that all political commissars of the Russian Army who were captured were to be 
eliminated. Hitler further stated that any soldier who undertook these actions would be pardoned for 
breaking international law and that the Russian soldier was not entitled to the protection of The Hague 
Convention as Russia had not taken part in it. 
 
Soldiers of the 3rd Waffen-SS Panzer Division 
Totenkopf.
Soldiers of the 3rd Waffen-SS Panzer Division 
Totenkopf.
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study of Greek soldiers who undertook duties as torturers during the military 
dictatorship in Greece from 1967-1974. Undeniably the more totalitarian the society is 
the more the individual will “… find it very politically, socially and morally difficult 
to extricate themselves from their assigned roles” (J. M. Steiner, 2000:65). 
 
It has been suggested that Milgram’s obedience model should be expanded to include 
situations in which the individual is beguiled by “… the seduction into doing evil by 
the immediate circumstances in which one finds oneself” (Katz, 1993:6). In this case 
Katz (1993) sees evil being committed not out of obedience to authority or broader 
societal values, but rather in response to new and locally generated values. This can 
be seen in Waller’s (1996) argument of a unitary self-being capable of committing 
acts of evil. This often arises when individuals find themselves subject to situational 
or organisational forces that lead to “… inconsistencies between our overt behaviours 
and internal psychological constellations” (J. E. Waller, 1996:16). These 
inconsistencies are overcome by either modifying our overt behaviours or altering our 
internal psychological constellations so that they are no longer in conflict with each 
other. 
 
In summary, one of the main facets of the situational approach seems to be a 
surrender of the individual to the control of the state or authority and “… once they 
have done so, their actions are no longer guided by their conscience, but by how 
adequately they have fulfilled the authority’s wishes” (Blass, 1993:33). The 
individuals having surrendered, no longer govern themselves by the innate sense of 
right and wrong (perhaps better termed as conscience or the ability to feel guilt) that 
most people possess.  
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Indeed, while the ordinary personality of the person is still present, it has been seen 
from the discussion above that it is suggested that some kind of alter ego is created 
that is quite capable of committing evil acts. Situational forces to attain what seems to 
be almost a sense of achievement guide these alter egos or second personalities. This 
achievement is aimed at satisfying or serving the state or authority immaterial of the 
actions that are required to achieve this. It is this environment that allows ordinary 
individuals to commit evil acts when placed under certain situational pressures. 
 
Dispositional Approach 
Let us now move on to a discussion of the dispositional explanations of evil acts and 
individuals who commit them. Arguments have been raised that a person’s disposition 
(by this I mean personality) is not an overriding factor in committing acts of evil as 
“often it is not so much the person a man is as the kind of situation in which he finds 
himself that determines how he will act” (Milgram, 1974:205). Others argue against 
this, stating that personality can very often be a “source of selection of an individual 
by those in authority for perpetrator roles” (Staub, 1999b:187). The Greek torturers in 
the study by Haritos-Fatouros (1988) were put through a rigorous selection process to 
find those soldiers best disposed towards committing acts of evil.  
 
Indeed those individuals who are more attracted to authority tend to release 
themselves more fully into the control of the system for their actions and allow the 
organisation to take responsibility for their internalised controls and prohibitions 
(Staub, 1999b). In several studies those individuals who refused to carry out the 
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organisation’s commands tended to view themselves as responsible for their actions 
rather than surrendering control to the organisation (Berkowitz, 1999). Those people 
with greater tendencies towards social responsibility and internal controls proved to 
be better at resisting situational pressures (Blass, 1993). It has been suggested that 
Milgram’s and like experiments “…fall short when it comes to explaining the more 
zealot hate-driven cruelties” (Blass, 1993:37). 
 
Baumeister and Campbell (1999) suggest that people can perform evil acts for the 
intrinsic appeal that arises from performing the act. While the motivations may not 
appear rational to the ordinary person, they may well be subjectively rational to the 
perpetrator. This proposition argues against the notion of the evil individual, rather 
there are individuals who commit evil acts for a variety of apparently non-rational 
reasons. They list three main sources of intrinsic appeal for the commission of evil 
acts; first sadism, the enjoyment of suffering of the victim; second a quest for thrilling 
sensations; and last, threatened egotism where one’s reputation has been attacked. The 
issue of sadism is put forward as an argument against the banality proposition, which 
states that it is ordinary people who commit evil acts (Arendt, 1963; Berkowitz, 1999; 
Dicks, 1972; Lifton, 2000). For example, if one looks at the Holocaust, “There was 
more to the genocidal Nazi program than the dispassionate obedience of the average 
citizen who participated in the murder of his fellow citizens … out of a sense of duty 
and not malice” (Blass, 1993:37).  
 
This can be seen by the level of sadism displayed by some individuals who committed 
acts of evil, which seems to defy the argument that it is situational forces that are 
responsible for evil acts (Baumeister & Campbell, 1999; Berkowitz, 1999; Blass, 
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2002). The previous example of Lieutenant Gnade of the 101st Police Battalion would 
seem to be evidence of a sadistic individual who undertook his required functions 
with malice. Adolf Eichmann, an SS official charged with the destruction of the Jews, 
has been described as appearing as ordinary or banal. Eichmann argued that he was 
merely a bureaucrat who carried out his orders efficiently (Arendt, 1963; Rosenthal, 
1987). Eichmann would seem a good example of an ordinary person caught up in 
situational forces, however, others argue against this.  
 
A range of psychological tests revealed that Eichmann displayed a sadistic and violent 
personality with an “… insatiable killing intention” (Blass, 1993:38). He was clearly a 
person capable of evil acts by virtue of his disposition. Matthaus (1996) makes the 
distinction that the killing operations in rural areas of occupied Russia in World War 
II were difficult to control from urban centres. He draws the conclusion that since 
control of the operations was tenuous at best, responsibility for compliance with the 
orders fell on the local police and as such those “… perpetrators who liked to kill…” 
were the most active in complying with the orders (Matthaus, 1996:141). 
 
There was motivation for those who killed. Baumeister (1999; , 2002) argues that evil 
has four root causes; first, evil as a means to an end; second, egotism and revenge; 
third, as previously discussed idealism and last sadism. Let us examine the first two 
causes, they being means to an end, and egotism and revenge. Baumeister (1999) 
suggests that people will often commit evil acts as a means to an end, the ends being 
the gaining of power and/or the satisfaction of lust and greed. It should be noted that 
this means-to-an-end cause can take place in a group context as well as an individual 
context (Darley, 1992; Staub, 1999b). It can also be linked to the notion of idealistic 
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evil, especially when occurring in a group context, the Nazis being a prime example 
of this.  
 
One of the roots of evil put forward by Baumeister (1999) is that of egotism and 
revenge. He suggests that the arguments of low self-esteem being responsible by itself 
for evil acts are flawed, and puts forward the proposition that low self esteem can lead 
to evil acts when combined with individuals who display a pattern of arrogance, 
confidence or egotism. The perpetrators can see themselves as superior and can be 
indifferent to the suffering of others (Baumeister, 1999). This can be linked to the 
concept of a just world, which maintains that all that occurs in the world is just and 
people who suffer misfortune have earnt it in some way (Newman, 2002; Staub, 
1989). People, 
Whose belief is strong derogate poor people, underprivileged groups or minorities. Strong 
belief in a just world is associated with rigid application of social rules and belief in the 
importance of convention, as opposed to empathy and concern with human welfare. (Staub, 
1989:79)  
 
The use of the just world concept allows us to see evil acts as being justified. “We 
cling to such a simplistic view of evildoing because it allows us to hold on to the 
notion of a just and predictable world” (J. E. Waller, 1996:12). Take, for example, the 
case of a man being beaten outside a nightclub. Most would stand back and assess the 
situation. Few would go to the immediate assistance of the victim. Rather, we would 
most likely justify the man’s suffering by reducing our concern for the victim. We 
may devalue the victim with the likely thoughts “he must be drunk”, “maybe he 
punched someone inside the club” or “they wouldn’t be doing that for no reason, he 
must have asked for it”. These are all ways in which bystanders reduce the feeling of 
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responsibility for the welfare of others (Staub, 1989). The need for consistency in our 
lives “… makes outward conformity lead to inner change” (J. E. Waller, 1996:16). It 
can be linked back to the belief in the just world concept, where the victim must be 
deserving of the punishment. To think otherwise would lead to inconsistency in the 
world being just, which would cause us concern (Darley, 1992; Staub, 1989).   
 
The disposition of an individual can also allow them to demean the victim or trivialise 
the harm that they are doing to the victim. There is a devaluing of the victim. This in 
some respects can be linked to the earlier concept of distancing, where the perpetrator 
distances themselves from the victims or devalues the victim to avoid feeling empathy 
or other disagreeable psychological effects of the act (Baumeister, 1999; Morton, 
2004; Staub, 1989; J. M. Steiner, 1963). To understand why these acts are performed 
one needs to consider the effect of the magnitude gap (discussed previously). This is 
important, as some perpetrators do not see their evil acts as being of any importance. 
The difference between victim and perpetrators’ perspectives can be summarised as 
follows; the victim sees the event over a much longer time span then the perpetrator, 
the victim’s account tends to have moral issues clearly defined in the act, and finally, 
the perpetrators usually have reasons or explanations for their actions, whereas the 
victim sees the actions of the perpetrator defying understanding (Baumeister, 1999; 
Baumeister & Campbell, 1999). This concept flows through to the revenge concept 
when seen as a cause of evil acts: 
In revenge, the perpetrator is inflicting harm to reach a certain level of satisfaction, and the 
victim has to suffer enough to provide that satisfaction. Because victims suffer more then 
perpetrators gain, the victim of revenge will probably have to suffer far more than the 
perpetrator realises. (Baumeister, 1999:162)  
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The initial reaction to doing harm to others can often be quite distressful for the 
perpetrator. However, it has been argued that with the repetition of the evil act the 
individual will learn to cope better. Opponent process theorists argue that each 
response that moves the body from its normal resting state (the A process) is 
accompanied by a converse response that moves the body back to its resting state (the 
B process) (Baumeister & Campbell, 1999). They argue that the more times a person 
undertakes a certain action a number of times the A process will weaken and the B 
process will become stronger. So following this theory, the first time a person kills 
there will be a strong emotive response to the killing. As the person continues to kill, 
the B process, which reduces this response and returns the person to their normal 
state, becomes stronger, with the effect that the person becomes less upset with each 
killing (Baumeister & Campbell, 1999). For example, the soldiers of the 101st Police 
battalion found it very arduous to conduct their first mass execution of Jews. In spite 
of this, the more the shooting went on the less difficult the soldiers found the tasks. In 
fact, they became far more efficient as killers as time went on: 
Once the killing began, however, the men became increasingly brutalised. As in combat, the 
horrors of the initial encounter eventually became routine, and the killing became progressively 
easier. In this sense, brutalisation was not the cause but the effect of these men’s behaviour 
(Browning, 1998:161)  
 
A criticism of this approach is that a normal person will feel guilt when committing 
an evil act; this feeling of guilt will usually prevent the B process becoming more 
powerful. It has been argued that those individuals with a sadistic nature will not 
suffer the effects of guilt and as such the B process will strengthen and allow them to 
continue to commit acts of evil (Baumeister & Campbell, 1999).  
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Obedience experiments conducted by Milgram (1974) and others often portray the 
individual as merely undertaking orders that have come from above in the 
organisation and these are the cause of their actions. Some argue against this approach 
and suggest that in any system there are individuals who will take it upon themselves 
to conduct acts of evil that go beyond the mere following of orders or a sense of duty 
(Blass, 1993). This is not to suggest that there are evil people as such. But rather there 
are individuals who are prepared to commit what could be considered evil acts for a 
variety of reason, some of which may appear non-rational to a bystander. 
 
An example of this is Waffen-SS lieutenant, SS-Untersturmführer Taubner, who was 
attached to the Waffen-SS 1st Brigade34 in Russia in 1941. Taubner was not part of the 
killing units or involved in cleansing operations against the Jews or so-called 
partisans, he was part of a workshop detail repairing equipment (Klee, Dressen, & 
Riess, 1988; Rhodes, 2002). Taubner and a number of other Waffen-SS men took it 
upon themselves to commence killing Jews that they came across, often with 
incredible brutality (Rhodes, 2002). Taubner organised and participated in the killing 
of children, women and men, often pausing between the killings to play his accordion. 
Of note is the fact that Taubner was eventually brought up on charges before an SS 
court, which delivered the following verdict: 
The Jews have to be exterminated and none of the Jews that were killed is any great loss … the 
accused should have recognised the fact that the extermination of the Jews was the duty of 
commandos which have been set up especially for this purpose … It is not the German way to 
apply Bolshevik methods during the necessary extermination of the enemy of our people. In 
doing so the conduct of the accused gives rise to considerable concern. The accused allowed his 
                                                 
34 The 1st SS Infantry Brigade (Motorised) was later used to form the Waffen-SS 18th SS 
Panzergrenadier Division Horst Wessel. 
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men to act with such vicious brutality that they conducted themselves under his command like 
a savage horde. (Klee et al., 1988:201). 
 
The actions of Taubner did not fit in with Hitler’s ideas of “A new anti-Semitism 
based on reason”. This type of thinking resisted killings that were based on emotions 
such as pleasure or revenge (Zukier, 1994:434). Indeed Himmler had indicated that 
SS men who carried out unauthorised shootings for political purposes should not be 
subject to punishment, but those who carried it out for sadistic or sexual reasons 
should be tried for murder (Krausnick et al., 1965). As early as 1935 Himmler had 
laid down strict instructions regarding actions against the Jews. In an order dated the 
16th of August 1935, SS men were prohibited from independent individual action as 
“… the solution of the Jewish question, as of all other questions, is the business of the 
Führer, and not of individuals. And even the most minor contravention of this order 
will by punished by dismissal from the SS” (Krausnick et al., 1965:351).  
 
Clearly Taubner was acting out his need to satisfy his personal sadistic disposition, he 
was not required by the organisation to undertake such actions. An important factor in 
the behaviour of Taubner was that he was an initiator of independent actions, not just 
a soldier following orders of the authorities (Rochat & Modigliani, 1995). The most 
poignant fact is that he was punished for his actions by the very organisation that was 
undertaking the extermination of the Jews. His role in the system was not meant to be 
that of a killer. He was meant to repair equipment. But by undertaking the killings he 
had allowed his personal disposition to interfere with the running of the organisation 
and as such was punished by the organisation.  
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Indeed Taubner’s case is an example of one flaw that has been seen in applying 
situational models such as Milgram’s to events such as the Holocaust. This perceived 
flaw is that Milgram’s experiment was highly centralised. The students were under 
the direct control of the authority figure (Blass, 1993; Hilberg, 1980). Clearly Taubner 
was not under the direct control of Hitler or Himmler. He was in fact thousands of 
miles away from Berlin, the centre of authority in relation to the extermination 
policies. Further, his unit was not part of the killing system that had been put in place. 
He was the producer of his own actions in relation to the killings of Jews. It would 
appear that his disposition drove him to commit acts of evil. Indeed the killings were 
not only propelled by the bureaucracy, but also by “… individual initiative and a 
shared set of beliefs, values and goals” (Kressel, 2002:163). 
 
Resistance to evil 
Of interest is that in the majority of the obedience experiments and case studies that 
have been examined by researchers there were always individuals who possessed the 
ability to resist the situational forces that they faced, and did not commit evil acts. For 
example, some 10 to 20 per cent of the men of the 101st Police Battalion did not 
commit atrocities (Browning, 1998). In fact, one of the Waffen-SS soldiers attached 
to Taubner’s unit did question the killings and when called upon to shoot the Jews 
replied, “To this I answered that I had not come to Russia to shoot women and 
children” (Klee et al., 1988:204). Another example occurred at an SS supply camp in 
Cracow, Poland during 1943. A Waffen-SS soldier, Karl Kirwald, ordered a Jewish 
Trustee Councillor to hang a forced Jewish labourer, or another five Jews would be 
hung. The Councillor obeyed and the Jew was hung. This same soldier later wanted to 
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force a Jewish labourer to hang himself and had ordered the victim’s sister to poison 
herself. Another German intervened and saved the victims after Kirwald had beaten 
them35 (Ruter & de Mildt, 2004: Vol 7). 
 
Other more recent examples are available. Matthew Fashingabo was Deputy Mayor of 
Nyarubuye in Rwanda during the genocide of 1994. He was one of the few Hutus in 
power who resisted the call to evil. Fashingabo was deputy to Hutu Mayor Sylvestre 
Gacumbitsi, who organised the wholesale slaughter of thousands of Tutsis in the 
village of Nyarubuye over a few days (Keane, 2004). When asked why he saved a 
Tutsi girl from certain death he replied, “I think it’s just within the heart of the 
individual to realise that people are all the same. It’s not right to wish the death of one 
group of people” (Keane, 2004:13). Those individuals who helped rescue Jews in 
Europe during World War II scored significantly higher scores in psychological tests 
in relation to displaying social responsibility and internal controls (Blass, 1993). J. M. 
Steiner (2000) argues that the level to which an individual will participate or 
contribute to a social situation can be determined by the moral and social intelligence 
(I would suggest a better term would be responsibility rather than intelligence) of the 
individual. The greater the level of responsibility the less likely one is to assist with 
evil acts (J. M. Steiner, 2000). It has also been argued that the concept of ordinariness 
can be applied in reverse to those who do not commit evil acts.  
Those who refused to obey the orders of authorities, and came to the aid of persecuted people, 
were neither saints nor heroes. Rather their goodness was that of ordinary men and women 
who were responsive to the victims. (Rochat & Modigliani, 1995:197) 
 
                                                 
35 FR case 249. 
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The specific example used by Rochat and Modigliani (1995) was the French village 
of Le Chambon in France during World War II. The villagers helped save thousands 
of Jews and other fugitives from the authorities (Rochat & Modigliani, 1995). During 
their analysis of the example it was noted that conversely some of the concepts of 
Milgram’s experiments held true for people who did not commit evil acts. For 
example, it was noted that helping happened progressively and gradually increased 
(Fogelman, 1996; Rochat & Modigliani, 1995). 
 
Clearly these examples illustrate an important point, the disposition of the individual 
can be a deciding factor in why an individual will not commit acts of evil. The 
soldiers in the previous examples were all subject to the same situational forces, yet 
some of the soldiers could not condone the actions undertaken; their conscience 
would not permit it. A person’s disposition is an important, if not crucial factor, in 
deciding whether an individual will conform or resist situational forces condoning 
evil actions. In essence the proposition here is that a person’s disposition may not be 
the causal factor (or perhaps better termed the sole factor, allowing for situational 
and other influences) for the evil act occurring, but it is the main causal factor in 
determining an individual’s ability to resist performing the evil act.  
 
Interactive Causation 
“Most people – under particular circumstances – have a capacity for extraordinary 
evil” (J. Waller, 2002:84). People affect situations and situations affect people; this is 
the simple premise that the interactive causation model relies upon. The committing 
of many evil acts cannot be exclusively explained by relying on either situational or 
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dispositional factors in isolation from each other. This study would argue that the 
situational/dispositional theories are not mutually exclusive, they are in fact 
convergent. This is supported by the view that: 
Ultimately the social and personality psychologists concluded that the person-situation 
dichotomy is an artificial one, and that trying to determine which set of variables accounts for 
more variance in behaviour is not just difficult, but actually conceptually vacuous. (Newman, 
2002:50) 
 
After all, a person’s traits and behaviours do not develop free from social pressures 
(Kressel, 2002). Indeed, in his discussion of evil and SS killers Staub states that “… to 
understand the psychology of perpetrators, we must consider their personality, the 
forces acting on them and the system they are part of” (Staub, 1989:144). Steiner 
supports this view and comments that “… to be more fully understood, human 
behaviour must be viewed within the structure of events in which it occurs” (J. M. 
Steiner, 1963:444). Arguments have already been raised against the concept of an evil 
individual. This study takes the stance that there are not evil people, however, there 
are some individuals who are more disposed to commit evil acts for various rational 
reasons in a given situation. It is suggested that certain situations may, in concert with 
common dispositions, shape specific types of hostility and aggression (Staub, 1989).  
 
I agree with the argument that interactions among individuals are affected by socio-
political structures or situations, which can restrict the role and discretion margins of 
individuals. Within these structures the dispositions of individuals also affect 
interpersonal interactions (J. M. Steiner, 2000). When talking about mass crimes such 
as genocide “… it is seldom easy to separate the impact of external pressures from the 
role played by personality and individual differences” (Kressel, 2002:183). For 
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example, in the liquidations carried out in Russia in 1941 by the Nazis it has been 
argued that the extermination actions were able to be carried out for a combination of 
reasons: 
The presence of senior Nazis in the field (who circulated verbal orders to kill more Jews), the 
leadership’s deployment of more killing forces, and the willingness of subordinates to carry out 
the murders created a lethal combination of central and peripheral forces. (Lower, 2002:6) 
 
In this case the situation, i.e. the invasion of Russia and the issuance of criminal 
orders, were the peripheral forces, while the central force was the willingness of 
minor officials to carry out the orders. Certainly the argument for an interactive 
approach would suggest by its very nature that the first two approaches can and do, in 
fact, combine to produce evil acts (Blass, 1993).  
 
At this point I have put forward various explanations in relation to the Holocaust and 
its associated actions. Two prominent pieces of work in this area are the studies of 
Browning into the actions of the 101st Police Battalion and Daniel Goldhagen’s wider 
examination of similar crimes by German Order Police units (including the 101st) in 
the then occupied Russia during World War II. The Ordnungspolizei or Order Police 
was the name given to the command organ responsible for control of various police 
units. The Order Police was controlled by SS-Oberstgruppenführer Kurt Daluege, 
who reported directly to SS-Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler (Matthaus, 1996; 
Williamson & Vuksic, 2002). Daluege was convicted of war crimes after the war and 
hung in Prague on October 24, 1946.  Both Browning and Goldhagen arrive at 
different conclusions for the behaviours of the individuals involved. Browning makes 
the claim that situational forces were the driving factors, while Goldhagen argues that 
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social dispositions (he refers to it as eliminationist anti-Semitism) were the main 
causes of the evil actions undertaken (Browning, 1998; Goldhagen, 1997; M. Mann, 
2000; Matthaus, 1996).  
 
Indeed many junior officers in the German Order Police, while in receipt of general 
orders, had the autonomy and influence to decide how and to what extent the order 
was to be implemented and followed (Matthaus, 1996). What this shows us is that to 
adopt either the situational or dispositional approach to the exclusion of the other can 
be difficult to sustain. Rather a much more complete causal explanation is to accept 
that both approaches can contribute relevant information to the understanding of 
certain human behaviours. In his study of the genocidal actions of the Nazis, Mann 
(2000) puts forward a number of typologies of killers, which can be seen to include 
situational and dispositional causes.  
 
He categorises the killers as either ideological or disturbed killers who acted in 
accordance with their ideological following or to satisfy dispositional needs. He also 
suggests that other killers acted as “ordinary people” who when placed in certain 
circumstances were capable of killing. These would be the situational killers. These 
types of killers, including bigoted killers (racist views already held were allowed to 
flourish under the Nazi rule), fearful or compliant killers (killers who claimed to have 
been coerced into killing and had no choice but to act the way they did), bureaucratic 
killers and materialist killers (including careerist killers who were just doing their job 
well), help provide a “starting point” for understanding why these actions took place 
(M. Mann, 2000:333). 
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In the case of Greek torturers in the 1960s, the situation that they found themselves in 
was designed to enable a disposition to commit evil acts (Haritos-Fatouros, 1988; 
Kressel, 2002). The torturers themselves were desensitised to pain and suffering. They 
did this by personally enduring torture themselves and came to see it as an everyday 
act. Second, there was a systematic desensitisation to the act of torture that had the 
aim of removing the noxious elements from the act and attempted to make it a neutral 
or pleasant experience. In the words of one of the soldiers, “We had to learn to love 
pain” (Haritos-Fatouros, 1988:1116). 
 
The Greek torturers then became persons who were disposed towards committing acts 
of evil. Of importance here is the fact that although these persons had a disposition to 
commit evil acts, this disposition would not have been created but for the evil system 
and situational pressures brought to bear. Indeed, some writers in providing 
explanations for evil actions provide causes that can be a product of either situational 
or dispositional factors present in an individual or their surroundings (Baumeister, 
1999; Katz, 1993).  
 
This could be seen as perhaps being similar to the socialisation process that the Nazi 
doctors in the killing camps underwent where the doctors were instructed by “old 
hands” and assisted in reducing the “selection” ordeal where they decided who lived 
and who died, to a medical procedure (Darley, 1992).  
The determination was supposed to be on the basis of those who remained fit to work, as 
against those who were exhausted by near starvation, were ill, or simply looked unfit ...  This 
killing was conceived as a public health decision ... selection was fitted into a version of the 
medical ethic under the heading of the ruthless extirpation of germs, of loathsome diseases ...  
The task for the new doctor was to fit into this machine...  This being the task then it was in 
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some cases better to still one’s doubts about what one was doing, to develop a network of beliefs 
that stilled the moral doubts. (Darley, 1992:205)  
 
Another example of the interactive approach can be seen in the killing actions that 
began after the invasion of the Soviet Union. German authorities had made it clear 
that enemies of the Reich were to be exterminated. This provided certain individuals 
with the circumstances or situations to undertake actions to which their disposition 
drove them. This is evidenced by killing actions being undertaken without express 
orders from Berlin, but with the knowledge that the state authorities would tacitly 
approve them. 
The Tilsit Gestapo office informed … about the killing of 526 persons, most of whom were Jews. 
The executions carried out by local units of the Gestapo, SD and Wehrmacht as well as by Order 
Policemen were initiated by lower-ranking officers in the area, not by central state agencies in 
Berlin. The leaders of Einsatzgruppen A, SS-Brigadeführer Franz Stahlecker and SS-
Sturmbannführer Sandberger, had given their assent to the “action”, while Himmler and 
Reinhard Heydrich … later approved of the killings. (Matthaus, 1996:136) 
 
Both Stahlecker and Sandberger were lawyers who had completed Doctorate level 
education. Stahlecker died of wounds in 1942. Sandberger was sentenced to death in 
1948. This sentence was later commuted to life and he was released from prison in 
1953 (MacLean, 1999b). 
 
The previous discussion has recognised that personal dispositions and situational 
factors can both play a central role in determining how an individual will behave. 
There is often a mediating role played by an individual’s differences in authority 
situations (Blass 1993). The degree of moral and social intelligence an individual 
brings into social situations “plays a major role in the outcome of situations to which 
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interacting individuals contribute” (Haslam & Abraham, 1987; J. M. Steiner, 
2000:64). Social and moral intelligence can be defined as the degree of responsibility 
an individual will accept for certain social interactions (J. M. Steiner, 2000). For 
example, the degree to which an individual obeys superiors’ orders is often dependent 
on the individual’s disposition (dispositional factors) and the perceived legality of the 
order (situational factors). Examples of this are easy to find, such as the soldier who 
refused to shoot in Taubner’s case.  Conversely, it is also the case that those who 
carried out the orders did so on their own initiative and with far greater barbarism 
than was required by the authorities who issued the orders. 
 
The issue of combat heroism can assist us in this discussion. By looking at acts of 
heroism, the converse of acts of evil can be seen to rely on an interactive approach to 
understanding causation. It has been recognised that heroism is not solely a product of 
an individual soldier’s personality traits. Rather it is “a behaviour arising from unique 
circumstantial conditions … (and) can be viewed as products of particular situational 
constellations”, further an “… interactional approach…” is required to understand and 
predict acts of heroism (Haslam & Abraham, 1987:43). To fully understand why evil 
actions occur it is necessary to refer to and analyse actions both at an individual level 
and societal level (Blass, 1993). This is supported by the argument that many aspects 
of culture are processes that occur among individuals (Staub, 1989).  
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In summation, I would argue that the interactive approach would seem to be the best 
way to try and understand the cause of evil acts. It allows for both individual and 
group dynamics to play a role in explaining how people can come to perform acts that 
would seem beyond comprehension. To look at either individual or group traits in 
isolation provides only partial answers to why certain evil acts take place. It is 
therefore important to examine acts of mass evil that are carried out by large groups 
of people. This allows us to more fully explore the causation factors and their 
interactions. It is for this reason I will discuss at length the crime of genocide in this 
study, as this is a crime that lends itself to the perception of having been committed 
by ordinary people. This is due to the scale of the crime and involvement of society as 
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a whole in the actions, as against the actions of an individual, for instance in the event 
of a series of sexual homicides. 
 
Genocide as the ultimate evil 
There is a strong association between war and genocide that can be linked through 
processes of aggression, the scenario of loss or grievance, use of war as a mask crime, 
the case of the enemy becoming the victim of genocide, and crisis or revolution where 
the old regime is overthrown (Fein, 1993; Markussen, 1996; Weitz, 2003b). UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan recognised this in his speech to the Commission on 
Human Rights in recognition of the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, where 
he outlined a number of steps aimed at preventing such crimes: 
Genocide almost always occurs during war. Even apparently tolerant individuals, once they 
engage in war, have categorised some of their fellow human beings as enemies, suspending the 
taboo which forbids the deliberate taking of human life. And in almost all cases they accept that 
civilians may also be killed or hurt, whatever efforts are made to limit so-called “collateral 
damage. (Annan, 2004) 
 
As one author notes ‘… the idea and practice of genocide is most probably as ancient 
as the idea and practice of war. Indeed war and genocide have always been closely 
related…” (Weitz, 2003a:75). In talking about the Holocaust, Gellately (2003:242) 
notes that “… the coming of war proved to be the key factor that led from various 
forms of repression and persecution into genocide”. 
The recent events of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia provide an example of this 
relationship. “In July 1995, General Krstic, you personally agreed to evil. You are 
guilty of the murder of thousands of Bosnian Muslims … You are guilty General 
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Krstic, of genocide”. These were the sentencing judge’s comments in relation to the 
trial of Bosnian Serb general Radislav Krstic (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(ABC), 2002). The trial was held before the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia in 2001 in relation to the general’s role in the 1995 massacre of 
more then 7000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. The crime of genocide has been 
recognised as a serious evil in the modern world by the United Nations. It is one of 
the particular crimes that have been identified by the Rome Statute of the ICC (see 
Part 2 Elements of Crimes). Indeed the preamble to the Rome Statute includes the 
following statements: 
Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of 
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity ... such grave crimes 
threaten the peace, security and wellbeing of the world ... that the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished...  
These “… massive and systematic violations…” have prompted the international 
community to look above and beyond traditional law enforcement options to deal with 
this most serious of crimes (McGoldrick, 2000:629). Genocide is a type of crime that 
“… seems obviously evil” to the majority of society (Staub, 1999b:179). The 
wrongful killing of innocent people is one of the most accepted transgressions of 
human moral beliefs, the crime of genocide multiplies this horror many times (Nickel, 
2001). Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, the commander of the United Nations 
peacekeeping forces in Rwanda during the genocide there, had this to say about the 
killing of 800,000 Tutsis. “It was hard to believe that in the past weeks an 
unimaginable evil had turned Rwanda’s gentle green valleys and mist-capped hills 
into a stinking nightmare of rotting corpses” (Dallaire, 2005:1).  
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So extreme and 
unreal are events 
such as the 
Holocaust that to 
attempt to explain 
them in normal 
terms seems to 
miss the depth of 
evil involved in the actions and the suffering of the victims (Baumeister, 2002; 
Zukier, 1994). It has in fact been referred to as the “supreme evil” (R. S. Clark & 
Sann, 1996:3). Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations (1998) made this 
reference in May 1998 to the genocide that occurred in Rwanda:36 
In the face of genocide, there can be no standing aside, no looking away, no neutrality, there are 
perpetrators and there are victims; there is evil and there is evil’s harvest. Evil in Rwanda was 
aimed not only at Tutsis. It was aimed at anyone who would stand up or speak out against the 
murder.  
Possible reasons for considering genocide to be so evil can include the degree of 
harm, the number of victims, the evil intent and the unusualness of the crime. At the 
Nuremberg trials the judges distinguished between war crimes and crimes against 
humanity (genocide). “Judges choose the latter description (crimes against 
humanity)37 to register their sense that they were confronted with something 
unprecedented in its criminality and unique in its evil” (Gaita, 1995:7). It should be 
noted that; “… all genocides are by definition crimes against humanity, but not all 
                                                 
36 Speech by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Parliament of Rwanda, in Kigali on 7 May 1998. 
Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, the 
commander of the United Nations peacekeeping
forces in Rwanda.
Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, the 
commander of the United Nations peacekeeping
forces in Rwanda.
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crimes of humanity are elevated to the symbolic significance of genocide” (Hagan et 
al., 2005:528). 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all the definitions of genocide and the 
arguments concerning such. Genocide in its most basic form can be said to be acts 
intended to destroy in part or whole any ethnic, racial, national or religious group 
(Commonwealth Attorney Generals Department, 1993). These acts can include 
murder, imposed conditions designed to eliminate the group, preventing births and 
moving children from the group as defined by the Genocide Convention (Yacoubian, 
2000). The crime is often carried out by a legitimate regime that is seen by the 
majority of society as undertaking positive action. In other words, it is a state crime 
(Fein, 1993; Friedrichs, 2000). The Rome Statute of the ICC gives the most recent 
definition of what the crime of genocide includes. In Article 6 it states: 
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
The United Nations definition of genocide has been criticised for not including 
political groups or social classes as victims (Fein, 1993).  
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
37 My italics. 
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Few if any criminologists are taught to regard the Holocaust as a criminological 
phenomenon and very few have focused on the criminological aspects of this event 
(Day & Vandiver, 2000; Friedrichs, 2000). Zukier (1994) argues that psychological 
roots of genocide have yet to be taken seriously by the social sciences. A recent study 
that examined 13 major international criminology journals over eight years found that 
of a total of 3138 articles published only one dealt with the issue of genocide 
(Yacoubian, 2000). Further, this study examined a number of annual meetings of 
American criminological societies and found that only approximately .001 per cent of 
papers presented were devoted to the topic of genocide (Yacoubian, 2000). It has also 
been argued that as criminologists we have been reluctant “… to entertain questions, 
much less answers, about some of the most momentous criminal atrocities committed 
against humanity” (Hagan et al., 2005:529).  
 
It was the case that sustained study of genocide was “… remarkably slow to start, 
although it accelerated in the 1990s” (Gellately & Kiernan, 2003:4). It has been 
suggested that genocide may be better explained through political science than 
criminology. This has prevented the application of tools that criminologists have at 
their disposal to the problem of genocide (Day & Vandiver, 2000). These tools consist 
of utilitarian criminological theories and criminological research processes (Day, 
Vandiver, & Janikowski, 2003). Indeed the “… attempt to apply other theories to 
macro and micro level phenomena evident in the commission of genocide can be a 
valuable exercise…” (Day et al., 2003:121). 
 
Others see this lack of application arising through a lack of funding, localisation of 
criminological issues, limitations of research methods and a lack of education (re 
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genocide) among criminologists (Yacoubian, 2000). There is also a perceived 
difficulty in dealing with massive human rights violations with the ordinary measures 
that are applied to common criminal events (Nino, 1996). This can be seen in attempts 
by various criminologists to limit the area of serial killers/mass killers to an 
individualised/personal level rather than including the group/socio-political level. 
This separation of criminological explanations from political events can be extended 
to a failure of criminologists to deal with issues such as genocide because there is a 
tendency “… to restrict their vision to national borders … we tend to measure, our 
definitions and our analyses at the level of the nation or smaller geographic units with 
a nation” (Day et al., 2003:119). Further to this is the fact that criminological theory 
has been applied as an explanation to “… individual acts of violence but not 
necessarily collective acts” (Wilson, 2003:5). 
 
Society has been fascinated as to how events like the Holocaust, the extermination of 
Muslims in Bosnia and the crimes that took place in Rwanda could actually come 
about. They present a more difficult concept for us to deal with than acts committed 
by individuals. We would like to imagine that if other members of our society 
suddenly started killing another particular group of people, that we, as individuals, 
could resist this form of mass or group evil. Yet history and recent events clearly 
show us that this is not the case (Anderson & Carnagey, 2005; Fein, 1993; Yacoubian, 
2000). The list of recent victims highlights how society has failed to deal with this 
form of evil. Over one million Bengali in Bangladesh in 1971, 150,000 Hutu in 
Burundi in 1972, 1.5 million Cambodians between 1975 and 1979, 200,000 Bosnian 
Muslims and Croats in Yugoslavia in 1992 and 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 
have become victims of genocide (Yacoubian, 2000:9). The list of victims gets longer 
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if one includes those persons who have had to flee to save their lives. Recent 
estimates have put the number of refugees at 16.7 million (Fein, 1993:81). 
  
I have suggested that evil acts often have two forms of motivation, first to harm a 
particular person or group, and second to fulfil some goal that the act is meant to 
achieve. To understand how this type of mass evil occurs we need to look at both 
group/situational influences (i.e. leaders, political systems or processes and culture) 
and individual psychology. This can be referred back to the interactional approach 
discussed previously (Blass, 1993; Staub, 1999a). It is suggested that the individual 
often feels obliged to undertake orders that are seen as legitimate or part of a process 
to achieve certain outcomes (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). It is this mentality of the 
end justifying the means that allows both criminals and non-criminals to justify 
actions in the attainment of certain goals (Fattah, 1997). This process involves the 
elements of making the acts routine so that they become more acceptable and 
vilifying the victim so that this person becomes devalued (Ball, 1999; Kelman & 
Hamilton, 1989; Kressel, 2002). I would argue that not only do the perpetrators 
devalue the victims, but bystanders do as well.  
 
Consider the example of Rwanda. The UN was clearly informed that thousands of 
Tutsis were being slaughtered every day, yet the UN failed to act by sending a 
military reinforcement to aid the UN peacekeepers who were there. This is despite the 
fact that countries like the US clearly had the ability to do so. Yet when terrorists 
killed some 3,000 US citizens in New York, the US was prepared to invade 
Afghanistan and Iraq at the cost of billions of dollars and thousands of lives. Clearly 
there has been a value judgement placed on the value of the respective victims. 
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In most genocidal actions there is a progression along a continuum of destruction that 
begins with small actions that progress to the final act of extermination of the target 
group (Staub, 1989; J. E. Waller, 1996). This proposition can be likened to the 
concept of momentum building as put forward by Milgram. The men of the 101st 
Police Battalion are a good example of killing becoming progressively easier and 
more efficient over time (Browning, 1998). Zukier (1994:435) refers to a similar 
process termed “murder by instalments” in which there is a “… pivotal encounter 
with evil”, the first unlawful act. After this the person then progressively increases 
their involvement, and this progression is facilitated by the overcoming of internal 
and external obstacles and the illusion of minimal change in actions “… the next step 
is a mere adjustment, not that different from its predecessor” (Zukier, 1994:435). 
 
Target groups are often devalued, which can lead to the victims being excluded from 
the benefit of normal moral considerations (Staub, 1999a). This devaluation can occur 
through two processes, first by dehumanising the victims and second by blaming the 
victims for the perceived sufferings of society (J. E. Waller, 1996). An example of 
this can be found in a speech that Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler gave to recruits 
of the Waffen-SS on July 13th, 1941 as they were preparing to go to the Eastern Front: 
This is an ideological battle and a struggle of races…on the other side stands a population of 
180 million, a mixture of races whose very names are unpronounceable, and whose physique is 
such that one can shoot them down without pity and compassion.  (Stein, 1966:126) 
 
It is also important that the target groups or victims are clearly identified so that the 
process of curing the perceived ills of the nation can be undertaken. This necessitates 
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that the cause is totally removed (Jones, 2000; Lifton, 2000). Moral considerations of 
the victims are replaced by higher ideals that are aimed at protecting the needs of the 
majority. In his history of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, Weingartner (1974) 
argues that by the time of the Russian conflict war had become a struggle of moral 
absolutes. In this type of war “… the enemy became the faceless, dehumanised 
embodiment of evil with whom no compromise was possible. Evil had to be 
annihilated so that good might triumph” (Weingartner, 1974:165). This allows 
behaviour that would otherwise be considered as unacceptable to become acceptable 
to attain these higher ideals (Staub, 1999a; Weingartner, 1974). To achieve the above 
would lead to an increase in the magnitude gap between victim and perpetrator as 
previously discussed (Baumeister, 1999).  
 
It is argued that mass violence often can arise in social situations in which there are 
life problems, such as political upheaval, poor economic conditions and social change 
(Staub, 2002). While difficult life conditions may act as a catalyst, they will not by 
themselves cause people to resort to evil acts. Take for instance the Great Depression, 
which is often cited as a cause of the problems in Nazi Germany. Other major 
countries also faced these same problems, yet this kind of behaviour did not break out 
in England, France or America. The difficult or unsatisfactory situation is often 
framed in terms of wrongfulness or the condition as being unjust (Borum, 2003; 
Staub, 2002). 
 
The difficult life conditions can, however, allow psychological and social processes to 
take place, leading subgroups within society to turn against each other (Jones, 2000; 
Staub, 1999a). Take for instance the case of one of the Rwandan killers, Lauren 
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Renzaho, a poor farmer. He was a member of the Interahamwe militia that was drawn 
from the poor and powerless and committed many of the killings in Rwanda (Keane, 
2004). He was faced with difficult life conditions in trying to feed his 10 children. It 
was all too easy to believe the Hutu government rhetoric that the causes of societies 
problems were the Tutsis: 
Of course we hated them. The plan to kill them was ready. It had been finished. The hatred was 
deeply imbedded so anyone who saw a Tutsi killed them … In the past they subjected Hutus to 
constant beating, they made them farm for them. That is what the Hutus didn’t like. (Keane, 
2004:2)  
 
Indeed the Rwandan Hutu government did all it could to dehumanise the Tutsi victims 
(Ball, 1999; Dallaire, 2005). This devaluation of the victim can be due to the injustice 
(that being the difficult life conditions) being seen to arise from the wrongful 
behaviour of a certain target group, and blame for the situation is attached to this 
group (Borum, 2003). Once difficult life conditions are in place genocide can emerge: 
By virtue of the fact that extreme discontent of broad segments of the population has reached 
unendurable proportions. Such a population becomes susceptible to charismatic demagogues 
who will promise to restore or even improve the previous level of satisfaction. (J. M. Steiner, 
2000:66) 
 
One does not only have to look to Nazi Germany to see examples of the above. 
Current-day Europe is experiencing a resurgence in racially motivated attacks on 
specific target groups, which include not only Jews, but Muslims, Africans and any 
who appear not to belong to the internalised us group. They are seen as the enemy 
within.  An article in Time Magazine highlighted the growing problem that faces 
Europe in the form of anti-Semitic and other racial attitudes: 
Europe today suffers from a much larger ailment, as evidenced by the growth of right-wing 
populism in France, the Netherlands, Denmark or Austria. The common denominator is not 
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Jews; it is angst and anger. The targets are foreigners who are dark-skinned and non-Christian. 
(Geary, 2002 12 December) 
 
It would be a mistake to think that what occurred in Nazi Germany was an aberration 
of history. It has happened too many times since in our supposedly civilised world to 
be written off as merely something out of the ordinary. An example was the large 
showing of support for Jean-Marie Le Pen in the French Presidential elections in 2002 
caused concern throughout Europe after he got through to the second round of voting 
on a platform that was based on racism, xenophobia and right-wing nationalism.  To a 
certain extent it is the ordinary problems in society that can cause extra-ordinary 
actions to take place. 
Instead, what appears to be happening in many European countries — as evidenced by the 
appeal of far-right leaders like France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen and the assassinated Dutch 
politician Pim Fortuyn — is a more generalised backlash against “foreigners” of all kinds and 
the entrenched political establishment. According to a new European Union report, for 
example, anti-Muslim attacks have also soared throughout much of the region since Sept. 11. 
And even the electoral success of Le Pen — who once called the Holocaust “a detail of history” 
— isn’t only a symptom of anti-Semitism, but a reflection of French unease with its immigrant 
underclass. (Geary, 2002 12 December ) 
 
Groups within society look for a scapegoat for their situation when difficult life 
conditions come into play (Staub, 2002). This phenomenon can be seen when crime 
increases in a society where there is often a call for more punitive law and order 
measures to be adopted against target groups (Weatherburn, 2002). These groups are 
held to blame for the insecurities of society.  Borum maintains that the target group is 
devalued, “… extremists describe the responsible party as evil: dehumanising a target 
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in this regard further facilitates aggression” and places the target group outside society 
and its norms (as society does not see itself as evil) (Borum, 2003:8).  
 
This dehumanisation is often achieved by astute use of the media to portray the target 
groups as being less then human and condoning action against these groups (Kressel, 
2002). Examples of how effective this is can be seen in the portrayal of the Jews and 
Bolsheviks as subhumans by the Germans, and the use of the media by the Hutus to 
denigrate the Tutsis in Rwanda. During the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 the state 
radio broadcast messages such as, “All Tutsis will perish. They will disappear from 
the earth. Slowly, slowly, slowly. We will kill them like rats” (Keane, 2004:11). As 
one Hutu killer explained, “Ordinary people tend to believe whatever the radio says 
because the radio is the main source of information. You want to tell lies to the 
people, just use the radio” (Keane, 2004:4). It is often the case the hateful leaders will 
utilise the “media and other institutions to flood people’s minds with messages 
teaching them to devalue their victims” (Kressel, 2002:169). 
 
Weatherburn (2002) holds that society feels disaffected and there is a perceived need 
to punish these groups (that are responsible for the unjust circumstances) for 
generating the problems facing society. From a political aspect society can adopt 
gross ideologies, which can identify a particular group that is seen to stand in the way 
of achieving success through the pursuit of this ideology (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; 
Staub, 1999a; Wilson, 2000a). The difficult conditions give rise to powerful needs 
and goals.  People need to satisfy these and this is achieved at the cost of a target 
group. In a totalitarian society often,  
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Perpetrators, accomplices and bystanders rendering overt or covert support to causing 
suffering or death of others may derive satisfaction, a feeling of accomplishment, or even 
pleasure from such acts. (J. M. Steiner, 2000:65) 
 
In terms of the conditions that can cause genocidal actions, Steiner (2000) uses the 
analogy of a lock and key, where the terms are used to express a cause and effect 
relationship (similar to the illness and cure analogy used by Lifton). Using the Nazi 
example, the lock was the socio-political and economic conditions after World War I. 
The key was Adolf Hitler and the Nazis. The interaction of these two variables 
provided a trigger for a response, which in this case was world war and persecution of 
certain target groups. Television producer Laurence Rees in conducting interviews 
with ordinary Germans for his documentary on the Nazis came to the following 
conclusion: 
After listening to witness after witness, not hardline committed Nazis, tell us how positive their 
experiences had been, a glimmer of understanding emerged. If you have lived through times of 
chaos and humiliation, you welcome order and security. If the price of that is a little evil, then 
you put up with it. (Rees, 1997:85) 
 
Indeed the above comments can provide some explanation and understanding as to 
how a seeming normal society can change to commit such acts of evil.  
What horrified many of the victims of Nazi persecution was the speed of conversion of many 
Germans to evil policies, the annihilation of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses 
and Slavs, and the fact that many of the persecutors had once been their neighbours and even 
friends. (Murray, 2004:28) 
 
This acceptance of some evil as the cost of achieving perceived greater good was 
shown to good effect at the Nuremberg Trials. During the case against the German 
General Staff and High Command at the International Military Tribunal (IMT), the 
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prosecutor, Colonel Taylor, noted how the generals had been prepared to accept the 
evils of Nazism in return for a restoration of military glory: 
The picture we have seen is that of a group of men with great power for good or evil, who chose 
the latter, who deliberately set out to arm Germany to the point where the German will could be 
imposed on the rest of the world, and who gladly joined forces with the most evil forces at work 
in Germany. "Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired," we are told by 
Blomberg and Blaskowitz, and that is obviously the truth.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:496) 
 
The above lock-and-key proposal of Steiner is similar to the concept of critical 
releasers as put forward by Milgram. Indeed genocidal actions can only be performed 
“… under favourable political conditions, most commonly a totalitarian or 
authoritarian regime which constrains criticism and prevents the diffusion of 
knowledge” (Nino, 1996:10). Genocide can arise by a number of ways. It can be 
purely reactive or retributive in response to certain social conditions or stimuli, 
alternatively it can be ideologically based and planned (Fein, 1993). Chalk and 
Jonassohn agree with Fein and list four typologies of genocide based on motives 
(Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990:29). First to eliminate a threat, to spread terror among 
enemies, to acquire economic wealth and last ideology (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; 
Fein, 1993). 
  
The following example shows how the genocide of European Jews was ideologically 
driven and carefully thought out. During dinner in February, 1942 Hitler explained to 
Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler and a SS-Sturmbannführer of the 5th Waffen-SS 
Panzer Division Wiking his view and solution of the Jewish problem: 
The discovery of the Jewish virus is one of the greatest revolutions that have taken place in the 
world. The battle in which we are engaged today is the same sort of battle waged during the last 
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century by Pasteur and Koch. How many diseases have the origin in their Jewish virus ... We 
shall regain our health only by eliminating the Jew. Everything has a cause, nothing comes by 
chance. (Trevor-Roper, 2000:332) 
 
In fact, as part of their victim devaluation the Germans made good use of lingual 
manipulation to portray and stereotype the Jews as various diseases or disease carriers 
to the extent that it assisted in the facilitation of the genocide against them (Matthaus, 
1996; J. E. Waller, 1996). The psychology of genocide has been likened to a society 
suffering from an illness, and the antidote or cure to this illness is the action that 
results in genocide (Lifton, 2000).  
 
It has been argued that genocide occurs more readily in certain situations. These 
include societies that are pluralistic in nature and contain social stratifications, 
allowing more easily of an us and them mentality. Regime type and ideology can also 
be an explanation as to the occurrence of genocide. As previously mentioned, non-
democratic governments are more predisposed to engage in genocide (Fein, 1993). I 
would argue that there are three basic processes that have been identified as being 
present in genocidal actions during the above discussion. Miller (1995) succinctly 
outlines these as making the act routine, dehumanisation of the target group and 
authorisation of the act. In summary, genocide can be broken down into some basic 
factors: 
• There is a bureaucracy/regime that is prepared to undertake evil acts.  
• There are individuals present in society who are prepared to surrender their 
moral responsibility to commit these actions.  
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• The following of these directions from the regime is part of the creation of 
distance between the perpetrator and the victim.  
• There is a devaluing of a target group. 
• The perpetrator does not have to be concerned with the moral implications of 
the act because this moral role has been assumed by the regime.  
• There is usually some kind of difficult life conditions present in society that 
make society more susceptible to this type of action.  
 
Importantly, there needs to be a clearly defined target group that can be readily 
identified as a causal factor of the problems in society. If there is one important facet 
of the crime of genocide it is the fact that while it is a crime carried out by 
individuals, it is a crime that encompasses the whole of society due to its enormity.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion it can be seen that the concept of evil does have a useful place in 
helping to classify and explain intentional human actions that result in gross harm to 
victims. There are actions that go beyond the concept of merely wrong, instead they 
appeal to a higher concept of wrongdoing. This concept of evil should, however, be 
grounded in the reality of physical actions, and to some degree the sometimes very 
real and ordinary motives behind such, and not seek to rely on the portrayal of evil 
acts being committed by evil or demonic people.  
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The causes of evil can be many and varied, and each act of evil will need to be judged 
in its specific situation to determine what the casual factors were. However, I take the 
view that the interactive approach is the best method of understanding why evil acts 
are committed. To exclude either situational or dispositional causes is far too limiting 
when examining human behaviour and the role of societal influences. After all, 
humans do not behave in a vacuum independent of outside influences. It is for this 
reason that the examination of genocide, perhaps the greatest evil of our time, 
provides a good case study for the methods of causation that I have proposed. This 
broad-based organisational and societal crime allows the application of evil above and 
beyond the individual. As such it would seem to quickly render as inadequate, 
arguments that the person or persons were just evil (as I have already rejected this 
notion in my earlier arguments). The crime is just too broad to be explained away in 
this fashion.  
 
As such I have chosen the Waffen-SS as the case study for this thesis so that I can test 
my operational definition as well as providing evidence for the interactional causation 
model of evil acts when looking at broad-scale atrocity. Examination of this group 
allows for an examination of collective behaviour and the application of the concept 
of evil to actions that have been accurately documented to some degree by tribunals 
after the conflict ended.  Further, the study provides important information in relation 
to the propensity for committing war crimes and broad-scale atrocities that can be 
directly applied to current occurrences. The application of the concept of evil to these 
actions may increase our understanding of why such actions occur. War crimes, in 
particular genocide, are a continuing problem regarding the humane treatment of 
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combatants and non-combatants, and as such it is important to try to determine factors 
that can cause these to more readily occur.  
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CH A P T E R  3:  TH E  OR I G I N S  A N D  
ID E O L O G Y O F T H E  WA F F E N -SS 
 
The SS were initially formed as a bodyguard for Hitler who could no longer rely on 
the support or loyalty of the original SA38 stormtroopers, who were the foot soldiers 
of the Nazi Party (Stein, 1966). From this handful of men the Waffen-SS became the 
largest of branches of the SS. In doing so, apologists for the Waffen-SS argue that it 
became the defacto fourth branch of the German armed forces of World War II, the 
others being the Navy, Army and Air Force, and numbered some 900 00039 men by its 
conclusion (Large, 1987; Quarrie & Burn, 1993).  
Date Waffen-SS Officer Corps 
31st December 1937 
 
16,902 757 
31st December 1938 
 
22,718 1203 
1st May 1940 
 
90,638 2453 
1st December 1942 
 
23,6099 9558 
31st December 1943 
 
501,049 Unknown 
30th June 1944 
 
594,443 15,722 
Note: Sourced from Wegner 1990 
 
                                                 
38 The term SA is referring to SturmAbteilung or storm troopers organised by the Nazi Party for 
protection against attacks by rival political groups. These troopers were also known as the Brown 
Shirts. 
 
39 Note that there is disagreement between researchers as to the strength of the Waffen-SS at the 
conclusion of the war. Suffice to say that the estimates of the strength vary between 500,000 to 900,000 
soldiers. 
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The Waffen-SS soldiers were unique in that they were the first of Germany’s armed 
forces that swore a personal oath of loyalty to Hitler, and underwent a rigorous 
process of indoctrination to Nazi ideals and were trained to be a highly disciplined, 
motivated and successful military formation (C. Mann, 2001; Quarrie & Burn, 1993). 
For this reason the Waffen-SS has been viewed by some as a “… praetorian guard and 
elite” of the Nazi state (Wegner, 1985:220). Indeed, during a dinner conversation on 
the 1st of November 1941 Hitler remarked that “Within a hundred years or so from 
now all the German elite will be a product of the SS, for only the SS practices racial 
selection” (Trevor-Roper, 2000:106). The Waffen-SS gained considerable respect 
both from foes and friends due to the fact that “The Waffen-SS possessed military 
qualities equalled by few other forces and surpassed by none” (Hohne, 1969:467).  
 
Defining the Waffen-SS 
One of the most contentious issues when dealing with the Waffen-SS is actually 
clearly defining what units and departments should be considered to be part of the 
Waffen-SS. As noted by Sydnor: 
Attempts to define the what the Waffen-SS was lead invariably to questions about the extent to 
which the Waffen-SS was or was not an integral part of the overall SS organisation, and the 
degree to which it was or was not involved in the criminal acts attributed to the SchutzStaffel. 
(Sydnor, 1973:339) 
 
On the 2nd of March 1940 Hitler accepted a proposal from Oberkommando der  
Wehrmacht (OKW) or Armed Forces Command that led to the re-organisation of SS 
units and the use of the term Waffen-SS became official (Stein, 1966). As a result of 
this proposal the Waffen-SS was at that stage to include the Leibstandarte SS Adolf 
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Hitler, the SS-Verfügungstruppe Division40 (SSVT was the forerunner to the Waffen-
SS), the Totenkopf Division, the SS Polizei Division, the SS Junkerschulen or training 
academies and all replacement and training units (Stein, 1966). Of crucial importance 
is that the proposal also recognised the SS Totenkopfverbände as part of the Waffen-
SS, with the qualification that “… the decision as to whether this duty counts as 
military service is to be taken in the future” (Stein, 1966:49).  
 
The proposal also acknowledged that there were additional sections of the Waffen-SS 
that went beyond the armed fighting units. These included “… seven administrative 
organisations handling recruitment, supply, administration, justice, welfare, weapons 
development and medical services” (Stein, 1966:49). Service in such units was 
considered to be military service. In addition to this “… the term Waffen-SS actually 
included all SS formations and offices borne on the budget of the Reich Minister of 
Finance” (Krausnick et al., 1965:269). In a memorandum dated the 11th of May 1942 
Himmler, when referring to the budget of the Waffen-SS, included the fighting 
divisions, schools and the concentration-camps and other ancillary units as being part 
of the Waffen-SS (Krausnick et al., 1965). This order was to be: 
The most cogent argument against those SS apologists who claim that the Waffen-SS had 
nothing to do with the concentration-camps. On both the highest formal level and the lowest 
guard level Himmler had irrevocably bound the knights of his black order to the murkiest 
corners of his deadly empire. (Mollo, 1982:42) 
 
This at least provides a starting platform as to what units or sections can be 
considered to be part of the Waffen-SS. However, like most apparatus of the Nazi 
                                                 
40 Militarised component of the SS in the pre-war period; direct predecessor of the Waffen-SS. 
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state this organisation was subject to revision as the war went on. As I proceed 
through the following sections I will discuss my arguments in more detail as to why 
the units, which undertook anti-partisan duties, and the activities of the 
Einsatzgruppen and the concentration-camps, were either part of, or heavily linked to 
the Waffen-SS. 
 
It is my argument that the Waffen-SS was not just limited to the fighting formations at 
the front. A fighting unit relies on a supply and administrative apparatus to survive. It 
is not sensible to separate the combat units from the other units that were so necessary 
for their ability to undertake the duties placed upon them. During his testimony at 
Nuremberg, SS-Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser attempted to distance the Waffen-
SS fighting units from the concentration-camp guards. 
HAUSSER: All persons who served at home and in the police had to be exempted from military 
service in the army by the Wehrkreis or district commander in order to carry out their police 
tasks. That did not apply when all guard units were designated as Waffen-SS, for these were a 
part of the armed forces. In the main offices in Berlin these units, in order to differentiate them, 
were designated nominal Waffen-SS. But all this I learned only here later.   
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:366)  
 
Hausser has outlined a major argument of Waffen-SS veterans and their supporters, 
that being “… except for organisational connections there were no fundamental ties 
between the SS and the Waffen-SS” (Kren & Rappoport, 1976:88). This is just simply 
not the case. Apologists such as Theile attempt to distance the Waffen-SS from the 
unsavoury parts of the SS organisation. In his study, Theile excludes from his 
discussion of the Waffen-SS the concentration-camps, the Einsatzgruppen and the 
main SS administrative offices (Theile, 1997).  As noted by Stein, the SS 
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Totenkopfstandarten (Death’s Head units formed from concentration-camp guards) 
“were eventually incorporated, unit by unit, into the larger field formations of the 
Waffen-SS” (Segev, 1987; Stein, 1966:50). The Death’s Head units were used to form 
various Waffen-SS formations, which one writer describes as a “second Waffen-SS” 
(Mollo, 1982:91).  
 
This is similar to the expression used by the SS in their defence at Nuremberg where 
some members were 
described as 
nominal. This is a 
flawed approach, it 
seems that the 
argument is that 
those parts of the 
Waffen-SS that 
appear tainted 
should be excluded from account. This is simply not the case; these formations were 
part of the Waffen-SS and as such should be included in the examination of the 
Waffen-SS organisation as a whole just as much as the front-line fighting units.  
 
The actions of officers and men attached to such as the above raised problems for the 
defence of the Waffen-SS at Nuremberg. To try and circumnavigate this problem the 
defence coined the term nominal members of the Waffen-SS, which they almost 
exclusively applied to those members of the Waffen-SS who were not in the combat 
units or who committed atrocities in places such as the camps. The argument of 
Soldiers of the Waffen-SS on parade.Soldiers of the Waffen-SS on parade.
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nominal Waffen-SS members was a constant theme used by the SS defence witnesses. 
It is interesting that at the time of the trials, the defence and witnesses never presented 
any documentary evidence that, indicated that the Waffen-SS command had protested 
against the inclusion of such officers or men within the ranks of the Waffen-SS. 
Certainly there is no evidence that officers like Hausser attempted to resign their 
commissions or leave the Waffen-SS in protest at such actions that they claimed were 
an insult to their honour.  
 
In essence the witnesses were trying to say that these other people were Waffen-SS, 
but not Waffen-SS. The difficulty in including such units can be seen by the answers 
given by Waffen-SS officers such as Robert Brill: 
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you tell us, please, who was in charge of the command 
within the concentration-camp. Was it not the Waffen-SS?  
BRILL: No, they were not commands of the Waffen-SS. Certain members of the nominal 
Waffen-SS were with the commands; but there is a clear order of the High Command of the 
Armed Forces which I have already mentioned. It is included in the Army circular of December 
1940, and states that members of the Death’s Head units do not do any military service in the 
sense' of the Waffen-SS -Members of the Death’s Head units.  
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like to ask you to be more concise. So you contend that 
the commands in concentration-camps were not Waffen-SS commands?  
BRILL: The commands were not under the High Command of the Waffen-SS; but I wish to 
point out that members of the Waffen-SS were with the commands. This is the difference.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:352) 
 
This would appear to be an inaccurate statement. The question needs to be asked at 
what point did these members of the Waffen-SS become nominal? Was it before they 
joined the fighting divisions of the Waffen-SS, or was it after they left them and took 
up duties in the camps? At what point did Max Simon, commander of the 
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Reichsführer-SS Division, or Georg Bochmann, commander of the Gotz Von 
Berlichingen Division, consider themselves to be merely nominal Waffen-SS 
members? Simon and Bochmann both served at Sachsenburg and Dachau (MacLean, 
1999a).  
 
One purpose of separating the Waffen-SS from these other organisations is that it 
allows the reputation of the Waffen-SS to be rehabilitated to some degree, and this 
has often been the aim of post-war apologists (Stein, 1966:3).  As stated by Wegner 
when he began his study of the Waffen-SS: 
Initial investigations soon revealed that the analysis of the Waffen-SS solely in terms of its 
military characteristics would not be historically relevant because this approach would have 
hidden the central fact that the Waffen-SS, as a result of its integration into the all-
encompassing system of organised violence that was the SS, neither possessed the professional 
autonomy of the army nor could it be defined as strictly military in the traditional sense. 
(Wegner, 1990:3) 
 
This study rejects the notion of the nominal Waffen-SS member as it was rejected at 
Nuremberg. It is my contention that the Waffen-SS needs to be examined as a whole 
organisation, rather then just isolating certain sections of the organisation. The 
following organisational chart provides some concept of the structure of the SS state 
as it related to the Waffen-SS.  
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Waffen-SS Structure
Waffen-SS
OKW and OKH
Note: This chart represents the organisation as it appeared in 1944,
however it should be noted that the structure of the SS organisation
was constantly changing. Only the main functions of each section
have been listed. Sourced from Bender 1971.
Kommando staff RFSS
SS-Brigadefuhrer Rode
Effectively the High Command
of the Waffen-SS
SS courts
HSSPF
Higher SS and Police Leaders
SS Main Office (SS-HA)
SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Berger
Responsible for recruiting and
ideological training
WAFFEN-SS
Training Schools
SS Main Operational Office (SS-FHA)
SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Juttner
Responsible for operations, supply
training and intelligence
SS Main Economic/Administrative Office
(WVHA) SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Pohl
Responsible for budget, etc
of the Waffen-SS and camps
Himmler
RF-SS
However, the SS structure was a constantly changing beast and as such the above 
structure is a general guide to give some understanding to the different departments of 
the SS as they relate to the Waffen-SS.  It is beyond the scope of this study to perform 
a full analysis of the SS organisation. The main departments as they relate to the 
Waffen-SS only have been included; as such it is not a complete representation of the 
SS state. Specific Himmler and Führer orders will shed more light on the relationship 
between the Waffen-SS and other departments of the SS. 
 
The Nazi ideology and the creation of the Waffen-SS 
I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, as Leader and Chancellor of the Reich, loyalty and bravery. I pledge 
to you and the superiors appointed by you, obedience unto death. So help me God. (Staub, 
1989:129) 
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“Loyalty is my honour”, this was the oath of allegiance of the Waffen-SS man. It was 
with this oath that the members of the Waffen-SS bound their destiny to a man who 
committed some of the worst atrocities in history and embarked on a path of murder 
and mayhem that would result in the destruction of the Nazi state and the deaths of 
millions. The purpose of this chapter is to basically explore whom the Waffen-SS 
were both from an organisational and personnel standpoint. That the Waffen-SS was a 
prodigy of the Nazis is beyond doubt; Wegner states that “… there was an intimate 
connection between the development of the Waffen-SS and the whole of the SS as a 
party organisation” (Wegner, 1990:62). Indeed the Waffen-SS as an organisation was 
prepared to surrender its moral responsibility to the Nazi state. This is mentioned in 
chapter 2 as one of the precursors to genocidal actions. The following pages will 
outline how this occurred. 
 
The SS was initially formed in 1925 as a protection squad for Hitler and other leading 
Nazis. It was formed from only the most active and reliable party members and was 
seen to be an integral part of the party structure (Krausnick et al., 1965). Upon the 
election of Hitler to the office of Chancellor, SS-Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler and 
the SS took up a number of “… official administrative, police and military functions” 
(Sydnor, 1990:xvii). It was in these roles that the SS would become the ultimate terror 
machinery of the Nazi state (Birn, 1991; Weingartner, 1983). Indeed at the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) the prosecution described the SS as below: 
For the SS was the elite group of the Party, composed of the most thorough-going adherents of 
the Nazi cause, pledged to blind devotion to Nazi principles, and prepared to carry them out 
without any question, and at any cost, a group in which every ordinary value has been so 
subverted that its members can ask, “What is there unlawful about the things we have done?”. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:161) 
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From its initial beginnings the SS developed into three main manpower sections. 
Initially there was the political arm, the General or Allgemeine SS, from which grew 
the SS-Totenkopfverbände (Death’s Head units) or camp guards, and finally the 
Waffen or fighting SS (Lumsden & Hannon, 1993; Quarrie & Burn, 1993; 
Williamson, 1994; Windrow & Burn, 1982). At the outbreak of war in 1939 the 
Waffen-SS emerged from a few regiments to some 38 divisions41 by war’s end. The 
General SS by war’s end would cease to be a significant force and the Death’s Head 
units would be absorbed into the Waffen-SS. As noted by the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunal (NMT): 
After the outbreak of war, units from both the Special Service Troops and the Death’s Head 
Formations were used in the Polish campaign. These troops came to be known as the Waffen or 
armed [Combat] SS. By 1940 the Waffen-SS contained 100,000 men, 56,000 coming from the 
Special Service Troops and the rest from the Allgemeine SS and the Death Head Troops. 
Concentration-camp guard duties came to be performed primarily by members of the 
Allgemeine-SS. The Waffen-SS fought in every campaign with the exception of those in Norway 
and Africa. By the end of the war it is estimated to have comprised about 580,000 men. Thus, it 
was numerically by far the larger branch of the SS, the Allgemeine-SS having declined in 
strength to less than 40,000.   
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:214) 
 
The SS rose to significance within the Nazi world by being utilised to spy on other 
members of the party and other party organisations (Muhlberger, 1991). Himmler and 
the SS were also used by Hitler to counter the growing power and threat from Ernst 
Rohm and the SturmAbteilung (SA) or Nazi Brown Shirts, who were the original foot 
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soldiers of the Nazis. The political reliability of the SS was confirmed when members 
of the Leibstandarte and other SS units were used by Hitler to eradicate the leadership 
of the SA in 1934 during the Rohm purge, the so-called Night of the Long Knives 
(Butler, 1978; C. Mann, 2001; Messenger, 2002; Wegner, 1985).  
 
During this action the SA leadership was emasculated and its leaders executed. The 
organisation was never again a serious political threat (Knopp, 2002; Stein, 1966). At 
Nuremberg, SS General Paul Hausser denied any involvement of the Waffen-SS (or 
its predecessor the SSVT in this case) in this incident. Other Waffen-SS generals 
stated a different story. SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff later related his role on this 
night after the war. He recounted how a “charming fellow”, who was the personal 
adjutant for Rohm, the leaders of the SA, and “… also a close personal friend, we 
often dined together” was executed (Messenger, 2002). Clearly friendship was not to 
stand in the way of the SS.  
 
For murdering many of their former comrades the SS earnt Hitler’s favour and 
gratitude. Waffen-SS General Von Eberstein had this to say when asked about killing 
their former comrades: 
MAJOR JONES: You are not answering my question, you know. You are wandering off into 
details that have no relevance to my question at all. I suggest to you that the killings by the SS 
on the 30th of June 1934 were a characteristic use of the SS as the fist of Nazism.  
                                                                                                                                            
41 It should be noted that some of these divisions were only of regimental strength, while others existed 
for only short periods of time. This is especially true of the divisions formed towards the end of the 
war. 
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VON EBERSTEIN: The events of the 30th of June 1934 were, according to my firm conviction 
and to that of my comrades, the result of a state of emergency and the orders which were given 
were adhered to because they were the orders of the head of the State.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:312) 
 
The Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler supplied troops that executed a number of high-
ranking SA officials. The affirmation of their loyalty and that of other SS units to 
Hitler was signed in the blood of their former SA comrades. Waffen-SS General Otto 
Kumm noted: “That is 
then that the image of the 
SS really changed for the 
first time, after the Führer 
said ‘SS men, your 
honour lies in loyalty’. 
You see for us that was 
naturally very uplifting” 
(Halliley, 2003). As a 
result of the Rohm purge the SS became the most powerful elite organisation within 
the Nazi state (J. M. Steiner, 1963).  
 
The role of the SS in the Rohm purge effectively ensured that from now on the SS 
displayed a “… will to act in conformity with the will of the Führer” (Hatheway, 
1999:31). Nicolaus Von Below was Hitler’s Luftwaffe adjutant from 1937 to 1945. 
He provides a glimpse of Hitler’s special relationship with the Waffen-S: 
Hitler sped by train to Metz, where the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler were quartered.  Among 
these men he was always in good spirits. In his speech he gave this feeling visible expression. 
Soldiers of the Waffen-SS undergo parade 
inspection. The discipline of the Waffen-SS was 
second to none.
Soldiers of the Waffen-SS undergo parade 
inspection. The discipline of the Waffen-SS was 
second to none.
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The SS-Leibstandarte must always expect to be deployed to the hottest spots of the battle. He 
said, “It is for you who are honoured to carry my name to stand at the forefront of the struggle”. 
(Von Below, 1980:80) 
 
 It was in this role that the Waffen-SS came to represent a sort of elite that placed 
heavy emphasis on loyalty to one’s comrades, common values and practices and a 
sense of obedience to the Nazi cause and ideology (Ripley, 2004; Staub, 1989; Stein, 
1966; Sydnor, 1990; Wolfson, 1965; Ziegler, 1989). This notion of the SS being a 
Nazi elite attached to the SS because of the fact that its duties were carried out on 
behalf of the Nazi regime (Gingerich, 1997; Ziegler, 1989). It was seen to be an elite 
from a social, racial and political aspect (Wolfson, 1965; Ziegler, 1989). In this 
respect limited research of some Waffen-SS officers has indicated that many joined to 
ensure that they could achieve “… a more satisfying self” through the apparently 
legitimate and socially acceptable means of joining this elite (J. M. Steiner, 
1963:416). 
 
The SS had proven its loyalty beyond doubt; it was for this reason that the Führer 
could place absolute faith in his SS legions. As such the SS were independent from 
both the Police and the Wehrmacht, and available for Hitler’s exclusive use (Buchler, 
1986). To this purpose Hitler issued a secret Führer order on the 17th of August 1938, 
which outlined the role and uses of the Waffen-SS both in peacetime and in war. He 
clearly delineates that the Waffen-SS is indeed different from just ordinary soldiers. 
II. The Armed Units of the SS.  
A. The SS-Verfügungstruppe.  
1. The SS-Verfügungstruppe is neither a part of the Wehrmacht nor a part of the police. It is a 
standing armed unit exclusively at my disposal. As such and as a unit of the NSDAP, its 
members are to be selected by the Reichsführer-SS according to the ideological and political 
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standards which I have ordered for the NSDAP and for the Schutzstaffeln. Its members are to 
be trained and its ranks filled with volunteers…  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:170) 
 
Note that Hitler himself has described the Waffen-SS as an organisation of the Nazi 
Party. This statement by Hitler is strong evidence against those apologists of the 
Waffen-SS who claim that it was not an organisation with political affiliations to the 
Nazi Party. Himmler also stipulates the political roots of the SS in an indoctrination 
pamphlet where he states: “Now I come to the Schulzstaffel itself. It is a part of this 
National Socialist German Workers Party created and trained by Adolf Hitler. Within 
the movement of the Führer it has received its special task for the protection of the 
Reich internally” (Pruess Publishing, 2001:25). This task was being carried out by the 
SS as early as 1938 when Hitler’s Army Adjutant, Major Gerhard Engel, recalled 
Himmler reporting to Hitler “about his cleansing measures” that were being 
undertaken in Vienna (Engel, 1974:37). Hitler himself stipulates the role the Waffen-
SS will play in times of conflict. 
III. Orders in case of Mobilisation.  
A. The employment of the SS-Verfügungstruppe in case of mobilisation is a double one.  
1. By the Supreme Commander of the Army within the wartime army. In that case it comes 
completely under military laws and regulations, but remains a unit of the NSDAP politically.  
2. In case of necessity in the interior according to my orders; in that case it is under the 
Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police.  
In case of mobilisation I myself will make the decision about the time, strength and manner of 
the incorporation of the SS-Verfügungstruppe into the wartime army; these things will depend 
on the internal political situation at that time.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:170) 
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As can be seen from this order, the Waffen-SS was to undertake a policing role 
internally as well as take part in any conflict with external enemies. This is clearly 
illustrated by comments made by Hitler during dinner on the 24th of July 1941 where 
he is referring the losses suffered by the Waffen-SS in the opening stages of the 
Russian campaign.  
For an elite force, like our SS, it’s great luck to have suffered comparatively heavy losses. In this 
way it is assured of the necessary prestige to intervene if need be, on the home front, which of 
course won’t be necessary. But it’s good to know that one disposes of a force that could show 
itself capable of doing so on occasion. (Trevor-Roper, 2000:13) 
 
This is further proof that Hitler saw the Waffen-SS as a political force to be used 
against their fellow Germans if need be, something that was not expected of the other 
German armed forces. Hitler made the differentiation of the Waffen-SS even more 
succinct when he commented on its role in relation to the other armed forces after the 
war on the 4th of January 1942.  
As soon as peace has returned, the SS will have to be given its independence again, a complete 
independence (from the Army).42 There has always been a rivalry between troops of the line 
and guardsmen. That’s why it’s a good thing that the SS should constitute in relation to the 
others, an absolutely distinct world. In peacetime it’s an elite police, capable of crushing any 
adversary. (Trevor-Roper, 2000:167) 
 
During a conversation on the 19th of April 1938 Hitler expressed his views on the 
Waffen-SS to his Army adjutant, Major Engel: 
He wants to keep this elite small or it will not be an elite for long. It has to be a political force 
blindly loyal to state and Führer. In the event of disturbances, this force would put them down 
                                                 
42 My italics and addition. Clearly here Hitler is comparing the Waffen-SS to the regular German 
armed forces. 
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brutally. He sees it as a real Praetorian Guard to snuff out all those, even within its own ranks, 
who swim against the current. (Engel, 1974:38) 
The SS Courts 
There was to be one important amendment to the order issued by Hitler regarding the 
role of the Waffen-SS. That was the removal of the SS from military justice and 
regulations by virtue of a Hitler decree on the 17th of October 1939 (Krausnick et al., 
1965; Weingartner, 1983). All matters of military laws and regulations and 
enforcement were to be undertaken by the SS courts, not the military. Himmler saw 
this as being an important step in ensuring the independence of the SS from the 
Wehrmacht (Hatheway, 1999). It would ensure that the Waffen-SS was judged by 
their own under the supervision of Hitler and Himmler. Only Hitler could impose a 
death sentence on officers and commanders of the Waffen-SS, and Himmler reserved 
the right to make decisions in cases concerning SS men with membership numbers 
less then 15,000 (Krausnick et al., 1965).   
 
The judges of the SS courts were almost entirely made up of Waffen-SS officers.  An 
officer list of the SS courts in 1944 shows that some 599 belonged to the Waffen-SS 
with just six belonging the Allgemeine SS (Krausnick et al., 1965).  
The judges in the SS courts were SS commanders qualified for the office, they were nominated 
by Hitler himself, were necessarily members of the Waffen-SS, and for disciplinary matters 
were directly subordinate to the Reichsführer-SS. Membership of the Waffen-SS was obligatory 
since the privileged position of the SS in the possession of its own legal system was based upon 
the existence of the Waffen-SS… (Krausnick et al., 1965:253) 
 
Himmler commented that “… we try to train our lawyers by putting them in the SS 
and infusing them with our own spirit” (J. M. Steiner, 1963:439). In the perverted 
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view of the SS courts, justice would serve the ideological goals of the Nazi movement 
(Weingartner, 1983; Ziegler, 1989). The decisions of the SS judges were required to 
further the ideological aims of the regime and also “… serve as precepts 
supplementing the ideological indoctrination of SS members” (Weingartner, 
1983:280). 
 
In an ominous premonition of what was to come, Hitler had removed the Waffen-SS 
from the accountability of normal military expectations; it was now to be judged by 
its own. This is of even more import when one considers that initially only the SS 
units who were at the cutting edge of the SS operations were included under this 
protection (Weingartner, 1983:276). These units included the concentration-camp 
operatives, members of the SS bureaucracy, the SS Verfügungstruppe, members of 
police units on special actions and the Junkerschulen (Weingartner, 1983). It would 
appear that the real intent of this move was to ensure that those SS units who could be 
called upon to commit crimes would be protected by the SS justice system. Himmler 
had in fact created a legal system in which the criminal orders that were to be issued 
had been legitimised. This as previously discussed is conducive to the commission of 
evil acts. 
 
Political and ideological roots 
Even the German people held the Waffen-SS in some trepidation with secret reports 
indicating that the impression of some German citizens was that the Waffen-SS was 
“… the most ruthless force. It takes no prisioners, but totally annihilates its enemy” 
(Simpson, 1990:7). Himmler it seemed enjoyed his SS soldiers having this kind of 
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reputation. In a pamphlet presented at the Nuremberg Trials titled, “The SS as an 
Anti-Bolshevist Fighting Organisation” (document 1851-PS), Himmler said this of his 
SS: 
I know that there are some people in Germany who become sick when they see these black 
coats. We understand the reason for this and do not expect that we shall be loved by too many. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:182) 
 
Many apologists argue that the Waffen-SS was just a military formation the same as 
the Army, Navy and Air 
Force. Former Waffen-
SS adjutant to Hitler, 
Richard Schulze-
Kossens argued that 
“The idea that with the 
Waffen-SS Himmler 
created a political troop 
after his own image is completely incompatible with historical reality” (Schulze-
Kossens, 1982b:33). Noted author Heinz Hohne attempts to paint senior Waffen-SS 
generals such as Hausser and Steiner as being non-political; as being soldiers “… who 
just wanted to devote themselves to an exclusively military job” (Hohne, 1969:449). 
Yet both Hausser and Steiner were members of the SA and also members of the Nazi 
Party (Yerger, 1997, 1999). An order of the day issued by Steiner after heavy fighting 
dated the 30 July 1944 would seem to indicate that Steiner had political affiliations 
even up to the late stages of the war. 
Comrades, today you have gained a defensive victory … With your excellent soldierly morale 
and performance you have proved your profound loyalty to our Führer Adolf Hitler. I deeply 
Waffen-SS General Felix Steiner (on the left).Waffen-SS General Felix Steiner (on the left).
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thank each of you for his unshakeable steadfastness and shake his hand in comradeship. 
Steiner. (Ertel & Schulze-Kossens, 2000:179) 
 
In contrast to Hausser, SS Colonel SS-Standartenführer Leon Degrelle, a Belgium 
national and favourite of Hitler who was the commander of the 28th SS Wallonien 
Division, goes to great lengths to stress that the Waffen-SS was an “… organisation 
that was both political and military” (Degrelle, 1983:11). The political nature of the 
SS is even more recognisable if one considers that “… from the very start the only 
personnel selected for the SS were those thought to have qualifications beneficial…” 
to the Nazi Party (J. M. Steiner, 1963:430). In the biography of SS-
Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff it is noted when he filled out his application form to 
join the SS that it included the below statement under the heading of commitment: 
I commit myself to support Adolf Hitler’s ideas, to observe the strictest party discipline, and to 
conscientiously carry out the orders of the Reich SS Leader. I am German, of Aryan descent, I 
do not belong to any Masonic Lodge or secret societies, and I promise to promote the 
movement with all my strength. (Von Lang, 2005:7) 
 
This was the standard application form used for all SS men. As noted by at least one 
author this argument that the Waffen-SS was just another military formation may 
seem plausible on the face of it, however, “… an entirely different picture emerges 
when we consider its origins” (Wegner, 1985:221). SS General Hausser claimed that 
the Waffen-SS was part of the Army when questioned at Nuremberg. 
HERR PELCKMANN: Surely you felt yourself to be a part of the Army?  
HAUSSER: We were completely incorporated into the Army, and the designation “fourth 
branch of the Army,” although it was not an official designation, was really much to the point.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:367) 
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However, even the generals of the Wehrmacht made it clear that the Waffen-SS was 
not part of the regular army but rather a creature of Himmler’s. Former chief of the 
Wehrmacht General Von Brauchitsch stated this at Nuremberg: 
DR. LATERNSER: Now, the subordination of the Waffen-SS will have to be cleared up as well. 
Just what was the subordination of a Waffen-SS division to the Army?  
VON BRAUCHITSCH: The Waffen-SS was subordinated to the Army only for tactical purposes. 
It was subordinated to the Army neither for discipline nor for judicial matters. The Army had 
no influence on promotions or demotions of people, and so forth.  
DR. LATERNSER: To whom was a Waffen-SS division subordinate, when it was not engaged in 
a tactical task? That is, when it was neither in battle nor in the operational area?  
VON BRAUCHITSCH: In any event, not the Army. It was subordinate to the Reichsführer-SS 
or to the High Command of the Armed Forces.  
DR. LATERNSER: And to whom was it subordinate in the home area?  
VON BRAUCHITSCH: To the Reichsführer-SS.   
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:580) 
 
The Role of Himmler 
The Reichsführer-SS; this was who the Waffen-SS answered to, except when in direct 
combat. Himmler kept a tight control on the Waffen-SS by ensuring that 
administrative matters in relation to personnel of the Waffen-SS remained under his 
control. Himmler also remained the nominal Commander in Chief of the Waffen-SS 
through his field command post and all recruiting for the Waffen-SS was handled by 
the Main SS Office (Bender & Taylor, 1971; Hohne, 1969). As part of the 
rehabilitation process of the image of the Waffen-SS, Himmler in some respects has 
been portrayed as a leader “… held in contempt and frequently disobeyed” by the SS 
generals (Sydnor, 1973:340). SS General Paul Hausser had this to say when 
questioned as to Himmler’s leadership capabilities: 
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HAUSSER: Heinrich Himmler most assuredly tried in peacetime to exert his influence on the 
small Verfügungstruppe. During the war this was practically impossible. He did not address 
troops of the Waffen-SS. On occasion he did talk to some officers and commanders of some 
divisions in the field. It was generally known that Heinrich Himmler, who had done only one 
year's military service, had no conception of the military and underestimated the military tasks 
and the work involved. He liked to play the role of the strong man through exaggeration and 
through superlatives. If someone comes along with big words, the soldier on the front does not 
pay much attention. Therefore, the influence of Himmler was very insignificant during the war. 
He wore his uniform, of course, but the reputation of the Waffen-SS was established by its 
officers, by the example they set and by their daily work.   
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946 Vol 20:368) 
 
While some Waffen-SS Generals and others have attempted to write Himmler off as 
somewhat of a nuisance, other authors state that Himmler “… was a powerful and 
effective leader, firmly in control of the entire SS organisation” (Sydnor, 1989:251). 
At least one author raises the important point that the SS could never have reached its 
powerful position in the Nazi state without an effective leader in the form of Himmler 
(Noakes & Pridham, 1988). Respected author Alexander Dallin makes the important 
point that if it had come to a “showdown”, no other leading Nazi would have been 
capable of matching Himmler in regards to power (Dallin, 1981:592).  
 
Those who deride Himmler’s influence forget one important fact; he was successful in 
ordering the murder of millions of innocent people, a feat that someone, who is indeed 
a bumbling eccentric, would be unlikely to achieve. Indeed the SS was a “… 
conscious, preconceived and central concern of Himmler’s social thinking” (Ziegler, 
1989:49). He controlled the Waffen-SS and directed it in accordance with the political 
and ideological will of the Führer.  During the war the “SS divisions, whose personnel 
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owed their loyalty personally to Hitler rather than the German state, and whom he 
therefore trusted more…” were used time and time again for crucial operations that 
the Führer would rather entrust to his political soldiers than the regular army (Quarrie, 
1981:7). 
 
As noted in the study of Krausnick et al, to say that the Waffen-SS was a fourth 
branch of the armed services “… is totally untrue … it is politically and historically 
untrue … the Waffen-SS owed allegiance to the Führer” (Krausnick et al., 1965:273). 
An order of the 4th SS Polizei Division provides evidence that Himmler remained in 
control of the political training of the troops even when they were serving with army 
formations: 
As of the day of integration into the SS-Polizei Division, the newly formed elements will be 
subordinated to the Commander in Chief of the army … the authority of the Reichsführer-SS 
and Chef der Deutschen Polizei in the area of political training … remains unaffected by this. 
(Husemann, 2003:10) 
 
A pamphlet on SS culture and titled Soldier had this to say about the Waffen-SS. 
“Today it may already seem incomprehensible that there were once non-political 
officers and non-political soldiers ... The great historical end of such ideological 
division came about through the Führer through the creation of the political soldier in 
his embodiment of the Waffen-SS!” (Pruess Publishing, 2004a:34). The apologists 
and others have often tried to maintain that the Waffen-SS was merely another 
military organisation. To this end they have at times enlisted the assistance of senior 
Wehrmacht generals such as Colonel-General Heinz Guderian, who stated:  
I can therefore assert that to my knowledge the SS divisions were always remarkable for a high 
standard of discipline, of esprit de corps, and of conduct in the face of the enemy. They fought 
  152 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
shoulder to shoulder with the panzer divisions of the army and the longer the war went on the 
less distinguishable they became from the army.  (Guderian, 1996:447) 
 
The Waffen-SS was never meant to be a permanent part of the German military 
system. The Waffen-SS was part of the SS system, it was not part of the Wehrmacht 
(Bender & Taylor, 1971; Krausnick et al., 1965; Kren & Rappoport, 1976; Large, 
1987).   As such it is best to approach any study of the Waffen-SS by viewing it as 
“… an integral part of the SS rather than as an ordinary elite military force” (Kren & 
Rappoport, 1976:89). It follows then that claims that the Waffen-SS was an 
organisation not controlled by Himmler or the SS are simply not true. This was to 
have chilling implications. With Himmler in control of the SS, legitimacy was lent to 
the criminal policies that would issued and acted on by the Waffen-SS. My previous 
discussion of evil and genocide indicated that was this was one of the most important 
aspects in allowing broad-scale evil acts to occur. 
 
The Waffen-SS as political soldiers 
The SS was a beast born of political necessity, and it was a political beast by nature 
(Hohne, 1969; Wegner, 1985). As has been noted, the Waffen-SS “… was one of the 
few military formations that owed its existence exclusively to the emergence of a 
particular political system, and whose nature reflected in microcosm the essence of 
the regime it served” (Lucas & Cooper, 1975:1). The initial members of the SS were 
made up of young political fighters who had been employed as bodyguards and 
bouncers by the Nazi Party (Hatheway, 1999; Koehl, 1962; Simpson, 1990; Staub, 
2002). But it was not long before Himmler envisaged that their role would extend far 
beyond this. They were seen to be the “… revolutionary shock troops of the Reich” 
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(Halliley, 2003). As such they were to hold a special place in the affections of the 
Führer. Units such as the Totenkopf Division could not deny their birthright; “… from 
the day of its creation until the end of the war, the Totenkopf Division remained bound 
by the general political, racial and administrative laws of the SS” (Sydnor, 1973:360). 
 
Certain Waffen-SS formations43 received equipment in preference and far out of 
proportion to the size of 
it forces when 
considered against the 
Wehrmacht (Darman, 
2004; Engel, 1974; 
Kren & Rappoport, 
1976; Ripley, 2004; 
Weinberg, 1994). This 
was despite the fact that the Wehrmacht continually resisted the Waffen-SS receiving 
such equipment (Hohne, 1969). One of Hitler’s adjutants recalls that: 
During 1943 the importance of the Waffen-SS had increased. At the beginning of the war, and 
more so since the beginning of the Russian campaign, Hitler had built up these divisions 
systematically. They embodied all his ideas for a fighting force. Division after division was 
formed; privileged as to its personnel and materiel … Hitler was extraordinarily proud of these 
SS divisions and trusted them and their commanders utterly. (Von Below, 1980:189) 
 
 The preferential treatment the Waffen-SS received in relation to the allocation of 
armour highlights this favouritism shown by the Führer to them. An example of this 
                                                 
43 These formations included the premier or classic divisions of the Waffen-SS such as the 
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and the Das Reich Divisions. 
Tiger 1 heavy tank of the Das Reich Division.Tiger 1 heavy tank of the Das Reich Division.
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are the Schwere Panzerabteilung (heavy tank battalions) that were formed by Hitler as 
a means to turn the tide of battle through the use of superior technology to overcome 
the numerical superiority of the enemy. These units were heavily utilised on the 
Eastern Front (Fey, 1990; T. Jentz, 1997; Kleine & Kuhn, 2004; Restayn, 2001). SS 
General, SS-Obergruppenführer Arthur Phelps had begged that the Waffen-SS be 
given more tanks, “… get us tanks, without them this magnificent force will be 
ruined” (Hohne, 1969:471).  
 
Given the importance that tanks had taken in combat, these units, which utilised the 
latest in Germany 
technology and weaponry, 
were seen as elite (Thomas 
Jentz, Hilary Doyle, & 
Peter Sarson, 1993a; 
Williamson & Bujeiro, 
2002). These units were 
normally equipped with 40 
to 50 tanks of either the Tiger 1 or later King Tiger variety (T. Jentz et al., 1993a; 
Thomas Jentz, Hillary Doyle, & Peter Sarson, 1993b). The Waffen-SS had three such 
Schwere SS Panzerabteilung assigned to them, against some 10 for the Wehrmacht 
(Restayn, 2001; W. Schneider, 1998, 2000).  
 
Overall, almost a third of all Germany’s Panzer Divisions belonged to the Waffen-SS 
(T. L. Jentz, 1996; Windrow & Hook, 1982). By the end of the war some of the SS 
Tiger 2 or King Tiger.
Tiger 2 or King Tiger.
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Panzer Divisions had tank battalions that were some 20 per cent stronger than 
equivalent army units (Quarrie, 1981).  Out of 38 Divisions the Waffen-SS had some 
seven Panzer Divisions and seven Panzergrenadier Divisions44 (T. L. Jentz, 1996; 
Nafziger, 2001). This was a ratio that far exceeded that of the Wehrmacht.  The 
Waffen-SS in fact, while only being 10 per cent of the strength of the Wehrmacht, 
made up a quarter of German Panzer units (Bishop, 2005). 
 
The fact that many 
of Hitler’s old 
party colleagues 
held commands in 
the Waffen-SS also 
caused him to feel 
a special fondness 
for their units. He 
had this to say 
about SS-Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich, commander of the Leibstandarte 
Division: 
The role of Sepp Dietrich is unique. I’ve always given him opportunity to intervene at sore 
spots. He’s a man who’s simultaneously cunning, energetic and brutal. Under his 
swashbuckling appearance, Dietrich is a serious, conscientious, scrupulous character. And what 
care he takes of his troops … For the German people, Sepp Dietrich is a national institution. 
(Trevor-Roper, 2000:168) 
 
                                                 
44 The main difference being that a Panzer Division had a Panzer Regiment on its establishment whilst 
a Panzergrenadier only had a Battalion on its establishment. 
Himmler talking with Waffen-SS General Sepp 
Dietrich.
Himmler talking with Waffen-SS General Sepp 
Dietrich.
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This close relationship with Hitler is exemplified in the actions he took when the 6th 
SS Panzer Army45 led by Dietrich failed in its offensive against the Russians near 
Vienna and Budapest in early 1945. Rather then remove or sack the SS generals as he 
had done to many of 
their Army 
colleagues, he 
ordered the Waffen-
SS Divisions to 
remove the honorific 
armband titles46 that 
he had allowed them 
to wear. This was the 
most demeaning punishment that he could think of for his SS soldiers. Former Deputy 
Chief Operations officer of the 6th SS Army, Georg Maier, wrote, “The decree was 
considered to be a moral punishment, and, in practice, meant the end of the Waffen-
SS as an elite body in Hitler’s eyes” (G. Maier, 2004:303). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
45 This army consisted of the 1st SS, 2nd SS, 9th SS, 12th SS Divisions and other army units as at the 5th 
March 1945. 
 
46 Elite units of the German Armed Forces in World War II wore armbands bands on their uniforms 
denoting the name of their unit. For example the men of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division 
wore a armband on the left arm with the words “Adolf Hitler” woven into the band. 
 
Armband of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler.Armband of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler.
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When the Gotz Von Berlichingen Division received their armbands a special 
ceremony was ordered by the division commander, and this was attended by 
Himmler. The divisional diary recorded the event as follows: 
The various preparations for the ceremony for the presenting of the armband to the division 
were completed on the 9.4.44. That same evening there also arrived the RF-SS (Reichsführer-
SS Himmler), making the ceremony an extra special occasion. However, after his tiring journey 
the eminent guest retired early. (Perrigault & Meister, 2004:88) 
 
It is of note that when formed the Waffen-SS was first and foremost a unit for use in 
internal policing tasks and only second was it to be used in an external role if a 
conflict arose. At all times, however, the use of the unit was at the personal discretion 
of Hitler (Wegner, 1985). SS General Paul Hausser attempted to deny this policing 
role while giving evidence at Nuremberg: 
HERR PELCKMANN: Was the Verfügungstruppe, therefore, meant to be a political nucleus? 
The Prosecution accuses it of being a special instrument for the oppression and elimination of 
political opponents and of having aided realisation of the Nazi ideology by use of force.  
HAUSSER: That is not true. The Verfügungstruppe had neither political nor police tasks. It 
developed gradually into a test troop which incorporated all the old soldierly virtues with the 
requirements of our socialist age. It paid special attention to the relations between officers and 
men, encouraged advancement without special examinations, and did away with any and all 
exclusiveness.  (The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:358) 
 
One will recall that the previous Führer order clearly outlined that the Waffen-SS was 
to be a political instrument. Himmler saw the Waffen-SS as political soldiery and to 
ensure this an indoctrination program was implemented that permeated all levels of 
the SS (Quarrie & Burn, 1993; Weingartner, 1974). As one Waffen-SS company 
commander  wrote home, “This morning I have held an hour of ideological 
instruction, consequently the men have had the necessary political knowledge 
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conveyed that they require for the battle against world Bolshevism” (Huffman, 
2005:96). This program covered such issues as the threat posed to Germany by the 
Jews and Communism, and the importance of German Volk and the Nordic race 
(Hatheway, 1999; Quarrie & Burn, 1993; Simpson, 1990; Weingartner, 1974). It 
needs to be remembered that the Waffen-SS in its initial stages at least, it was an all 
volunteer organisation, as such there can be little doubt that those volunteering were 
not aware of its close association with the Nazi Party and its ideology (Messenger, 
2002; Simpson, 1990; Stein, 1966; Wegner, 1990).  
 
Indeed admission to the SS was “… ideologically anchored in the National Socialist 
doctrine of racial purity…” (J. M. Steiner, 1963:434) The SS even had its own 
newspaper called the Das Schwarze Korps, which was approved in 1936 by Himmler 
and was published in an effort to widely distribute all of the SS messages of hate. It 
continued to be distributed up to the last month of the war (Combs, 1986). 
Das Schwarze Korps did mirror the ideas of the SS leadership, and in its pages basic elements 
of SS ideology are present. In this respect, it was indeed the voice of the SS and not just another 
Nazi newspaper. (Combs, 1986:35) 
 
At Nuremberg, however, the defence witnesses for the Waffen-SS attempted to ignore 
this political affiliation. Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler officer Robert Brill gave the 
following evidence. 
HERR PELCKMANN: And now, to go back to the volunteers, can you tell us anything about the 
motives for volunteering?  
BRILL: Yes. In my office I read thousands upon thousands of applications for admission. I can 
say that up to 1939 the enthusiasm for the SS, for its decent and proper conduct, was the main 
reason for volunteering. Besides these, many volunteered for professional reasons.  
HERR PELCKMANN: Did that change after the beginning of the war?  
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BRILL: After the beginning of the war, the main reason for volunteering was that the men 
wanted to do their military service in a clean, modern, elite formation. Professional reasons 
also played a part in volunteering. After the beginning of the war very few came to the Waffen-
SS for political reasons…  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:341) 
 
Brill’s claims do not match the political reality of the Waffen-SS. For example, of the 
approximately 6000 Danes who volunteered for service in the Waffen-SS, some 75 
per cent had some kind of affiliation with the Danish Nazi Party (DNSAP) (Smith, 
Poulsen, & Christensen, 1999). Of the 125,000 West European volunteers, about a 
third belonged to pro-Nazi organisations (Hohne, 1969). Some 30 per cent of the SS 
Flemish Legion were members of the Dutch National Socialist party (Buss & Mollo, 
1978). Of the approximately 950 SS camp officers studied by MacLean about 80 per 
cent were members of the Nazi Party (MacLean, 1999a). As has been noted “… a 
correct ideological attitude was necessary for entry into the SS”; being a member of 
the Nazi Party made this all the easier (Hatheway, 1999:18). Himmler himself 
constantly reminded his soldiers of their underlying ideals and mission. Shortly after 
the Germans invaded Russia in 1941, Himmler made the following speech to Waffen-
SS soldiers of Kampfgruppe Nord. 
For years, for over a decade now we old National Socialists have struggled in Germany with 
Bolshevism … These animals, that torture and ill-treat every prisoner from our side, every 
wounded man that they come across and do not treat them the way decent soldiers would, you 
will see for yourself. These people have been welded by the Jews into one religion, one ideology, 
that is called Bolshevism… (Quarrie, 1991:64) 
 
Speeches such as the above allowed the process of distancing to begin. The Waffen-
SS was clearly being encouraged to distance itself from those elements of society 
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viewed by the Nazis as dispensable. Despite the fact that the Waffen-SS was entwined 
with the roots of the Nazi Party former members still attempted to deny this 
association at Nuremberg. Brill goes on to explain why people joined the Waffen-SS 
for non-political motives. 
HERR PELCKMANN: Is it true that in Germany the Waffen-SS was considered as the fourth 
branch of the Armed Forces and not, as the Prosecution says, the picked troop of the Nazis?  
BRILL: Yes. I believe I can affirm this, at least for my field of duty. Only the selection was 
carried out according to SS directives, while acceptance for the Waffen-SS depended on the 
approval of the Wehrbezirkskommando … We can also say that we had no connection whatever 
with the Party, for the Party gave us no orders. The few Party members who were in the 
Waffen-SS paid no Party dues for the period of their service…  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:344)  
 
There were more than a few party members in the Waffen-SS; there can be little 
denial of the link between the Nazi Party and the Waffen-SS. Yerger (1997; , 1999) in 
his vast two-volume study examined the commanders of the Waffen-SS Divisions, 
corps and armies. He provides details for some 105 senior Waffen-SS commanders. 
An analysis of these commanders shows that some 97 per cent had joined the Nazi 
Party in 1933 or prior. Ninety per cent of these officers were members of the general 
SS prior to joining the Waffen-SS. A further 31 per cent had been members of the SA. 
In his study of the Waffen-SS, Wegner estimates that about two-thirds of the senior 
Waffen-SS officers had been members of the general SS prior to joining the Waffen-
SS (Wegner, 1990). An examination of the Dienstaltersliste or SS Officers list for 
January 1942 provides an interesting insight into the political affiliations of the senior 
officer corps of the Waffen-SS.  Of the 30 Waffen-SS generals listed some 25, or 83 
per cent, were members of the Nazi Party (Schiffer Publishing, 2000). The break-up is 
as follows. 
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Rank Number of 
officers listed as 
members of the 
Waffen-SS 
Members of 
the Nazi Party
% 
membership 
SS-Obergruppenführer 3 3 100 
SS-Gruppenführer 11 10 91 
SS-Brigadeführer 16 12 75 
Total 30 25 83 
Note: Sourced from Schiffer Publishing 2000. The figures show those officers listed as 
having Waffen-SS rank in the SS-Officer list for January 1942. 
 
By 1933 69 per cent of the future officers of the Waffen-SS were members of the 
Nazi Party. A further 20 per cent of these officers would join the Nazi Party at a later 
stage (Wegner, 1990). These figures can leave little doubt as to the consensus held 
among Waffen-SS officers as to their political views. Wegner makes the interesting 
observation that while the SS generals had about a 25 per cent membership of the SS 
prior to the Nazis taking power47, this figure was as high as 50 per cent for lower 
ranks such as SS-Obersturmbannführer or Lieutenant-Colonel (Wegner, 1990). These 
were the officers who would be commanding the regiments and battalions of the 
Waffen-SS in the field. This political affiliation made obedience all the easier. The 
Organisation Book for the Nazi Party itself succinctly states the role of political 
obedience that the SS soldier was expected to show to the Nazi regime: 
Obedience is unconditionally demanded. It arises from the conviction that the National 
Socialist ideology must reign. He who possesses it and passionately supports it submits himself 
voluntarily to the compulsion of obedience. Therefore, the SS man is prepared to carry out 
blindly every order which comes from the Führer or is given by one of his superiors even if it 
demands the greatest sacrifice of himself.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:179) 
                                                 
47 Thus making them “old party fighters” and seemingly more aligned to the political and ideological 
ideas of the Nazi Party. 
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This clearly indicates the strong political affiliation that senior officers of the Waffen-
SS had with the Nazi Party. As noted by Wegner: 
What matters is not so much the fact that there was a greater number of convinced Nazis in the 
Waffen-SS than in the army. What actually made the two officer corps so fundamentally 
different was the fact that within the Waffen-SS there was from the outset no place for officers 
whose political past could have been anything other than National Socialist. (Wegner, 
1990:280) 
 
But the SS was seen as more then just a political force driven by the Nazi ideology. 
Himmler saw that the SS man would have a two-fold role that would have first have 
the SS heavily involved in the political apparatus of the state and also the genetic 
foundation of the new Germanic nation as well (Hatheway, 1999:11). Himmler saw 
the SS as a kinship or tribal order that would bind Germanic men together with a view 
to strengthening Aryan blood (Birn, 1991; Flitton, 1991; Wegner, 1990).  
 
The SS would essentially be the core of the new master race; they would be the 
biological agent with which he would achieve his Aryan dream. Himmler saw the SS 
being grounded in the terms of blood and bone; he held romantic visions of Nordic 
peasants forming a new elite in the Nazi Reich (Flitton, 1991). These were not just the 
ramblings of a romantic Himmler, Hitler himself claimed to have seen the results of 
his SS propagating the species first-hand near his home at Berchtesgaden in April, 
1942: 
At Berchtesgaden we owe a great deal to the infusion of SS blood, for the local population there 
was of specially poor and mixed stock. I noticed this particularly while the Berghof48 was being 
                                                 
48 The Berghof was Hitler’s residence and headquarters situated in the Bavarian Alps. 
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built, and I was most anxious to do something to improve it. Today, thanks to the presence of a 
regiment of the Leibstandarte, the countryside is abounding with jolly and healthy young 
children. It is a practice which must be followed. To those districts in which a tendency towards 
degeneracy is apparent we must send a body of elite troops, and in 10 or 20 years the 
bloodstock will be improved out of all recognition. (Trevor-Roper, 2000:434) 
 
This pure race was to be preserved by ensuring that only the purest of bloodlines were 
allowed to enter his SS (this would change later in the war as manpower needs took 
precedence). For this reason Aryan bloodlines had to be proved for generations as far 
back as 1750 for SS officers and 1800 for enlisted men (Victor, 1998; Wolfson, 1965; 
Ziegler, 1989). SS General Otto Kumm explained how the members of the SS were 
initially selected; 
I first took a look at them, how they were built, what impression they made on me and then we 
selected accordingly. There was such a lot of them that we couldn’t take all those who applied. 
Big, blond, blue eyed, that was our first choice, we would only take the best. (Halliley, 2003) 
 
It was for this reason that all recruit examinations for the Waffen-SS (at least in the 
early war years) consisted of a doctor and a racial examiner, who was to determine if 
the recruit was racially acceptable to the Nordic ideals (Rempel, 1980; Ziegler, 1989). 
Recruits were required to possess a medical and racial fitness certificate before 
gaining entry to the Waffen-SS (Wegner, 1990).  The recruit, in the early days of the 
war at least, faced a five point racial check “… to evaluate the racial features of the 
applicant. This stretched from purely Nordic down to suspicion of extra-European 
blood mixtures” (Wegner, 1990:134). Clearly there can be no denying that the 
Waffen-SS was a racially based organisation. Indeed as late as 1944 Himmler refused 
to reduce the racial standards for the Waffen-SS any further, arguing that the racial 
selection was “… an inseparable part of the SS Orden” (Wegner, 1990:138). 
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Waffen-SS veteran Jurgen Girgensohn related the importance of this concept of the 
master race in a post-war interview: “… the fact that we were genuine Aryans was a 
very important point. We as Aryans felt superior to other races, we believed that we 
really would rule Europe one day” (Halliley, 2003). This mixture of elitism in the 
traditional sense of a guard unit and the biological purity of the members would 
ensure that the SS would be capable of carrying out the revolutionary role it was 
envisaged to perform in the new order (Hatheway, 1999). Himmler explained the 
reasoning and importance behind his vision in a Nordic order in the following speech. 
This speech by Himmler was contained in a publication entitled, “Organisation and 
Obligations of the SS and the Police”. It was published in 1937 in a booklet 
containing a series of speeches or essays by important officials of the Party and the 
State known as “National Political Course for the Armed Forces from 15 to 23 
January 1937” (document 1992a-PS). 
Accordingly, only good blood, blood which history has proved to be leading and creative and 
the foundation of every state and of all military activities, only Nordic blood, can be considered. 
I said to myself that should I succeed in selecting from the German people for this organisation 
as many people as possible, a majority of whom possess this desired blood, in teaching them 
military discipline and, in time, the understanding of the value of blood and the entire ideology 
which results from it, then it will be possible actually to create such an elite organisation which 
would successfully hold its own in all cases of emergency … They are very thoroughly examined 
and checked. Of 100 men we can use on the average 10 or 15, no more. We ask for the political 
record of his parents, brothers and sisters, the record of his ancestry as far back as 1750, and 
naturally the physical examination and his record from the Hitler Youth. Further, we ask for a 
eugenic record showing that no hereditary disease exists in his parents and in his family. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:176) 
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From the above it would be difficult to see how any recruit for the Waffen-SS could 
claim that they were unaware of the political or ideological basis of the SS. In the new 
world order envisaged by Himmler, seen from a neo-Darwinism viewpoint, only the 
strong would survive, the weak would be destroyed. As a veteran of the 4th SS Polizei 
Division recounted, “We are the race that must rule the world, that’s what they said to 
us, and all other races must be subordinated to the Aryan race. They are no more then 
swine, we rule the whole world” (Halliley, 2003). Indeed a study conducted on 
members of the SS in 1933 showed that most were “… openly and viciously anti-
Semitic…”, and further, that those with the most intense anti-Semitism were in senior 
leadership positions (Staub, 2002:21). 
 
 The SS attempted to foster a tribal or family identity by involving itself in all aspects 
of its members’ lives. 
Himmler’s Germanisation policy, his proclamation of a tribal order instead of an exclusively 
male organisation, the marriage laws of the SS, the policy of Lebensborn, the promotion of 
births out of wedlock and Himmler’s consideration of introducing polygamy, were all measures 
intended to infuse new blood into the German people. (Wegner, 1990:24) 
 
This policy of Germanisation and promotion of Aryan blood was to be achieved not 
only by the culling of those of non-Aryan blood, but also by prolific reproduction of 
the Aryans (Birn, 1991). To facilitate this Himmler “… demanded total dedication, 
service and submission without contradiction to his own will, even in private matters” 
(Birn, 1991:356). Members of the SS were encouraged and even pressured to 
relinquish membership of the church. The level of church membership cancellations 
increased rapidly in the Waffen-SS as a result of an understanding (Wegner, 
1990:242). At every opportunity by the use of speeches, pamphlets and lectures the 
  166 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
SS were exposed to an ideology that focused on the good of the Volk or race (Knopp, 
2002; Smith et al., 1999).  SS General Karl Wolff stated that “Himmler had set out to 
achieve a dream, he would inspire a new awakening of the Germanic race within the 
German people” (Bloomberg, 2000).  
 
This attempt to forge a family identity and involvement in all aspects of the members’ 
lives led the SS to become a total institution; this being a institution where all life 
activities are undertaken uniformly by a single authority (J. M. Steiner, 1963:425). 
For this reason the vast majority of the Waffen-SS officer corps “… were brought 
together under one and the same ideological roof” (Wegner, 1990:268). This would 
enable Himmler to call upon the SS to undertake a number of atrocities in the name of 
this shared idealism. 
 
In many of his speeches Himmler referred to the extermination role that he and the SS 
had been called on to perform. He argued that this burden that they undertook was 
proof of their faith to the Germanic cause (Birn, 1991). Many of the Waffen-SS tried 
to distance themselves from Himmler after the war and stated that they did not take 
him seriously. It is not the case that the officers of the Waffen-SS were unaware of 
Himmler’s intentions. Himmler clearly alluded to this ridding of undesirables in a 
speech to officers of the Leibstandarte SS Division in 1941 where he makes reference 
to the invasion of Russia and the tasks that will have to be undertaken there: 
Very often the member of the Waffen-SS thinks about the deportation of this people here. 
These thoughts came to me today when watching the very difficult work out there performed by 
the Security Police, supported by your men, who helped them a great deal. Exactly the same 
thing happened in Poland in weather with 40 degrees of cold, where we had to haul away 
thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands; where we had to have the toughness, you 
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should hear this but also forget it again immediately, where we had to have the toughness to 
shoot thousands of leading Poles, otherwise one might later sorely regret it.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:348) 
 
In a speech on the 16th of May 1944 to officers of the 14th SS Galicia Division at 
Neuhammer Himmler stated that “Your homeland has become so much more 
beautiful since you have lost – on our initiative I must say – the residents who were so 
often a dirty blemish on Galicia’s good name, namely the Jews” (Littman, 2003:78). 
SS-Obergruppenführer Wolff recounts how the men of the SS were: 
… subtly conditioned to see themselves as the sons of light, that they were engaged in a struggle 
against the powers of darkness, and it was their duty to feel that they were at all times on duty 
for the nation and in a wider sense for the new order in Europe. (Bloomberg, 2000) 
 
Himmler, if ever the idealist, was also open to the practicalities of the war. When 
addressing the division he made no mention of the subhuman Slav in his speech. This 
being because the 14th Division was constituted by Ukrainians (Bender & Taylor, 
1975). Indeed, while most of the West European recruits received the same 
ideological indoctrination as the German recruits, special allowances were made for 
the recruits from Eastern Europe. The Ukrainians were not given lectures about the 
inferiority of the Slav race, and the Bosnian Moslems were not exposed to the 
criticisms of organised religions (Stein, 1965). 
 
These racial and ideological messages were well accepted by most of the Waffen-SS.  
For instance, soldiers of the Totenkopf Division were exposed to this depiction of the 
evil Jewish-Bolshevik enemy who would destroy the German nation. As a result they 
fought the conflict on the Eastern front with “… indifference to hardship, contempt 
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for death and genuine hatred of the Jewish-Bolshevik enemy. The products of Eicke’s 
tutelage developed a lust for killing Russians and fought with a corresponding 
tenacity that earned them the unqualified respect of professional soldiers…” (Sydnor, 
1990:316).  
 
As a former concentration-camp commandant and Waffen-SS officer in the 3rd 
Totenkopf Division, SS-Sturmbannführer Johannes Hassebroek stated after the war, 
“We were the best and the toughest” (MacLean, 1999a; Segev, 1987:63). Nor were 
the soldiers of the Totenkopf alone in this view of the world. This is reinforced by the 
comments of Waffen-SS Hauptsturmführer Mathieu Klein of the 1st Waffen-SS 
Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler: 
Why did I volunteer for the Waffen-SS and not the Wehrmacht? The Bolsheviks were seen by 
me and by the Waffen-SS, as the principal enemy, against who I wanted to fight as a member of 
an elite force. (Williamson, 1995b:22) 
 
The commandant of Auschwitz concentration-camp, SS-Obersturmbannführer Rudolf 
Hoss, claimed that “I was just as much a soldier and as the squadron commander was, 
even though they (the Allies)49 do not want to recognise the Waffen-SS as regular 
armed forces, but more like a party militia. We in the SS were as much soldiers as the 
army, navy or air force” (Hoss, 1992:171). Hoss clearly saw his role of extermination 
as just another facet of the armed conflict. 
 
This view was reinforced by official ideological training manuals produced for the 
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, which included such subjects as German History, The 
                                                 
49 My insertion and italics. 
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Führer and the history of the National Socialist movement, Jewry and Bolshevism 
(Huffman, 2005). Indeed, upon taking over the 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking, SS-
Obergruppenführer Felix Steiner ordered the formation of an ideological training 
unit, which then gave the men a broad introduction to the racial and ideological 
themes of the Nazis (Smith et al., 1999). Waffen-SS veteran Oswald Van Ooteghem, 
a Flemish volunteer, outlined one of the main reasons for him joining the Waffen-SS 
was so that he could join the fight against Bolshevism (Halliley, 2003). In his post-
war memoirs Swedish veteran Erik Wallin, a member of the 11th SS Panzergrenadier 
Division Nordland, showed just how resilient this view of the enemy in the east was: 
After more then three years of struggle in the East, and two years of almost continuous retreat, 
our fighting spirit was still unbroken. We preserved under the hardest conditions. Every day, 
comrades faced death and destruction. The last physical energy and mental force was almost 
drained out of the common soldier, but our fighting spirit was still there. Our faith lay firmly in 
the final victory of the superior power of our weapons. Our trust in our own combat skill, 
against the barbaric masses from the East, was as strong as ever. (Hillblad, 2002:11) 
 
The above comment shows that even after years of defeat, members of the Waffen-SS 
still saw the Russians as barbarians, barbarians who could, however, consistently 
defeat an army of supposed Aryan supermen. As one Waffen-SS veteran commented; 
In retrospect I think that there was a very strong spirit of comradeship, which was based on the 
same beliefs so to speak. Based on the fact that we were convinced that we were conducting a 
just fight. That we were convinced that we were a master race. We were the best of this master 
race and that really does form a bond. (Halliley, 2003) 
 
Other veterans have steadfastly maintained that the Waffen-SS was not a political or 
ideological beast, but rather just mere soldiers. Johann Voss, a member of the 6th SS 
Mountain Division Nord, argues this in his post-war memoirs: 
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The notion of the Waffen-SS as politically or racially indoctrinated fanatics, driven by party 
ideology and hate, was in my experience far from reality. Our training was focused on 
preparation for victory in modern warfare, and all of us were volunteers who wanted just that 
kind of preparation. Yes, we did feel a bit different from the other parts of the armed forces… 
(Voss, 2002:57) 
 
SS-Obersturmbannführer Richard Schulze-Kossens of the SS Leibstandarte division 
stated in a post-war interview that the Waffen-SS soldiers just laughed off the 
ideological ideas of Himmler. However, it is of note that later he stated, “… we would 
go into action if it ever became necessary – not for Hitler the man, but for Germany. 
As far as we were concerned, Hitler was the embodiment of the German State in those 
days” (Mollo, 1982:86). These comments from the veteran seem at odds, as on one 
hand he dismisses the influence of Hitler, but in the next sentence emphasises the 
importance of Hitler as a political leader and as such the political affiliation of the 
Waffen-SS to Hitler. The comments of Schulze-Kossens are undermined even further 
when one considers that the use of ideology in the Waffen-SS was “… therefore not 
solely a measure meant to impose mental uniformity on it own troops, but also to 
serve its ambition to assert itself vis-à-vis the Wehrmacht” (Wegner, 1990:213).  
 
This ideological basis is what differentiated the Waffen-SS from the regular army. 
Certainly the account rendered by one veteran of the SS Hitlerjugend50 Division, 
Herbert Walther, would seem to illustrate the loyalty to death shown by even the boy 
soldiers of this division of the Waffen-SS: 
                                                 
50 Hitler Youth – Division formed from youths from this movement. 
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A young lad who died in my arms, whose eyes I closed as I cried as a baby, said to me ‘Leutnant, 
ask the leader of my company to write to my mother and tell her I died as a brave soldier, for 
my Führer and my fatherland”.  (Halliley, 2003) 
 
Other veterans of the Hitlerjugend Division also confirm that “… to die for the 
Fatherland was an honourable act” (Luther, 1987:16). 
 
Veterans who try to paint the Waffen-SS as just simple soldiers are supported to some 
degree by authors who claim that the Waffen-SS units, for example the Leibstandarte 
SS Adolf Hitler, while not being ordinary soldiers, were not ideological fanatics. 
Rather they were an “… elite military unit which, infused with the freebooter spirit 
which recognised no moral limitations, acted as an immediate executor of the 
Führer’s will…” (Weingartner, 1974:172). There is some difficulty with this 
statement. On the one hand the units are not ideological fanatics, yet on the other they 
are described as a military unit without moral conscience and acting at the will of an 
ideological and political demagogue. I fail to see much difference between the two 
concepts. Their actions on the Night of the Long Knives would seem to indicate the 
opposite to this claim.  
 
When talking about the Waffen-SS as a whole I would agree with Sydnor who states 
that “… to conclude that all of these men were murderers or criminal lunatics who 
willingly indulged in atrocities would be just as ludicrous as the efforts by the 
apologists to prove that the Waffen-SS really was not part of the SS” (Sydnor, 
1973:341). Certainly it is not the argument of this study that all the soldiers of the 
Waffen-SS were ideological warriors bent on destruction. But certainly the higher-
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command echelons and a large core group of the Waffen-SS were motivated by 
political and ideological concerns and carried out what could only be described as 
systematic or endemic atrocities. This raises the issue of group responsibility, which 
will be discussed later. 
 
It has been noted that the Waffen-SS displayed anti-Slavic prejudices in its military 
activities (Gumz, 1998). This type of attitude was contributed to by the ideological 
training of the Waffen-SS. As part of the preparation of his Totenkopf division, SS-
Obergruppenführer Eicke had a special course of political indoctrination devised. 
This involved breaking the soldiers into small discussion groups with SS officers 
where they would discuss nationality and home, history, geography and biology 
(Sydnor, 1990). Eicke considered these topics to be of great importance as “… they 
represented most of the basic Nazi racial and political theories” (Sydnor, 1990:143). 
Of note is that; 
Many present-day apologists for the Waffen-SS, those who claim that its functions and conduct 
were strictly military and not political, maintain either that no such training programs existed, 
or that if they did the average SS man did not take them seriously. In the Totenkopf division 
such political and racial indoctrination definitely existed …the reputation it subsequently earnt 
in Russia, moreover, leaves the distinct impression that Eicke’s men took the lessons of their 
political training very seriously. (Sydnor, 1990:146) 
 
The Totenkopf was not alone or peculiar among Waffen-SS units in this type of 
training and attitude towards certain groups of society. The Leibstandarte SS Adolf 
Hitler also had a course of weekly indoctrination lessons that were conducted by 
education officers (Weingartner, 1974). Sessions such as these were standardised for 
the entire SS in 1935 through the use of indoctrination journals, which carried the 
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usual Nazi racial themes such as “… one had better not speak at all about a feeling of 
honour among Jews” (Weingartner, 1974:30). It has been argued that the Waffen-SS 
as a whole was not naive in relation to the aims and policies of the Nazi Party, “there 
is also no doubt that they were already aware of Hitler’s racist policies, especially 
towards the Jews…” (Reynolds, 1999:3). When engaged in bitter fighting with 
Russian forces the Waffen-SS began to readily label the enemy as Jewish or other 
enemies of the Nazi state. It became standard practice that where there was desperate 
Russian resistance this would be attributed to: 
… Jews, bandits, partisans or the sinister influence of commissars. The object was to intensify 
the SS men’s hatred for the enemy by identifying the Russian soldier with the most pernicious 
and lethal enemies of the Third Reich, who would destroy Germany first unless annihilated. 
(Sydnor, 1990:165). 
 
The Training Schools 
In a post-war memoir Paul Hausser had this to say of the Waffen-SS: “For years the 
former soldiers of this troop, and also soldiers of the Heer, have been concerned to 
show and to prove that the Waffen-SS was trained according to the regulations and 
instructions of the Heer…” (Association of Soldiers of the Former Waffen-SS, 
1973:9). In his plea for justice for the Waffen-SS Hausser is not accurate in describing 
how the Waffen-SS were trained. The SS trained their officers at separate officer 
candidate schools or SS-Junkerschulen. Each year the schools passed out some 300 
militarily trained SS officers (Wegner, 1985).  
 
This number was in excess of that required by the Waffen-SS, so some of these 
officers served in other areas of the SS other then the Waffen-SS (Wegner, 1985, 
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1990). It served two purposes, however, to have this excess, first, it meant that there 
was a ready reserve of militarily trained SS officers, and second it helped to 
strengthen the ties between the various SS components (Wegner, 1985). As noted by 
SS-Brigadeführer Doerffler-Schuband: “The schools also trained young police 
officers for whom there was increased demand. Young SS officers who were slated 
for administrative assignments were also trained at the officer candidate schools of the 
SS” (Doerffler-Schuband, 1949:2). There were some five SS Junkerschulen51 that 
operated between 1934 and 1945, with perhaps the Junkerschulen at Bad Tolz being 
the most well-known (Hatheway, 1999).  
 
The benefit of having separate training schools from the regular forces was that the SS 
could ensure that a political leadership corps was trained in the educational and 
ideological areas that Himmler saw as essential without interference (Hatheway, 
1999). By 1944 some one-third of Waffen-SS regimental or battalion commanders 
were products of the Junkerschulen; they were, in fact, given preference for field 
commands (Wegner, 1990).  
 
                                                 
51 Note that in his manuscript D-178 SS-Brigadeführer Doerffler-Schuband lists only four officer 
candidate schools. 
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The Junkerschulen provided a curriculum that dealt with “… military subjects and 
practical weapons and combat training, similar to the officer academies of the army” 
(Wegner, 1985:226). However, unlike the Wehrmacht the Waffen-SS under the 
auspices of ex-army officer SS-Obergruppenführer Felix Steiner adopted a more 
physical approach, with recruits training in athletics and sport rather than parade-
ground drills (Gingerich, 1997; Hohne, 1969). It was this physical preparation that 
some Waffen-SS veterans made them so combat effective in the harsh climates of 
Russia (Degrelle, 1983). The aims of the schools’ training according to SS-
Brigadeführer Doerffler-Schuband were to “… build character by emphasising 
integrity, fearlessness, chivalry, honour, obedience, helpfulness and good fellowship. 
Moreover, irreproachable conduct in public, and the development of a family spirit 
were further 
requirements” (Doerffler-
Schuband, 1949:7). 
 
Ideological training was 
also undertaken in an 
effort to produce a “… 
specifically National 
Socialist type of professional solider” (Wegner, 1985:226). Waffen-SS officer and 
commander of the Bad Tolz school, Richard Schulze-Kossens, attempted to deny any 
such indoctrination in his book on the Junkerschulen: “A mental attitude developed in 
which common European interests ranked above official party doctrine … there was 
no sense in bothering European Junkers … in simplifying European history to a 
Training School at Bad Tolz.Training School at Bad Tolz.
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course of events in which the Nordic principle reigned supreme” (Schulze-Kossens, 
1982a:28). The purpose of the ideological indoctrination subject was: 
To support the cadet’s inner acceptance of these military and specifically SS values by 
illustrating their ideological background … The basic themes of SS ideology constituted the 
contents of this subject: the eternal law of life, their realisation through National Socialism, but 
above all an extensive portrayal of German and European history since early Teutonic times 
from a racial and geopolitical perspective. (Wegner, 1990:171) 
 
Other veterans would disagree with Schulze-Kossen’s attempt to dismiss the 
ideological indoctrination undertaken at the Junkerschulen. As Leon Degrelle 
explains the Waffen-SS soldiers were “… taught why they were fighting, what kind of 
Germany was being resurrected before their very eyes … they were taught that all 
Germans represented an ethnic unity” (Degrelle, 1983:16). As noted by Vuksic, “In 
addition to physical training, politics and ideology were an integral part of their 
training” (Vuksic, 2005:1). Instructors at the schools taught the students that the war 
was a continuation of the 2000-year-old conflict between the Aryan and the non-
Aryan, the Jew and the Slav (Hatheway, 1999). This had the effect of creating 
distance between the Waffen-SS, the Aryans, and their potential victims. As discussed 
in chapter 2, this creation of distance assists in the commission of evil acts. 
 
Waffen-SS veteran, Zvonimir Bernwald, a racial German, recounted how they were 
trained at the officer cadet schools in military aspects, but above all in the principles 
of National Socialism (Halliley, 2003). As the veteran explained, this was seen as a 
crucial part of the soldier’s craft for elite troops by the Waffen-SS (Halliley, 2003; 
Smith et al., 1999).  This allowed indoctrination that stimulated “the SS man’s 
impetus to act according to a few basic rules of Nazi morality” (Wegner, 1990:173). 
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A special training camp was set up at Ausbildungslager Sennheim for integrating 
Germanic volunteers into the Waffen-SS in 1940. As part of this training “… 
ideological education was considered the most important component of the program” 
(Gingerich, 1997:822). In referring back to my initial discussion of evil I see these 
training schools as the first step in momentum building on the path to genocide. The 
Waffen-SS officers were clearly being conditioned to move down the path of 
genocide against those elements that the Nazis saw as subhuman or politically 
dispensable. 
 
Chief Waffen-SS recruiter, SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger, wanted to ensure 
the non-German recruits “… received the same ideological instruction as their 
German counterparts, learning about the great idea of Nazism, racial science and 
methods to recognise the enemy in all forms” (Gingerich, 1997:822). Of note, 
however, is that few officers in the Waffen-SS came from outside Germany. Wegner 
studied some 582 officers of the Waffen-SS and only 48 officers or eight per cent 
came from outside Germany (Wegner, 1990:235). As noted by Hatheway, the SS 
Junkerschulen were inexorably linked to the Nazi Party and its ideological and 
political goals: 
From their inception in 1934 until their demise in 1945. The Junkerschulen, therefore, 
remained political institutions in service to the National Socialist revolution and to the various 
organisations of the party and state … indeed it was precisely because the SS was so highly 
political and revolutionary that Himmler considered the development of a standardised, 
professional educational process essential. (Hatheway, 1999:9) 
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Ideological training took up some 10 per cent of a cadet’s course work (Hatheway, 
1999). Some may argue that this is a small component overall, however, ideology 
indoctrination was given special weighting in excess of its time allotment in the final 
evaluations of all officer candidates (Wegner, 1990). SS-Brigadeführer Doerffler-
Schuband stated that political indoctrination was given the same weighting as tactics 
in the curriculum, with both subjects having the greatest time allocation compared to 
others (Doerffler-Schuband, 1949). He gives a breakdown of comparative weightings 
of subjects and it is reproduced above. 
 
It is interesting to read the post-war memoirs of some Waffen-SS members; despite 
trying to walk the politically correct line one can glimpse their deeper feelings coming 
to the fore. For instance, in his biography Hans Schmidt, a veteran of the 
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division, comments on the training he received. 
Among other things we touched on such subjects as racial studies, culture, European history 
from a National Socialistic point of view, religion in general and social progress … the many 
hours a week of our training was evenly split between practical field service and theoretical 
Subject Weighting 
Tactics 8 
Political Indoctrination 8 
Organisation of the German Army 5 
Special Services Course 3 
Terrain Orientation 3 
Troop Duty 5 
Signal Communication 3 
Engineering 2 
Aviation 1 
Motor Transport  1 
Gymnastics 5 
Mounted Drill 1 
  
Note: Sourced from Doerffler-Schuband 1949. The figures show the relative amount of 
time spent on each subject. For instance eight times as much time was spent on 
Tactics as compared to with the time spent on Motor Transport, etc. 
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instruction ... During our instructions about race no attempt was made to imbue hate of other 
groups in us, although it was quite clearly pointed out that most of the accomplishments of the 
modern man, beginning with the ancient Greeks, came from white Aryans. Perhaps due to time 
limits we touched on the various characteristics of the major races i.e. white, yellow and black. 
Jews did not fall into either of these categories, and were, with one sentence, merely defined as 
a mixed race seemingly not worthy of greater consideration. (Schmidt, 2001:51) 
 
Further on Schmidt comes to the following conclusion, which seems to suggest that 
he was instructed about the Jews with much more than just “one sentence”. 
Leaders like Martin Luther and Frederick the Great had all been real Germans, and suddenly 
these giants and other like them had been supplanted by an ethnically and genetically different 
tribe that believed it could do everything better. In other words, no German solution of German 
problems was possible with the Jews still in power. (Schmidt, 2001:56) 
 
This claim of training being conducted without any racial or ideological 
indoctrination was also put forward by SS-Oberstgruppenführer Hausser, who was 
initially in charge of the Waffen-SS training program. 
HERR PELCKMANN: The Prosecution is particularly accusing the Verfügungstruppe for 
inciting racial hatred and for the persecution of the Jews as one of its special tasks. Was the 
troop trained for these purposes?  
HAUSSER: The political and ideological training could only be achieved by schooling. I, 
personally, as director of the school and as an inspector, have closely watched this training, for 
I was a new man myself and had first to acquaint myself with these ways of thinking. I can 
testify that race hatred and the extermination of Jewry or of the Eastern peoples was never 
taught and was never demanded.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:359) 
 
This testimony from Hausser bears examination. This is the SS general who also 
claimed that he did not know about the concentration-camps, yet slave labour was 
employed at the SS-Junkerschulen that he was in charge of. In the Junkerschulen at 
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Bad Tolz there were cells built underneath the school to house concentration-camp 
inmates whose job it was to maintain the facilities of the school (Hatheway, 1999). In 
fact, the cells in the basement of the school were used as a sub-camp for Dachau and 
could house up to 50 prisoners at any one time (Hatheway, 1999:83). As noted by 
Stein, to claim that the training of the Waffen-SS was not in ideological sync with the 
Nazis was just not true; 
… In view of the amount of time devoted to ideological indoctrination in the pre-war SS and the 
nature of the material presented, there can be little doubt that many of the men who made up 
the Waffen-SS of 1941 – particularly the officers and NCOs – subscribed to the basic view set 
forth in Himmler’s statements on the racial struggle and similar matters. (Stein, 1966:125) 
 
The SS Economic and Administrative Main Department (WVHA) 
The Pohl Trial (or WVHA Trial) was the fourth of the 12 trials for war crimes the 
U.S. authorities held in their occupation zone in Germany in Nuremberg after the end 
of World War II. These 12 trials were all held before the NMT, not before the IMT. In 
this case, Oswald Pohl and 17 other SS officers employed by the Wirtschafts- und 
Verwaltungshauptamt (WVHA), the Economic and Administrative Department of the 
SS, were tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the time 
of the Nazi regime. The main charge levelled at them was their active participation in, 
and administration of, the genocide of the Jews and other target groups. They were 
also accused of slave labour, participation in the concentration-camp system, 
euthanasia programs, economic exploitation and various medical experiments carried 
out on camp inmates. The WVHA was the SS office that ran the concentration and 
extermination camps. It also handled the procurement for the Waffen-SS. 
As far as the Waffen SS was concerned, responsibility for supply was divided between the SS 
Operational Headquarters and the WVHA. Broadly speaking, the operational headquarters 
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supplied arms, ammunition, and other technical equipment, while the WVHA was responsible 
for rations, clothing, fuel, and personal items of equipment. Among other things, Amtsgruppe 
B was responsible for the supply of food and clothing to concentration-camps.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:217) 
 
Examples of the exploitation conducted by the WHVA for the benefit of the Waffen-
SS are not hard to find. SS-Obersturmbannführer Bobermin reported how earthworks 
would be obtained for the Waffen-SS in a letter to WVHA Chief Oswald Pohl in 
1944. 
… considering that we have a technically well-equipped establishment, and that the men of the 
forced labour camp will be at our disposal at favourable conditions, we shall most likely show a 
profit. The main reason for the taking over is the sufficient supply of building material to the 
Waffen-SS.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:249) 
 
The WVHA also played a role in the establishment of the Waffen-SS fighting 
divisions as is shown by this order concerning the setting up of the 17th SS 
Panzergrenadier Division Gotz Von Berlichingen in 1943. 
SS-FHA Amt IV will raise by 15.11.43 Section IVA of the division with the divisional treasury … 
The personnel department of the SS-WVHA is requested to allocate the necessary 
administrative officers at once. (Perrigault & Meister, 2004:25) 
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The WVHA had the following organisational structure. 
Division A of the WVHA was responsible for the budget of the Waffen-SS as well as 
promotions and transfers of the Waffen-SS and the same such movements for the 
concentration-camps among other things. Division B was responsible for troop 
organisation including food supplies, military-camp stores, clothing factories and 
funds, maintenance of vehicles, etc. Division C was responsible for constructions and 
real estate, etc of the Waffen-SS. Division D was responsible for the command of the 
concentration-camps. Division W was responsible for economic enterprises. Pohl, 
SS Main Economic and Administrative 
Department (WVHA)
Division A
Administration of the Troops
SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Frank
SS- Brigadefuhrer Fanslau
Division B
Troop Organisation
SS-Gruppenfuhrer Loerner
Division C
Construction Matters
SS-Oberfuhrer Kammler
Division D
Concentration Camps
SS-Brigadefuhrer Glucks
Division W
Economic Enterprises
SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Pohl
SS-Gruppenfuhrer Loerner
Deputy of WVHA
SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Pohl
Chief of WVHA
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when questioned before the NMT, confirmed that the WVHA was an integral part of 
the Waffen-SS. 
Q. What other agency of the German Wehrmacht could be compared with the WVHA as it was 
organised in February 1942?  
A. One could compare it with the army administrative office. What that office was for the army, 
the WVHA was for the Waffen-SS.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:327) 
 
WVHA deputy, SS-Gruppenführer Georg Loerner, supported this when he was 
questioned about the role of the WVHA. 
Q. What, speaking quite generally, was the main field of task of the WVHA?  
A. The WVHA was the highest administrative authority of the Waffen-SS and to a lesser degree 
of the Allgemeine SS. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:744) 
 
A number of SS officers were brought to trial in relation to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in relation to the actions of the WVHA. Of the 17 defendants 
brought to trial some 12 were officers of the Waffen-SS, some having served in 
various combat units. They included the below: 
• OSWALD POHL — SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS; Chief of the 
SS Economic and Administrative Main Department (SS Wirtschaftsund 
Verwaltungshauptamt, commonly known as “WVHA”) and chief of Division W of the 
WVHA. 
• AUGUST FRANK — SS-Obergruppenführer in the SS and General of the Waffen-SS. 
Deputy Chief of the WVHA and chief of Division A of the WVHA.  
• GEORG LOERNER — SS-Gruppenführer in the SS and Generalleutnant of the 
Waffen-SS. Deputy Chief of the WVHA, chief of Division B of the WVHA, and deputy 
chief of Division W of the WVHA.  
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• HEINZ KARL FANSLAU — SS-Brigadeführer in the SS and Generalmajor of the 
Waffen-SS. Chief of Division A of the WVHA. Fanslau had also served in the 5th SS 
Wiking Division. 
• ERWIN TSCHENTSCHER — SS-Standartenführer and deputy chief of Division B and 
chief of Office I of Division B of the WVHA. Tschentscher had served in the 4th SS 
Polizei and the 5th SS Wiking Divisions. 
• RUDOLF SCHEIDE — SS-Standartenführer and chief of Office V of Division B of the 
WVHA.  Scheide had served in the 1st Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division. 
• MAX KIEFER — SS-Obersturmbannführer and chief of Office II of Division C of the 
WVHA.  
• FRANZ EIRENSCHMALZ — SS-Standartenführer and chief of Office VI of Division C 
of the WVHA.  
• KARL SOMMER — SS-Sturmbannführer and deputy chief of Office II of Division D of 
the WVHA.  Sommer saw combat with the Waffen-SS. 
• HERMANN POOK — SS-Obersturmbannführer of the Waffen-SS and chief dentist of 
the WVHA, of Office III, Division D. Pook saw combat with the Waffen-SS. 
• LEO VOLK — SS-Hauptsturmführer, personal adviser (Persoenlicher Referent) on 
Pohl's staff, and head of legal section (Leiter der Rechtsabteilung) in the executive 
office of Division W of the WVHA.  
• HANS BOBERMIN — SS-Obersturmbannführer and chief of Office II of Division W of 
the WVHA.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5) 
 
 Of these officers Pohl, Eirenschmalz and Sommer were sentenced to death by 
hanging, the rest were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Scheide was 
acquitted. SS-Brigadeführer Glucks, responsible for the concentration-camps, was 
never tried as he committed suicide after being captured by the British. 
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The personnel composition of the Waffen-SS 
The early years 
The Waffen-SS was severely limited by the Wehrmacht in the number of Germans it 
could recruit, so it was for this reason that it looked to sources of manpower outside 
Germany to expand (Smith et al., 1999; Wegner, 1985, 1990). To address this 
manpower shortage the SS undertook three methods of combating it, first they 
attempted to negotiate higher conscript quotas with the Wehrmacht, second they 
attempted to encourage volunteers, and third they utilised sources of manpower 
outside of the German Reich (Wegner, 1985).  
 
To oversee this recruitment drive Himmler appointed chief of the SS Main office (SS-
HA) and Waffen-SS General, SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger. Berger was to 
undertake his duties with relish and with his staff he “… developed the means and 
methods to provide the manpower which made the Waffen-SS a political and military 
force to be reckoned with” (Rempel, 1980:107). Of note is that when recruiting 
Berger had instructed his staff that they were to emphasise the following points when 
recruiting: “After a general discussion of compulsory military service and the role of 
the Waffen-SS as a branch of the armed services, recruiters were to sketch the history 
of the SS, stressing the concept of the political soldier.” (Rempel, 1980:109). At the 
time of the invasion of Russia there were some 160,425 soldiers of the Waffen-SS 
with a combat strength of some 95,868 (Koehl, 1983:200). Some 90 per cent of these 
soldiers were Germans from within the German Reich, so even at this stage of the war 
the Waffen-SS was still very much a pure Nordic organisation (Koehl, 1983). 
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By 1938 the Waffen-SS officer corps contained some 90 per cent of officers who 
came from a peasant background as compared to only some two per cent for the army 
(Hohne, 1969; Simpson, 1990:18). This lack of military background is further 
illustrated when it is considered that only five per cent of Waffen-SS officers had a 
military background of this type as against some 49 per cent for army officers 
(Hohne, 1969; Simpson, 1990). Wegner argues, however, that at least for the generals 
of the SS they had the same percentage military backgrounds, some 25 per cent, as 
their army counterparts (Wegner, 1990).  
 
Berger identified the Hitlerjugend or Hitler Youth as an excellent recruiting ground 
for the Waffen-SS and even before the war Berger was recruiting heavily from this 
source of manpower (Rempel, 1980). Himmler was always on the lookout for 
ideological suitable recruits. To this end he enticed leaders of the Hitlerjugend leaders 
to his Junkerschulen by offering them a shortened course for officer candidates, in 
this way many became officers and NCOs in the Waffen-SS (Rempel, 1980). The 
Waffen-SS relied heavily on the youthful idealism in Germany to provide this 
manpower. In 1941, for instance, of some 50,000 recruits over two-thirds of them 
were under the age of 20 (Rempel, 1980). Many of them came through the Hitler 
Youth movement to join the Waffen-SS; this had the benefit that both organisations 
were in ideological sync. Koehl gives a figure of some 40,000 Hitler Youth 
volunteering for the Waffen-SS in 1941/42, “… many with extensive political 
indoctrination” (Koehl, 1983:208). Hans-Joachim Lindow was a member of the Hitler 
Youth, who joined the Waffen-SS as a matter of course; it was seen as a natural 
progression (Halliley, 2003). He saw the Waffen-SS as a guards regiment with its 
associated attractions and benefits. 
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In addition to this there were a number of non-German volunteers who joined the 
Waffen-SS. In all it is estimated that some 125,000 West European volunteers served 
in the Waffen-SS. These included some 50,000 Dutch, 20,000 Walloons, 20,000 
Flemings, 6,000 Danes and 6000 Norwegians, etc (Hohne, 1969; Simpson, 1990; 
Stein, 1965). For example, in June 1941 within the ranks of the Wiking Division were 
some 1143 volunteers which included 631 Dutch, 294 Norwegians, 216 Danes, one 
Swede and one Swiss (Solarz, 2003:15). Other sources claim that approximately 
300,000 Waffen-SS soldiers were of non-German origin (this figure would likely 
include Romanians, Hungarians and other Volk Deutsch (racial Germans) from 
Eastern Europe as well as those nationalities listed by Simpson) (Hohne, 1969; 
Lumans, 1993; Smith et al., 1999). Other authors claim that up to 500,000 Waffen-SS 
soldiers came from foreign sources, with the result that almost half of the personnel of 
the Waffen-SS were from some non-German origin (Gingerich, 1997; Hatheway, 
1999; Rempel, 1980). Some 375,000 of these came from countries in Eastern Europe, 
these being racial Germans (foreigners of German decent) (Hatheway, 1999; Lumans, 
1993).  
 
Whatever the exact figure of foreign nationals it highlights an important point, the 
myth of the Waffen-SS being a pure Germanic force of Nordic warriors is not correct. 
Of note is that all foreign nationals who undertook officer training “had to also prove 
Germanic (Aryan) origin, and demonstrate to a board of examiners loyalty to Hitler, 
to the Reich, and to National Socialism” (Hatheway, 1999:114). This ensured that the 
political and racial loyalties of the Waffen-SS were still maintained to some degree. 
At least in the initial stages of foreign recruitment it was still the intent of the Waffen-
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SS to maintain their racial purity. For this reason recruitment was limited to their 
fellow Nordic countries such as Sweden and Denmark, etc.  
The recruitment of Germanic volunteers in fact developed as an expression of SS racial and 
political thought and ambition. The decision to recruit non-Germans of “Germanic Blood” for 
the Waffen-SS was inextricably connected with the dream of  radically transforming the face of 
Europe according to the Nazi concepts of race and ethnicity. (Gingerich, 1997:817) 
 
Later years 
By 1943 the Waffen-SS was suffering severe manpower shortages. As a result 
Himmler and Berger were forced to look further afield and consider sources that 
would never have passed inspection in the early years (Hohne, 1969; Mackenzie, 
1997; Stein, 1966). Over one-third of the original Waffen-SS Divisions had fallen in 
Russia by 1943 (Hohne, 1969). As a result, in 1943 some 25 per cent of Waffen-SS 
recruits were racial Germans (Hohne, 1969).  Another change also took place in the 
recruitment of the Waffen-SS. Whereas they had previously relied on an all-volunteer 
force, now they were forced to resort to press-ganging conscripts into service (Hohne, 
1969; Rempel, 1980; Stein, 1966). The judges of the IMT noted: 
Until 1940 the SS was an entirely voluntary organisation. After the formation of the Waffen-SS 
in 1940 there was a gradually increasing number of conscripts into the Waffen-SS. It appears 
that about a third of the total number of people joining the Waffen-SS were conscripts, that the 
proportion of conscripts was higher at the end of the war than at the beginning, but that there 
continued to be a high proportion of volunteers until the end of the war.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946:  Vol 1:270) 
 
They also received large drafts from the Air Force and Navy. This affected the elite 
integrity of the Waffen-SS to some degree, as no longer was it purely made up of 
ideologically aligned volunteers (Dallin, 1981; Hohne, 1969; Krausnick et al., 1965; 
  189 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
Kren & Rappoport, 1976; Stein, 1966). SS General Karl Brenner noted the effect 
conscripts had on the 6th SS Mountain Division Nord in early 1945 after it had 
suffered some 50 per cent losses. 
Numerically, the losses had been more or less compensated by assignment of new 
replacements. These consisted for the greater part of young foreign nationals of German 
descent (Volksdeutsche – racial Germans) who had received only a brief training and had not 
volunteered, but been drafted to the Waffen-SS in the normal conscription procedure. Their 
fighting value was therefore correspondingly lower then had been the case with the former 
personnel and naturally lowered the combat efficiency of the entire division. (Brenner, 1947b:1) 
 
Indeed Berger was forced to address issues that arose from the negative attitude 
towards the Waffen-SS that many of the recruits displayed. This negativity arose from 
the high casualty rates of the Waffen-SS, the fact it served in the military hot spots, 
hard training, little chance of promotion and forceful repudiation of religious beliefs. 
All of these Berger attempted to discount as only been rumours far removed from the 
truth (Rempel, 1980). It would appear, however, that the high casualty rates may have 
been more truth then fiction, as Hitler commented, “For an elite force like our SS, it’s 
great luck to have suffered comparatively heavy losses. In this way it is assured of the 
necessary prestige…” (Trevor-Roper, 2000:13).  
 
Even German Field Marshal Eric Von Manstein commented on high casualties in his 
post-war memoirs, where he claimed that the Waffen-SS “… paid a toll of blood 
incommensurate with its actual gains … the blame for such unnecessary consumption 
of manpower must lie with the men who set up these special units for purely political 
motives…” (Von Manstein, 1982:188). He seemed to forget that he himself 
commanded the SS Divisions and in fact stated the following in an order of the day 
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dated 12th July 1941: “The SS-Totenkopf Division attacked with great courage … the 
divisions regiments have suffered high casualties in this fighting. I express my 
gratitude to all the officers and men of this corps for their dedication; my recognition 
for your high achievement” (Ullrich, 2002:90). 
 
So varied were the manpower sources of the Waffen-SS that it defies putting them 
into any specific group. In 1943 the 13th SS Handschar Division was formed by 
recruiting Bosnian Moslems (Bender & Taylor, 1972; Lepre, 1997; Nafziger, 2001; 
Westwood, 2001). A second Moslem Division, the 23rd SS Kama Division, was 
planned but never reached divisional status, and its cadres were later transferred to the 
Handschar Division (Nafziger, 2001; Westwood, 2001; Williamson & Andrew, 
2004b). Himmler was forced to some degree to lessen his racial standards and his 
abhorrence of religion. The Handschar Division was allowed Imams and the 14th SS 
Galicia Division made up of Eastern Catholics from the Ukraine was allowed 
chaplains (Bender & Taylor, 1975; Lepre, 1997). Two divisions were formed from 
policemen, these being the 4th and 35th SS Divisions (Husemann, 2003; Nafziger, 
2001; Westwood, 2001; Williamson & Andrew, 2004c). However, it is worth noting 
that even though Himmler was forced to reduce his racial standards in some respects, 
he still believed that they were essential to the nature of the Waffen-SS. To this end 
there was a 
Fundamental separation between the German and Germanic SS troops as part of the whole SS 
Orden on the one hand, and the numerous SS volunteer units without special racial 
qualifications – a sort of second-class Waffen-SS – on the other, which actually began the 
transformation of the SS from the Fuhrer’s guard into a multinational army. (Wegner, 
1990:139) 
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It was then the turn of the Baltic States to contribute to the SS war machine. Two 
further SS Divisions were raised by the Latvians, one by the Estonians (Bender & 
Taylor, 1975, 1982; Nafziger, 2001; Westwood, 2001). By late 1944 Germany was 
accepting any human material it could find and no source was left untapped. It is 
therefore not surprising that the Germans in their ingenuity turned to their own terror 
apparatus, the concentration-camps, to obtain more recruits for the Waffen-SS. SS-
Oberführer Dirlewanger proposed using camp inmates in his unit. He had already 
been using poachers and other criminals for some time. Now, however, he obtained 
permission to utilise political prisoners currently held in the camp system (MacLean, 
1998; Stein, 1966). Some 1910 men were recruited from camps such at Auschwitz, 
Buchenwald, Dachau, Ravensbruck and Mauthausen, etc in late 1944 (MacLean, 
1998:203).  
 
This very reliance on such a variance of manpower sources provided a quandary for 
Himmler as they undermined his very vision of the Waffen-SS being a ideologically 
and racially pure elite for the new German Reich (Wegner, 1985). It was due to this 
expansion the Waffen-SS, while still remaining a tool of Nazi conquest and 
annihilation, lost some of its distinctive political and ideological makeup (Koehl, 
1983; Wegner, 1985; Ziegler, 1989). While many of the West European volunteers 
fell into the ideological category, many of the East European members of the Waffen-
SS were fighting for nationalistic reasons at best, or reluctant to fight at all at worst 
(Stein, 1965).  
 
There were still, however, some ideological reservoirs of manpower available to 
Himmler. In 1944 the Waffen-SS hierarchy decided to recruit a division from the 
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young men and boys of the Hitlerjugend (Luther, 1987). As noted by SS-
Brigadeführer Hugo Kraas, commander  of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, 
as late as November 1944 the division could rely on the following replacements: “The 
young replacements consisted of volunteers, whose training had been very short” 
(Kraas, 1947:5).  This reliance on the Hitlerjugend ensured that the soldiers were 
recruited from the “… racially, ideologically and physically fit youth of Nazi 
Germany” (Simpson, 1990:61). The other inherent benefit on drawing on such a 
resource was that the boys of the Hitlerjugend had been subjected to “… years of 
ideological indoctrination, coupled with the purposeful manipulation of youthful 
idealism within the Hitler Youth…”; in short they were the perfect ideological 
warriors for the Waffen-SS (Luther, 1987:12).  
 
With this in mind some 17,000 were called up to form the SS Hitlerjugend Division, 
while another 25,000 were distributed to other Waffen-SS formations (Rempel, 1980). 
These boy soldiers would be as effective as any of the premier Waffen-SS divisions. 
In fact they were seen as almost a pseudo Leibstandarte, given their idealism and the 
fact that a large per centage of the officer and NCO cadre for the Hitlerjugend was 
transferred from the Leibstandarte Division. The fact that they were young boys 
however, could not be overlooked. As one veteran of the SS Hitlerjugend Division, 
Bernhard Heisig, recalled, “The youngest among us didn’t get any cigarettes, well 
they didn’t smoke anyway. They actually got sweets, confectionery” (Halliley, 2003; 
Luther, 1987). 
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By the end of the 
war the Waffen-SS 
contained soldiers of 
foreign origin that 
included Danes, 
Norwegians, Finns, 
Swiss, Swedes, 
Flemings, Walloons, 
Frenchmen, Italians, 
Latvians, Estonians, Russians, Ukrainians, Croats, Bosnian Serbs, Hungarians, 
Albanians, Romanians, Netherlanders, Spaniards, and even some Britons and Indians 
(Bishop, 2005; Bowen, 2001; Ripley, 2004; Stein, 1965, 1966; Ziegler, 1989). With 
this influx of foreigners the Waffen-SS had grown from a small Germanic elite body 
to a large multinational force. It had, in fact, gone from some 0.7 per cent of 
Wehrmacht strength in 1939 to 5.4 per cent in 1944 (Scherzer, 2006). According to 
one source by the end of 1944 the Waffen-SS contained some 400,000 German 
citizens, 310,000 Volksdeutsche (foreigners of Germanic origin) and 200,000 foreign 
volunteers (Ploetz, Schramm, & Hillgruber, 1960). This illustrates that even with the 
influx of foreigners the Waffen-SS was still, however, primarily Germanic. Some of 
these nationalities were only present in small numbers, but nonetheless they were part 
of the Waffen-SS at one point of another. The table below illustrates the numbers of 
various nationalities that served in the Waffen-SS and, main units that they served in. 
 
 
Youthful soldiers of the Waffen-SS Hitlerjugend 
Division.
Youthful soldiers of the Waffen-SS Hitlerjugend 
Division.
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Country of 
Origin 
Approximate number of 
men 
SS Formations 
Netherlands 50,000 22nd and 34th divisions 
Belgium 40,000 27th and 28th divisions 
France 20,000 33rd division 
Italy 15,000 29th division 
Denmark 10,000 5th and 11th divisions 
Norway 6000 5th division 
Finland 3000 SS Regiment Nordland 
Spain 1000 28th division 
Sweden 300 5th and 11th divisions 
Switzerland 300 5th division 
Soviet Union 60,000 29th and 30th divisions 
Latvia 80,000 15th and 19th divisions 
Romania 50,000 7th and 8th divisions 
Estonia 25,000 20th division 
Hungary 20,000 25th and 26th divisions 
Croatia 20,000 13th and 23rd divisions 
Albania 7000 21st division 
Bulgaria 600 Various 
Serbia 10,000 Various  
Note: Sourced from Bishop 2005. Some of the smaller nationalities that contributed to 
the SS are not mentioned here. Only the major units that these nationalities served in 
have been mentioned. The total figure of volunteers may differ from that of other 
authors but nonetheless gives an account of the varied sources of manpower. 
 
The apologists for the Waffen-SS have raised the argument that they were merely the 
replication of the post-war NATO military formations; they were, in fact, a European 
army (Mackenzie, 1997). The argument being that they were a multination force 
formed to oppose communism. Indeed, former Waffen-SS officers have argued that 
the European volunteers were not pro-Nazi, but rather should be seen as “anti-
Bolshevists” (Ertel & Schulze-Kossens, 2000:6). SS-Obergruppenführer Steiner 
argued in his post-war account of the Waffen-SS that “… the foreign volunteers were 
men of spirit who, like their German comrades, saw the diabolical threat to Western 
civilisation posed by Bolshevism and fought like lions against it under the banner of 
the Waffen-SS” (Mackenzie, 1997:138).  
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This stands some credence until one considers that the recruitment of Germanic 
volunteers was done “… with the Nazi goal of creating a Germanic Reich by drawing 
upon the Germanic blood in the entire world” (Gingerich, 1997). There were no plans 
for autonomy of the countries that the volunteers came from, they would continue 
after the war under the German yoke. Indeed, unlike NATO, which is a standing force 
among equal partners, the foreigners who served in the Waffen-SS were for 
expediency only and were certainly not equals in the relationship.  
Nor were the German-raised legions intended as a permanent force, since they were formed for 
one purpose and one purpose only – the defeat of the Soviet Union. Had the war ended with 
German victory, the legions were to have been disbanded, their purpose having been served. 
(Buss & Mollo, 1978:10) 
  
As well as this many of the foreign groups who joined the Waffen-SS later in the war 
“… were motivated to fight for different reasons than their Reich German 
counterparts” (Wegner, 1990:311). Many fought for nationalist reasons, however they 
still displayed and shared the German dislike for Jews and Bolshevism. The inclusion 
of racially inferior groups later in the war was done for the sake of military 
expediency as great holes were torn in the manpower of the Waffen-SS on the Eastern 
Front. The Waffen-SS remained a Germanic order. As Stein notes: “The Waffen-SS 
had indeed become an army of Europeans; it never was a European army” (Stein, 
1965:22). 
 
  196 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
Conclusion 
In conclusion it can be seen that the Waffen-SS was in fact part of the overall Nazi 
political apparatus. It was never a legitimate part of the armed forces, but rather an 
armed adjunct of the Nazi Party, available for utilisation at the will of the Führer. The 
arguments by veterans that they were just simple soldiers of no particular political 
persuasion do not hold up under examination. The Waffen-SS was an organisation 
that was heavily based on the racial, ideological and political beliefs of the Nazi Party. 
 
The Waffen-SS was given special treatment in relation to its relationship with Hitler, 
in its training schools and the SS court system used to regulate it. These were benefits 
that were never given to the regular army units. The training of the Waffen-SS was 
deliberately aimed at producing effective military leaders who would also be 
politically and ideologically reliable. There can be little doubt that in the early days at 
least, the Waffen-SS was seen as the genetic base of the new Germanic Reich, and for 
this reason Himmler and Hitler held it in special regard.  
 
While in the later years of the war the racial and political elite was diluted to some 
extent due to manpower shortages, there did, however, remain a large hard core of 
Waffen-SS officers and men who were aligned with the racial, political and 
ideological views of the Nazis. This consensus on a world view would allow the 
Waffen-SS to undertake massive atrocities in a systematic way as the revolutionary 
shock troops of the Third Reich during their war of destruction in Russia. 
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It can be seen that the Waffen-SS organisation was a mixture of situational and 
disposition factors. In fact, clearly it shows the attributes of the interactional evil 
model that I discussed previously. It was an organisation created to undertake 
whatever was necessary to further the Nazi state and it attracted and accepted (in the 
early years at least) only those who were in ideological sync with its aims. It can also 
be seen that the Waffen-SS was setting the foundations for the genocide that was to 
follow. This can be seen by the below points that developed from my genocide 
discussion. I see the following factors as necessary precursors for genocidal actions to 
take place. 
• There is a bureaucracy/regime that is prepared to undertake evil acts. In this 
case the SS, and later the Waffen-SS. 
• There are individuals present in society who are prepared to surrender their 
moral responsibility to commit these actions. The early and even later recruits 
into the Waffen-SS, but more importantly perhaps was that the command and 
control elements of the Waffen-SS were clearly prepared to do the above. 
• The following of these directions from the regime is part of the creation of 
distance between the perpetrator and the victim. This is shown by the 
preparedness of the Waffen-SS to do what was necessary for the Nazi state so 
as to ensure its survival. 
• The perpetrator does not have to be concerned with the moral implications of 
the act because this moral role has been assumed by the regime. The radical 
views held by the SS and the Waffen-SS in regards to Jews and other 
subhuman elements. 
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• There is usually some kind of difficult life conditions present in society that 
make society more susceptible to this type of action. In this case the economic 
hardship of the Great Depression, and the sense of betrayal and loss following 
the humiliating conditions imposed by the victors after World War I. 
 
The next chapter will provide clear evidence of the atrocities undertaken by the 
Waffen-SS. 
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CH A P T E R  4:  NE C E S S A RY E V I L O R  
H U M A N  AT R O C I T Y ? A CA S E  ST U D Y 
O F T H E  WA F F E N -SS 
 
I can imagine the need to dig an antitank dike and about 10,000 Russian women dying of 
exhaustion during the course of the work. This is of no interest to me. The only question is 
whether the dike is completed or not. (Segev, 1987:86) 
 
This speech given by Himmler to officers of the Waffen-SS in Posen in 1943 
succinctly outlines the brutal practicality of the SS psyche. In fact it gives clear 
representation to the notion of instrumental evil as described in previous discussions.  
The logic was let 10,000 Russians die, their loss will prevent the loss of German lives 
and for this result the cost is acceptable.  
 
In dealing with the actions of 
the Waffen-SS on the Eastern 
Front it is necessary to 
clearly outline the aspects 
that this study will address. 
The previous sections have 
already set the scene and 
tone of the conflict, what this 
discussion shall attempt to do 
is outline what actions the Waffen-SS undertook on the Eastern Front. Indeed the 
Waffen-SS recruiting poster.Waffen-SS recruiting poster.
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conflict on the Russian front has an unenviable association with the SS due to “… 
their part in policing the country, in the massacres of Jews, in the hunt for political 
commissars and partisans, in the reprisals on villages, and in the round-up of slave 
labour” (Reitlinger, 1957:166).  
 
It is not my intent to discuss the military exploits of the Waffen-SS to any large 
degree, that is not my purpose. I do intend, however, to examine various acts of the 
Waffen-SS in an attempt to show that this military force did commit some of the most 
heinous acts to occur during World War II. To this purpose I intend to examine the 
following areas in an effort to provide examples of what may later be called evil 
actions. These areas will include: 
• Anti-partisan operations; 
• General combat duties; 
• The concentration-camps and;  
• Other miscellaneous actions. 
Let me justify why I am including the concentration-camps. These are included as 
there is a strong link between the Waffen-SS and the concentration-camps, second 
many of the death camps were situated in the conquered Eastern territories and third 
the majority of the victims came from the conquered Eastern territories while others 
were subject to the actions of the Einsatzgruppen behind the front lines in the east. As 
Sydnor notes in his study of the Totenkopf division; 
… Among the officers and NCOs and SS enlisted men who fought in the ranks of the Totenkopf 
division there were many who had come from or later went to SS agencies or affiliates engaged 
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in non-military tasks. Personnel exchanges between the SSTK52 and the extermination centres, 
the concentration-camps, the Einsatzgruppen, the SS anti-partisan units, the staff of the 
HSSPF, the SD, the domestic police forces of the Reich, the administrative personnel, and 
operational staffs of the SS, are all a matter of documentary record. (Sydnor, 1990:341) 
 
He is supported in this claim by Wegner who states the following regarding the 
relationship between the Waffen-SS and the more insidious branches of the SS: 
The staffs of the concentration-camps were organisationally part of the Waffen-SS. Units and 
formations of the Waffen-SS were used behind the front as part of “anti-guerrilla actions” and 
assigned, in limited numbers to be sure, to Einsatzgruppen… (Wegner, 1985:222) 
 
In handing down its judgement that the SS was a criminal organisation the IMT stated 
the following in reference to the Waffen-SS and its activities and guilt: 
There is evidence that the shooting of unarmed prisoners of war was the general practice in 
some Waffen-SS divisions. On 1 October 1944, the custody of prisoners of war and interned 
persons was transferred to Himmler, who in turn transferred prisoner-of-war affairs to SS-
Obergruppenfuhrer Berger and to SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Pohl. The Race and Settlement 
Office of the SS, together with the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle53, were active in carrying out 
schemes for Germanisation of occupied territories according to the racial principles of the Nazi 
Party and were involved in the deportation of Jews and other foreign nationals. Units of the 
Waffen-SS and Einsatzgruppen operating directly under the SS Main Office were used to carry 
out these plans. These units were also involved in the widespread murder and ill-treatment of 
the civilian population of occupied territories. Under the guise of combating partisan units, 
units of the SS exterminated Jews and people deemed politically undesirable by the SS, and 
their reports record the execution of enormous numbers of persons. Waffen-SS divisions were 
responsible for many massacres and atrocities in occupied territories … Units of the Waffen-SS 
were directly involved in the killing of prisoners of war and the atrocities in occupied countries. 
                                                 
52 3rd SS Totenkopf Division. 
 
53 The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle or VOMI, the organisation that ensured the privileges of ethnic 
Germans living outside the borders of the German Reich. 
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It supplied personnel for the Einsatzgruppen, and had command over the concentration-camp 
guards after its absorption of the Totenkopf SS, which originally controlled the system. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 22:514) 
 
I shall expand upon these arguments in the following pages, but suffice for now it 
provides the reader with some indication of how I intend to frame my arguments. It is 
important to outline to some degree the actions of the Waffen-SS as it will provide 
support for my conclusions in the final chapter when I conduct an analysis of the 
Waffen-SS and the concept of evil. As such much of the following information will 
be of a factual nature rather then the theoretical discussions that were undertaken in 
the first two chapters. 
 
Combat operations 
The invasion of Russia saw the Waffen-SS build a formidable reputation as a fighting force, but 
it also confirmed that they were warriors for a truly evil cause. (Ripley, 2004:73).  
 
It has been noted that the Waffen-SS in general earnt a reputation for brutality in the 
way it conducted itself in armed conflicts. During the conflict on the Eastern Front the 
shooting of prisoners, the massacre of civilians and the destruction of villages became 
a signature behaviour of the Waffen-SS (Ripley, 2004; Staub, 1989; Stein, 1966). The 
Waffen-SS “… were accused of violations of the Geneva Convention and the 
generally accepted rules of war” during the conflict in Russia and also to a lesser 
extent in the Western conflict (Reynolds, 1999:9). It is acknowledged that the conflict 
on the Eastern Front was fought with barbarity on both sides, however, the “… brutal 
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reprisals for Soviet crimes taken by Waffen-SS soldiers were out of all proportion, 
and repugnant to many of their fellow country men” (Hohne, 1969:469).  
 
The SS went to great lengths to portray the Russian soldier as a different opponent to 
those encountered in the West. The SS newspaper showed “… Russian prisoners who 
look especially non-Aryan, and they are described as being in rags and lice-infested” 
(Combs, 1986:138). All this was designed to ensure that the German soldier did not 
see the Russian as a fellow soldier, but rather as a subhuman. SS-Gruppenführer Max 
Simon clearly espoused the view held of the Russian soldier in a post-war manuscript, 
“… the primitive way of thinking and the mental sluggishness of the Russian peasant 
did not permit the employment of complicated weapons” (Simon, 1949:12).  
 
The Eastern Front was not a place of comradely pity for a vanquished foe. An 
example of this thinking is given by a German Army officer, Bern Freytag Von 
Loringhoven, who recounted how he saw a row of Russian prisoners lined up and a 
group of SS soldiers getting ready to shoot the prisoners. When queried an SS 
corporal turned to Von Loringhoven and said, “Ah Lieutenant, they are just brutes” 
prior to killing them (Halliley, 2003). He is not alone in recounting incidents like this. 
At Nuremberg, evidence was given about the execution of prisoners by the Waffen-
SS in 1941 by a captured Russian soldier, Mojzesz Goldberg: 
On 23 June 1941 I was called up into the Soviet Army in Lemberg. In the middle of July I was 
taken prisoner by the Germans. At a locality five kilometres from Podwoloczysk the SS 
companies sought the Jews out of the whole mass of prisoners and shot them on the spot. I 
remained alive as they did not recognise me as a Jew. I stress the fact that it was the Waffen-SS 
who did this. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:388) 
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Examples of this type of behaviour can be found from other sources. A soldier of the 
16th SS Panzergrenadier Reichsführer SS Division wrote in a letter that,  
In the vicinity of our camp there is situated a Russian prisoner-of-war camp. In there they did  
not want to correctly obey orders. Now we have shot 800 men. Now they are quiet. Yes, they 
must be happy that they still live, since we know no mercy. Now they have the first warning, the 
confounded dogs. (Huffman, 2005:153) 
 
Waffen-SS veteran Hans Schmidt recounts in his autobiography an incident with a 
sergeant on the Russian Front in 1944: 
The sergeant and I had been talking about rather mundane things when we came upon the 
wounded enemy soldier. When we came closer and saw the horrible shape the fellow was in the 
sergeant quietly lifted his machine gun, aimed at the wounded man, shot him dead with a short 
burst of fire, and then walked on as nothing had happened. (Schmidt, 2001:231) 
 
Schmidt later attempts to justify this act as a mercy killing and did not consider it a 
war crime. Two Swedish volunteers in the Waffen-SS had this to say during a visit to 
the Swedish embassy in Berlin in 1941: 
Prisoners were seldom taken by the Waffen-SS. Unless they surrendered in greater numbers 
than company size they would be shot on the spot. The prisoners were harshly treated and were 
then moved forward by kicks and beatings. Female soldiers were killed instantly… (Christensen 
et al., 2003:21) 
 
Even as the war ended in 1945 soldiers of the Waffen-SS acted with cruelty towards 
Russian soldiers. For example, two escaped Russian POWs were executed by a 
solider of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler in March 194554 (Ruter & de Mildt, 2004: 
                                                 
54 FR case 491. 
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Vol 16). This dismissal of the value of life is clear in the comments of Hans 
Hossfelder, an officer of the Das Reich Division:  
It was one thing to enter Russia and combat the Red Army, kill partisans and the like. We had 
been indoctrinated to believe that they were a subhuman culture, slightly above the status of 
animals, and this was not too hard for many of us to believe. However, for the men who entered 
Greece before June 1941 (the invasion of Russia), as I was one of them, it would have been 
difficult to carry out or issue an order to kill people simply because they had to die. This was not 
the case in Russia. Now when these people returned from Russia and the brutal anti-partisan 
war in Yugoslavia, it was just a different matter. Men had seen and done so much killing, it 
almost seemed to be just a part of the job. I do not say that it is right now, or even that it was 
right back then. It was only right according to the times we found ourselves in, given the 
particulars of the circumstances. It was very sad. (Heaton, 2001:85) 
 
This type of attitude was exhibited by a host of Waffen-SS units. So commonplace 
and widespread were these acts of brutality that I would contend these types of actions 
were endemic to the Waffen-SS units as a whole.  
 
Foremost among them was the Totenkopf division, which conducted such actions as 
“… the burning of villages, the murder of prisoners and the summary execution of 
captured commissars and politruks” and earnt its reputation as one of the most brutal 
SS units on the Eastern Front (Sydnor, 1990:316). It is with little surprise then that at 
the end of the war the Russians asked for and succeeded in getting all Totenkopf 
personnel who had surrendered to the Western Allies handed over to them for 
punishment. The Totenkopf was not alone in the destruction of villages and the killing 
of civilians. On the 2nd of July 1941 men from the Westland Regiment (part of the 5th 
Waffen-SS Wiking Panzer Division) exacted revenge with the destruction of a village 
and reprisals against the inhabitants in return for a sniper killing their commander, SS-
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Standartenführer Wackerle (Smith et al., 1999). The Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler 
conducted the murder of 200 Russian civilians near the town of Slucz for the murder 
of German soldiers. The civilians were herded into a petrol-soaked cottage; “The 
windows and doors were then barricaded and a hand grenade dropped down the 
chimney. The explosion and holocaust were spectacular…” (Wykes, 1974:125). 
 
Some Waffen-SS veterans claimed that no atrocities were ever committed. As one 
veteran of the 6th SS Mountain Division Nord stated “… as I recall my time with the 
battalion on Russian territory, I can’t think of any actions which could have tarnished 
our battalion’s honour. It is also my firm belief that this notion is true of the other 
units.” (Voss, 2002:147). It is of interest that later in the memoirs of this particular 
veteran he describes his first combat with American forces where the Americans were 
allowed to tend to their wounded on the field. He states, “I couldn’t believe my eyes. 
What kind of war was this? Nothing like that would have happened at the Eastern 
Front, but here some of the rules of war seemed still to be in force, valid for both 
sides” (Voss, 2002:183). This statement would seem to contradict his earlier claim 
regarding a lack of atrocities or knowledge of such on the Eastern Front. 
 
During June 1941 the soldiers of the Waffen-SS began to fight their way into Russia 
against disorganised Russian resistance. Huge losses were being inflicted upon the 
Russians, the result being large groups or pockets of Russian soldiers that were 
bypassed and cut off from their main forces. The 1st Totenkopf Infantry Regiment 
(part of the 3rd Waffen-SS Totenkopf Division) was subjected to attacks by these 
groups of straggling Russian soldiers with the result that the regimental commander, 
SS-Standartenführer Max Simon, ordered that these Russian soldiers be seen as 
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partisans and be “… dealt with most ruthlessly” (C. Mann, 2001; Sydnor, 1990:160). 
This, Sydnor (1990:160) argues, resulted in the likely consequence that the SS 
soldiers “… shot the majority of the Russian stragglers they encountered, especially 
those who offered resistance rather then immediate surrender”.  
 
This claim is supported by several reports from Waffen-SS officers of this unit to 
higher commands describing the Russian soldiers in panic-stricken terms as “… 
fanatical, inhuman creatures who employed the vilest tricks to kill German soldiers” 
(Sydnor, 1990:160). To support these claims the officers gave examples such as some 
200 Russian soldiers coming forward to surrender with hands raised, who then 
suddenly began firing on the SS soldiers. The result being that the SS killed all of the 
Russians, including those who later attempted to surrender (Sydnor, 1990).  At 
Zhitomir the SS Wiking Division carried out the following orders in the town. 
Its men were given the instructions to search every home and building for, in addition to 
People’s Commissars, all of the town’s officials, whether civilian or military. When these 
officials were rounded up, they were shot. (Butler, 1978:106). 
 
The attitude of the Waffen-SS to the Russian civilians is reflected in the comments of 
Waffen-SS General Karl Herrmann. He recalls: 
During the entire advance we encountered scattered snipers, saboteurs and partisan groups. 
Usually dressed as civilians, these partisans carried on insidious guerrilla warfare behind our 
lines; they engaged in raids, demolition and all other forms of sabotage … the employment of 
these partisan groups as combat units constituted a flagrant violation of the rules of warfare … 
as a rule captured partisans were hungry and filthy.  Among them were half-starved 
underworld characters. Some were adolescents, 15 to 17 years old, whose faces betrayed their 
lust for murder … women were also among the partisans. Almost all of them claimed to be 
doctors or nurses, but to judge by their hard and brutal faces, there was many an active partisan 
among them. (Herrmann, 1947:2) 
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When the Dutch SS volunteers of the Nederland division found that their 
communications were being sabotaged the commander of the division, SS-
Brigadeführer Jurgen Wagner, decided that an example needed to be made. As a 
result certain areas were declared off limits. The SS soldiers then conducted a sweep 
of the area. 
Every Latvian who could be found was rounded up. In a short space of time, more than 150 
civilians were captured … Wagner decided to have a number of them executed in front of 
everyone so as to warn the people of the gravity of the consequences of partisan activity. 
(Pierik, 2001:240) 
 
Eyewitness Andrej Wachranov recalled how upon entering the newly conquered 
Russian town of Borisovo in 1941, SS soldiers of the Das Reich Division collected all 
the village activists, the head of the collective farms, etc and took them to a trench and 
executed them, claiming that they were partisans (Halliley, 2003). SS-
Obersturmbannführer Otto Weidinger, the last commander of the 4th SS Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment Der Führer, wrote an extensive history of the Das Reich 
Division. It is of note that he refers to the battle for Borisovo between the 21-23 of 
October 1941, however, no mention is made of the above shootings (Weidinger, 1998, 
2002). He recalls how after entering the town the Waffen-SS soldiers engaged in “… 
bitter house-to-house fighting” to root out the Russian defenders (Weidinger, 
2002:145). An order of the day was issued on the 23rd of October 1941 by the 
divisional commander, SS-Brigadeführer Wilhelm Bittrich, which stated: 
SS-Division Reich has attacked from the 6-21 October 1941 with hardly a break … strong enemy 
forces were defeated or eliminated … bottomless roads, storms and biting frost presented just 
as little hindrance to the division as the determined counterattacks of the numerically far 
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superior enemy … We will help destroy Bolshevism so that Germany can live. Hail to the 
Führer. (Weidinger, 2002:148) 
 
No mention is made of the massacre of civilians. In November 1942 the 8th SS 
Florian Geyer Division was involved in the encirclement of several Russian units, 
which was called the Beliye pocket (Trang, 2000). At the conclusion of the battle the 
pocket “… was finally closed after five days fighting, with the Soviet unit completely 
wiped out. Only a few elements managed to escape in an isolated breakout at Zizina” 
(Trang, 2000:89). Danish volunteers in the Waffen-SS recounted the killing of 
Russian POWs for minor infractions and also in retaliation for deaths of their 
comrades (Smith et al., 1999). As one Danish volunteer wrote in his diary: 
6/9/1942 A Jew in a greasy kaftan walks up to beg some bread, a couple of comrades get a hold 
of him and drag him behind a building and a moment later he comes to an end. There isn’t any 
room for Jews in the new Europe, they’ve brought too much misery to the European people. 
(Smith et al., 1999:92) 
 
Danish Waffen-SS volunteers of the Freikorps Danmark killed Russian prisoners for 
minor violations. They also executed a number of Russian prisoners in retaliation for 
the death of their commander, with one officer writing home that no prisoners were 
taken that day (Christensen et al., 2003). 
 
During fighting in February 1943 the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler reported killing 
some 500 Russian soldiers while taking only five prisoners (Weingartner, 1974). 
These high enemy death rates and low prisoner counts were not unusual for other 
units of the Waffen-SS. During the 6th of July 1941 the SS soldiers of the Totenkopf 
division engaged in such fierce fighting that no prisoners were taken for the day 
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(Sydnor, 1990). The 49th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment De Ruyter, part of the 23rd SS 
Panzergrenadier Division Nederland, reported during fighting in the Kurland pocket 
in 1944 that in a few days fighting 520 Russian soldiers were killed with only some 
14 being taken prisoner (Pierik, 2001:239).  
 
This viciousness of the fighting between the Waffen-SS and Russian army units is 
highlighted by the fate of the 9th Waffen-SS Mountain Corps during its defence of 
Budapest in early 1945. Among other units the Corps contained the 8th SS Calvary 
Division Florian Geyer and the 22nd SS Calvary Division Maria Theresa (Bender & 
Taylor, 1971; Landwehr, 1998; Trang, 2000; Westwood, 2001). Some 24,000 German 
soldiers (the majority of which were Waffen-SS) attempted to break out of the city 
through Russian lines on the 11th of February 1945. For many of the Waffen-SS 
soldiers this attempt to escape was to result in their slaughter. Members of the 22nd 
Division were ambushed by Russian troops as they tried to break out of the 
encirclement, the Russians “… slaughtered the Germans but spared the Hungarians” 
(Ungvary, 2005:235). Of 24,000 who attempted to break out only some 170 Waffen-
SS soldiers were successful in reaching the German lines55 (Landwehr, 1998; Trang, 
2000; Weinberg, 1994). For those Waffen-SS soldiers who were captured an ominous 
end awaited them. “The Waffen-SS and wounded were most at risk. The former were 
killed for political reasons … in the sports ground in Budakezi, SS soldiers were 
forced to dig their own graves before being shot.” (Ungvary, 2005:333). 
 
                                                 
55 Ungvary gives the strength of the garrison as some 44,000 (including some 11,000 wounded) at the 
time of the breakout and cites some 700 German soldiers reached the German lines. He does not 
stipulate how many of these were from the Waffen-SS. 
  211 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
The pinnacle of the Waffen-SS, the battle of Kharkov 
In 1943 the Waffen-SS gained a great victory in the battle of Kharkov where they 
destroyed substantial Russian forces and recaptured the city. It was to be the last 
major victory by German troops on the Eastern Front. But more than this, it was 
solely a Waffen-SS victory, the feat being achieved by the 1st SS Panzer Corps 
containing the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, Das Reich and Totenkopf Panzer 
Divisions. Hitler’s special relationship with the Waffen-SS is evident by the fact that 
he lavished a large number of Knight’s Crosses on his political soldiers for their 
actions in retaking the city. Fourteen went to the Leibstandarte, 10 to the Das Reich 
and five to the Totenkopf (Butler, 1978; J. W. Schneider, 1993). The battle turned into 
a massacre by its end. During the fighting soldiers of the Totenkopf division: 
Drew alongside the retreating Russians at distances of 20 to 30 yards, machine gunning at will 
the trucks crammed with infantry … the Russians had abandoned most of their vehicles and 
equipment and were trying to escape on foot … the SSTK First Panzergrenadier Regiment … 
methodically cut down the panicked herds of stampeding Russians fleeing… (Sydnor, 
1990:269)  
 
SS-Sturmbannführer Ralf Tiemann of the SS Leibstandarte Division described the 
action as follows:  
Panzers of the 7.Panzerkompany drove through Bulachi to the position of the breakthrough 
and were able to effectively support the grenadiers of the II battalion during the annihilation of 
the enemy forces … At a distance of 3000 to 4000 metres we could observe the Soviet horse-
drawn sleds and tanks. During the attack I successfully positioned my panzer III in a small 
depression and was able to kill 48 Russians with machine-gun fire. (Tiemann, 1998:35) 
 
This type of action is graphically illustrated in Nipe’s (2002) photo essay on the 
Kharkov campaign. It shows a series of pictures depicting some Russian soldiers with 
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horse-drawn carts on the empty steppe trying to flee from Waffen-SS soldiers of the 
SS Leibstandarte division. The SS soldiers, heavily armed and mounted in halftracks 
and assault guns, rapidly overtake the Russian soldiers, who with no hope of flight 
attempt to surrender. The SS soldiers then machine gun the soldiers attempting to 
surrender (G. Nipe & Spezzano, 2002:145). One author describes the action as 
follows, “… for the soldiers of the SS Panzer Corps it was like a field day with live 
ammunition and moving targets” (Simpson, 1990:58). Clearly the above actions are in 
contravention of Article 23 of the Hague Conventions, which states it is forbidden “… 
to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer 
means of defence, has surrendered at discretion…”. This can be referred back to my 
argument in Chapter 1 where I base the objective assessment of actions on 
internationally accepted rules or standards. Clearly here the actions of the Waffen-SS 
are outside of such. Gunter Oehmke, a solider in the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 
admitted that “… especially in offensive combat units such as the Panzer and fast-
moving Panzergrenadier elements, prisoners were at times shot or simply not even 
taken basically because of military necessity” (Huffman, 2005:151). 
 
During the battle for Kharkov in 1943 the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division was 
accused of setting fire to a building containing 300 wounded Soviet soldiers in one 
incident and shooting some 400 wounded officers in their hospital beds in another 
(Darman, 2004; Reynolds, 1999; Ripley, 2004; Stein, 1966). When the Russians 
recaptured Kharkov evidence was uncovered of atrocities committed by the Waffen-
SS. This included some 10,00056 civilians who were killed by Einsatzgruppen and 
                                                 
56 Stein puts the figure claimed at 20,000. 
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other units following behind the Waffen-SS (Darman, 2004; Halliley, 2003; Stein, 
1966). One doctor recounted how SS soldiers “… threw incendiary grenades through 
the windows, the buildings began to burn and the wounded tried to save themselves”, 
few survived (Halliley, 2003). This matter was investigated after the war and one 
author had the following to say. 
In response the judicial authorities in Nuremberg carried out a lengthy inquiry, examining no 
less than 688 witnesses, all but 13 of whom were former members of the Leibstandarte. Only 
four of them professed to having ever heard of Soviet prisoners having been shot and the 
general view was that the Leibstandarte would never have been permitted to shoot defenceless 
prisoners. What could be established was that the hospital itself was within the area of the 
attack made by the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment and that the main Soviet defensive belt 
was just north of the hospital. It is thus very likely that it became embroiled in the battle, and 
given that street fighting is often confused and merciless, it is quite possible that the 
Leibstandarte soldiers may have believed that they were being fired upon from the hospital and 
decided to eradicate all possible opposition inside it. (Messenger, 1988:211) 
 
The above explanation hardly stands scrutiny when examined in the light of the 
background and other actions of the Waffen-SS in general, and the Leibstandarte in 
particular. Himmler arrived in the city shortly afterwards and a recording was made of 
the following speech to the Waffen-SS soldiers of the 1st SS Panzer Corps. At this 
point in time SS-Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser commanded the corps. Footage of 
the time shows an eager Hausser greeting Himmler with the Nazi salute as he arrives 
in Kharkov. Himmler’s speech contained the following exhortation to his soldiers: 
We have but one task. To fight this racial battle without mercy. This great weapon of fear and 
terror which has guided us since the victory of Kharkov must never be allowed to weaken; 
instead we must strengthen it further. Heil Hitler. (Halliley, 2003) 
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Hausser attempted to play down this speech later when it was introduced into 
evidence before the IMT. However, the comments of Das Reich veteran Hans-
Joachim Lindow serve to illustrate the motivations of the Waffen-SS at this point in 
time; “… at one point there was this silly saying, that the Leibstandarte saw it as their 
mission to lay Kharkov at Hitler’s feet, and that motivation was certainly there, lets 
not fool ourselves” (Halliley, 2003). The city changed hands on a number of 
occasions and 
the Waffen-SS 
were 
responsible for 
its defence. In 
preparing the 
defences of the 
Kharkov the SS 
Leibstandarte 
used slave labour in the form of “… 25,000 Russians, presumably both prisoners of 
war and conscripted civilians” to carry out the work required (Weingartner, 1974:92). 
The involvement of the Waffen-SS in committing atrocities was to continue in a 
variety of conflicts. 
 
The Warsaw Uprisings 
Two actions stand out in the history of the Waffen-SS and these both concern the city 
of Warsaw in Poland. Two uprisings took place in this city. The first being the 
Film footage of SS-Oberstgruppenfuhrer Paul 
Hausser greeting Himmler after the battle of 
Kharkov.
Film footage of SS-Oberstgruppenfuhrer Paul 
Hausser greeting Himmler after the battle of 
Kharkov.
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uprising of the Jews in the ghetto in 1943; and the second being the offensive of the 
Polish Home Army in 1944.  
 
The uprising of the Warsaw Ghetto 
On the 19th of April 1943 the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto rose up against their Nazi 
oppressors and engaged in combat against them for some 28 days (Davidson & 
Manning, 1999; Dear & Foot, 2001; Kurzman, 1993). This was as a result of some 
300,000 Jews being transported from the ghetto to the death camp at Treblinka since 
July 1942. Time was running out for the remaining 60,000 or so Jews (Dear & Foot, 
2001; Kurzman, 1993). The Waffen-SS was to have a major role in suppressing this 
uprising both from a 
command point of 
view and also in 
relation to the combat 
units utilised.  
 
The command of 
suppressing the 
uprising was put in 
the hands of Waffen-SS General, SS-Brigadeführer Jurgen Stroop, who was later to 
take on the position of SSPF Warsaw (MacLean, 2001; Snyder, 1976).  Stroop had 
served in the Totenkopf Division on the Eastern Front in 1941. He then became the 
Higher SS and Police Leader (HSSPF) for Russia South and was then made SS and 
Police Leader (SSPF) for Lvov in the Ukraine before being sent to Warsaw to deal 
Polish Jews being led out of the Warsaw Ghetto 
by SS soldiers.
Polish Jews being led out of the Warsaw Ghetto 
by SS soldiers.
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with the Jews (MacLean, 2001). After the war he was extradited to Poland and tried 
for the crimes committed during the Ghetto uprising. He was convicted and executed 
on the 8th of September 1951 (MacLean, 2001). 
 
While Stroop had direct control of the operations in Warsaw, he was overseen by SS-
Obergruppenführer Friedrich Wilhelm Kruger. Kruger was the HSSPF for the Polish 
area. He gained extensive experience in the Waffen-SS battle formations by serving 
command positions in the 6th SS Nord Division, the 7th SS Prinz Eugen Division and 
he then commanded the 5th SS Mountain Corps (MacLean, 2001; Yerger, 1999). He 
committed suicide on the 9th of May 1945 to avoid capture (MacLean, 2001; Yerger, 
1999).  
 
Stroop had the following SS units available to him to combat the uprising: The 1st and 
2nd battalions of the 22nd SS Police Regiment, the 3rd battalion of the 23rd SS Police 
Regiment, the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Training and Replacement battalion (this was 
the replacement battalion for the Totenkopf Division) and the SS Calvary Field 
Replacement Detachment (this was the replacement unit for the SS Calvary Division) 
(MacLean, 2001). 
 
As with many German actions Stroop kept detailed reports as to the actions 
undertaken by the units under his control. These were then sent to Himmler to keep 
him informed of events. Stroop compiled a final report dated the 16th of May 1943 to 
catalogue his destruction of the ghetto and it is titled; “The Warsaw Ghetto is no 
more”. It was tendered as an exhibit (document number 1061-PS) at Nuremberg and 
provides proof of Waffen-SS involvement and actions undertaken during the combat 
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operations (Office of the United States Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 
1946: Vol 3:718).  On page one of the report Stroop lists the daily average of troops in 
action during the conduct of the conflict (number of soldiers involved indicated as 
officers/men). Of interest is the involvement of the Waffen-SS. 
Waffen SS:  
SS Panzer Grenadier Training and Reserve Battalion 3, Warsaw  4/440  .  
SS Cav. Training and Res Bat. Warsaw  5/381  
(Office of the United States Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946: Vol 3:718) 
 
The Germans were better armed and better trained. The Jews could never hope to win 
such a one-sided fight, and they did not. From the start of the conflict Stroop makes it 
clear in his report that the hardest measures were used against the Jews: 
The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could be broken only by relentlessly using all our 
force and energy by day and night. On 23 April 1943 the Reichsführer-SS issued through the 
Higher SS and Police Führer East at Cracow his order to complete the combing out of the 
Warsaw Ghetto with the greatest severity and relentless tenacity. (Office of the United States 
Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946: Vol 3:725) 
 
The fighting proved tough and hard, even for the soldiers of the Waffen-SS as Stroop 
recounts: 
Then the men of the Waffen SS, the Police or the Wehrmacht Engineers courageously climbed 
down the shafts to bring out the Jews and not infrequently they then stumbled over Jews 
already dead, or were shot at. It was always necessary to use smoke candles to drive out the 
Jews. Thus one day we opened 183 sewer entrance holes and at a fixed time lowered smoke 
candles into them, with the result that the bandits fled from what they believed to be gas to the 
centre of the former Ghetto, where they could then be pulled out of the sewer holes there. A 
great number of Jews, who could not be counted, were exterminated by blowing up sewers and 
dug-outs. (Office of the United States Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946: Vol 
3:725) 
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Eventually all the Jews were killed or evacuated from the Ghetto to the death camps. 
Stroop paid special homage to the troops of the Waffen-SS units and their resilience: 
The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the Waffen SS, Police and Wehrmacht 
became; they fulfilled their duty indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood together as 
models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours often lasted from early morning until late at 
night. At night, search patrols with rags wound round their feet remained at the heels of the 
Jews and gave them no respite. Not infrequently they caught and killed Jews who used the 
night hours for supplementing their stores from abandoned dugouts and for contacting 
neighbouring groups or exchanging news with them.  (Office of the United States Counsel for 
Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946: Vol 3:726) 
 
Stroop continues on and praises the dedication with which the Waffen-SS applied 
themselves to the destruction of the Jews of Warsaw; 
Considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen-SS had only been trained for three 
to four weeks before being assigned to this action, high credit should be given for the pluck, 
courage and devotion to duty which they showed … Only through the continuous and untiring 
work of all involved did we succeed in catching a total of 56,065 Jews whose extermination can 
be proved. To this should be added the number of Jews who lost their lives in explosions or 
fires but whose numbers could not be ascertained. (Office of the United States Counsel for 
Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946: Vol 3:726) 
 
This report contains an interesting fact, that many of the SS soldiers had only been 
members of the Waffen-SS for some weeks. These were not the SS stormtroppers of 
the 1930s. Yet they were still prepared to undertake the massacre of unarmed civilians 
and fight with the most brutal of tactics. I believe that this provides strong evidence of 
the effect of the situation on individuals. When called upon these new recruits showed 
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no hesitation in committing atrocities. Stroop went on to go into detail as to the killing 
wrought on the Jews: 
Of the total of 56,065 Jews caught, about 7,000 were exterminated within the former Ghetto in 
the course of the large-scale action, and 6,929 by transporting them to T.II, which means 
14,000 Jews were exterminated altogether. Beyond the number of 56,065 Jews an estimated 
number of 5,000 to 6,000 were killed by explosions or in fires. (Office of the United States 
Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946: Vol 3:727) 
 
Despite the high numbers of killed only minimal weapons were located by the 
Germans. Stroop listed the booty, as he called it, that he recovered from the Jews. 
• 7 Polish rifles, 1 Russian rifle, 1 German rifle, 59 pistols of various calibres  
• Several hundred hand grenades, including Polish and home-made ones  
• Several hundred incendiary bottles  
• Home-made explosives  
• Infernal machines with fuses  
• A large amount of explosives, ammunition for weapons of all calibres, including some 
machine-gun ammunition. 
(Office of the United States Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946: Vol 3:728) 
 
It can be seen without doubt that obviously most of those killed were unarmed 
civilians. Some of the Waffen-SS soldiers such as Hugo Mielke of the 8th Florian 
Geyer Calvary Division were brought to trial for their crimes after the war.57 Mielke 
was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for leading a destruction unit that 
set fire to houses and shot Jews as they tried to escape from being burnt alive (Ruter 
& de Mildt, 2004: Vol 3). SS General Paul Hausser was questioned in relation to the 
                                                 
57 GDR case 1083. 
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use of the Waffen-SS for combat duties behind the front lines, with reference to the 
Ghetto uprising: 
HERR PELCKMANN: Apart from the accusation concerning the concentration-camps, the 
Prosecution further asserts that the Waffen-SS, on the basis of its training, was a particularly 
cruel military tool; and that is to be shown, allegedly, by the participation of the Waffen-SS men 
in the evacuation of the Warsaw Ghetto and, so says the Prosecution, in the violations of 
international law such as the murder of prisoners of war. Is that correct?  
 
HAUSSER: I already testified, yesterday, that our training was not organised to that end, that 
our method of fighting was supervised and ordered by the Army, and that we did not gain 
prestige through cruel methods. The commanders who had personal pride in leading a clean 
fighting unit against the enemy saw to that. I learned only here of the participation of small 
units of the Waffen-SS in the evacuation of the Warsaw Ghetto or in the executions which took 
place in Bohemia and Moravia. This can only be a question of small details of replacement 
units, which were temporarily subordinated for a brief period of time.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:367) 
 
Hausser raises an important point here that training and replacement battalions of the 
Waffen-SS formations were used for combat operations behind the lines when 
necessary. This was a result of Himmler gaining an agreement with the Wehrmacht in 
1941 that these types of unit would remain under SS control. The result was that: 
Himmler lost no time in scattering the SS replacement units all over German-occupied Europe, 
thus men who had been recruited for front-line service found themselves at times during their 
training period called upon to engage in ‘police activities’. (Stein, 1966:47) 
 
This ensured that Himmler would have a ready source of politically reliable troops 
available to deal ruthlessly with situations just such as the Ghetto uprising. The city of 
Warsaw would feature again in yet another terror campaign undertaken by the 
Waffen-SS. 
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The uprising of the Polish Home Army 
On the 1st of August 1944 the Polish Home Army General Bor-Komorovski, with a 
force of between 35,000 and 50,000 partisans, attacked the Germans in Warsaw 
(Davidson & Manning, 1999; Dear & Foot, 2001). The uprising was instigated as the 
Red Army was on the outskirts of Warsaw, however, the Russian offensive came to a 
stop outside the city and the Germans were able to direct all their attention to the 
insurgents. The conflict was to last for some 63 days before it was defeated. A 
number of Waffen-SS units took part in the combat against the Polish Home Army 
(A. J. Munoz, 1997; Quarrie, 1981; Stein, 1966).  
 
One such unit was the Waffen-SS Sturm Brigade Rona (also known as the Kaminski 
Brigade after its commander), which was formed in July 1944 from elements of the 
Russian People Freedom Army (RONA) (A. J. Munoz, 1997; Nafziger, 2001; Stein, 
1966; Westwood, 2001). This unit would later form the 29th SS Grenadier Division, 
but would only exist for a short period of time (A. J. Munoz, 1997; Nafziger, 2001; 
Westwood, 2001). In June 1944 this unit came under the control of the Reichsführer-
SS after being transferred from army control (A. J. Munoz, 1997). The unit was sent 
to Warsaw to combat the uprising. Units of the Totenkopf and Wiking divisions were 
also used to suppress the uprising (Davies, 2003; Quarrie, 1981).  
A huge sweep through the forest was launched on the 27 September by three battalions of the 
Hermann Goering Panzer Division and the SS Panzer Divisions Totenkopf and Wiking, who 
acted like beaters in a grouse shoot. All the villages, which had given the insurgents shelter, 
were burned, all the male villagers shot. It was typical Nazi anti-partisan warfare. (Davies, 
2003:397) 
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These Waffen-SS units came under the overall command of Waffen-SS General 
Bach-Zelewski. Here they engaged upon an orgy of slaughter and rape. The Kaminski 
Brigade entered a hospital for cancer patients and raped and killed most of the staff 
and patients (A. J. Munoz, 1997). The actions of this brigade extended to shooting of 
innocent civilians in a carte-blanche fashion. So excessive were the tactics of the 
brigade that several sources claim that the SS lured the Brigade’s commander 
Kaminski to a meeting and then executed him for his actions (A. Clark, 1965; 
MacLean, 1998; A. J. Munoz, 1997; Stein, 1966). 
 
This, however, was not the only Waffen-SS unit present at the battle; nor was it the 
only one to commit atrocities. The Dirlewanger SS-Sonderkommando was also sent to 
the city and there it fought with its usual brutality and ruthlessness. 
During the defeat of the uprising, the Dirlewanger brigade burned prisoners alive with gasoline, 
impaled babies on bayonets and stuck them out of windows and hung women upside down 
from balconies… (MacLean, 1998:177) 
 
As Himmler explained to Goebbels the purpose of this was to create such terror and 
sheer violence that the uprising would be stopped “… in a very few days” (A. Clark, 
1965:391). To ensure this aim was achieved Hitler and Himmler issued an order to the 
commander of the SS forces in Warsaw, SS-Obergruppenführer Bach-Zelewski to 
undertake the following: 
Captured insurgents ought to be killed regardless of whether they are fighting in accordance of 
the Hague Convention or not. The part of the population not fighting, women and children, 
should likewise be killed. The whole town must be levelled to the ground… (MacLean, 
1998:177).  
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During the conflict Dirlewanger’s unit operated as part of a Kampfgruppe under the 
direct control of SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Reinefarth, who was later to command the 
18th SS Corps (Bender & Taylor, 1971; MacLean, 1998; Westwood, 2001; Yerger, 
1999). While under his command the Dirlewanger unit “…used crowds of women and 
children as human shields while advancing on rebel strong points” (MacLean, 
1998:188). For his command during the Warsaw conflict Reinefarth was awarded the 
Oak leaves to his Knight’s Cross (J. W. Schneider, 1993; Yerger, 1999). Dirlewanger 
was also rewarded for his actions during the conflict by being awarded Germany’s 
highest military honour, the Knight’s Cross, on the 30th of September 1944 (MacLean, 
1998; J. W. Schneider, 1993).  
 
Yet despite men from this unit being awarded Germany’s highest military awards, 
many Waffen-SS veterans simply ignored the unit’s existence when writing their 
memoirs (Kren & Rappoport, 1976). Dirlewanger’s recommendation for the award 
referred to him as belonging to the “… bravest of the brave” and was warmly 
supported by SS-Obergruppenführer Bach-Zelewski (MacLean, 1998:195). One 
would wonder how the killing of innocent civilians could be deemed brave. Bach-
Zelewski offered a different version, however, while giving evidence before the IMT. 
DR. THOMA: If I understood you correctly, you disapproved of the manner in which the 
fighting against partisans was carried on, involving many innocent people; and you 
disapproved also of the existence of the Dirlewanger Regiment… 
BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:493) 
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A German officer 
offered a different view 
when he recounted how 
he had told Bach-
Zelewski that the 
executions were a 
waste of resources, 
“Bach-Zelewski voiced 
his opposition to this 
notion and stated he was fulfilling a duty to the fatherland” (Klee et al., 1988:122). 
Bach-Zelewski’s inaccurate memory did not end there. He was awarded the Knight’s 
Cross also on 30th of September 1944 for his leadership during the crushing of the 
rebellion. However, when asked about this before the tribunal he claimed the 
following. 
BACH-ZELEWSKI: No. I received no decoration for the war against the partisans. I received all 
my decorations, beginning with the clusters to the Iron Cross II, at the front and from the 
Wehrmacht…  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:493) 
 
Dirlewanger and his unit were a military abnormality by any standards. During the 
defence of Hungary in 1944, Colonel-General Friessner noted the following when he 
visited Dirlewanger’s unit: 
When I reached Dirlewanger’s staff I was met by a strange sight. The Brigadeführer, a not very 
appealing adventurer type, was sitting at his desk with a live monkey perched on his shoulder. 
The monkey was said to have accompanied him everywhere, including Poland. When I 
discovered that the staff was packing up I ordered them to stay on the spot. The unit was, as 
SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Bach-Zelewski accepting 
the surrender of the Polish Home army after the 
uprising.
SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Bach-Zelewski accepting 
the surrender of the Polish Home army after the 
uprising.
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suggested before, a wild bunch. One company, communists who were expected to prove 
themselves on the front, had just deserted to the enemy. (Ungvary, 2005:30) 
 
The uprising was subsequently defeated, but surprisingly given the ferocity with 
which the Waffen-SS had treated the general population the remnants of the Polish 
Home Army were treated as POWs when they surrendered.  
 
When queried by the prosecution at Nuremberg in relation to the role of the Waffen-
SS in this conflict, SS-Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser attempted to deny that the 
Waffen-SS had any involvement: 
MAJOR JONES: …Those were crimes of the SS, were they not, Witness?  
HAUSSER: That was not the Waffen-SS. They are always only a group of men who belonged to 
Himmler and who had nothing whatsoever to do with the fighting troops. We never fought at 
Warsaw.  
MAJOR JONES: Are you denying that the Waffen-SS took part in the destruction of Warsaw?  
HAUSSER: I have not been there and therefore I cannot make any comments. But to my 
knowledge, there was no fighting there; it was a riot, which was quelled, as several witnesses 
have testified.  
MAJOR JONES: It was a revolt and then the mass extermination by the SS troops; that's what 
happened in Warsaw, wasn't it?  
HAUSSER: The Waffen-SS participated only to a very small extent because the Waffen-SS was 
in combat.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:382) 
 
The evidence of this discussion would suggest otherwise.  
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Other examples of the Waffen-SS ethos in combat 
In this section I intend to provide some general examples of the actions of the 
Waffen-SS in combat. I do not intend to account every atrocity committed, but rather 
provide the reader with an appreciation of the ethos of the Waffen-SS as indicated by 
the actions of the soldiers themselves. During the battle of Taganrog soldiers of the SS 
Leibstandarte located six of their fellows who had been mutilated and tortured 
(Quarrie, 1991). The discovery of the men’s bodies was made on the 28th of March 
1942, when the remains were located in the former GPU58 building in Taganrog. The 
following are the results of the autopsies performed on the men: 
… Sturmann Gehrken had four fingers of his right hand missing. His skull was shattered, but 
there were no gunshot wounds to the body. Sturmann Lippke had been shot in the right 
temple. Sturmann Schwillinsky had a shattered skull and no gunshot wounds were found. 
Sturmann Steiner had a shattered skull and broken spine, no gunshot wounds. SS-Mann Plotz 
had a broken spine and shattered left rid cage. No gunshot wounds. (Mooney, 2004:87) 
 
As a result the commander of the Division, SS-Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich, 
ordered that no Russian prisoners be taken for the next three days (Quarrie, 1991; 
Reitlinger, 1957; Stein, 1966; Weingartner, 1974; Wykes, 1974). This resulted in 
some 4000 Russian soldiers being executed (Quarrie, 1991; Reitlinger, 1957; Stein, 
1966; Weingartner, 1974; Wykes, 1974).  Of note is that Article 23 of the Hague 
Conventions forbids the declaration that no quarter will be given. By an objective 
assessment (as referred to in Chapter 1) the actions of the Waffen-SS would seem to 
indicate that they are outside the norm of acceptable behaviour. 
 
                                                 
58 Russian State Security service. 
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The Waffen-SS was to feature far more prominently in war crime reports than the 
small numbers would suggest. A report by the General Office of the Wehrmacht in 
1943 into the commission of war crimes concluded that; “… in the period covered by 
this report 151 cases of this nature came to notice. In 19 cases the culprits’ belonged 
to the army, in 53 cases to the Waffen-SS, while in 79 cases the culprits units could 
not be established” (Hohne, 1969:470). Clearly the ethos of hardness and no pity for 
the enemy stood the Waffen-SS out and above the Wehrmacht when it came to the 
commission of war crimes. 
 
During the trials of the IMT evidence was offered as to Waffen-SS complicity in the 
shooting of civilians. This evidence came in the form of a letter from the Chief of the 
Command Office of the Waffen-SS to the Reichsführer-SS, dated 14 October 1941; 
subject: “Intermediate Report on Civilian State of Emergency”. The letter clearly 
outlined the types of actions that were being undertaken on the Eastern Front: 
I deliver the following interim report regarding the commitment of the Waffen-SS in the 
Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia during the civilian state of emergency. In turn all battalions 
of the Waffen-SS in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia were assigned to shootings and 
hangings.  Up till now there occurred in Prague 99 shootings and 21 hangings, in Brünn 54 
shootings and 17 hangings; total: 191 executions (including 16 Jews). A complete report 
regarding other measures and on the conduct of the officers, non-commissioned officers and 
men will be made following the termination of the civilian state of emergency. (The 
International Military Tribunal, 1946 Vol 4:221) 
 
This would not be the first nor the last time the Waffen-SS would be used to put down 
uprisings in conquered territories. In August 1944 a rebellion rose up in Slovakia 
against the puppet government of President Joseph Tiso. To quell this uprising units 
of the 14th SS Galicia Division, the 18th SS Horst Wessel Division and Einsatzgruppen 
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H were utilised by the HSSPF for the area, Waffen-SS General SS-
Obergruppenführer Hermann Höfle (Bender & Taylor, 1975). It was put down with 
the usual Nazi efficiency and harshness. The units of the 14th Division came under the 
direct command of SS-Obersturmbannführer Friedrich Beyersdorff; he was to lead his 
units in the commission of a number of atrocities that will be discussed shortly. 
 
As the war came to an end many soldiers of the Waffen-SS committed what are 
termed final-phase crimes. For instance in early 1945 a soldier from the 12th SS 
Panzer Division Hitlerjugend shot two Russian labourers for allegedly threatening a 
German woman59 (Ruter & de Mildt, 2004: Vol 13). Waffen-SS soldiers executed 
some 151 Russian labourers on the basis of danger to the German people due to 
German troops having to withdraw in 1945 from the advancing Russian army60 (Ruter 
& de Mildt, 2004: Vol 16).  
 
The actions of the Waffen-SS were not solely directed at the enemy, other Germans 
also fell foul of the brutal tactics of these soldiers. An example of this occurred in 
April 1945 at Baden in Austria, where members of the Waffen-SS Jagdverband Süd 
shot two German soldiers and a priest for making derogatory remarks about the 
crumbling German military situation61 (Ruter & de Mildt, 2004:Vol 2). These cases 
highlight that even up to the end of the war Waffen-SS units were prepared to commit 
atrocities.  Friedhelm Busse, a veteran of the SS Hitlerjugend Panzer Division, offers 
                                                 
59 FR case 428. 
60 FR case 486. 
61 FR case 062. 
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the following insight into why the Waffen-SS were so prepared to kill their own 
country-men in the final days. He recounts an execution he witnessed of Germans. 
We stood there in the square and the sentence was read out. And all of a sudden the barrels 
were kicked away and they dangled there.  And I must say that my feelings at the time were that 
the pigs deserved to hang because they stabbed us in the back. You don’t give up in war, you 
don’t sabotage, you have to do your duty until the end. (Halliley, 2003) 
 
This attitude was reflected by SS soldiers of the SS Hitlerjugend who shot a civilian 
for calling them war prolongers62 (Ruter & de Mildt, 2004: Vol 13). As the IMT 
surmised, it was not surprising that units of the Waffen-SS and the branches that had 
thus been employed in extermination actions and in the execution of civilians were 
also to be found violating the laws of warfare when carrying on ordinary combat 
operations. But it was in the anti-partisan role that the Waffen-SS would reveal its 
true brutality. 
 
Anti-partisan operations 
The Partisan problem and the German response 
The conflict with the partisans on the Eastern Front served to unleash a barbaric 
conflict in areas behind the front lines. Orders such at the one issued by General Von 
Reichenau (regarding conduct of the troops on the Eastern Front) accused the Jews of 
being behind the ever-increasing partisan attacks that the German forces were 
experiencing in rear areas. This was a common accusation made by the German 
authorities and served as an excuse under which to conduct their extermination 
                                                 
62 FR case 428. 
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program (Buscher, 2003). There is little evidence to support such accusations and in 
fact much to the contrary. A member of the German Military Economics Department 
in the Ukraine prepared a report on the Jews and commented that “… there was no 
evidence that they were widely engaged in sabotage and similar acts, nor that they 
could be considered to represent a threat to the German Wehrmacht” (Krausnick et al., 
1965:65). 
 
 In his directive 33A dated the 22nd July 1941 Hitler had given the go ahead for 
German forces to act outside the law of war in the conduct of partisan warfare. This 
was confirmed during by the evidence of Waffen-SS General Bach-Zelewski: 
COL. TAYLOR: Was an order ever issued by the highest authorities, that German soldiers who 
committed offences against the civilian population were not to be punished in the military 
courts?  
BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, this order was issued.  
COL. TAYLOR: Was this order an obstacle to correcting the excesses of the troops?  
BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes, in my opinion this order prevented the orderly conduct of operations, 
since one can train troops only if one has adequate disciplinary powers and jurisdiction over 
them and is able to check excesses.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946 Vol 4:479) 
 
Hitler already recognised that having sufficient manpower to manage the captured 
territory was going to be a problem. To circumnavigate this he authorised an order 
outlining the action to be taken: 
The troops available for securing the conquered Eastern Territories will, in view of the size of 
this area, be sufficient for their duties only if the occupying power meets resistance, not by legal 
punishment of the guilty, but by striking such terror into the population that it loses all will to 
resist … The Commanders concerned are to be held responsible … they will contrive to contain 
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order, not by requesting reinforcements, but by employing suitably draconian methods. 
(Trevor-Roper, 1964:144) 
 
This order was given only a month after the invasion of Russia commenced and it is 
clear evidence that Hitler sought to fight the war outside the normal bounds of conflict 
and that he expected his soldiers to do likewise. Examples of the Waffen-SS carrying 
out such draconian measures are found in reprisal shootings they conducted in 
retaliation for casualties they suffered. The following is an extract from a report by 
SS-Sturmbannführer Breimeier,63 who was the commander of a battalion in the Prinz 
Eugen Division: 
On 3 November 1943, around 2000 hours, a German soldier on the Velika Street in Sinj was 
ambushed and killed. Since, despite all efforts, the culprit has not been found and the 
population has not supported us in this matter, 24 civilians will be shot and one hanged. The 
sentence will be carried out on 5 November 1943 at 0530 hours. --Signed-- Breimeier, SS 
Sturmbannführer and Battalion Commander 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:402) 
 
SS-Brigadeführer Otto Kumm had this to say about reprisals in his history of the 7th 
SS Prinz Eugen Division. 
Their activities (the partisans) were made possible by sympathetic elements of the local 
population. It was, therefore, necessary for the troops to take measures against these through 
local reprisals, in order to insure that the partisans did not maintain the initiative. However, 
the soldiers disdained actions against the local population. So such operations were only 
carried out when necessary. (Kumm, 1995:268) 
 
                                                 
63 Note that Westwood has a different spelling for this officer’s name. He has it as Wilhelm Breimaler, 
who was commander of the III battalion, 1st SS Mountain Regiment Prinz Eugen from the 31 July 
1943. 
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Exactly what necessary situations entailed is open to conjecture, but there can be little 
doubt that the Waffen-SS utilised reprisals as terror tactics in the fight against the 
partisans on a widespread scale. In 1943 Waffen-SS soldiers from the Nordland 
Division came under fire while performing anti-partisan duties in Yugoslavia, with 
the result that they attacked a village “… and finding no adult men there they 
apparently killed the inhabitants” (Christensen et al., 2003:13). Such reprisal actions 
were considered in the Einsatzgruppen trial where the relevant law of war was applied 
by the NMT. They found that the actions of the SS in reprisals were unjustified in that 
there was a lack of nexus between the acts and the victims of the reprisals: 
While generally the persons who become victims of the reprisals are admittedly innocent of the 
acts against which the reprisal is to retaliate, there must at least be such close connection 
between these persons and these acts as to constitute a joint responsibility.  
Article 50 of the Hague Regulations states unequivocally —    
"No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account 
of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally 
responsible."  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:493) 
 
That many of the reprisals conducted by the SS were disproportionate to the original 
act was also noted by the NMT. Waffen-SS General, SS-Obergruppenführer Erich 
Bach-Zelewski gave evidence at the IMT as to the severity in which the anti-partisan 
operations were conducted. At the end of 1942 Bach-Zelewski was appointed Chief of 
Anti-partisan Combat Units on the Eastern Front and he reported directly to Himmler. 
COL. TAYLOR: Did the highest military leaders issue instructions that anti-partisan operations 
were to be conducted with severity?  
BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.  
COL. TAYLOR: Did the highest military authorities issue any detailed instructions as to the 
methods to be used in anti-partisan operations?  
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BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.  
COL. TAYLOR: What was the result, in the occupied territories, of this lack of detailed 
directives from above?  
BACH-ZELEWSKI: This lack of detailed directives resulted in a wild state of anarchy in all anti-
partisan operations.  
COL. TAYLOR: In your opinion, were the measures taken in anti-partisan operations far more 
severe than the circumstances warranted, or were they not?  
BACH-ZELEWSKI: Since there were no definite orders and the lower commanders were forced 
to act independently, the operations varied according to the character of the officer in 
command and the quality of the troops. I am of the opinion that the operations often not only 
failed in their purpose but even overshot their mark.  
COL. TAYLOR: Did these measures result in the unnecessary killing of large numbers of the 
civilian population?  
BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946 Vol 4:479) 
 
The above testimony highlights two important facets of the conflict on the Eastern 
Front. First unlawful actions by German soldiers were approved by higher authorities; 
and as previously mentioned the removal of such actions from judicial review or 
punishment. As such the conduct of anti-partisan warfare by the Germans was an “… 
integral part of the war of annihilation and exploitation that was the campaign against 
the Soviet Union” (Birn, 1997:288). The Waffen-SS also had the benefit that even 
though its units might be serving with the Armed Forces, they were not subject to its 
military justice. The Waffen-SS came under the control of the SS in relation to 
personnel, training, replacements and military justice (Wegner, 1985). The obvious 
point being here that given the ideology of the SS this was tacit approval for atrocities 
as long as they fell within the goals and aims of the SS. 
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This is evidenced by a statement of Hitler where he responded to Stalin’s call for Red 
Army soldiers to become partisans if trapped behind enemy lines. Hitler argued that 
“… this partisan warfare gives us an advantage by enabling us to destroy everything 
in our path … in this vast area, peace must be imposed as quickly as possible and to 
achieve this it is necessary to execute even anyone who doesn’t give us a straight 
look” (Buchler, 1986:14). A further example of this is an order, which was issued to 
the SS Wiking Division just prior to the invasion that stated civilians could be shot 
without trial as partisans (Smith et al., 1999).  
 
To be fair it was not the case that brutality was only used on one side (A. Clark, 1965; 
Simpson, 1990). The partisans in fact used various tactics in an effort to incite the 
German forces to greater crimes. One standard tactic of the partisans was to attack 
German forces then withdraw into a nearby village, with the expectation that the 
Germans would attend the village and carry out reprisal killings that would “…create 
even more partisans” (Heaton, 2001:111; Lucas, 1991). This annihilation was made 
all the easier by the tactics used by the partisans and the Germans in reprisal. As SS-
Brigadeführer Otto Kumm commented, this type of action had predictable results. 
Naturally the destruction of villages, killing people even if proven to be partisans, rapidly 
destroyed our credibility, and increased the resistance against us … What was perhaps the 
worst thing for us was the narrow-minded approach we as a collective military body used in 
handling these problems. The lessons should have been learned much sooner, but 
unfortunately they were not. (Heaton, 2001:128) 
 
A Waffen-SS officer gives a further example of the provocative action by the 
partisans. He recovered the bodies of a number of German soldiers after a partisan 
attack on a Wehrmacht convoy. “The partisans had first shot them, and immediately 
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afterwards mutilated or stripped them. As we found the murdered soldiers belongings 
in one of the isbas, it was a clear-cut affair…” (Trang, 2000:89). The SS then 
identified and executed the suspected partisans; of interest is that upon returning to 
the train a Wehrmacht officer asked why the whole village was not shot, after guilt 
was not a prerequisite for punishment on the Eastern Front (Trang, 2000). The 
partisans were not averse to dealing ruthlessly with SS men who fell into their grasp. 
The Bielski Partisan group was mainly made of Jews. In his account of the group Tec 
(1993) outlines the fate of three captured SS men. One witness recalled that the 
following: 
I will never forget it, how on their knees the SS men were begging for their lives. They pleaded 
for mercy because they had children and wives at home. They swore that they’re not to blame 
for anything that had happened to the Jews … Then two partisans came out leading a tall, blond 
German, hands tied behind his back … The first to reach the SS man was Pupko, the oldest man 
in the otriad … With knife in hand, Pupko screamed: “God, my grandfather was not a murderer, 
my father was not a murderer, but I will be a murderer”…As if in a trance this main actor began 
the job of cutting up the SS man … In a few intense, highly charged moments the SS man was 
unrecognisable and dead. The other two were shot. (Tec, 1993:197) 
 
To counter the activities of the partisans the Germans, in particular the Waffen-SS, 
resorted to a brutal doctrine of counterinsurgency activity (Barker, 1998; A. Clark, 
1965; Heaton, 2001). These brutal tactics extended to the taking of hostages and 
shooting of innocent civilians in reprisal for acts of terrorism and sabotage. For 
example, on the 23rd of August 1941 the SS Calvary Brigade entered the town of 
Starobin in Russia and took the following action: 
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The tension by now was extreme: the new mayor was killed by three Jews and during the night 
the partisans tried to burn down many houses. Waldemar Fegelein64 ordered all male Jews in 
the area to be shot in reprisal. Altogether 21 persons were executed. (Trang, 2000:35)  
 
The use of this doctrine, while helping to ensure survival of the Waffen-SS units, also 
contributed to the Russian civilians joining the partisans in response to the actions of 
the Germans (Bartov, 1992; A. Clark, 1965; Heaton, 2001). The doctrine utilised by 
the Germans also had the result of “… enhancing the legendary brutality that would 
be attributed…” to various Waffen-SS units (Heaton, 2001:117). The majority of 
Waffen-SS divisions had some involvement in fighting partisans and the associated 
atrocities committed during such. 
 
By late 1942 partisan activity had reached such significant levels that Hitler felt 
obliged to issue a directive detailing how this menace was to be combated. He issued 
directive 46 on the 18th of August 1942 and in it he outlined the action to be taken and 
the command role the SS was to play in the fight against the partisans: 
In recent months banditry in the East has assumed intolerable proportions, and threatens to 
become a serious danger to supplies for the front and to the economic exploitation of the 
country … The following measures are necessary. 1. Rapid, drastic and active operations against 
the bandits by the co-ordination of all available forces of the Armed Forces, the SS and Police 
which are suitable for the purpose… (Trevor-Roper, 1964:198) 
 
Hitler went on to outline the type of principles that he expected his armed forces to 
use in the fight against the partisans. 
                                                 
64 Waldemar Fegelein was a SS-Hauptsturmführer in the brigade and the brother of the Brigade and 
later divisional commander Hermann Fegelein. 
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The fight against banditry is as much a matter of strategy as the fight against the enemy at the 
front. It will therefore be organised and carried out by the same staffs. The destruction of the 
bandits calls for active operations and the most rigorous measures against all members of the 
gangs or those guilty of supporting them … In this struggle against the bandits the co-operation 
of the local population is indispensable. Deserving persons should not be parsimoniously 
treated; rewards should be really attractive. On the other hand, reprisals for action in support 
of the bandits must be all the more severe. (Trevor-Roper, 1964:198) 
 
To carry this fight to the partisans Hitler entrusted it to his loyal follower Himmler, 
and his Higher SS and Police Leaders (HSSPF). 
The Reichsführer-SS and the Chief of the German Police is the central authority for the 
collection and evaluation of all information concerning action against the bandits. In addition, 
the Reichsführer-SS has the sole responsibility for combating banditry in the Reich 
Commissioners territories … Higher SS and Police Leaders will if necessary assume temporary 
command of forces of the Armed Forces for use in their operations. (Trevor-Roper, 1964:199) 
 
Just how seriously Hitler and Himmler took the fight against the partisans is shown by 
the creation in 1944 of the Anti-partisan War Badge65 for all soldiers who took part in 
such activities for a certain number of days (MacLean, 1998:154). This shows that the 
military campaign against the partisans was seen an important contribution to the 
overall military effort. It is of interest that numerous Waffen-SS officers involved in 
the fight against the partisans were awarded the highest German Military honours. SS-
Obergruppenführer Bach-Zelewski was awarded the Knight’s Cross for the 
suppression of the Warsaw Rising in 1944. Prior to this he had been awarded the Iron 
Cross 1st and 2nd Class and the German Cross in Gold for his actions against the 
                                                 
65 See the appendices for descriptions of such awards. 
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partisans (J. W. Schneider, 1993; Yerger, 1997). SS-Oberführer Oskar Dirlewanger 
was awarded the Knight’s Cross in 1944 and had also been awarded the Iron Cross 1st 
and 2nd Class and the German Cross in Gold for his actions (J. W. Schneider, 1993; 
Yerger, 1997).  
 
SS-Gruppenführer Hermann Fegelein was awarded the Knight’s Cross in 1942 with 
the later addition of Oak leaves in 1942, and swords in 1944. As well as this he had 
been awarded the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Class and the German Cross in Gold (J. W. 
Schneider, 1993). SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich Jeckeln received the Knight’s 
Cross in 1944 with that later addition of Oak leaves in 1945. As well as this he was 
awarded the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd Class and the German Cross in Gold (J. W. 
Schneider, 1993; Yerger, 1997). The majority of the awards were issued at the time of 
these officers performing anti-partisan duties.  
 
The 8th Florian Geyer Division, an anti-partisan unit, had more Knight’s Crosses 
awarded than front-line Panzer divisions such as the 12th Hitlerjugend, the 9th 
Hohenstaufen, the 10th Frundsberg and the 23rd Nederland. A number of anti-partisan 
units had substantial numbers of the Knight’s Crosses awarded. These included the 
Florian Geyer Division with 23,66 Prinz Eugen Division with six, Handschar 
Division with four and the Maria Theresa Division with six (Simpson, 1990; 
Williamson, 1994). These were the highest military accolades that Germany could 
confer; they were also the same accolades that the recipients from the front line units 
received.  
                                                 
66 Note the Williamson lists only 22 awards for this division. 
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For the purpose of this discussion I will adopt the definition used by Heaton and 
define a partisan as being “… an irregular force politically motivated into paramilitary 
action against an armed external aggressor, imbued with limited military or 
paramilitary capabilities and dedicated to waging unconventional warfare through 
small localised units on an individual level as well as collective basis” (Heaton, 
2001:18). SS-Gruppenführer Hermann Fegelein, the commander of the units that 
would become the 8th SS Calvary Division Florian Geyer, offers the following insight 
into combat operations against partisans in Russia: 
The enemy forces were always wiped out when they were made up of regular Russian Army 
troops. The greatest difficulties were posed by the partisans. Militarily they were the biggest 
threat to be found behind a fighting army. Ruthless, brave up to the moment of annihilation, 
with Asian cruelty. (Trang, 2000:35) 
 
It was in the combat against the partisan groups that the Waffen-SS began to fight 
with extreme brutality.  
For the first time during the Russian campaign the Totenkopf division’s records mention the 
shooting of civilians and indicate that when SSTK units encountered groups of partisans or 
suspects no prisoners were taken. (Sydnor, 1990:201).  
 
Indeed it was clear that the conflict with the partisans was used as an excuse for the 
annihilation of Jewry and Slavism (Birn, 1991; Reitlinger, 1957). A number of SS 
Death’s Head regiments (Totenkopf Standarten) came under the personal command of 
Himmler where they were used for the fight against partisans which “… was a 
convenient cloak under which the SS could cleanse the occupied Eastern Territories 
of all political, intellectual and racial enemies” (Mollo, 1982:92). The brutality 
  240 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
extended to murder of innocent civilians and destruction of villages. Indeed 
substantial operations were carried out where the populations of suspect areas were 
simply rounded up and shipped out as slave labour. In January 1943 SS-
Sonderkommando Dirlewanger conducted an anti-partisan operation in the Minsk area 
where “SS-Sturmbannführer Magill ordered the battalion to round up all persons in 
the area between the ages of 16 and 50 who were fit for work- they would be shipped 
off to Germany as slave labour” (MacLean, 1998:107). 
 
The 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich developed an infamous reputation for dealing 
out of hand with suspected partisans or guerrillas (Heaton, 2001). SS-
Hauptsturmführer Hans Hossfelder, an officer of the Das Reich Division, related in a 
post-war interview the situation faced by Waffen-SS soldiers as they saw it: 
Many people have often wondered if we actually had standing orders to shoot women and 
children, and I know that there have been many denials regarding this by former SS members. 
However, it was unfortunately true. I can state that the types of orders were not as 
commonplace in my unit as in others, obviously. When we speak about partisans, it must be 
understood that these were of course criminals even according to the Geneva and Hague 
Conventions, since they forfeited their non-combatant status upon taking up arms against us. 
Our handling of these people was considered within our right, although there were many 
excesses and outright war crimes committed against innocent people. This cannot be 
completely overlooked. (Heaton, 2001:127) 
 
This opinion would not seem to be supported by Articles 1 and 2 of the Hague 
Conference of 1907, Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 
1907, which outline the duties and regulations respecting the laws and customs of war 
on land regarding belligerents: 
Article 1. 
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The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer 
corps fulfilling the following conditions:  
To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;  
To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance; 
To carry arms openly; and  
To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.  
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are 
included under the denomination “army”.  
Art. 2. 
The inhabitants of a territory, which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the 
enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to 
organise themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry 
arms openly and if they respect the laws and customs of war.  
 
I see the Hague Conventions as similar in their use to the ICC, in that it can be used to 
form the basis of an objective assessment of actions, as outlined in chapter 1. Heaton 
contends that it was the failure of some irregular forces to comply with the 
identification requirements that caused them to be exposed to the full extent of 
German retaliation (Heaton, 2001). While this may be legally acceptable it certainly 
does not extend to the shooting of hostages, killing of civilians, the destruction of 
property and the shooting of suspected partisans without trial, which was the norm on 
the Eastern Front. As Headland argues “… furthermore, the assumption here is that 
people had actually carried out the crimes for which they had been executed … direct 
evidence indicates that such accusations of criminality were simply manufactured by 
the Germans” (Headland, 1992:77). Another question begs asking, why in some 
operations were so-called partisan prisoners taken yet in others none were? The 
judges of the NMT considered the question of partisans in the Einsatzgruppen case 
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and they arrived at the following conclusion when considering the relevant sections of 
The Hague Conventions and the actions of the SS: 
It is unnecessary to point out that, under these provisions, an armed civilian found in a treetop 
sniping at uniformed soldiers is not such a lawful combatant and can be punished even with the 
death penalty if he is proved guilty of the offence. But this is far different from saying that 
resistance fighters in the war against an invading army, if they fully comply with the conditions 
just mentioned, can be put outside the law by the adversary. As The Hague Regulations state 
expressly, if they fulfil the four conditions, “the laws, rights, and duties of war” apply to them in 
the same manner as they apply to regular armies. Many of the defendants seem to assume that 
by merely characterising a person a partisan, he may be shot out of hand. But it is not so simple 
as that. If the partisans are organised and are engaged in what international law regards as 
legitimate warfare for the defence of their own country, they are entitled to be protected as 
combatants. The record shows that in many of the areas where the Einsatzgruppen operated, 
the so-called partisans had wrested considerable territory from the German occupant, and that 
military combat action of some dimensions was required to reoccupy those areas. In belligerent 
occupation the occupying power does not hold enemy territory by virtue of any legal right. On 
the contrary, it merely exercises a precarious and temporary actual control. This can be seen 
from Article 42 of the Hague Regulations which grants certain well-limited rights to a military 
occupant only in enemy territory which is “actually placed” under his control. The language 
used in the official German reports, received in evidence in this case, show, however, that 
combatants were indiscriminately punished only for having fought against the enemy. This is 
contrary to the law of war.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:492) 
 
Another Waffen-SS veteran, SS-Sturmbannführer Rudolf von Falkenhahn claimed “I 
rarely met soldiers regardless of rank who actively pursued non-combatants. I did see 
it happen and it was wrong…” (Heaton, 2001:135). The above comment seems 
confusing to say the least. On one hand the officer is saying he knew no-one who 
committed atrocities, but he then says that he saw them being committed. Otto 
Kumm, while an officer of the Das Reich Division, related how in one fight with 
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partisans near Kharkov in February 1943 soldiers of the Der Führer Regiment 
stormed a barn containing partisans and killed or captured the entire force. Those 
captured were summarily shot, a decision, which Kumm claimed, he disagreed with 
(Heaton, 2001:142). It is of note that Kumm would later go on to command one of the 
most brutal anti-partisan formations, the SS Prinz Eugen Division (Bender & Taylor, 
1972; Heaton, 2001; Kumm, 1995; Westwood, 2001). Clearly there was a role played 
by the Waffen-SS in combating the partisan threat. Let us now examine this role. 
 
The role of the Waffen-SS 
Leading Waffen-SS General, Paul Hausser, when asked about the role of the Waffen-
SS in anti-partisan operations, denied that they were involved: 
HERR PELCKMANN: Witness, was the Waffen-SS a special fighting unit for the combating of 
partisans, and was the fight against the partisans considered to be a war of extermination?  
HAUSSER: The fight against partisans is a general military and political police measure, which 
can be assigned to any troop; front-line troops of the Army and of the Waffen-SS were used 
only in exceptional cases, for instance when they were in the rear areas. There were usually no 
partisan fights in the operational areas; they mostly took place in the rear areas only. This 
fighting was mainly the task of the Security Division of the Army and special defence battalions, 
and besides these of police troops. Units of the Waffen-SS at the front were not especially 
trained for this kind of fighting and were assigned this duty just as little as Panzer divisions of 
the Army, for instance. In the East, units of my divisions were never used in the fight against 
partisans at any time. Therefore it was not a special task for SS units, and they were not 
especially trained or instructed for this purpose.   
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:365) 
 
The Führer seemed to have other ideas. At a military conference on the 1st of 
December 1942 he was talking about the partisan problem with his generals. The 
conversation lead to the use of the Waffen-SS and the appointment of Waffen-SS 
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General Bach-Zelewski to head anti-partisan operations. Hitler had the following to 
say: 
It (the SS)67 has more experience. Listen to what is being said about the SS, because it has this 
experience. They are always saying that the SS acts brutally … Bach-Zelewski is one of the 
cleverest people. Even in the party, I used to always use him for the most difficult things. If the 
Communist resistance couldn’t be broken somewhere, I took him there and he smashed it. 
(Heiber & Glantz, 2003) 
 
By the end of 1944 the Germans had been driven out of Russia and the need for a 
higher anti-partisan command was made redundant. Bach-Zelewski later commented 
that the corps staff from the 14th SS Corps “consisted mainly of the personnel of the 
former operational staff of the Chief of the anti-partisan formations” (Bach-Zelewski, 
1946:2). This would not be the only transfer of Waffen-SS soldiers to and from anti-
partisan duties. 
 
The use of the Waffen-SS as both the conductor and orchestra for anti-partisan 
operations led to a series of campaigns in 1942-43 that were conducted so “… brutally 
and ruthlessly that nothing living was left in vital communications zones” (Koehl, 
1983:203). The claim that the fighting units of the Waffen-SS were not involved with 
extermination actions can be rejected. SS-Obergruppenführer Kurt Knoblauch was 
appointed to the staff of the Reichsführer-SS as the chief of the Waffen-SS Command 
branch in July 1942 (MacLean, 1998; Westwood, 2001). Knoblauch had previously 
served in the Totenkopf Division in 1940 (Westwood, 2001). Himmler gave him the 
role of co-ordinating support for the army “… with the SS and to provide all Higher 
                                                 
67 My italics and insertion. 
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SS and Police Leaders in the East with SS units as needed” (MacLean, 1998:77). 
These units were available to the HSSPF who were responsible for extermination 
measures being carried out in occupied areas (Littman, 2003; Padfield, 1990; 
Reitlinger, 1957). As noted by Stein “… there were many other occasions when field 
units of the Waffen-SS were employed against partisans, suspected partisans, or 
ordinary civilians who had the misfortune of being proscribed under Nazi racial 
policies” (Stein, 1966:275). 
 
For example one rear area company of the Das Reich division helped “to massacre 
920 Jews at Lachoisk, near Minsk” as part of an extermination operation (Reitlinger, 
1957:169). In July 1941 the 4th SS Polizei Division as part of Army Group North was 
confronted by an alleged serious partisan problem, which resulted in a “decisive and 
ruthless response” (Heaton, 2001:123). In May 1944 the Germania Regiment, which 
was part of the Wiking Division, took part in operation Maigewitter, “… the goal of 
which was the liquidation of the Peoples Army (AL) partisan divisions in the Parczew 
forest” (Solarz, 2003:55). SS-Obergruppenführer Lothar Debes recalled how units of 
the 6th SS Mountain Division Nord were “… committed against the partisan troops 
who were threatening the supply from the north” (Debes, 1947:16). SS-Brigadeführer 
Otto Kumm confirmed in his post-war interrogation by the US Army that the 7th SS 
Division Prinz Eugen was used extensively in 1944/45 to combat partisans in 
Yugoslavia (Kumm, 1947, 1995). 
 
Waffen-SS units were heavily involved in combating the partisan problem on the 
Eastern Front and its occupied territories (Birn, 1991, 1997; Burleigh, 2000; Heaton, 
2001). Heaton argues that due to the vast expanses of Russia there were insufficient 
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German security forces to deal with the partisan threat, in response front line units 
were called upon to assist with security operations and these units “… were primarily 
Waffen-SS” (Heaton, 2001:148). In fact some units such as the 8th SS Calvary 
Division Florian Geyer were specifically created and designed for the anti-partisan 
role (Heaton, 2001). The 14th Waffen-Grenadier Division, also know as the Galicia 
Division, was constituted mainly of Ukrainian volunteers (Littman, 2003; Logusz, 
1997). It was formed primarily to be a police formation (Bender & Taylor, 1975; 
Dmytryshyn, 1956; Littman, 2003). The German Order Police were asked by SS-
Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger, of the Main SS office, to supply training officers 
so that the division would be “… effective in fighting bandits before being moved to 
the front line” (Dmytryshyn, 1956; Littman, 2003:62). 
 
The statement of Hausser regarding the Waffen-SS not being involved in anti-partisan 
operations is inaccurate to say the least. The Waffen-SS was to play a major role in 
the combat of partisans on the Eastern Front and its occupied territories. As noted it 
was “… necessary to call upon any Waffen-SS units which might happen to be in the 
vicinity” when combating the partisan problem (Krausnick et al., 1965:230). At the 
start of the invasion SS Totenkopf infantry regiments “… remained under the control 
of Himmler for use in operations against the partisans”, which “… served as a cloak 
for the mass execution of civilians” (Stein, 1966:259).  
 
The SS Calvary Brigade,68 consisting of the 1st and 2nd SS Calvary Regiments, was 
under the control of the HSSPF for Central Russia (Birn, 1997). These units were 
                                                 
68 The forebearer of the Waffen-SS Florian Geyer Calvary Division. 
  247 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
used by the Commander of the Army Group Centre rear area in Russia in July 1941 
who commented, “… the strangers in the area, Red Army soldiers and Jewish 
Commissars, were taken prisoner by the SS, and the majority of them were shot” 
(Birn, 1997). Indeed the regiments were able to report to the HSSPF leader the “… 
execution of some 14,000 marauders, who were actually Soviet soldiers that had been 
cut off from their units, partisans and racially undesirable civilians (Jews and 
Gypsies)” (Trang, 2000:33).  Some have argued that as these units were under the 
direct control of Himmler they should not be considered Waffen-SS units. SS General 
Fegelein obviously held a different view when on the 27th of November 1940 he had 
this to say about the activation of the cavalry units: “The Führer has authorised our 
regiments for deployment. We are now beginning the cavalry tradition in the Waffen-
SS” (Landwehr, 1998:67). Members of this Brigade were brought to trial for these 
operations in the 1960s and they admitted that such operations were nothing less then 
the wholesale execution of Jews in the area (Birn, 1997). 
 
Of interest with this account is that in 1941 the partisan threat was not great and there 
was little partisan activity, in fact the operations were nothing less then a subterfuge 
for racial cleansing (Buchler, 1986; Lucas, 1991). In his post-war interview 
Wehrmacht Colonel-General Erhard Rauss confirmed the above by stating that “… 
generally speaking, Russian partisan groups on the Eastern Front were formed in early 
1942” (Tsouras, 1995:138). 
 
In June 1940 Himmler authorised the transfer of SS-Obersturmführer Oskar 
Dirlewanger to the Waffen-SS (MacLean, 1998). At the instigation of Hitler and 
Himmler he was to form an anti-partisan unit of Waffen-SS soldiers consisting of 
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convicted poachers, concentration-camp inmates and other criminals (MacLean, 
1998). This unit would be known as the SS-Sonderkommando Dirlewanger, before 
later becoming the 36th SS Grenadier Division.  It is often argued by apologists for the 
Waffen-SS that this and other units like it were not part of the Waffen-SS. SS-
Obergruppenführer Bach-Zelewski was asked about the Dirlewanger unit at the 
International Military Tribunal while he was giving evidence. 
DR. EXNER: Was it a formation of the Army or the SS?  
BACH-ZELEWSKI: No, it was not a formation of the Waffen-SS; it was supplied by the 
Allgemeine SS69, that is, by the Berger office. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:487) 
 
Paul Hausser also attempted to distance the Waffen-SS from the Dirlewanger unit 
when asked about it:  
HAUSSER: Dirlewanger was the commander of a picked troop of men from the concentration-
camps. He had no connection with the Waffen-SS. I did not meet him personally, nor his 
troops, so I can give no further testimony from my own knowledge. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:383) 
 
This is simply not true. The unit was commanded by Waffen-SS officers, it received 
commands from the headquarters of the Waffen-SS, and also received replacements 
from the main fighting units such as the Das Reich Division, which on the 28th of 
August 1940 was asked to arrange for the “… transfer of four junior non-
commissioned officers” to assist with the formation of the unit (MacLean, 1998:57). 
On the 29th of January 1942 the unit received orders from the Waffen-SS command to 
undertake duties under the command staff of the Reichsführer-SS and his HSSPF in 
Russia: “It is clear that the Sonderkommando, at this point in time, was clearly 
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considered a unit of the Waffen-SS proper…” (Krausnick et al., 1965; MacLean, 
1998:65).  
 
The SS-Sonderkommando Dirlewanger would burn a path of death and destruction 
through Russia. Tactics employed by the unit included rounding up innocent civilians 
and marching them through minefields, as well as this Dirlewanger would fly on 
reconnaissance over suspect areas, and if he received fire from a village he would 
later return and burn the village and kill the inhabitants (MacLean, 1998). HSSPF 
Von Gottberg conducted Operation Hornung in February 1943 in the Mogil’ov area, 
the SS-Sonderkommando Dirlewanger was among the units involved in the operation 
(MacLean, 1998). At the conclusion of the operation Von Gottberg claimed to have 
killed some 9662 partisans; in a message to another SS leader Von Gottberg admitted 
that some 3300 Jews were killed in the operation (MacLean, 1998:113). In April 1943 
the Sonderkommando took part in operations Draufganger one and two (MacLean, 
1998). Records indicate that during these operations the unit collected slave labourers, 
confiscated agricultural products and killed a number of partisans as well as executing 
some 65 women and children (MacLean, 1998:119). 
 
Other frontline Waffen-SS units were used in the fight against the partisans. The 1st 
and 2nd SS divisions were just two of the premier Waffen-SS divisions who at some 
point in time conducted anti-partisan operations. Soldiers of the 1st SS Panzer 
Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler engaged in anti-partisan combat duties in 
Croatia during 1943 (Mooney, 2004). Parts of the division were ordered to combat 
                                                                                                                                            
69 The term used to describe the General SS. 
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partisans in the Kiev sector of the Eastern Front in late 1943 (Tiemann, 1998).  The 
first act of the newly formed 3rd SS Panzer Corps under the command of SS-
Obergruppenführer Felix Steiner in 1943 was to undertake anti-partisan duties in 
Croatia (Tieke, 2001). The Corps consisted of the 11th SS Panzergrenadier Division 
Nordland and the 14th SS Police regiment in September 1943 (Tieke, 2001; 
Westwood, 2001). In the brutal fighting that ensued members of the 24th SS 
Panzergrenadier Regiment burnt down villages and exterminated the occupants 
(Smith et al., 1999). The 18th SS Horst Wessel Division undertook anti-partisan 
operations in Moravia in 1945 (Bender & Taylor, 1975). The 13th SS Handschar, 21st 
SS Skanderbeg and 23rd SS Nederland Divisions all undertook anti-partisan duties 
(Ertel & Schulze-Kossens, 2000). 
 
As the partisan problem grew the Waffen-SS began “… the creation of Waffen-SS 
units for special use in partisan-filled areas” (Koehl, 1983:215). The 7th SS Mountain 
Division Prinz Eugen was one of these units. It was to earn itself a reputation for 
brutality and featured prominently in the Nuremberg trials. As one author noted the 
actions of the Prinz Eugen Division in Yugoslavia “… blazed a notably ruthless path 
throughout the country” (Heaton, 2001:100). The division was mainly made up of 
“ethnic Germans from Serbian Banat … these having to be supplemented by others 
from Rumania” (Bender & Taylor, 1972:11; Kaltenegger, 1995; Windrow & Burn, 
1982).   
 
At Nuremberg a report was entered into the record from the Yugoslav State 
Commission into war crimes committed by the Nazis. It outlines the activities of the 
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Prinz Eugen Division in an anti-partisan operation called Operation Black, which was 
conducted in May 1943 in the Niksic area: 
Immediately after its invasion, this formation, opening fire with all its arms, commenced to 
commit outrageous crimes on the peaceful villages for no reason at all. Everything they came 
across they burned down, murdered and pillaged. The officers and men of the SS Division Prinz 
Eugen committed crimes of an outrageous cruelty on this occasion. The victims were shot, 
slaughtered and tortured, or burned to death in burning houses. Where a victim was found not 
in his house but on the road or in the fields some distance away, he was murdered and burned 
there. Infants with their mothers, pregnant women and frail old people were also murdered. In 
short, every civilian met with by these troops in these villages was murdered. In many cases 
whole families who, not expecting such treatment or lacking the time for escape, had remained 
quietly in their homes, were annihilated and murdered. Whole families were thrown into 
burning houses in many cases and thus burned. It has been established from the investigations 
entered upon that 121 persons, mostly women, and including 30 persons aged 60-92 years and 
29 children of ages ranging from six months to 14 years, were executed on this occasion in the 
horrible manner narrated above.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:375) 
 
SS-Gruppenführer Arthur Phelps, commander of the division, considered it a waste of 
time to be precise with reprisal methods against partisans, it was much easier just to 
choose the closest village to where the attack took place and destroy it (Gumz, 1998). 
Indeed the atrocities being committed by the division under its second commander, 
SS-Brigadeführer Carl Reichritter Von Oberkamp, reached such a level that in 
correspondence to Phelps, Himmler asked him to intercede with his old division and 
restore some order as it was affecting relations in Croatia (Gumz, 1998; Heaton, 
2001). 
In July 1943, a company from Prinz Eugen machine-gunned the residents of the Muslim town 
of Kosutica, women and children included, after the company found the body of a dead SS man 
in the town. Concluding that partisans were endangering the unit, the commander ordered his 
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men to open fire on a crowd of residents, who were then listed as enemy dead.  (Gumz, 
1998:42) 
   
Despite the efforts of 
Phelps, Himmler was soon 
informed that the division 
had in the spring of 1944 
killed some 3000 civilians 
in Dalmatia.70 As a result 
Phelps, who was now 
commander of the 5th SS 
Mountain Corps “… attempted to submerge the civilians killed as enemy dead, an 
indication of the wide latitude German combat commanders had assumed” (Gumz, 
1998:42). After the conclusion of the war the Yugoslav War Crimes Commission 
found that the division had committed: 
Some of the worst atrocities attributable to any soldiers during the Second World War … it 
committed various excesses such as the murder of unarmed prisioners, looting and burning of 
villages and the torture and massacre of helpless civilians. (Bender & Taylor, 1972:16) 
 
Phelps was not alone in his ambivalent attitude towards actually identifying who the 
partisans were and who the civilians were. At Nuremberg a report from the 
Wehrmacht’s 1st Mountain Brigade commanding officer, Colonel Pericic, outlined 
how SS troops had been attacked by partisans in a village in Bosnia and forced to 
                                                 
70 Dalmatia is a mountainous strip of land, in south-eastern Europe, lying almost entirely within 
Croatia. 
 
 
SS-Obergruppenführer Arthur Phelps.
SS-Obergruppenführer Arthur Phelps.
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retreat. During the retreat the SS commander reported that “… when he had to retreat, 
he had killed all persons who were in the open because he had no chance to 
distinguish between the loyal population and the partisans. He himself said that he 
killed about 100 persons in this incident” (The International Military Tribunal, 1946: 
Vol 20:373). 
 
The 14th SS Galicia Grenadier Division, consisting mainly of Ukrainian volunteers, 
was involved in anti-partisan operations in 1944 in Poland in the Chelm area where 
units under the control of SS-Obersturmbannführer Friedrich Beyersdorff and SS-
Hauptsturmführer Bristot committed a number of atrocities (Littman, 2003). 
Beyersdorff was commander of the 14th SS Artillery Regiment of the Division, Bristot 
was later to command the Fusilier Battalion of the Division (Bender & Taylor, 1975; 
Westwood, 2001). Over the next few months these units would be involved in 
numerous atrocities against “bandits” and civilians that would result in the hanging, 
torture, beating, burning and shooting of civilians as well as executions in gas vans 
(Littman, 2003). At the conclusion of these operations it was estimated that the units 
led by Beyersdorff had “… shot, hanged, gassed and burned more than 1500 men, 
women and children between February 1943 and March 1944” (Littman, 2003:74). 
The German Field Marshal Walter Model noted that the troops had fought gallantly 
during this period (Bender & Taylor, 1975:31).  
 
In June 1944 the 14th SS Galicia Division had conducted a long battle against 
partisans in Yugoslavia and claimed the following losses among the partisans. 4526 
counted dead, 3766 additional dead, 1246 prisoners. However they only located 19 
machine guns and 825 rifles (Lepre, 1997:222). Less then one weapon for each 10 
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partisans. The only conclusion can be that the majority of dead were in fact innocent 
civilians. 
 
On the 27th of February 1945 men from the 14th SS Division along with other troops 
surrounded the village of Huta Pieniacka in Poland and attacked it after two SS 
soldiers had been killed in a small firefight near the village the previous day (Littman, 
2003). As a result of the SS attack more than 1200 villagers were killed and executed 
and the village destroyed (Littman, 2003:77). These examples show that front-line 
fighting units of the Waffen-SS did commit numerous atrocities while engaged in 
anti-partisan activities. The majority of these actions were done under the auspices of 
the HSSPF, Himmler’s representatives in the occupied areas. 
 
The Higher SS and Police Leaders 
It is worth exploring the role of the SS Police Leaders or HSSPF and their relationship 
with the Waffen-SS. The HSSPF were responsible for the conduct of anti-partisan and 
extermination operations behind the front lines. The aim of Himmler in creating these 
positions was to bring all the components of the SS and police, including the Waffen-
SS, under one command in the occupied territories and areas of command of the 
HSSPF (Birn, 1991; Koehl, 1983; Littman, 2003; MacLean, 1998, 1999b, 2001; 
Noakes & Pridham, 1988; Stein, 1966).  
 
Not only was it an attempt at integration of these units, but it was also intended that 
the HSSPF would provide political direction to these units (Krausnick et al., 1965). 
For example, SS-Obergruppenführer Otto Winkelmann was the HSSPF for Hungary, 
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and was responsible for the concentration and deportation of Jews in 1944 (Lozowick, 
2000). He was also in charge of the Waffen-SS units in Budapest until shortly before 
the city was besieged by the Russians in late 1944 (Lozowick, 2000; Ungvary, 2005). 
 
In an order issued on the 21st of May 1941 Himmler ordered that “The Higher SS and 
Police Leader is placed in charge of SS and Police troops and also of the operational 
personnel in the Security Police in order to carry out the tasks allocated to him by me 
personally” (Headland, 1992:138). During the Pohl case, HSSPF for Italy SS-
Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff confirmed the close link between the HSSPF and 
Himmler: 
Q. As a Highest SS and Police Leader, who was your immediate superior?  
A. The Reich Leader SS. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:771) 
 
It was in this role that the HSSPF “… became the agents for implementing the whole 
range of occupation policy insofar as Himmler was – or could be argued to be – 
responsible for it” (Krausnick et al., 1965:219).  Indeed the role of the HSSPF in 
Russia would flourish in its attempt to put into action the ideological ideas of the SS 
(Koehl, 1983). The ability to command units of the Waffen-SS meant that the HSSPF 
could use this authority to carry out “… ruthless directives to conduct anti-partisan 
warfare and reprisals” (Sydnor, 1989:253). As well as having these units under their 
control most HSSPF also had the SS courts attached to their headquarters 
(Weingartner, 1983). This relationship would prove useful should there be any 
problems with special directives carried out at Himmler’s behest. 
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The Waffen-SS units were at the disposal of the HSSPF. An example of this is a letter 
from Himmler to Waffen-SS General, SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Koppe, the 
HSSPF for Poland. In this letter Himmler told Koppe to use the 14th Waffen-SS 
Grenadier Division “… in any way necessary to hold down resistance” in the Polish 
area in 1944 (Littman, 2003:73). SS-Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser attempted to 
distance the Waffen-SS from the HSSPF and their activities. When asked by the 
defence counsel for the SS about the HSSPF he had the following to say. 
HERR PELCKMANN: Did the Higher SS and Police Leaders belong to the officer corps of the 
Waffen-SS?  
HAUSSER: The Higher SS and Police Leaders did not belong to the Waffen-SS. They had no 
authority to command and they had nothing to do with us.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:366) 
 
The link between the HSSPF and command of the Waffen-SS was strong. Many of 
the HSSPF had served in the Waffen-SS (Birn, 1991). Of approximately 58 HSSPF 
leaders,71 at least six HSSPF leaders, or 10 per cent, held commands at divisional 
level or higher within the Waffen-SS at some point in time (Yerger, 1997, 1999). In 
fact, Himmler sent several SS Officers marked as HSSPF to units of the Waffen-SS 
for a period of military training (Sydnor, 1973). The link between the HSSPF and the 
Waffen-SS was cemented even further when Himmler ordered that all HSSPF were to 
become part of the Waffen-SS in 1944. SS General and HSSPF Friedrich Von 
Eberstein gave the following evidence to the IMT when questioned by the defence 
counsel for the SS: 
                                                 
71 This figure does not include temporary or substitute HSSPF leaders. 
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HERR PELCKMANN: You just said that you were a general of the Waffen-SS. So far you have 
told the Tribunal only that you were a member of the General SS. When and for what reason 
did you become a general of the Waffen-SS, although up to then you had had nothing whatever 
to do with the Waffen-SS?  
VON EBERSTEIN: In the fall of 1944 Himmler became commander-in-chief of the reserve 
army. When he took over this office, the Prisoners of War Organisation also came under his 
jurisdiction. In the fall of 1944 Himmler transferred to the Higher SS and Police Leaders the 
responsibility for safeguarding prisoner-of-war camps against mass escapes and against 
attempts from the outside to liberate prisoners. For this purpose, the Higher SS and Police 
Leaders were made senior commanders of the prisoners of war in their defence areas. 
According to international regulations regarding prisoners of war, police could not be used to 
guard prisoners of war, so the Higher SS and Police Leaders were taken over into the Waffen-
SS and appointed generals of the Waffen-SS.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:306) 
 
As has been noted, the contributions to genocide by the Waffen-SS units under the 
command of the HSSPF was “… no less significant in quantity or brutality as those of 
the Einsatzgruppen” (Buchler, 1986:14). The following discussion gives some insight 
into this relationship between the HSSPF and the Waffen-SS.  Under each HSSPF 
were a number of subordinate SS and Police Leaders (SS und Polizeiführer - SSPF) 
who controlled smaller areas within the overall area of control of the HSSPF. The 
following discussion provides some insight into the HSSPF and their links to the 
Waffen-SS. 
 
Erich Bach-Zelewski SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS and 
Police, was also the HSSPF for central Russia (Yerger, 1997). He was provided the 
SS Brigades by Himmler to undertake the mass murder of the Jews in occupied 
Russia (Buchler, 1986). These units were assisted in 1942 by the Danish SS 
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Freikorps72, a unit made up of Danish volunteers, in anti-partisan duties (Smith et al., 
1999).  He was hospitalised in 1942 as a result of suffering “the psychological effects 
of carrying out orders involving the extermination policies in the East within his 
HSSPF command” (Yerger, 1997:37). He was appointed by Himmler as his special 
deputy for anti-partisan warfare in October 1942 and eventually took command of all 
anti-partisan operations on the Eastern Front until 1944. This position gave him the 
responsibilities of issuing reports, proposing courses of action and acting as liaison 
between the High Command, the Army and SS on anti-partisan matters (MacLean, 
1998). He went on to command the 10th SS Corps in late 1944 (Bender & Taylor, 
1971; Simpson, 1990; Westwood, 2001; Yerger, 1997). An example of the complicity 
of Bach-Zelewski is that he ordered the SS Calvary Brigade to refer to murdered Jews 
as looters and partisans in their reports to hide the true nature of their actions 
(Buchler, 1986; Headland, 1992). He survived the war, and to escape death gave 
evidence at the Nuremberg trials.  
 
A further example of this close link between the Waffen-SS and the antipartisan 
command structure is SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Lammerding, who was the chief of 
staff to Bach-Zelewski in 1943 and was responsible for the clearing of the Pripet 
Marshes and its associated killing operations, which resulted in the deaths of 15,000 
Russians (C. Mann, 2001; Yerger, 1999). He served in the 3rd SS Division and later 
went on to command the 2nd SS and 38th SS Divisions (Westwood, 2001; Yerger, 
1999). 
 
                                                 
72 This unit would later form the 24th Regiment of the 11th Panzergrenadier Division Nordland. 
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SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS and Police Kurt Von Gottberg 
took over from Bach-Zelewski and served as the HSSPF in Central and White Russia. 
He initially served in the indoctrination office of the SS and gave up his Waffen-SS 
rank in 1942, but was promoted to the above rank in the Waffen-SS on June 30th 1944 
after serving for some time in his HSSPF role fighting the partisans in Russia (Yerger, 
1997). Gottberg carried out a number of operations against supposed partisans in the 
occupied areas for which he received various awards. Of interest are a number of 
operations that were run in 1943, which earnt him the German Cross in Gold.  
 
The following information was drawn from extracts of reports submitted for these 
operations. Operation Erntefest resulted in 3721 enemy casualties, however, the arms 
tally was only 433 rifles, nine heavy machine guns, 19 light machine guns, eight 
machine pistols, etc (Yerger, 1997). The SS-Sonderkommando Dirlewanger served in 
this operation in January 1943 (MacLean, 1998). During the course of the operation 
the Sonderkommando reported killing 48 partisans, while it captured 26 partisans, 
executed 34 suspicious persons for the loss of three killed and four wounded 
(MacLean, 1998:110). Operation Cottbus resulted in 6042 enemy casualties in battle. 
Some 3709 men suspected of being partisans were executed, 599 men were taken 
prisoner for the loss of only 127 German soldiers killed (Yerger, 1997). The weapons 
captured consisted of some 19 cannons, 30 heavy machine guns, 45 machine pistols, 
903 rifles, etc (Yerger, 1997). Von Gottberg tacitly admitted that prisoners were being 
killed when he issued an instruction on the 11th of August 1943 to units under his 
control that “Henceforth no captured partisans or partisans who had deserted to the 
Germans would be shot” (MacLean, 1998:132). 
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When one looks at the figures there is a great disparity between the number of 
supposed partisans killed and actual weapons captured. For example in Operation 
Cottbus less then one in nine had a gun if the figures in Gottberg’s reports are 
accurate. For Operation Erntefest the ratio was eight partisans to each rifle. Clearly 
what were termed partisans could only have been a euphemism for outright slaughter 
of civilians. The low casualty rate for German forces also supports this proposition.  
 
This and other terms such as pacification and purification could only serve as code 
words for the wanton murder of innocent people. Other operations such as Operation 
Turov, which was conducted by the elements of the SS Calvary Brigade, had similar 
uneven results. In this operation the SS soldiers reported that 600-700 partisans were 
killed with just 10 taken prisoner. The 2nd SS Calvary Regiment reported the death of 
some 400 partisans for the loss of just four Germans dead and 12 wounded (Trang, 
2000:35).  
 
Even the German authorities themselves admitted this disparity, as was shown at 
Nuremberg. The results of Operation Cottbus was subject of a report from the General 
Commissar for White Ruthenia to the Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories 
that was critical of the slaughter of civilians:  
SS-Brigadeführer, Major General of Police Von Gottberg reports that the operation “Cottbus” 
had the following result during the period mentioned … the figures mentioned above indicate 
that again a heavy destruction of the population must be expected. If only 492 rifles are taken 
from 4500 enemy dead, this discrepancy shows that among these enemy dead were numerous 
peasants from the country. The Battalion Dirlewanger especially has a reputation for destroying 
many human lives. Among the 5000 people suspected of belonging to bands, there were 
numerous women and children.  
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(The International Military Tribunal, 1946:Vol 4:220) 
73 
 
In a letter dated the 19th of July 1943 a Police general stationed in the Ukraine 
complained to SS-Obergruppenführer Von Herff, head of the SS Personnel office 
that: 
Yesterday a Gauleiter and General-Kommissar unintentionally and unwittingly broadcast 
certain secret reports intended for the Führer, showing that some 480 rifles were found on 
6000 dead partisans. Put bluntly, all the men had been shot to swell the figures of enemy losses 
and highlight our own heroic deeds. (Krausnick et al., 1965:346) 
 
Indeed it has been noted that “… the massive anti-partisan operations he conducted in 
the first half of 1943 in the Lake Pelik area were especially brutal” (Yerger, 
1997:204). A the conclusion of operation Cottbus a German propaganda officer 
toured the area and noted that “… some of the partisans had been burnt alive and their 
half-roasted bodies had been eaten by pigs” (MacLean, 1998:141). Von Gottberg 
went on to command the 12th SS Corps in 1944 (Bender & Taylor, 1971; Westwood, 
2001; Yerger, 1997). He committed suicide in May 1945 (Yerger, 1997).  
 
Friedrich Jeckeln, SS-Obergruppenführer and General in the Waffen-SS and Police, 
served as the HSSPF leader for the Baltic States and North and South Russia. He saw 
combat service in the Western campaign with the Totenkopf Division before taking on 
the role of various HSSPF appointments in Russia in 1941 (Birn, 1991; Simpson, 
1990). He personally oversaw the first killing action of Einsatzkommando 4 in the 
                                                 
73 Note these figures differ from the figures quoted by Yerger, but the basic argument is unchanged. 
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Ukraine where some 90 Jews were killed (Lozowick, 1987). His reign in Russia was 
punctuated by various massacres where: 
Mass executions took place on numerous occasions … at Kamenets-Podolsky, Jeckeln’s units 
killed 23,600 people in August 1941. In a ravine outside of Kiev on September 29/30, 1941, 
another 33,000 people were executed … In Dnepropetrovsk, 15,000 were killed during October 
1941, and a further 15,000 were executed in Rovno on November 7/8… (Yerger, 1997:274) 
 
In the month of August 1941 it is estimated the Jeckeln was responsible for the 
murder of some 44,000 Jews in the area of the Ukraine (Buchler, 1986; Lower, 2002). 
Jeckeln is mentioned in various Operational Situation Reports of the Einsatzgruppen, 
which outline the above atrocities. In Operational Situation Report 80 dated 11th of 
September 1941 it outlines the assistance provided by Jeckeln in supplying a 
commando to assist with the liquidation of Jews at Kamenets-Podolsky (Arad et al., 
1989). Operational Situation Report 101 dated the 2nd of October 1941 outlines how 
police units under the control of Jeckeln assisted the Einsatzgruppen with the 
slaughter of Jews in Kiev. This was the infamous slaughter of Babi Yar (Arad et al., 
1989). The report states that a number of Jews and communists were killed. With 
typical thoroughness the Einsatzgruppen nominated the numbers involved. 
… In the period covered by the report, the towns of Nikolayev and Kherson in particular were 
freed of Jews. Remaining officials there were appropriately treated. From September 16 to 30. 
22,467 Jews and communists were executed. Total number 35 782… (Arad et al., 1989:168) 
 
At least one source lists units of the Waffen-SS assisting with the slaughter at Babi 
Yar (Lozowick, 1987). Operational Situation Report 136 dated the 19th of November 
1941 outlines how: 
Of approximately 100,000 Jews originally living in Dnepropetrovsk, about 70,000 escaped 
before the German troops entered the town. Of the remaining 30,000 approximately 10,000 
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were shot on October 13, 1941 by a detachment of the Higher SS and Police Chiefs.  (Arad et al., 
1989:242)  
 
Jeckeln performed various anti-partisan combat duties in 1942/43 where he had 
control of the SS Volunteer Legion Norwegen,74 units of the 4th SS Polizei Division 
and various army units (Yerger, 1997). In Aktion Sumpffieber (Operation Malaria), 
carried out in early 1942, the anti-partisan units under his command in Belorussia 
liquidated many ghettos and slaughtered tens of thousands of Jews (Gutman, 1990). 
He was promoted to General of the Waffen-SS in 1944 while he continued to fill the 
post of HSSPF leader (Yerger, 1997). At the end of the war Jeckeln was captured by 
the Russians and tried. He was hung in Riga, Latvia on the 3rd of February 1946 
(Yerger, 1997). 
 
Friedrich-Wilhelm Kruger was an SS-Obergruppenführer, a General in the Waffen-SS 
and the Police. He was also the HSSPF leader for East Poland, a position to which he 
was appointed in October 1939 (Yerger, 1999). So brutal were his actions against the 
Poles that a failed assassination attempt was made on the 20th of April 1943. He was 
responsible for the liquidation of various ghettos and the operation of the Belzec, 
Sobibor and Treblinka extermination camps, where 1,720,000 Jews were murdered 
(Gutman, 1990). He received divisional-level training with the Prinz Eugen Division 
from November 1943 to April 1944 and was given the rank of General of the Waffen-
SS in 1944 (Yerger, 1999). He was made commander of the 6th SS Mountain Division 
Nord in 1944 and later went on to command the 5th SS Mountain Corps (Bender & 
                                                 
74 This unit was used in July 1943 to form SS Panzergrenadier Regiment Norge of the 11th SS 
Panzergrenadier Division Nordland. 
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Taylor, 1971; Westwood, 2001; Yerger, 1999). He committed suicide at the end of the 
war (Yerger, 1999). 
 
SS-Gruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS Carl Graf Von Pückler-Burghaus 
served as deputy HSSPF for Central Russia to Bach-Zelewski from January 1942 until 
taking the latter’s place in late 1942 when Bach-Zelewski was sick until early 1943 
(Yerger, 1999). He transferred to the Waffen-SS on the 1st of August 1942 and took 
command of the 15th SS Latvian Grenadier Division in 1943. He surrendered to the 
Americans, but was handed over to the Russians. To avoid a trial he committed 
suicide on the 12th of May 1945 (Yerger, 1999). 
 
SS-Gruppenführer Odilo Globocnik served in an SS division in Poland as an enlisted 
man. He was later responsible for the supervision of the extermination camps of 
Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka and Majdanek (Arad, 1987; Birn, 1991; Krausnick et al., 
1965; MacLean, 1998; Poprzeczny, 2004; Reitlinger, 1957). Majdanek received the 
official title Waffen-SS Prisoner of War Camp Lublin (White, 1990). The camp was 
constructed by the Lublin Central Construction Board of the Waffen-SS and Police 
(White, 1990). Himmler had instructed that “In operations against guerrilla troops, 
men, women and children suspected of guerrilla activities will be rounded up and 
shipped to the camps in Lublin or Auschwitz” (Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: 
Vol 5:234). This resulted in thousands of children being consigned to the Majdanek 
camp.  
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Globocnik had seen his role in the East as being the “… biological crushing of the 
Polish people from the East and West” (Scheffler, 1985:32).  As the SSPF for the 
Lublin district in Poland Globocnik: 
Had the power of life and death over everyone in or passing through this recently acquired 
distinct; Pole, Jew and Ukrainians. By the time he left he had, in various ways murdered no 
fewer then 1.5 million Jews … Two of his large killing compounds were situated within this 
district, Belzec and Sobibor, while the third, Treblinka, was outside the district. (Poprzeczny, 
2004:93 )  
 
The work of Globocnik was noted by the NMT in the Pohl Trial. 
The extermination camps in the vicinity of Lublin, such as Treblinka and Majdanek, gave rise to 
special problems because of the magnitude of their operations. These camps were, until the 
latter part of 1943, under the jurisdiction of one Odilo Globocnik, the Higher SS and Police 
Leader, Lublin. In order to coordinate the undertaking, a special staff “G” was created within 
the framework of the WVHA. The head of this staff was Globocnik, while the administrative 
and accounting personnel was supplied by the WVHA. It was the task of special staff “G” to 
seize and account for all property in the Government General of occupied Poland derived from 
the extermination and enslavement of Jews.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:254) 
 
So inspirational were the actions of Globocnik to the Nazis that they were deemed 
worthy of a major story in the SS newspaper Das Schwarze Korps, titled Picks and 
Spades for the work that the Jews were doing. The article praises: 
…SS-Brigadeführer Odilo Globocnik, the police commander in Lublin, for having provided so 
many tasks for the Jews there that they scarcely have time to catch their breath. It says that 
getting things done in Poland requires “guys” who understand how to get to the root of the 
Jewish problem. Only special personalities and character suffice. (Combs, 1986:131) 
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Other members of the HSSPF had close ties with the Waffen-SS. Josef Fitzthum had 
served in the Flemish Volunteer Legion in 1942 (Birn, 1991; Westwood, 2001). As an 
SS-Gruppenführer he later went on to command the 18th SS Panzergrenadier Division 
Horst Wessel and the 21st SS Mountain Division Skanderberg for short periods in 
194575 (Westwood, 2001). Konstantin Kammerhofer served in the 5th SS Panzer 
Division Wiking in 1941(Westwood, 2001). Walter Schimana was responsible for the 
formation of the 14th SS Grenadier Division Galicia before being transferred to 
Greece as the HSSPF (Birn, 1991). 
 
In her study of five HSSPF leaders in the Balkans, Birn (1991) found that they were 
deeply involved in the persecution of the Jews. To achieve this the HSSPF leaders 
relied on the contribution of all parts of the SS apparatus, including the Waffen-SS:  
The whole machinery was involved on a routine basis. The Waffen-SS divisions, for instance, 
set up under the supervision of the HSSPF, were very active in anti-Jewish measures, contrary 
to the popular belief that they were fighting units uninfluenced by Nazi ideology. (Birn, 
1991:358). 
  
In 1943 Himmler ordered the Jews of Lublin, Poland to be dealt with. To this end he 
had an order passed on to SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich Kruger to undertake this 
action and to assist in this he was to “… form a special cordon of 2000 soldiers from 
units of a Waffen-SS Brigade” to deal with the Jewish problem (Poprzeczny, 
2004:105) This involvement in operations against the Jews is supported by the fact 
that the HSSPF were made fully aware of the nature of the cleansing operations to be 
undertaken by troops under their control. The HSSPF were informed in a telegram 
                                                 
75 Of note is that other sources such as Yerger and Bender and Taylor do not list Fitzthum as being in 
command of any Waffen-SS units. 
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from SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich dated the 2nd of July 1941 of the activities to be 
undertaken by the Einsatzgruppen (Headland, 1989; Krausnick et al., 1965; 
Longerich, 1997). This order contained a list of those who were to be eliminated: 
Comintern functionaries and communist professional politicians generally, lower functionaries 
of Party central, higher, middle and (radical lower) functionaries of Party central, regional and 
local committees, Peoples Commissars, Jews in party and state positions, other radical 
elements… (Longerich, 1997:262) 
 
Certainly the above order was taken to extend to all Jews by the commanders of the 
killing units (Headland, 1989). Indeed some of the commanders of the 
Einsatzgruppen testified in later trials that the order to kill all Jews was given to them 
prior to entering Russia (Lozowick, 1987). In any event the Einsatzgruppen certainly 
undertook the systematic liquidation of certain ethnic groups with great gusto. 
 
In the area of Serbia, SS-Gruppenführer August Meyszner undertook the daily routine 
of killing Jews. Further to this as a result of his actions Meyszner “… received several 
million marks from confiscated Jewish property … for the newly formed Prinz Eugen 
SS Division” (Birn, 1991:359). This was not an unusual arrangement; often Waffen-
SS units would receive benefits from the actions against the Jews in the form of goods 
or money.  
 
In the district of Lublin, SSPF SS-Gruppenführer Globocnik had various SS men and 
Jews assigned to his staff who were “… involved in sorting and storing the high value 
possessions removed from hundreds of thousands of Jewish families” who had been 
killed or transported to the camps (Poprzeczny, 2004:115). This collection of material 
was reported to Waffen-SS General, SS-Obergruppenführer Oswald Pohl, who was in 
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charge of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Department (SS Wirtschafts und 
Verwaltungshauptamt, commonly known as "WVHA") and chief of Division W of 
the WVHA (Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:200).  
On 4 July 1944, Pohl, in a communication to the Main Office chiefs, announced the names of 
officers responsible for the property seized in several areas, and stated: “As a matter of 
principle, it has to be kept in mind that the entire Jewish property is to be incorporated into the 
Reich property.” Property from the Action Reinhardt which had been delivered to the Reich 
Main Treasury was kept in a separate account, appropriately called, “Department Booty.” 
Moved by the Christian spirit of Christmas, Pohl, on 6 November 1943, wrote to Himmler, 
stating that he intended to make gifts of watches and fountain pens to SS units.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:988) 
 
SS-Gruppenführer Frank of the WVHA gave evidence as to where the money that 
Globocnik obtained went, “… the money, the cash, went into the treasuries of the 
Waffen-SS…” (Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:759). 
 
Witnesses for the Waffen-SS before the IMT denied knowing about this type of 
activity during the war. SS-Obergruppenführer Von Eberstein gave the following 
evidence. 
MAJOR JONES: Did you ever hear of Oswald Pohl?  
VON EBERSTEIN: Yes.  
MAJOR JONES: He was the head of the Economic and Administrative Main Office of the SS, 
was he not, the WVHA?  
VON EBERSTEIN: Yes.  
MAJOR JONES: Did you know that this organisation, using SS personnel, was employing 
murder as a means to establish loot on a colossal scale for the benefit of the Waffen-SS and 
other SS organisations?  
VON EBERSTEIN: Yes; I heard that from the reports on this trial while I was in the camp. I had 
never heard before that gold teeth, etcetera, were collected.  
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MAJOR JONES: Did you know of the great business in death that was bringing millions of 
marks to the coffers of the Reich bank? And it was involving numerous departments of the 
Third Reich.  
VON EBERSTEIN: No, I did not know that.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:315) 
 
The following letter from Waffen-SS General, SS-Obergruppenführer August Frank 
to the Auschwitz concentration-camp and Lublin District SS administrations 
(document No–724) leaves little doubt as to the utilisation by the Waffen-SS of the 
property of the camp inmates. The letter has not been produced in full, however, the 
salient parts are below:  
To the Chief of the SS Garrison Administration Lublin 
To the Chief of Administration Concentration-camp Auschwitz 
Subject: Utilisation of property on the occasion of settlement and evacuation of Jews.  
 Without taking into account the overall regulations which are expected to be issued during 
October, pertaining to the utilisation of mobile and immobile property of the evacuated Jews, 
the following procedure has to be followed with regard to the property carried by them — 
property, which will in all orders in the future be called goods originating from thefts, receiving 
of stolen goods, and hoarded goods … Watches and clocks of all kinds, alarm clocks, fountain 
pens, mechanical pencils, hand and electrical razors, pocket knives, scissors, flashlights, wallets 
and purses are to be repaired by the Economic and Administrative Main Office in special repair 
shops, cleaned, and evaluated; and have to be delivered quickly to front-line troops. Delivery to 
the troops is on a cash basis through the post exchanges. Three-fourth price grades are to be set 
and it has to be made sure that each officer and man cannot buy more than one watch … 
Ordinary furs (lamb, hare, and rabbit skins) are to be reported to the SS WVHA, Amt B II, and 
are to be delivered to the clothing plant of the Waffen-SS, Ravensbruck near Fuerstenbern 
(Mecklenburg) … It has to be strictly observed that the Jewish Star is removed from all 
garments and outer garments which are to be delivered. Furthermore, items which are to be 
delivered have to be searched for hidden and sewed-in values. This should be carried out with 
the greatest possible care. 
ACTING FOR 
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 [Signed] FRANK 
SS-Brigadeführer and Brigadier General of the Waffen-SS. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:695) 
 
Not only were the Waffen-SS directly involved in the atrocities, but they also 
benefited materially from the persecution of the Jews and other racially undesirable 
elements. The involvement of the HSSPF and Waffen-SS units in atrocities continued 
with members of the 31st SS Grenadier Division killing Jews who up to 1944 had 
been used as slave labourers in mines (Birn, 1991). 
In the village of Czervenka, the Hungarian guards were relieved by units from the 31st SS 
Division … During the night the SS men shot several hundred Jews, who were buried in a mass 
grave. The next day, on the march, the SS men amused themselves by shooting at the Jews for 
target practice, and the roadside was littered with corpses well into Hungarian territory. (Birn, 
1991:359) 
 
In Croatia similar actions were conducted by the Waffen-SS under the guidance of 
SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei Konstantin Kammerhofer. 
Soldiers of the 13th SS Mountain Division Handschar and the 23rd SS Mountain 
Division Kama committed regular atrocities in the persecution of the Jews (Birn, 
1991; Heaton, 2001).  
The Handschar killed 22 Jews in Tuzia, where it was stationed during the summer of 1944 … a 
building unit consisting of members of both divisions … were guarding Hungarian Jewish 
forced labourers building fortifications at the Austrian village of Jennersdorf. They treated the 
Jews with such cruelty that local villagers were infuriated. Many of the inmates who were 
incapable of working were ultimately taken from the group and shot. (Birn, 1991:360) 
 
The 7th SS Mountain Division Prinz Eugen also had a hand in the killing of Jews in 
late 1943. In the Town of Split on the Adriatic coast of Croatia, members of the 
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division used Jews to exhume the mass graves of previous victims, “… after which 
they themselves were shot” (Birn, 1991:361). One author describes this action as 
follows: “… then came the advance on Split and combat in the Split area…”; no 
mention in made of the slaughter (Kaltenegger, 1995:21). In early 1944 a German 
supply column was ambushed near the town of Otok in the Split area, as a result “… 
all the residents of the town were killed. The battalion from the Division Prinz Eugen 
participated” (Kumm, 1995:269). 
 
In Albania it was the role of HSSPF Josef Fitzthum, SS-Gruppenführer and general in 
the Waffen-SS and Police, to ensure action was taken against the Jews.  He utilised 
the 21st SS Mountain Division Skanderbeg to take action against the Jews as he held 
the view that they were to blame for “… all political agitation and economic 
shortages” (Birn, 1991:363). This division, under the control of SS-Brigadeführer 
August Schmidhuber, rounded up Jews and executed any who resisted (Birn, 1991). 
Many of those rounded up were later transported to Belsen concentration-camp where 
they perished. Schmidhuber served in the Germania Regiment in Poland. He was then 
a regimental commander in the Prinz Eugen Division before serving as a divisional 
commander for both the Prinz Eugen and Skanderbeg Divisions (Bender & Taylor, 
1972; Westwood, 2001; Yerger, 1999). Schmidhuber had also been in command of 
the Prinz Eugen Division when it had committed its earlier atrocities in the towns of 
Split and Dubrovnik (Birn, 1991; Kaltenegger, 1995; Westwood, 2001; Yerger, 
1999). Of interest is that Schmidhuber never joined the Nazi Party and was, in fact, 
opposed to their political views. By his actions it is clear however that he was 
ideologically aligned with them. He was captured by the Russians in May 1945, tried 
in Belgrade and executed for war crimes on the 19th of February 1947 (Yerger, 1999). 
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The SS Calvary Brigade also participated heavily in anti-partisan operations, first as 
this Brigade and later as the 8th SS Calvary Division Florian Geyer (Trang, 2000). 
One veteran of the division recalls how a partisan group was neutralised in operations 
during 1943 when it was placed at the disposal of Bach-Zelewski: 
In one intensive operation several bands were neutralised. A partisan was taken prisoner. The 
man was sentenced to be hanged. The entire company had strict orders to watch the execution. 
The time came and a whistle was blown as I was sitting comfortably with a few comrades. 
Everyone set off at a run. Some were even quite merry. (Trang, 2000:97) 
 
During one of these operations the division “… managed to encircle and wipe out a 
large group of partisan: there were 1256 killed (including many during summary 
executions) and 206 prisoners … The SS had casualties of 22 killed and 56 wounded” 
(Trang, 2000:95). 
 
That fact that the Waffen-SS command not only participated in the actions but also 
had extensive knowledge of such is shown in the comments of SS-Obergruppenführer 
Karl Wolff, who recounted that Himmler had asked senior Waffen-SS officers on how 
to address the partisan problem (Heaton, 2001). These officers included at least two 
divisional commanders of the Waffen-SS, SS-Obergruppenführer Felix Steiner and 
SS-Brigadeführer Otto Kumm. Wolff recalls that at Himmler’s behest he spoke to 
these two officers about the partisan problem: 
I spoke to Felix Steiner and Otto Kumm about this, and they were of the opinion … the greatest 
problem was trying to undo the damage already done from the invasion (of Russia)76 forward 
                                                 
76 My italics and insertion. 
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with regard to the civilian populations, especially the mass executions, which had not been 
handled very well. (Heaton, 2001:106) 
 
Further to this, according to Wolff, Steiner was involved with Bach-Zelewski in 
deciding how the partisan threat could be met (Heaton, 2001:128). This clearly 
indicates that at the very least senior officers of the Waffen-SS who were in charge of 
front-line fighting units were aware of the atrocities being committed. Indeed the fact 
that the many senior Waffen-SS commanders were aware of the killing operations 
taking place is evidenced by the comments of SS-Gruppenführer Bittrich at a meeting 
of 15 Waffen-SS Generals in 1941, where he criticised the racial cleansing in the East 
being undertaken by Himmler (Heaton, 2001; Yerger, 1997). This is ironic given that 
Bittrich went on to command the SS Calvary Division in 1942, a unit that, was 
responsible for many atrocities on the Eastern Front (Trang, 2000; Westwood, 2001). 
Indeed this is the same SS General Bittrich who in April 1938 had taken over an 
apartment in Vienna with his wife that had been confiscated from a Jew (Von Lang, 
2005:115). One could perhaps surmise that his concern arose out of the military 
implications of these actions, rather then any moral concern for the victims 
themselves. Certainly Bittrich never attempted to resign his commission or bring to 
justice any of the personnel of the SS Calvary Brigade involved in the cleansing 
actions. As one author has noted, the cleansing actions of units such the 
Einsatzgruppen and others were to be “… given the highest priority: no exigency of 
war, no economic consideration, no shortage of supplies would diminish the necessity 
of completing the assignment down to the last Jew” (Littman, 2003:35).   
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Also present at the meeting were such SS notables as Sepp Dietrich (SS Leibstandarte 
Adolf Hitler Division), Paul Hausser (Das Reich Division), Theodor Eicke (Totenkopf 
Division), Karl Wolff (Himmler’s adjutant) and Felix Steiner (Wiking division) 
among others, all generals of frontline Waffen-SS units (Heaton, 2001). Yet at 
Nuremberg Hausser made the following claim that he did not “… remember a single 
case in which the front troops of my division had ever taken hostages or destroyed 
villages as a punishment” (The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:363). 
Such a claim would not seem to match the recollections of other Waffen-SS generals 
and other facts. 
 
As noted by Birn at the conclusion of her study, “…  all actions of extermination were 
the common responsibility of the security police, order police and the Waffen-SS” 
(Birn, 1991:364). This claim is supported by Buchler who argues that “… units of 
both the police (Orpo) and the Waffen-SS played a very active role in the mass 
murder of Jews in Soviet territory” (Buchler, 1986:19). One of the arguments raised 
by defenders of the Waffen-SS is that units such as the 1st and 2nd SS Brigades and the 
SS Calvary Brigade were not part of the Waffen-SS as such. This claim can be 
rejected. Waffen-SS officers commanded these units, they contained members of the 
Waffen-SS and these units were later used as the cadres to form other Waffen-SS 
units such as the 18th SS Panzergrenadier Division Horst Wessel and the 8th SS 
Florian Geyer Division. They were engaged not only in anti-partisan duties, but also 
in combat duties on occasions. Perhaps the only difference that can be drawn between 
them and the front-line Waffen-SS units is that at times they came under the direct 
control of the Reichsführer-SS, rather the high command of the Waffen-SS and the 
Army (Bender & Taylor, 1972; Buchler, 1986; Nafziger, 2001). Let us now turn our 
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attention to the SS killing units that operated in the wake of the advancing army 
groups, the Einsatzgruppen. 
 
The Einsatzgruppen 
The role and methods of the Einsatzgruppen 
The Einsatzgruppen were mobile killing groups that operated behind the front lines on 
the Eastern Front conducting so-called cleansing operations where they would murder 
Jews and any others who were seen as a threat to the Nazi regime. These actions can 
be seen to be the first steps on the path to the final solution and the death camps. 
Waffen-SS General Bach-Zelewski gave the following insight into the mission of the 
Einsatzgruppen at the IMT trial at Nuremberg: 
COL. TAYLOR: Are you generally familiar with the operations of the so-called Einsatzgruppen 
of the SD?  
BACH-ZELEWSKI: Yes.  
COL. TAYLOR: Did these units play any important part in large-scale anti-Russian operations?  
BACH-ZELEWSKI: No.  
COL.TAYLOR: What was the principal task of the Einsatzgruppen?  
BACH-ZELEWSKI: The principal task of the Einsatzgruppen of the Sicherheitspolizei was the 
annihilation of the Jews, gypsies, and political commissars.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:477) 
 
The methods of killing used by the Einsatzgruppen included shooting, gassing, 
burning, bludgeoning and others (MacLean, 1999b). Some methods of execution were 
as sadistic as they were unique. Adolf Ruche, a former SS-Hauptscharführer, gave 
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evidence during the Einsatzgruppen trial77 that showed how occasionally there were 
executioners who devised original methods for killing their victims (Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal, 1946):  
On the occasion of an exhumation in Minsk, in November 1943, Obersturmführer Heuser 
arrived with a Kommando of Latvians. They brought eight Jews, men and women, with them. 
The Latvians guarded the Jews, while Harter and Heuser erected a funeral pyre with their own 
hands. The Jews were bound, put on the pile alive, drenched with gasoline and burned. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:448) 
 
By December 1942 the Einsatzgruppen had murdered at least some 1.1 million 
people78 in less then six months in which they had been operating in Russia 
(Headland, 1992:105). In all there were four Einsatzgruppen that operated in concert 
with the German Army Groups behind the front lines in Russia and were responsible 
to Himmler (Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:89). The groups were divided 
into smaller sub-units called Sonderkommandos or Einsatzkommandos (Arad et al., 
1989). The Einsatzgruppen were required to report to the Reich Main Security Office 
(RSHA) and also to the HSSPF in their area of operations, whom Himmler would use 
to pass on orders directly to the Einsatzgruppen (Headland, 1992). 
 
The use of the Waffen-SS in the Einsatzgruppen 
In all some 3000 men served in the Einsatzgruppen and these were drawn from the 
Waffen-SS, SD, Security Police, Gestapo, Criminal Police and various other police 
services (Headland, 1992; Longerich, 1997). It has been noted that the Waffen-SS 
                                                 
77 Case number IX, known at the Einsatzgruppen case. 
78 This figure is not exact as there is some difficulty in arriving at a precise number of victims listed in 
the reports, however, most sources state that at least 500,000 people had been murdered. 
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provided significant forces to the Einsatzgruppen (Buchler, 1986; Headland, 1992; 
MacLean, 1999b; Stein, 1966). As noted during the Einsatzgruppen trial “… the 
troops were largely made of emergency service draftees and of companies of the 
Waffen-SS and Order Police” (Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:93). One 
author puts the figure at some 1500 Waffen-SS soldiers being active members of the 
Einsatzgruppen (Stein, 1966).  
 
As well as being members of the actual Einsatzgruppen, Waffen-SS units were sent as 
support units to help them achieve their aim of pacification and purification of the rear 
areas (Buchler, 1986). As noted by Lower on August 7th 1941 at Zhitomir, men on the 
Einsatzgruppen “along with a Waffen-SS platoon … collaborated in the Mass 
shooting of 400 Jews at a horse cemetery on the outskirts of town” (Lower, 2002:4). 
Some of these units were the 1st and 2nd SS Brigades, the SS-Sonderkommando 
Dirlewanger and the SS Calvary Brigade as well as regular Waffen-SS units; the 
actions of these units have already been discussed to some degree. 
 
Yet again the Waffen-SS witnesses denied any knowledge of the actions of these 
killing groups at Nuremberg, yet their complicity cannot be denied. One former 
Einsatzgruppen officer gave a guide to the make-up of a SonderKommando, which he 
stated consisted of 20 drivers, 15 Waffen-SS, five administrative officials, 15 
Gestapo/Police, 10 SD officials and five interpreters (Headland, 1992:38).   
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The IMT also heard evidence of the actions of the Einsatzgruppen and their 
composition. The prosecution presented Activity and Situation report number six, 
which covered the actions of the Security Police and SD in Russia from the 1st to the 
31st of October 1941 (The 
International Military 
Tribunal, 1946:Vol 
4:217). These reports 
were similar to the 
Operational Situation 
Reports produced by the 
Einsatzgruppen (which 
will be discussed shortly), except they covered greater time periods (Headland, 1992). 
The report covered personnel details of Einsatzgruppen A at this time period. The 
table above indicates the number of personnel and the per centage of the total force. 
Service Number of men Per centage of 
Einsatzgruppen A 
Waffen-SS 340 34.4 
Drivers 172 17.4 
Administration 18 1.8 
SD 35 3.5 
Criminal Police Kripo 41 4.1 
Stapo 89 9.0 
Auxiliary Police 87 8.8 
Order Police 133 13.4 
Female employees 13 1.3 
Interpreters 51 5.1 
Telautograph operators 3 0.3 
Wireless operators 8 0.8 
TOTALS 990 100 
Note: Sourced from (The International Military Tribunal, 1946:Vol 4:220) 
 
An Einsatzgruppen execution taking place.
An Einsatzgruppen execution taking place.
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Of interest to us is that some 34 per cent of this group were made up of Waffen-SS 
personnel. Other Einsatzgruppen also had a similar mix of Waffen-SS men and other 
staff. “Einsatzkommando 6 consisted of approximately 130-150 men, including a 
platoon of Waffen-SS…” (Lozowick, 1987:228). In his study Stein identified that: 
On the basis of the evidence at hand it may be concluded that at least 1500 members of the 
Waffen-SS served with the Einsatzgruppen, that at least some of the senior SS combat officers 
were aware of the manner in which they were employed, and that for these reasons the Waffen-
SS must bear its share of responsibility for the cold-blooded murder of hundreds of thousands 
of civilians. (Stein, 1966:264)  
 
It was not always necessary, or perhaps desirable, to place the Jews within the ghettos 
to effect their elimination. In the Baltic States a more direct course of action was 
followed. A report by SS-Brigadeführer Stahlecker to Himmler, dated 15 October 
1941, entitled “Action Group A”, was found in Himmler's private files and was 
tendered at Nuremberg (document L-180). It refers to the actions of Einsatzgruppen 
A. Stahlecker reported that 135,567 persons, nearly all Jews, were murdered in 
accordance with basic orders directing the complete annihilation of the Jews (The 
International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:219). This report also goes on to tell us 
that the Waffen-SS undertook cleansing actions on the Eastern Front: 
… It shows further that the forces of the uniformed police and the Waffen-SS are active mainly 
in front of Leningrad, in order to take measures under their own officers against the streaming 
back of the population … It should be mentioned that the leaders of the Waffen-SS and of the 
uniformed police, who are on the reserve, have declared their wish to stay with the Security 
Police and the SD.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:219) 
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In addition to these enlisted men, a number of Waffen-SS officers also served in the 
Einsatzgruppen. Of all of the Einsatzgruppen officers, eight per cent served in the 
Waffen-SS. This is in contrast to some 43 per cent of concentration-camp officers 
who served in the Waffen-SS (MacLean, 1999b). Some 23 officers served in the 
Einsatzgruppen then transferred to the Waffen-SS, while seven served in the Waffen-
SS and then transferred to the Einsatzgruppen (MacLean, 1999b). A number of 
officers also served in non-divisional Waffen-SS organisations and these include the 
12th and 3rd SS Corps, 502nd SS Heavy Tank Battalion and the 2nd SS Flak Detachment 
(MacLean, 1999b).  
 
While these numbers may be small when compared to the total number of men 
serving in the Waffen-SS, the salient point is this; the officers of the Einsatzgruppen 
No. Name of division/formation Number of 
Einsatzgruppen officers 
1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler 3 
2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich 1 
3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf 1 
4th SS Panzergrenadier Division SS-Polizei 3 
8th SS Kavallerie Division Florian Geyer 1 
9th  SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen 2 
12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend 1 
14th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS (Ukrainische NR 1) 1 
16th SS Panzergrenadier Division Reichsführer-SS 1 
18th SS Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier Division Horst Wessel 1 
19th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS (Lettisches NR 2) 1 
20th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS (Estnische NR 1) 1 
29th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division Der (Russische NR 1) 
later to become the (Italienische NR 1) 
1 
36th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS 1 
38th SS Grenadier Division Nibelungen 1 
3rd SS Corps 2 
12th  SS Corps 1 
502nd Heavy Tank Battalion 1 
2nd SS Flak Detachment 1 
2nd SS Infantry Brigade 1 
 SS Regiment Der Fuhrer 1 
 Ss Regiment Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler 1 
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were at the cutting edge of the genocide being conducted in Russia. They had full 
knowledge of the killing operations being undertaken in Russia, and they were widely 
dispersed through the Waffen-SS. The table above indicates the divisions/formations 
in which Einsatzgruppen officers served.79 
 
This bearing of responsibility is even more so when one acknowledges that it is 
reasonable to assume that the generals and, other officers of the Waffen-SS knew 
about the Einsatzgruppen and what they were doing. This is indicated by the 
testimony of SS-Obergruppenführer Bach-Zelewski during the trials at Nuremberg 
when asked about his knowledge of their activities. 
BACH-ZELEWSKI: Einsatzgruppe B was located in Smolensk, and operated in precisely the 
same way as all the other Einsatzgruppen. One heard everywhere in conversation that the Jews 
were being rounded up and sent to ghettos.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:481) 
 
The link between the Waffen-SS and the extermination units was admitted by a 
commander of the Das Reich Division, SS-Gruppenführer Georg Keppler, who 
outlined that “… posting to the former was a part of Waffen-SS discipline”, where the 
posting was used as punishment for infractions (Reitlinger, 1957:171). The movement 
of personnel was not one-way, however. After suffering grievous losses on the 
Russian front the Totenkopf Division transferred a whole company of soldiers from 
Einsatzgruppen A to its 3rd infantry regiment (Sydnor, 1973).  
 
                                                 
79 Exact service details were unavailable for two Waffen-SS officers, so total equals 28. 
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That senior SS officers knew about the actions of the killing groups is beyond doubt. 
An order dated 21st September 1939 from SS-Obergruppenführer Heinrich Heydrich, 
chief of the security police, was sent out to various Einsatzgruppen leaders and 
several HSSPF outlining the special measures to be taken in the occupied countries 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:127). Heydrich outlined these special 
measures were to be carried out: 
In a spirit free from bureaucratic and administrative influences and with an eagerness to 
assume responsibility. While the regulations and orders of the prisoners-of-war system were 
hitherto based exclusively on considerations of a military nature, now the political goal must 
be attained, namely, to protect the German people from Bolshevist agitators and to gain a firm 
grip on the occupied territory at the earliest possible moment. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:127) 
 
While this order was issued before the invasion of Russia it is useful in that it clearly 
sets out the way in which the Jewish question was to be solved in the occupied 
territories.  
 
The Operational Situation Reports 
The Germans were meticulous in their recording the actions of the Einsatzgruppen, 
with Operational Situation Reports regularly being submitted by the units in the field 
to the authorities in Berlin outlining their actions. The reports catalogue the 
involvement of various Waffen-SS units in the atrocities committed during cleansing 
operations in Russia. During the Einsatzgruppen trials the authenticity of the reports 
were shown beyond doubt and no challenge to them was mounted by the defence 
(Arad et al., 1989). Operational Situation Report 19 dated the 11th of July 1941 
outlines Waffen-SS involvement in the killing of Jews, “Einsatzkommando 4b … In 
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Zborov, 600 Jews liquidated by the Waffen-SS as a retaliation measure for Soviet 
atrocities” (Arad et al., 1989:19). 
 
Waffen-SS and Police troops executed the entire Jewish council in the Russian town 
of Belzy on the 15th of July 1941 (Stokes, 2002). Operational Situation Report 37 
stated that this was in relation to partisan attacks on German troops: “The precise 
number of shootings can not be ascertained … the Kommando appropriately punished 
the Jewish Council of Elders in Belzy and other Jews for failing to comply with 
security police directives and a retribution for attacks on German military personnel” 
(Arad et al., 1989:57). 
 
Operational Situation Report 58 dated the 20th of August 1941 outlines how the 
Waffen-SS were involved with the Einsatzgruppen in the area of Novoselye, “… an 
exchange of gunfire took place on August 15 1941 between partisans and two sub-
units of the Waffen-SS platoon attached to the Einsatzgruppe A near Boskina near the 
H.Q. of the Einsatzgruppe A. Thirteen partisans were killed…” (Arad et al., 1989:94).  
 
Operational Situation Report 59 dated the 21st of August 1941 outlines the actions of 
Einsatzgruppen C in the Novo-Ukrainka area. The report commences with a 
information about partisan activity and the shooting of civilians deemed responsible 
for such. It then describes the involvement of the 1st SS Brigade in the killing of Jews. 
An extract of the report is show below: 
After the German troops entered Staro-Konstantinov (the present seat of the Higher SS, the 
Police Chief and the Military Commander of the Rear Area), Jews were employed for cleaning 
the barracks. Since the Jews did not report for work lately, the military authorities had to round 
up the Jewish labour force early in the day. The Jews were impertinent and even refused to 
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work. Out of about 1000 Jews that were recruited for fieldwork, only 70 appeared on the 
following day. Moreover it was established that harvesters were sabotaged. Finally, the Jewish 
Council of Elders spread the rumour that the Russians were advancing again; whereupon the 
Jews publicly threatened and abused the Ukrainians. Finally it was established that the Jews 
were conducting a flourishing trade with stolen cattle and goods. In reprisal, the 1 SS Brigade 
carried out an action against the Jews in the course of which 300 male and 139 female Jews 
were shot. (Arad et al., 1989:100) 
 
In Operational Situation Report 86 dated the 17th of September 1941 we again find the 
1st SS Brigade conducting cleansing operations in the Novo-Ukrainka area. In the 
town of Ushomir SS units were in action where the 1st SS Brigade “… shot all male 
Jews” (Arad et al., 1989:134). The 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking also assisted in the 
cleansing operations in occupied Russia by liquidating 600 Jews (Knopp, 2002; 
Reitlinger, 1957). SS-Brigadeführer Heinz Karl Fanslau was brought to trial in 
relation to this matter for actions when he was in command of the supply battalion for 
the division, but was acquitted due to lack of evidence (Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 
1946: Vol 5:998). 
 
Clearly the Waffen-SS were heavily involved in the activities of the Einsatzgruppen. 
These units were the leading edge of the effort to destroy the Jews and other 
undesirable elements. As such it would seem to repudiate the claims by the Waffen-
SS that they were just simple soldiers and distinct from the terror apparatus of the SS. 
When it was found that the Einsatzgruppen were not killing Jews fast enough the Nazi 
regime turned to another SS terror apparatus to complete the task, the concentration-
camps. 
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The Concentration-camps 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to verify that the crimes against humanity were 
committed in the concentration-camps system under the Nazis. Several million people 
perished in this terror apparatus.80 This I believe history and subsequent tribunals 
have shown beyond doubt. The NMT attempted to arrive at a rough estimate as to the 
human cost: 
As to the total number of prisoners delivered to the camps, only a reasonable estimate can be 
made. If the number of dead at Auschwitz alone is considered, amounting to at least 3.5 
million, it is safe to assume that no less than 10 million human beings were at one time or 
another incarcerated in a concentration-camp.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:222) 
 
What I will show in this section is the involvement of the Waffen-SS in this 
enterprise. However, to not make some attempt to paint the enormity or callousness of 
this enterprise would be a failing to history. To this point the post-war television 
interview below, by SS Corporal Richard Boch paints a terrifying picture. Boch tells 
the story seemingly without emotion and in an almost detached fashion.81 He was 
approached by a fellow SS soldier in relation to the killing of the Jews in the gas 
chambers: 
“Richard, you are interested in the actions?”, I said, “Yes, very interested indeed.” He said “I 
will take you with me this evening.” The new arrivals had to get undressed and when a certain 
                                                 
80 Note that figures for the total of those killed vary. The accuracy of the final figure is not the issue 
here, rather the approximate figure serves to illustrate the scale of the crime, which is the important 
point. 
 
81 Boch was investigated, but found not to have committed any crimes. 
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number got inside they shut the doors and that happens three times…they took out a sort of tin, 
one of the SS guards did that, and then he climbed up a ladder and then at the top there was a 
round hole and he opened a little iron door and held the tin there and shook it and then he shut 
the little door again. And then a fearful screaming started, approximately, I would reckon after 
about 10 minutes it suddenly went quiet. I said to Herblinger “Can we get a bit nearer when 
they take them out?”  So we went a bit closer, they opened the door, that was the prisoner 
squad who did that. Then a blue haze came out and I looked in and I saw a pyramid, they had 
all climbed on top of each other until the last one stood on the very top. All one on top of the 
other, it was a pointed heap, all came up to a point. And then the prisoners had to go in and tear 
it apart. They had to tug and pull very hard to disentangle all these people. Then we went back 
to the hall, then it was the turn of the last lot to get undressed, the ones who had managed to 
hang back a bit all of the time. Then the prisoners had to check where small children had been 
hidden and covered up, they pulled them out and opened the doors quickly again and whoosh, 
they threw all the children in and slammed the doors. “Uh, I’m going to be sick,” I said. I said, 
“Oh, I’ve seen nothing like it in my life, oh it’s absolutely terrible.” And just imagine when they 
threw the children in how the people inside screamed because then the people inside suddenly 
realised what was happening. And I said, “Karl, can we leave soon, I can’t stand it any more?”, 
and he said, “You do get used to anything in time.” (Bloomberg, 2000) 
 
Boch later refused the orders to take part in such massacres. Of note is that he was not 
shot as a result; a claim often made by the SS in the defence of following orders. As 
noted by Sydnor regarding the involvement of the Waffen-SS in the camp system; “A 
number of men from the Totenkopf Division became active cogs in the greatest 
deliberate process of human destruction in the history of mankind” (Sydnor, 
1973:361). I shall show that the links between the camp system and the Waffen-SS 
extend far beyond just the Totenkopf Division. 
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Creation and management of the camp system 
In 1934 the SS took control of the concentration-camp system and SS-Reichsführer 
Heinrich Himmler was now the regulator of this apparatus of the Nazi state 
(Reitlinger, 1957; Simpson, 1990). Waffen-SS General, SS-Obergruppenführer 
Theodore Eicke, a man with a reputation for brutality, was given the role of Inspector 
of Concentration-camps (Sydnor, 1990). Eicke was the commandant of Dachau, and 
this camp was used as the model for future camps. It was Eicke who formulated a 
code of conduct for the SS guards and also the disciplinary and punishment 
regulations for the prisioners (Bracher, 1969; Sydnor, 1990). The disciplinary 
regulations became the standard for concentration-camps and remained in use until 
1945. They included punishments such as forced labour, solitary confinement, 
corporal punishment and the death penalty for certain offences (Sydnor, 1990). The 
brutality of Eicke was demonstrated by the code of conduct for the SS guards: 
The code of conduct for the SS guards was based upon Eicke’s demand for blind and absolute 
obedience to all orders from SS superior officers, and upon his insistence that each prisoner be 
treated with fanatical hatred as an enemy of the state. (Sydnor, 1990:11) 
 
 Eicke was later to command the 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf before being killed 
on the Russian front. This division was recruited almost exclusively from camp 
guards during its formation (Bender & Taylor, 1971; MacLean, 1999a; C. Mann, 
2001; Sydnor, 1990; Yerger, 1997). Eicke provided the Nazis with a concentration-
camp system that was “… beyond the control of traditional law and authority, in 
which the enemies of the state were broken and destroyed by the organised, 
impersonal and systematic brutalities…” (Sydnor, 1990:23). This system was to 
burgeon from a mere six camps before the war to some 185 by 1944, and this figure 
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did not include hundreds of sub-camps. Waffen-SS General Oswald Pohl boastfully 
reported this growth to Himmler in April 1944: 
In April 1944 the defendant Pohl informed Himmler that there were 20 concentration-camps 
and 165 labour camps in the Reich and German occupied territory. A postscript to this letter in 
Pohl’s handwriting boastfully states that: “In Eicke’s time there were altogether six camps. 
Now: 185!”  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:221) 
 
That Pohl was aware of what was happening in the camps is evidenced by his 
comment during his trial when asked by the judges if he was aware of the deaths in 
the camps: 
Q. What Judge Phillips and I were endeavouring to ascertain, and I think now we have 
ascertained, is whether you knew the number of deaths occurring in the concentration-camps, 
and from this long interrogation we now conclude that you did know.  
A. Yes. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 45:433) 
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Further to this is a diary entry by SS doctor Kremer at Auschwitz. 
23 September 1943 Tonight sixth and seventh Sonderatkion.82 In the morning 
Obergruppenführer Pohl and party arrived at the Waffen-SS quarters. A guard was standing 
outside the door and was the first to stand to attention before us. In the evening, at 20:00 
hours, dinner with Obergruppenführer Pohl in the officers mess, a real feast… (Klee et al., 
1988: 260) 
 
The denials of the Waffen-SS 
Often it has been argued that the Waffen-SS was a separate organisation from the 
concentration-camp system. During his testimony at the Nuremberg trials SS General, 
SS-Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser was asked by the SS defence counsel if there 
was a link between the Waffen-SS and the camp guards: 
HERR PELCKMANN: Did the Waffen-SS furnish the guard units and the so-called command 
personnel for the concentration-camps?  
                                                 
82 Sonderatkion indication mass executions. 
  290 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
HAUSSER: The guards of the concentration-camps and the personnel in the command did not 
belong to the Waffen-SS. Only in the course of the war were these units designated as Waffen-
SS in order to release them from military service and give them freedom to carry out their 
police duties. The members of the Waffen-SS considered this measure, which they learned of 
only after the war, a deliberate deception on the part of Himmler. We did not have anything to 
do with the men of the concentration-camps and the guard personnel.  
HERR PELCKMANN: It has not become quite clear yet, Witness, just what you meant when 
you said “to release them from military service.” Will you explain that in more detail?  
HAUSSER: All persons who served at home and in the Police had to be exempted from military 
service in the Army by the Wehrkreis or district commander in order to carry out their police 
tasks. That did not apply when all guard units were designated as Waffen-SS, for these were a 
part of the Armed Forces. In the main offices in Berlin these units, in order to differentiate 
them, were designated nominal Waffen-SS. But all this I learned only here later.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:366)  
 
Hausser’s testimony is confusing to say the least. After initially stating that the camp 
guards were not linked to the Waffen-SS, in the next breath he then admits that they 
were part of the Waffen-SS organisation. It needs to be considered that Hausser was 
one of the most senior Waffen-SS officers and had served on various commands staffs 
and in various theatres of war, yet he purported to have no knowledge of Waffen-SS 
involvement in the camp system. Remember this is a man who oversaw the SS 
training schools that had cells built into the basements for concentration-camp 
inmates to see to the comfort of SS officers. Of even more importance is his claim 
that the Waffen-SS soldiers only became aware of the amalgamation of the camps 
with the front-line units after the war. SS-Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer, former 
commander of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, also puts forward this 
argument regarding lack of knowledge in his post-war account of his wartime 
  291 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
involvement. He claims that soldiers of the Waffen-SS have been tarred with the same 
brush as other elements of the SS: 
 The Waffen-SS is now incriminated with events in the concentration-camps because leading 
individuals of the government have placed special formations in the same category as the 
frontline troops … The soldiers had neither more nor less knowledge of the events in Germany 
that the majority of the German people. (Meyer, 2001:392) 
 
Clear evidence will be shown that the front-line Waffen-SS units had close and 
inseparable ties with the camp guards and camp-system administration well before the 
end of the war, and with this the obvious requisite knowledge of the operations of the 
camps was also present. Not only this, but the Waffen-SS were clear financial 
beneficiaries of the camp system. 
 
SS-Brigadeführer Heinz Karl Fanslau was one of Hausser’s former adjutants. His role 
was to organise “… replacements, recruiting, discharges, promotions, assignments, 
and transfers. Within this field he dealt indiscriminately with the Waffen-SS 
personnel and also with that of the concentration-camps” (Nuremberg Military 
Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:998; Reitlinger, 1957). Fanslau tried unsuccessfully to argue 
that even though he was responsible for personnel matters in the camps he had no 
knowledge of the crimes being committed. The tribunal rejected this claim outright 
and he was found guilty with the following judgement.83  
As the officer in charge of personnel, he was as much an integral part of the whole organisation 
and as essential a cog in its operation as any other ...  He was in command of one of the 
essential ingredients of successful functioning. This has no relation to “group condemnation”, 
                                                 
83 Case IV before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, commonly referred to as the Pohl case. 
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which has been so loudly decried. Personnel were just as important and essential in the whole 
nefarious plan as barbed wire, watchdogs and gas chambers. The successful operation of the 
concentration-camps required the coordination of men and materials, and Fanslau to a 
substantial degree supplied the men. He was not an obscure menial; he was a person of 
responsibility and authority in the organisation, who was charged with and performed 
important and essential functions … His claim that he was unaware of what was going on in the 
organisation and in the concentration-camps which it administered is utterly inconsistent with 
the importance and indispensability of his position. Whether or not he was aware of the cold-
blooded program of extermination of useless concentration-camp inmates, he must have been 
aware that millions of human beings had been herded into concentration-camps, in violation of 
all their rights and solely because Germany needed their labour, to work under the most 
inhumane circumstances. The Tribunal finds without hesitation that Fanslau knew of the 
slavery in the concentration-camps and took an important part in promoting and administering 
it. This being true, he is guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:998) 
 
Personnel links between the camps and the Waffen-SS 
This link between the Waffen-SS and the concentration-camp system can be shown 
by a number of factors. Eicke formed a number of Totenkopf Standarten or Death’s 
Head regiments that were used in the guarding of the concentration-camps prior to the 
war. With the commencement of the conflict another 12 regiments were formed 
(Stein, 1966). A Hitler decree on the 18th of May 1939 provided that the Death’s Head 
units (camp guards) were to be used as combat replacements for the Waffen-SS 
(Sydnor, 1990). This established a ready exchange in personnel between the camp 
system and the Waffen-SS (Headland, 1992; Koehl, 1983; MacLean, 1999a; Pierik, 
2001; Reitlinger, 1957; Stein, 1966; Sydnor, 1973, 1990; Wegner, 1985). The 
apologists claim that the Waffen-SS were not associated with the camp system. 
Contrary to this view, however, is an order from Himmler, which incorporated all of 
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the Death Heads units into the Waffen-SS (Simpson, 1990; Sydnor, 1990). In fact, 
some of the duties that Eicke had performed as Inspector of Concentration-camps 
were given to the Waffen-SS command to oversee (Mollo, 1982; Sydnor, 1990:133).  
 
In 1941 nine Death’s Head infantry and two cavalry regiments were transferred to the 
control of the Waffen-SS, “… three Death’s Head infantry regiments were formed 
into a Waffen-SS battle group, SS Kampfgruppe Nord, and one regiment was 
transferred to the Waffen-SS Motorised Division Reich (later Das Reich)” (Mollo, 
1982:92). The Mountain Division Nord was initially formed exclusively with 
personnel from the Death’s Head regiments and utilised regiments six, seven and nine 
for personnel (Bender & Taylor, 1971; Williamson & Andrew, 2004a; Zoepf, 2001). 
 
As early as 1940 Waffen-SS units sent personnel to camps for duty and wounded 
soldiers were sent there for recuperation (Koehl, 1983).  There was a flow of Waffen-
SS soldiers who were unfit for service or wounded into the camps, however later in 
the war as manpower demands increased and “… great numbers of concentration-
camp guards were re-drafted into the field divisions of the Waffen-SS…” (Reitlinger, 
1957:266). One example of this is SS-Sturmbannführer Richard Baer who was 
attached to the 3rd SS Totenkopf Division. Baer served in the camps prior to the war 
and then undertook combat duties until he was wounded in 1942 (MacLean, 1999a; 
Segev, 1987). He then was transferred back to the camp system where he went on to 
become commandant of Auschwitz (MacLean, 1999a; Segev, 1987).  
 
When ordered to form a new tank battalion in 1942 for the Totenkopf division, SS-
Obergruppenführer Eicke drew on personnel from “… the SS Mountain Division 
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Nord, and from an additional gleaning of the various SS agencies – including the 
guard detachments of the concentration-camps” (Sydnor, 1990:259). Some camp 
commanders recalled that their men were sent off to the Waffen-SS divisions. From 
Auschwitz at least 2500 were sent between 1940 and 1943, and from Sachsenhausen 
between 1942 and 1945 some 1500 were sent (Stein, 1966). Former camp inmate 
Helmut Bickel had this to say about the interchange of SS soldiers to the camps and 
their character. 
I can only compare the actions of the SS men who came to us from the front lines and those SS 
men who had never been in the front lines: all of them acted alike. The SS man who was 
assigned as a guard in a concentration-camp or as officer of the guard in a concentration-camp, 
the moment he entered that barbed-wire fence simply became a member of a group of 
murderers. In order to give an example, there was an SS-Obersturmführer who had just 
returned from front line duty and he had a small terrier and while working one of the inmates, 
a Jew, while pushing his little cart, unintentionally hit his little dog. The dog just gave a little 
yelp; that was all that happened. This SS man liked the dog so much, however, that for that 
reason, because the man had molested the little dog, he killed the inmate. That is how much he 
liked the animal and hated the human being. That was not his character. That was simply the 
outstanding position which he held and where he had power over life and death of the inmates. 
For the SS men it was the sacred duty towards the Führer to kill an inmate as brutally as 
possible. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:785) 
 
 An in-depth examination of personal files of over 950 SS officers who served in the 
camp system was conducted by MacLean (1999a), and it would seem to refute the 
testimony of Hausser regarding there being no links between the Waffen-SS and the 
camp system. This examination revealed that over 43 per cent of all concentration-
camp officers had served in the Waffen-SS fighting units either before or after their 
service at the camps (MacLean, 1999a). Yet despite the fact that a multitude of 
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officers from the camp system had served in the Waffen-SS, senior officers such as 
Hausser still attempted to distance the Waffen-SS when questioned by the defence for 
the SS at Nuremberg: 
HERR PELCKMANN: The Prosecution asserts that the Waffen-SS was only a part of the whole 
SS organisation and that as such it was needed for the carrying through of the joint criminal 
conspiracy. Please comment on this.  
HAUSSER: I believe that it can be gathered from all of my testimony that the Waffen-SS was a 
completely independent unit and connected with other organisations only through the person 
of Heinrich Himmler. This separation of the various branches was undoubtedly intensified 
during the war. Therefore, we could not have harboured common criminal plans with the 
others or participated in carrying them through.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:367) 
 
Hausser went as far as to claim that “… There were neither official nor personal 
relations with the Death's-Head units, which had the task of guarding the 
concentration-camps” (The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:360). Indeed 
it has been suggested by some ex-Waffen-SS veterans that Himmler was careful to try 
and keep the Waffen-SS separate from the camps for the sake of its image and also 
the to avoid the soldiers confronting matters that “… they could not understand or 
judge” (Reitlinger, 1957:265).  
 
At least one author attempts to portray the Waffen-SS as being innocent and only 
victims by association with the concentration-camp guards, “…  they carried the same 
pay books, they wore the same uniform as the true Waffen-SS which, with its fighting 
formations at the front, had never been implicated in the terror regime of the 
concentration-camps” (Hohne, 1969). This is clearly not the case, as I will show 
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evidence that the Waffen-SS were involved in, and had knowledge of, the camp 
system.  
 
During the preparation for his television documentary for the Thames television 
company on the SS, author Andrew Mollo came across this denial of association. He 
had contacted SS-Obersturmbannführer Richard Schulze-Kossens84 for the purpose of 
an interview; Kossens had been an officer in the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and 
was also the Waffen-SS adjutant to Hitler for part of the war. Schulze-Kossens was 
briefly the commander of the 39th SS Grenadier Division Nibelungen, the last Waffen-
SS division formed before the end of the war (Westwood, 2001; Williamson & 
Andrew, 2004c). Upon finding out that the television series was to cover all aspects of 
the SS, including the camps, Schulze-Kossens had this to say: 
If this report is correct, I must inform you that I am not prepared to give an interview which 
begins with the events in the concentration-camps, which will inevitably stir up feelings against 
the SS. As an officer of the former Waffen-SS I am not interested in allowing myself to be 
defamed again in England if our troops are again to be associated with the events in the 
concentration-camps. Our statements which would distance us from such events would only 
create the impression of a cover-up … I want to take this opportunity to say how deeply it would 
offend me to have our troops portrayed once again as a sort of “soldateska” who committed a 
string of war crimes…  (Mollo, 1982:2) 
 
This is a crucial argument raised by many Waffen-SS apologists; that they were in 
fact separate from the camp system and had nothing to do with the personnel of the 
system and had no knowledge of the crimes committed therein. Indeed, even some 
                                                 
84 Schulze changed his name after the war to Schulze-Kossens. 
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authors, such as Lucas state: “Survivors of the Waffen-SS claim that few of them ever 
saw a concentration-camp or guarded one” (Lucas, 1991:37).  At Nuremberg Hausser 
argued the following: 
HERR PELCKMANN: To what extent were the crimes in concentration-camps, such as the 
extermination of the Jews, known to the Waffen-SS? I should like you to remember that you 
speak not only for yourself as a highly placed general, but that you also speak for the simple SS 
man, based on your own experience, of course.  
HAUSER: It sounds quite unlikely, and foreign countries do not wish to believe that the 
members of the Waffen-SS as well as myself knew nothing of the crimes of which we have heard 
here. This perhaps may serve as an explanation: At home only those who had victims in the 
concentration-camps learned, anything about them; only the ever-present secret opposition 
spread stories and rumours. This was kept from the SS man. If he happened to hear something 
by chance, he thought that it was hostile propaganda. Foreign radio broadcasts or newspapers 
were unknown to him for they were forbidden at home. The bulk of the Waffen-SS was facing 
the enemy. The war tasks grew from year to year and the efforts became more intense. The SS 
man did not have the time or opportunity to check rumours, and like myself he was surprised 
and indignant about all these things which Himmler had done contrary to what he had 
preached to us in peacetime.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:369) 
 
I will present clear evidence that it would have been almost impossible for officers 
such as Hausser not to be aware of what was going on in the camps. As well as 
administrative ties there were also personnel links between the camps and the Waffen-
SS. Camp officers served throughout the divisions of the Waffen-SS including the 
divisions commanded by Hausser such as Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, Das Reich 
and the Totenkopf divisions (MacLean, 1999a). These camp officers served in every 
division of the Waffen-SS except for the 28th SS Division Wallonien, 37th SS Division 
Lutzow and the 38th SS Division Nibelungen (MacLean, 1999a). Examples of this 
interaction are not hard to find, for instance Hilmar Wackerle became the first 
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commandant of Dachau in 1933. He later went on to serve in the 5th SS Wiking 
Division until being killed at Lvov in Poland in 1941 (MacLean, 1999a; Segev, 1987). 
Otto Foerschner was an SS-Sturmbannführer who served in the 5th SS Wiking 
Division and later went on to command the Dora sub-camp at Buchenwald (MacLean, 
1999a; Segev, 1987). He was executed on the 28th of May 1946. This lack of distance 
between the two groups is supported by the observation that: 
… the total separation between the battlefield units of the Waffen-SS and even more sinister 
organisations such as the Einsatzgruppen and the Totenkopfverbände85  a separation of which 
post-war apologists make much – does not stand up to detailed examination, there was a 
division, but it was somewhat porous.  (Windrow & Burn, 1982:6). 
 
Further to this “… not only did hundreds serve in the front line Waffen-SS divisions, 
but six former concentration-camp officers also rose to become divisional 
commanders in the Waffen-SS” (MacLean, 1999a). It was not the case that these 
officers just served at the minor labour camps, rather many of them served at the 
major extermination camps such as Auschwitz, Sobibor, Belzec, Belsen, Dachau and 
Mauthausen, etc (MacLean, 1999a). Yet despite the fact that officers with knowledge 
of the atrocities that were being committed in the camps were woven throughout the 
fighting units of the Waffen-SS, senior  Waffen-SS officers such as Hausser claimed 
no knowledge of the activities of the concentration-camps. 
 
Just as with the Einsatzgruppen, the Waffen-SS used transfers between the front-line 
units and the camps as a form of punishment. SS-Obersturmbannführer Karl 
                                                 
85 Death’s Head formations, armed full-time component of the SS during pre-war period, tasked with 
guarding concentration-camps and political prisons. 
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Kuenstler is an example of this type of treatment. As commandant of the Flossenburg 
concentration-camp he came into disrepute due to his drinking, as a result he was 
transferred to the 7th SS Prinz Eugen Division where he was later killed during 
combat duties (MacLean, 1999a; Segev, 1987). Hans Maubach was an SS officer on 
the staff of SSPF Odilo Globocnik in Lublin and had an intimate knowledge of the 
killing camps through the administrative role he played on the staff of the SSPF. In 
October 1941 he had a falling out with Globocnik and was sent to the Waffen-SS 
were he served in the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (Poprzeczny, 2004). There were 
other reasons for sending officers from the front to the camps and vice versa. These 
included incapacitation by injury, incompetence and specific expertise that could be 
utilised in the camp system (Sydnor, 1973). 
 
Hausser was not alone in his claim of lack of knowledge of the camps. Waffen-SS 
officer, Robert Brill, who served in the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and also at the 
Waffen-SS training centre, gave the following testimony: 
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you contend that the Waffen-SS did not participate in the 
killings in the concentration-camps?  
BRILL: I said that I and countless comrades of the Waffen-SS knew nothing about them. The 
defendant’s counsel told me that killings were carried out. I did not deny it.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:352) 
 
Note that Brill does not deny what occurred in the camps, but merely not having 
knowledge of such actions. Brill seems to be unaware of the fact that at least 16 
officers from the camp system served in the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. The list 
below of officers and the Waffen-SS divisions they served in render such claims 
regarding this lack of knowledge as ridiculous. 
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No. Name of Division Number of 
camp officers 
1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler 16 
2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich 39 
3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf 159 
4th SS Panzergrenadier Division SS-Polizei 29 
5th SS Panzer Division Wiking 45 
6th SS Gebirgs Division Nord 57 
7th SS Freiwilligen-Gerbirgs Division Prinz Eugen 23 
8th SS Kavallerie Division Florian Geyer 28 
9th  SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen 22 
10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg 20 
11th SS Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier Division Nordland 12 
12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend 6 
13th Waffen-Gebirgs Division Der SS (Kroatische NR1) Handschar 9 
14th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS (Ukrainische NR 1) 5 
15th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS (Lettische NR 1) 5 
16th SS Panzergrenadier Division Reichsführer-SS 17 
17th SS Panzergrenadier Division Gőtz Von Berlichingen 15 
18th SS Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier Division Horst Wessel 7 
19th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS (Lettisches NR 2) 3 
20th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS (Estnische NR 1) 7 
21st Waffen-Gebirgs Division Der SS (Albanische NR1) Skanderberg 4 
22nd Freiwilligen-Kavallerie Division Der SS Maria Theresia 3 
23rd Waffen-Gebirgs Division Der SS Kama later to become Panzer 
division Nederland 
5 
24th SS Gebirgs Division Karstjager 1 
25th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS (Ungarische NR1) Hunyadi 2 
26th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS (Ungarische NR 2) Hungaria 3 
27th SS Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier Division (Flamische NR 1) 
Langemarck 
5 
28th SS Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier Division Wallonien 0 
29th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division Der (Russische NR 1) later to become 
the (Italienische NR 1) 
3 
30th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division Der (Weissruthensche NR 1) 2 
31st SS Freiwilligen-Grenadier Division 2 
32nd SS Freiwilligen-Grenadier Division 30 Januar  
33rd Waffen-Kavallerie Division Der SS (Ungarische NR 3) later to 
become Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS (Franzosische NR 1) 
Charlemagne 
1 
34th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS Landstorm Nederland 6 
35th SS Polizei Grenadier Division 1 
36th Waffen-Grenadier Division Der SS 7 
37th Freiwilligen-Kavallerie Division Lűtzow 0 
38th SS Grenadier Division Nibelungen 0 
 (MacLean, 1999a:282)  
 
The concentration-camp system was just too big, and the Waffen-SS too closely 
entwined for the soldiers of the Waffen-SS not to have known about the activities that 
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were going on there. For instance, SS-Obersturmbannführer Jochen Peiper was a 
leading figure in the Waffen-SS. Many would say that he was the epitome of the 
Waffen-SS, officer being resourceful, tough and brutal. He would rise to prominence 
in the public eye after the war when brought to trial for the massacre at Malmedy in 
Belgium of American soldiers. From November 1939 he performed the role of 
military adjutant to Himmler before going to become one of the most well-known 
officers of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. Although not directly associated with 
the camps, there is no doubt that he had knowledge of the camps and their function: 
As personal adjutant he would have been privy to virtually everything in Himmler’s office and 
he could not have failed to be aware of Hitler’s and Himmler’s policies for ethnic cleansing of 
the Greater Reich, the organisation and establishment of concentration-camps and the overall 
policy for the genocide of the Jewish race. Indeed, there is photographic evidence of Peiper with 
Himmler at Mauthausen during a visit to this, the most deadly of all the existing concentration-
camps, at the end of May 1941.  (Reynolds, 2002:27) 
 
His case highlights the fact that as well as those directly involved in the camps system 
there would have been hundreds of Waffen-SS soldiers involved in the administration 
or supply of such a system. In addition to these officers who actually served in the 
fighting divisions of the Waffen-SS, in excess of 50 SS officers also served in other 
Waffen-SS non-divisional organisations such as corps headquarters, independent 
regiments, etc (MacLean, 1999a).  
 
Economic links between the camps and the Waffen-SS 
In April 1941 Himmler issued a directive that instructed all existing concentration-
camps were for economic and administrative reasons to be listed as part of the 
Waffen-SS establishment (Hohne, 1969; Stein, 1966). Further reorganisation of the 
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SS departments took place in 1942 which “… clearly combined the two (the 
Police/Waffen-SS and the SS/Party) and placed the concentration-camps … within 
one unified economic administration for Police, Waffen-SS and General SS” (Koehl, 
1983:171).  
 
So not only was there a link in personnel, but also a link along administrative and 
economic lines. This was indicated by the evidence given by Waffen-SS officer Brill 
when confronted with a report by the Rusian prosecutor Mr Smirnov, outlining the 
usage of seven tons of human hair taken from 140,000 female prisoners at the 
Auschwitz camp (Document number USSR-511). The letter was sent from Waffen-SS 
General Glucks to the various camps administrations: 
The chief of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office, SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl, on 
the basis of a report submitted to him, has ordered that all human hair cut in concentration-
camps be appropriately utilised. Human hair is to be used for the manufacture of industrial felt 
and to be spun into yarn. Out of combed and cut hair of women, hair-yarn socks for U-boat 
crews are to be made, as well as hair-felt stockings for employees of the Reich railways … The 
hair gathered in all the camps will be utilised by creating a special production unit in one of the 
concentration-camps. More detailed instructions as to the delivery of the collected hair will be 
given separately. Reports on amount of hair gathered each month, male and female recorded 
separately, must be submitted on the 5th of each month, beginning with 5 September 1942. 
Signed: Glucks, SS-Brigadeführer and Major-General of the Waffen-SS.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:353) 
 
Brill is then questioned about Waffen-SS involvement in the camp system. 
MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Now, Witness, I would like you to look at the stamp. Do you 
see this stamp? It says, “Waffen-SS Commandant, KL Sachsenhausen.” Do you still assert that 
the command of the camps was not composed of the Waffen-SS?  
BRILL: Yes. I will explain that. The commands of the Waffen--SS-the commands of the 
concentration-camps were officially on the budget of the Waffen-SS… 
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MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So they were on the budget of the Waffen-SS, were they not?  
BRILL: I said they were on the budget of the Waffen-SS. For economic reasons it was necessary 
that the commands, in their dealings with the Reich, operate under the name of an 
organisation, which had the possibility of working with Reich funds and with the Reich 
authorities.   
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:353) 
 
Brill attempts to discount this link between the camps and the Waffen-SS as being of 
no importance, it was merely economic and administrative; but none-the-less they are 
linked. Camps like the one at Majdanek were designed hold prisoners who would “… 
work for industries owned by the SS and operated primarily for the benefit of the SS, 
in accordance with Himmler’s plans to make Lublin the industrial centre of an SS 
empire” (White, 1990:10). Like any military organisation the Waffen-SS could not 
have functioned without economic support and administrative support. Himmler 
himself espoused how the camps would be used to the economic and material benefit 
of the Waffen-SS. Examples of the economic links between the Waffen-SS and the 
camp system are not hard to find. SS clothing works were set up in the camps in 
Lublin. These acted as subsidiary of the main Waffen-SS clothing workshops at 
Ravensbruck concentration-camp (Arad, 1987; White, 1990). Indeed the camp at 
Majdanek was “…  intended to produce supplies necessary to feed, clothe, house, 
fuel, transport and arm the SS” (White, 1990:13). 
 
In April 1943 he made a speech to officers of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler at 
Metz. Himmler explained how the SS would benefit from the work in the camps 
(document 1918-PS): 
The apartment-building program, which is the prerequisite for a healthy and social basis of the 
entire SS, as well as of the entire leadership corps, can be carried out only when I get the money 
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for it from somewhere. Nobody is going to give me the money. It must be earned, and it will be 
earned by forcing the scum of mankind, the prisoners, the professional criminals, to do positive 
work. The man guarding those prisoners serves harder than the one on close-order drill. The 
one who does this and stands near these utterly negative people will learn within three to four 
months-and we shall see. In peacetime, I shall form guard battalions and put them on duty for 
three months only. They will learn to fight the inferior beings; and this will not be a boring 
guard duty, but if the officers handle it right, it will be the best indoctrination on inferior beings 
and inferior races … This in turn is necessary because we stand or die with this leading blood of 
Germany; and if the good blood is not reproduced, we will not be able to rule the world.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:202) 
 
Again Himmler is clearly outlining racial and ideological messages. Of note is 
Himmler again goes to lengths to state how the role of the camp guard is just as 
important and perhaps more onerous than that of the fighting SS soldier, this again 
being a message used by him to forge the SS into one organic body.  
 
The camps were run with chilling economic efficiency. At Nuremberg a report 
(document D-960) was tabled that clearly shows the callousness with which human 
life was treated. It was put to SS-Oberführer Gunther Reinecke, who was chief judge 
of the Supreme SS and Police court. It clearly shows the link between the camps and 
the Waffen-SS. 
Waffen-SS, Natzweiler Concentration-camp, Commander's office, 24 March 1943. 
Bill to the Security Police and SD, Strasbourg. 
For the 20 prisoners executed and cremated in this concentration-camp, costs amounting to 
127,05 Reichsmark arose. The Commander’s office of the Natzweiler Concentration-camp 
requests the early payment of the above-mentioned sum. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:459) 
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This economic wrangling over the costs to be born for the destruction of human lives 
is also clearly illustrated in a letter from the President of the Reich Research 
Department to the Reich Finance Minister relating to whether the SS is entitled to 
payments for experiments conducted on camp prisoners (document 002-PS): 
The Reich Surgeon SS and Police, in a personal discussion, told me that the budget claim, 
which he looked after, is used primarily in the pure military sector of the Waffen-SS. Since it is 
established on a smaller scale for the enlarging of scientific research possibilities, they pertain 
exclusively to such affairs, which are carried out with the material (prisoners), which is only 
accessible to the Waffen-SS and are therefore not to be undertaken by any other experimental 
office. I cannot object therefore on behalf of the Reich Research Council against the budget 
claim of the Reich Surgeon SS and Police. The letter is signed, “Mentzel, Ministerial Director.” 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:210) 
 
Reports such as the above clearly show both the type of actions being undertaken in 
the camps and the administrative and economic links the Waffen-SS had with such.  
 
Not only were there the personnel links in regards to the camps, but there was also the 
issue of property and material taken from the Jews and others who were evacuated to 
the camps. The Waffen-SS were clear beneficiaries from the concentration-camp 
system. War records of the Totenkopf Division indicate that they received numerous 
supplies from the workshops of the camps such as Dachau and Oranienburg (Sydnor, 
1973). On the 13th of May 1943 SS-Obergruppenführer Frank wrote to Himmler and 
informed him of the “… utilisation of Jewish concealed and stolen goods” 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:709). In the letter Frank suggests that 
some of the property, in particular men’s watches, be distributed in the following 
manner. 
I suggest to distribute the repaired men's watches as follows: 
  306 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
(a) Each combat division receives immediately — 500 items, beginning 1 October 1943, 
“Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”, once more 500 items, division “Das Reich”, “Totenkopf Division”, 
(once received already 500 watches each). 
(b) The submarine service receives immediately 3000 items beginning 1 October 1943, once 
more 3000 items. 
(c) Concentration-camps receive for squads on outside duty, guard-commanders etc, according 
to the decision of the commandant, 200 items. This is a total of about 25,000 watches; 
remainder 2,000 items. 
Fountain pens — Each combat division receives 300 items; the submarine service receives 
2000 items; remainder 1500 items.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:710) 
 
Waffen-SS units received winter clothing that had been confiscated in the camps and 
ghettos in the East. These units included the Leibstandarte and Totenkopf Divisions 
(Reitlinger, 1957; Sydnor, 1990; Weingartner, 1974). Here is conclusive proof that 
the Waffen-SS were beneficiaries of the looting that was being done of the Jewish 
populations. One would wonder what the 500 soldiers of the Leibstandarte thought 
when they received 500 watches with Jewish names inscribed on the back? In his 
reply on the 3rd of December 1943 Himmler agreed with the distribution of watches 
but added the following: 
The Reich Leader SS has agreed that you, according to your proposition, distribute pocket 
watches, wristwatches and fountain pens among the individual divisions. He merely requests 
that the police division should not receive 700 pocket watches, but only 500. Those 200 
watches are to be distributed, 100 watches each, among the divisions, “The Reich”, and 
“Death’s Head.” I have reported to the Reich Leader SS immediately because I thought that 
would be better that you suggested to put the watches and fountain pens in his name at the 
disposal of the divisions for the yuletide celebration.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:713) 
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The Waffen-SS undertook the administration of the camps and ensured that its rigid 
discipline code was enforced, as can be seen from the letter from two Waffen-SS 
Generals (document 2189-PS). It is dated the 11th of August 1942 and is from SS-
Brigadeführer Glucks, on behalf of SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl, to the commandants 
of the concentration-camps. 
The Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered that punishment by beating 
will be executed in concentration-camps for women by prisoners under the ordered 
supervision. In order to co-ordinate this order the Main Office Chief SS of the Economic 
Administration, SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Waffen-SS Pohl, has ordered, 
effective immediately, that punishment by beating will also be executed by prisoners in 
concentration-camps for men. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:201) 
 
There was little mercy from the Waffen-SS soldiers for those camp inmates who 
could no longer function or committed minor infractions. For example, Waffen-SS 
soldiers executed prisoners during evacuation marches from the Hersbruck 
concentration-camp to Dachau and shot one prisoner for daring to steal a potato86 
(Ruter & de Mildt, 2004: Vol 6). 
 
The links between the medical experiments and the Waffen-SS 
In a post-war interview SS General Karl Wolff claims: 
Never would I have thought; it never occurred to us that we might arrogantly talk about 
exterminating anybody who didn’t happen to have been born with the right skin or who was 
culturally inferior to us, or was undesirable.  (Bloomberg, 2000). 
 
                                                 
86 FR case 223. 
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Yet in a letter to the State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Transportation Wolff 
expressed his thanks for the assistance being given in transporting the Jews to the 
extermination camps. This document formed part of the prosecution evidence during 
the Pohl Trial, and reads as below: 
Thank you very much, also in the name of the Reich Leader SS, for your letter of 28 July 1942. I 
was especially pleased to learn from you that already for a fortnight a daily train; taking 5000 
members of the Chosen People every time, had gone to Treblinka… I have contacted the 
departments concerned myself, so that the smooth carrying out of all these measures seems to 
be guaranteed. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:777) 
 
When this was put to Wolff, who up to that point had denied any knowledge of the 
actions in the camps, he had the following to say: 
I admit without any reservation that this had slipped from my memory. However, it is not 
possible for a human being to remember every letter which I wrote during a number of years. I 
gave the answers according to the best of my belief and knowledge and to the best of my 
recollection. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:778) 
 
During the Pohl Case, Wolff was questioned in relation to his knowledge of the 
actions taking place at the camps and elsewhere: 
Q. Well, did you ever hear about Russians and Poles, who were not Jews, being exterminated 
and killed, did you ever hear about that?  
A. No. I have never heard anything about extermination. I know that in the cases of combating 
partisans, and in cases of attempts at life, harsh measures were taken and people would be shot, 
but what your Honour is probably referring to is systematic and planned extermination. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:681) 
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This is the same SS general who was convicted after the war of being responsible for 
the deaths of 300,000 Jews at Treblinka and for the conduct of medical experiments at 
the Dachau concentration-camp (Gutman, 1990).  
 
It would seem that Wolff was not surprised, however, when he signed off on many of 
the reports from the concentration-camps outlining the deaths of the culturally inferior 
or the disposal of property taken from camp inmates to SS formations. Film footage 
of the period shows Wolff visiting a concentration-camp near Minsk in 1941 looking 
anything but surprised as he toured the concentration-camp with Himmler looking at 
the camp inmates 
consisting mainly 
of Russian POWs 
(Bloomberg, 
2000). Wolff can 
be seen to the 
right of Himmler. 
This is the same 
SS general who 
had knowledge of and assisted with the administration of the cruel and abhorrent 
medical experiments being conducted at Dachau, that resulted in inmates being 
subjected to fatal cold weather and high-pressure experiments. At Nuremberg a letter 
was produced which shows complicity of Wolff and the senior Waffen-SS 
administration beyond doubt (document 343-PS). It is from Luftwaffe Field-Marshal 
Milch to Wolff thanking him and the SS for their assistance in conducting the 
experiments. 
Himmler with SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Karl Wolff 
(far right) visiting a concentration camp.
 
Himmler with SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Karl Wolff 
(far right) visiting a concentration camp.
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Dear Wolff 
In reference to your telegram of 12 May, our sanitary inspector reports to me that the altitude 
experiments carried out by the SS and Air Force at Dachau have been finished. Any 
continuation of these experiments seems not to be necessary. However, the carrying out of 
experiments of some other kind, in regard to perils on the high seas, would be important … The 
low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these low-temperature experiments. It is 
urgently needed at another place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau. I convey the 
special thanks from the Supreme Commander of the Air Corps to the SS for their extensive co-
operation. I remain with best wishes for you in good comradeship and with Heil Hitler! Always 
yours, E. Milch. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:204) 
 
Himmler himself later wrote to Milch and begged him to allow the doctor responsible 
for these terrible experiments, Dr. Rascher, to be transferred to the Waffen-SS so that 
experiments in relation to frost-bite, etc could be carried out. The Medical Case 
revealed that Waffen-SS doctors participated in a number of experiments involving 
camp inmates as human guinea pigs for issues such as freezing, incendiary explosive 
injuries, poison, malaria, mustard gas, jaundice, bone and nerve transplants and 
regeneration and typhus, etc. Without going into the detail of such it is sufficient to 
say that they were held to be the most grave of crimes against humanity by the 
tribunal, which resulted in the deaths of thousands of camp inmates (Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 1).  
 
These experiments included shooting prisoners in the leg with an infected or poisoned 
bullet and then calmly watching them as they died an agonising death. The below is 
an excerpt of a report prepared by the Reich Surgeon for the SS and Police (document 
L-103). I have included the letter in full as I think it is important to understand the 
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callous way in which the SS undertook these experiments. The SS doctors reported on 
how they shot prisoners with poisoned bullets” 
On 11 September 1944, in the presence of SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Ding, Dr. Widmann, and 
the undersigned, experiments with aconite nitrate bullets were carried out on five persons who 
had been sentenced to death. The calibre of the bullets used was 7.65 millimetres, and they 
were filled with poison in crystal form. Each subject of the experiment received one shot in the 
upper part of the left thigh, while in a horizontal position.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:208) 
 
The SS Doctor then goes on to outline in great deal the fatal sufferings of the 
prisoners: 
In the case of two persons, the bullets passed clean through the upper part of the thigh. Even 
later no effect from the poison could be seen. These two subjects were therefore rejected. The 
symptoms shown by the three condemned persons were surprisingly the same. At first, nothing 
special was noticeable. After 20 to 25 minutes, a disturbance of the motor nerves and a light 
flow of saliva began, but both stopped again. After 40 to 44 minutes, a strong flow of saliva 
appeared. The poisoned persons swallowed frequently; later the flow of saliva is so strong that 
it can no longer be controlled by swallowing. Foamy saliva flows from the mouth. Then a 
sensation of choking and vomiting starts. At the same time there was pronounced nausea. One 
of the poisoned persons tried in vain to vomit. In order to succeed he put four fingers of his 
hand, up to the main joint, right into his mouth. In spite of this, no vomiting occurred. His face 
became quite red. The faces of the other two subjects were already pale at an early stage. Other 
symptoms were the same. Later on the disturbances of the motor nerves increased so much 
that the persons threw themselves up and down, rolled their eyes, and made aimless 
movements with their hands and arms. At last the disturbance subsided, the pupils were 
enlarged to the maximum, the condemned lay still. Rectal cramps and loss of urine was 
observed in one of them. Death occurred 121, 123 and 129 minutes after they were shot. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:208) 
 
It may seem hard to comprehend how doctors, supposed to save life, could in fact take 
it in such abhorrent circumstances. One SS doctor, Hans Munch, who served at 
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Auschwitz, gave this insight in a post-war interview as to the SS psyche and their 
racist views, “… that was their religion, they believed that by eliminating the Jews 
they were not only improving Germany, but also the whole world” (Halliley, 2003). 
 
It is of interest that the camps served as a training ground for Waffen-SS medical 
staff, with some 152 Waffen-SS medical staff having served in one or more camps 
(MacLean, 1999a). Johannes Kremer was a SS-Obersturmführer in the Waffen-SS 
reserve.87 He held a doctorate and was also a doctor of medicine. In 1942 he received 
orders to proceed to the Auschwitz concentration-camp where he kept meticulous 
diaries as to the events that occurred there (Weitz, 2003a). He attended his first action 
and recorded the following diary entry: 
… 3.00AM attended my first Sonderatkion (gassing of camp inmates). Dante’s inferno seems to 
me almost a comedy compared to this. They don’t call Auschwitz the extermination camp for 
nothing. (Weitz, 2003a). 
 
Kremer later relates how he selected inmates from the camp sick bay, administered 
them a lethal injection and then used their organs for research (Weitz, 2003a).  
 
Another example of Waffen-SS involvement is that SS officers from the Main 
Hygienic Office of the Waffen-SS were responsible introduction of Zyklon B gas as 
the main instrument of killing in the camps (Arad, 1987). In the Medical case88 before 
the Nuremberg Tribunal, of the 23 defendants indicted in this case, some seven were 
members of the Waffen-SS. 
                                                 
87 Note that Maclean lists no Waffen-SS service for Kremer. 
 
88 Case number 1 before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, also known as the Medical Case. 
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• KARL BRANDT — Personal physician to Adolf Hitler; SS-Gruppenführer and 
General-Leutnant in the Waffen-SS; Reich Commissioner for Health and Sanitation 
and member of the Reich Research Council.  
•  KARL GENZKEN — SS-Gruppenführer and General-Leutnant in the Waffen-SS; and 
Chief of the Medical Department of the Waffen-SS. 
• KARL GEBHARDT – SS-Gruppenführer in the SS and General-Leutnant in the 
Waffen-SS; personal physician to Reichsführer-SS Himmler; Chief Surgeon of the 
Staff of the Reich Physician SS and Police and President of the German Red Cross. 
• JOACHIM MRUGOWSKY — SS-Oberführer in the Waffen-SS: Chief Hygienist of the 
Reich Physician SS and Police and Chief of the Hygienic Institute of the Waffen SS. 
• VIKTOR BRACK — SS-Oberführer in the SS and SS-Sturmbannführer in the Waffen-
SS; and Chief Administrative Officer in the Chancellery of the Fuehrer of the NSDAP. 
• FRITZ FISCHER — SS-Sturmbannführer in the Waffen-SS; and Assistant Physician 
to the defendant Gebhardt at the Hospital at Hohenlychen. 
• WALDEMAR HOVEN — SS-Hauptsturmführer in the Waffen-SS: and Chief Doctor of 
the Buchenwald Concentration-camp. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 1:8) 
 
All were found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Brandt, Gebhardt, 
Mrugowsky, Brack and Hoven were sentenced to hang, while the others were 
sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. 
 
Other crimes linking the camps and the Waffen-SS 
Many of the concentration-camp officers saw themselves at “… first and foremost 
soldiers”, indeed up to two-thirds of concentration-camp officers had some kind of 
military background (Segev, 1987:60). Of note is that MacLean’s analysis is only 
concerned with officers who actually served in front-line Waffen-SS units. He does 
not take into account officers of the Waffen-SS who did not complete active military 
service at the front. These officers included the likes of SS-Hauptsturmführer Amon 
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Goeth and SS-Standartenführer Franz Ziereis, who were both members of the 
Waffen-SS. The case of Ziereis has previously been mentioned, so let us examine the 
actions of Goeth. Goeth, who was commander of the Cracow concentration-camp, 
was tried after the war in Poland89 and hung in 1946 (MacLean, 1999a; The United 
Nations War Crime Commission, 1946). He was found guilty of the murder of 8000 
inmates at the Cracow camp, the liquidation of the Cracow ghetto, which resulted in 
the deaths of 2000 people, the closing down of the Tarnow ghetto and the sending of 
the survivors to Auschwitz and the closing down of the forced labour camp at 
Szebnie, which resulted in the deaths of several thousand people (The United Nations 
War Crime Commission, 1946 Vol 7:1).  Goeth used to go, 
… on to the balcony of his villa in the morning with a rifle and binoculars and scan the 
campground. When he saw a prisoner doing something that displeased him – pushing a cart 
too slowly, standing rather than moving, or committing some other unfathomable crime, he 
would shoot the prisoner. (Staub, 1989) 
 
It is beyond belief to try and state that despite the fact that hundreds of officers from 
the camp system were in daily service with the units of the Waffen-SS, the Waffen-SS 
were not aware of the crimes that had and were being committed. SS-
Sturmbannführer Per Sorenson, commander of the 24th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment 
Danmark, recounted how during his officer training for the Waffen-SS he and others 
were taken on an excursion of the Dachau concentration-camp and of a mental asylum 
to reinforce the ideological and racial messages of the SS (Smith et al., 1999). Indeed 
the actual existence of the concentration-camps could hardly be denied by certain 
units, when, for example, all new officers of the Leibstandarte received their tactical 
                                                 
89 Case Number 37, Volume VII. 
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training in the same area as the Dachau concentration-camp (Reynolds, 1999:3). The 
24th Waffen-SS Division Karstjager was formed in 1942 using the SS training camp 
at Dachau (Nafziger, 2001).   
 
In addition to this a number of Waffen-SS atrocities have been catalogued since the 
end of the war. I have included just a few of these. On the 3rd of November 1943 
Operation Harvest Festival was commenced. This resulted in the shooting of some 
42,000 inmates of the Majdanek concentration-camp by units of the Waffen-SS 
(Arad, 1987; Scheffler, 1985; White, 1990). These executions were not allowed to be 
carried out by the camp personnel, rather “… but were carried out by Police and 
Waffen-SS units brought from other areas of the General Government for this purpose 
alone” (Scheffler, 1985:45).  
 
In April 1945 racial German recruits of the Waffen-SS, who were from an armoured 
warfare school, were seen to be indiscriminately shooting the inmates of the Belsen 
concentration-camp (Reitlinger, 1957:266). Waffen-SS soldiers were convicted of 
shooting prisoners during an evacuation march from the Hersbruck concentration-
camp to the Dachau concentration-camp90 (Ruter & de Mildt, 2004: Vol 6). A soldier 
of the 11th SS Infantry Regiment was found guilty of shooting Jews at a detainment 
camp near Radom in Poland91 (Ruter & de Mildt, 2004: Vol 6). Soldiers of the 
Ukrainian 14th Waffen SS Division were involved in the “… shooting of Soviet 
prisoners of war at Szebnie, the liquidation of Poles, Gypsies and Jews in the town of 
                                                                                                                                            
 
90 FR case 223. 
91 FR case 247. 
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Moderowka and the reinforcement of German units guarding the concentration-camp 
at Szebnie” (Littman, 2003:73).  
 
Soldiers of the SS Gotz Von Berlichingen Division were convicted of shooting foreign 
concentration-camp prisioners as the war drew to a close92 (Ruter & de Mildt, 2004: 
Vol 3). Members of the Das Reich division shot Jewish camp inmates and a Russian 
POW near Melk in Austria in 194593 (Ruter & de Mildt, 2004: Vol 26). These 
examples serve to illustrate the involvement of the Waffen-SS in the crimes 
committed in the camp system. 
 
Conclusion 
It can be seen beyond doubt that the Waffen-SS perpetrated some of the worst 
atrocities of World War II. Most of these were committed on the Eastern Front in the 
whirlwind of the brutal campaign there. It was on the Eastern Front that the Waffen-
SS gave full vent to their ideological and political crusade to create an Aryan utopia 
and rid it of undesirable elements. 
 
While not examining every minute action carried out by the Waffen-SS, I believe I 
have shown that the conduct of the Waffen-SS in committing atrocities can be 
considered systemic. They were involved in atrocities in combat; they were involved 
in the Einsatzgruppen and their deadly campaigns of mobile genocide. They 
conducted themselves with utter brutality in the fight against partisans, and last but 
                                                 
92 FR case 111. 
93 FR case 649. 
  317 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
not least, they were irrevocably entwined in the twisted terror that was the 
concentration-camp system and its associated genocide. One can safely say, simple 
soldiers they were not. We have seen what the Waffen-SS did; I must now address the 
next crucial question, why did they do it? 
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CH A P T E R  5:  AN  AN A LY S I S  O F T H E  
WA F F E N -SS 
 
“Soldaten wie die anderen auch” 
Just soldiers like the others. This is the claim made by veterans of the Waffen-SS and 
their supporters. In 1953 West German Chancellor Konrad Adenuaer uttered these 
very words in describing the Waffen-SS (Simpson, 1990; Stein, 1966). Legitimacy 
was lent to the Waffen-SS claim of innocence when US President Ronald Reagan 
visited a war cemetery containing Waffen-SS graves in an effort to “… put the past to 
rest” (Large, 1987:82). Veterans continue to claim that they were no different to the 
other armed forces of Germany during the war. Das Reich Division veteran, SS-
Obersturmbannführer Otto Weidinger stated in his history of the Der Führer 
Regiment; “… the truth will be served by the statement that the soldiers of the 
Waffen-SS and the Der Führer Regiment in particular never considered themselves a 
special force or guard. All felt that they were just German soldiers” (Weidinger, 
1998:20). Weidinger neglects to mention that he joined the Nazis in 1933 and served 
in the SS guard unit at Dachau in 1934 (Yerger, 2000). While indeed the Waffen-SS 
were German soldiers, there was a great difference between them and the members of 
the Wehrmacht as noted by Huffman: “Waffen-SS troops were the most radicalised 
and politicised troops in the German armed forces and the fanaticized military elite 
and political soldiers of Nazi Germany” (Huffman, 2005:iv) 
 
A leading spokesman for former Waffen-SS veterans, SS-Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer, 
a former commander of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, was just one of 
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many to claim the innocence of the Waffen-SS. In a speech to Waffen-SS veterans 
after the war he claimed that the Waffen-SS “… committed no crimes except the 
massacre at Oradour94 and that was the action of a single man. He was scheduled to 
go before a court martial, but he died a hero’s death before he could be tried” (Stein, 
1966:255). Through 
these efforts of former 
veterans and others the 
Waffen-SS has been 
able to gain acceptance 
despite the fact that “… 
large-scale atrocities 
continue to tarnish its 
image … the classic divisions are commonly treated as a revolutionary fighting elite” 
(Mackenzie, 1997:141).  
 
When giving evidence at Nuremberg SS Colonel SS-Oberführer Gunther Reinecke, 
who was chief judge of the Supreme SS and Police court, made the following claim in 
relation to the atrocities of the SS being systematic when questioned by the defence 
counsel for the SS. 
HERR PELCKMANN: … Did the Waffen-SS commit crimes against the civilian population in 
the occupied territories and at the front, and were these crimes committed systematically and 
in violation of international agreements, in violation of the penal law existing in the countries 
concerned, and in violation of the general principles of penal law of all civilised nations?  
                                                 
94 The massacre by Waffen-SS troops of a French village that occurred in 1944. 
Russian soldiers facing an uncertain future with 
Waffen-SS soldiers, note the female in the front 
row.
Russian soldiers facing an uncertain future with 
Waffen-SS soldiers, note the female in the front 
row.
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REINECKE: No, there can be no question of that. It is clear that on the part of the Waffen-SS 
violations of international law occurred in individual cases, just as they took place on the other 
side also. But all these were isolated occurrences and not systematic… 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:430) 
 
Reinecke is supported to some degree by comments from authors such as the 
following regarding the liability of the Waffen-SS; “The doctrine of criminal 
conspiracy and collective guilt formulated during the Nuremberg era no longer 
satisfies serious investigators” (Stein, 1966:vii). Other authors argue that the 
criminality of the Waffen-SS is not outstanding. “The Waffen-SS as a group had a 
record no worse than that of the Western Allies” (Rikmenspoel, 1999:vii). However, 
as I have shown in the last chapter the claim that the Waffen-SS did not commit 
systematic violations is bankrupt. Still “… even outside the circles of SS apologists, 
however, many Germans insist that criminal acts committed by the Waffen-SS 
personnel were exceptions to person and condition” (Koehl, 1962:278). I have had to 
take an organisational approach to the commission of acts that could be defined as 
evil rather than an individual one during this study. This approach brings with it the 
following question. Is the application of collective guilt and group responsibility 
appropriate in this case? 
 
Group Responsibility or Collective Guilt? 
Is it feasible to hold the entire Waffen-SS responsible for the evils acts committed, 
when not all of the members of the Waffen-SS were directly involved? This was just 
the proposition put forward by Lieutenant-Colonel Murray Bernays, who was a 
Jewish lawyer in the US War Department’s Special Projects Branch, which was 
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responsible for deciding how war criminals would be dealt with. Bernays argued that 
central to the plan should be the notion of collective criminality, in which the crime of 
membership would make each member of a criminal organisation liable for the acts 
committed (Ball, 1999; Van Sliedregt, 2006). This was an approach fraught with 
danger. Levinson notes, “Great difficulties emerge when one considers the question of 
criminal responsibility for actions occurring within an organisational context. If we 
wish to engage in communal condemnation, whom should the opprobrium be 
directed?” (Levinson, 1973:371). Fletcher succinctly surmises the core question in 
relation to collective guilt: 
As the fight over collective guilt is won or lost, so are larger stakes decided: Is the individual the 
ultimate unit of action and responsibility, or are we, as individuals, invariably implicated by the 
actions of the groups of which we are a part? (Fletcher, 2002:1499) 
 
The Waffen-SS was declared a criminal organisation by the IMT. However, despite 
the fact that the leadership corps of the SS was seen as criminal “… the question is 
not only whether an organisation can have a criminal purpose, but whether its 
members can be guilty by virtue of association or membership or something more is 
required?” (Bassiouni, 1999:389). I subscribe to the view put forward by Branscombe 
and Doosje that collective guilt, rather then being seen as from a legal perspective, 
should in fact: 
Focus on people’s experience of one particular group based emotional response, collective guilt. 
Collective guilt stems from the distress that group members experience when they accept that 
their in-group is responsible for immoral actions that harmed another group. (Branscombe & 
Dossje, 2004:3) 
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The notions of group responsibility and collective guilt become much more relevant 
when the crimes committed have everything to do with the group and not the 
individual. In other words, when the crimes committed are systematic, the issue of 
group accountability comes to the fore (Barkan, 2004). While the prior discussions 
have shown that the Waffen-SS did commit systematic violations of international law 
and acts that this thesis would define as evil, there is one important premise to this 
conclusion. That is that not every soldier of the Waffen-SS committed atrocities. As 
noted by Sydnor “… it would be puerile to assume the reverse of the apologist thesis; 
namely that all or a majority of the officers and men who served in the Waffen-SS 
were criminals” (Sydnor, 1973:341). In his thesis Wiggers supports this view by 
arguing the below: 
By the same token, this paper does question the wholesale classification of Waffen-SS members 
as criminals who were ideologically seduced or mentally ill, or volunteer members of a physical, 
racial and ideological elite … A careful and comprehensive analysis of the war-time Waffen-SS 
organisation, its character and activities, indicates that the picture of the criminal organisation 
presented by the prosecution at Nuremberg and post-war critics was overblown, a result of 
heightened post-war emotion, and a victim of a failed legal innovation concerning collective 
guilt. (Wiggers, 1990:178) 
 
Certainly the IMT recognised the importance of knowledge of the crimes that were 
committed, as distinct from just pure membership of the organisation being required 
to entail criminal guilt: 
A criminal organisation is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that the essence of both is co-
operation for criminal purposes. There must be a group bound together and organised for a 
common purpose. The group must be formed or used in connection with the commission of 
crimes denounced by the Charter. Since the declaration with respect to the organisations and 
groups will, as has been pointed out, fix the criminality of its members, that definition should 
exclude persons who had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the organisation and 
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those who were drafted by the state for membership, unless they were personally implicated in 
the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter as members of the 
organisation. Membership alone is not enough to come within the scope of these declarations.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 22:500) 
 
From a pure legal viewpoint the above arguments may have credence in limiting the 
ability to apportion blame or guilt to the Waffen-SS in its entirety. On the other hand, 
it must also be remembered that these acts of evil committed by the Waffen-SS were 
not just isolated events conducted by a few psychotic personalities. The crimes are 
simply too widespread and enormous in their undertaking for this to be a valid 
argument. It is beyond the scope and purpose of this thesis to conduct a full 
exploration of the nuances of collective guilt from a legal standpoint. I will, however 
touch on some issues that will justify my inclusion of the entire Waffen-SS 
membership in regards to responsibility for the actions committed by the organisation 
more from a moral than legal viewpoint.  
 
I adopt the view espoused by Fletcher in which he argues that collective 
accountability is acceptable. However, in the place of collective guilt I would 
substitute the notion of group responsibility, which I will explain shortly. 
… I will assume that collective guilt is a plausible, widely shared, and sometimes healthy 
response to collective wrongdoing. I know that this idea disturbs liberal individualists who 
think that individuals are the only conceivable unit of action. Elsewhere I have argued at length 
against this liberal postulate in favour of the view that the ideas of collective action, collective 
intention and collective guilt all have a sound grounding in Western culture. (Fletcher, 2004) 
 
The crimes committed by the Waffen-SS were spread throughout the organisation and 
its formations, they were legitimised and condoned by the command and control 
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elements of the organisation, and finally on the evidence presented, they must have 
been well-known to the majority of those serving in the Waffen-SS. The crimes were 
planned and carried out at every level of war. From the strategic level where Himmler 
and his command structures planned the genocide, to the operational level where 
divisional commanders and HSSPFs issued orders in compliance with strategic goals, 
to the tactical level where the soldiers committed the killings. With this comes the 
issue of group responsibility and collective guilt. As noted: “moral responsibility can 
attach to collectives” (Van Sliedregt, 2006:104). I would argue that the Waffen-SS 
should be held morally responsible (as against legal, criminal, or collective guilt) as a 
group. I will discuss this in depth presently, as well as the prerequisites for such 
responsibility. However, it is worth noting that “… moral responsibility ensuing from 
moral condemnation does not necessarily coincide with legal responsibility” (Van 
Sliedregt, 2006:103). My major purpose in coming to the above conclusion is that I 
am not posturing in the realm of punishment, rather I am looking to apportion 
responsibility (in this case moral rather than legal), and these are two key, but entirely 
different concepts. 
 
The major question posed is that if these persons are acting as agents for the rest of 
the group (i.e. the Waffen-SS), does it follow that Waffen-SS should also be held 
responsible for the actions of the agents?  It was this type of thought process of letting 
others act as agents that allowed many civilians in Germany to one way or another 
condone the “… dirty work…” that was being done by others (Coser, 1969:101). 
However, letting others commit the atrocities does not necessarily absolve the others 
from the dominant group from responsibility (moral rather then legal) for what is 
occurring: 
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When some major evil such as genocide is said to be committed by some large collectivity such 
as the German state, each individual German is, as it were, under a sort of moral cloud, a 
presumption that he or she probably or possibly had something to do with it. (Narveson, 
2002:188) 
 
In situations such as this there is a denial of the victim, which is created when 
individuals rationalise actions in such a way that reduces the immorality of the action 
against a certain individual (Day & Vandiver, 2000). A soldier from the 22nd Panzer 
Division serving on the Eastern Front upon seeing a train containing Jews heading to 
a concentration-camp highlights this vilification of certain groups: 
All of us had heard about concentration-camps, but the generally accepted understanding was 
that only anti-social and anti-German elements, like Communists, homosexuals, Jews, thieves, 
bible punchers, gipsies and such like were being kept there and forced to do a decent day’s work 
for the first time in their lives. (Metelmann, 2001:31) 
 
Coser (1969) argues that society is aware of roles and actions that are distasteful, yet 
society condones the acts that are completed by others. In other words, we allow 
others to act for us as agents. This I would argue was the situation in the Waffen-SS, 
the vast majority of soldiers must have been aware of the genocidal actions that were 
taking place. Previous discussions have shown that Waffen-SS troops “… were some 
of the most highly motivated on the German side. They had all been thoroughly 
indoctrinated with Nazi racial superiority theories. To the members of the Waffen-SS, 
their Russian enemies were racial inferiors to be treated as subhumans” (Ripley, 
2004:58). This attitude towards the Russian soldiers being seen as a primitive 
subhuman can be seen in the post-war comments of SS General Max Simon, who 
stated the following when writing about the Russian soldier: “The Russian peasant… 
he cannot think independently, a deficiency not found among West European 
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peasants…” (Simon, 1949:9). SS-Obergruppenführer Lothar Debes described how in 
fighting, “… cunning, cruelty and malice appeared…” among the Russian enemy 
(Debes, 1947:34). 
 
In an attempt to shift blame members of the Waffen-SS have often fallen back on the 
defence that only a few men committed atrocities when the issue of responsibility for 
atrocities is raised. When questioned about the issue of killing prisoners at 
Nuremberg, SS General Paul Hausser had the following to say in regards to group 
responsibility: 
HAUSSER: Yes. These incidents are not the result of training, but rather the failure of 
individuals, perhaps the giving way of nerves when in difficult situations deep in enemy 
territory. But these accusations should not be generalised. Even if there had been 10 instead of 
only two cases, the ratio as applied to the entire membership of the Waffen-SS of one million 
men would mean there would be one case to every 100,000 men. Such incidents are the results 
of the intensification of combat on the ground and in a long war; incidents which have occurred 
on both sides and will always continue to occur. You cannot hold the bulk of the Waffen-SS 
responsible.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:367) 
 
Even if only a handful were committing the atrocity the knowledge of this must have 
gravitated out in an ever-expanding circle of knowledge. This was exactly the 
proposition put to SS-Obergruppenführer Wolff during the Pohl Trial. 
Q. Well, the circle of people who knew about the gassings, and the mass liquidation of people, 
certainly was more than just a handful, wasn't it? It was not just a few people you told us about 
yesterday?  
A. I don't think that I used the expression “a few people”.  I would like to give you a 
proportional number, then I would assume that the people who had knowledge and who 
participated in the planning and execution of these monstrosities were merely tenths of one per 
cent, and I would say that that itself is a good percentage, and to a number of one million 
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members of the Waffen-SS, or the General SS, that it is an infinitely small proportion. For the 
majority of the SS it is incomprehensible that the entire group collectively were sentenced as 
criminals, although they neither played any part in this nor did they have any knowledge. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:775) 
 
During Wolff’s trial for war crimes after the war, fellow Waffen-SS General Bach-
Zelewski gave evidence that “… he found it highly improbable that an SS officer of 
his rank and position would know nothing about the crimes” (Von Lang, 2005:184). 
This assumption could safely be applied to the entire Waffen-SS leadership of the 
evidence that has been discussed in the previous chapter. It is of interest that Wolff 
was clearly aware of the actions that were taking place, as were others who chose not 
to pursue the subject. The following incident during the Russian campaign, recounted 
by Hitler’s Luftwaffe adjutant, Nicolaus Von Below, illustrates this. 
During the stay at Winniza a young lieutenant of the FHQ95 signals train told me that he had 
witnessed a terrible massacre nearby. While working on communications equipment he had 
come to a gorge, where he discovered an SS troop shooting a large number of men and women. 
He was very distressed by what he had seen and thought that he ought to report it. I spoke to 
the SS liaison officer, Gruppenführer Wolff, and asked him to investigate and report back. After 
a few days he supplied me with a very ambiguous answer and hinted at sabotage in the 
rearward areas. I was requested to take no further steps in the matter. I was satisfied with the 
explanation and forgot the incident… (Von Below, 1980:155) 
 
Von Lang completed an exhaustive work on Wolff’s career and he notes that “At the 
very least, however, he must have discovered what was really happening to the Jews 
during his service for Hitler and Himmler at the Führer’s headquarters between 1939 
                                                 
95 Führer head quarters. 
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and 1943” (Von Lang, 2005:1). The above highlights an important point, the genocide 
that was being committed must have been widely known to the membership of the 
Waffen-SS, especially the command elements. 
 
I would argue against the statements of Hausser and Wolff that the bulk of the 
Waffen-SS cannot be held accountable in the sense of group responsibility. I base this 
argument on the following. As a pure legal concept the notion of collective guilt may 
fail. Indeed it has been discredited as being unfair since the war (Mollo, 1982). It has 
been noted that  “Collective criminal punishment is in principle open to the charge 
that it violates fundamental standards of fairness by being overinclusive: the category 
of individuals actually stigmatised or otherwise treated as criminal would include 
some who could successfully defend themselves” (Levinson, 1973:374). The result of 
the IMT declaring the Waffen-SS as being criminal has been criticised because it was 
a “… completely lopsided approach … intended to serve only one purpose and that 
was to brand as criminal such organisation as the SS” (Bassiouni, 1999:384). This is 
supported to some degree when one considers that: “Being the member of an identity 
group does not by itself constitute a crime, and the law abhors collective 
responsibility” (Barkan, 2004:311). However, I would draw upon the associative 
notion put forward by Fletcher; I would argue that members of the Waffen-SS bear 
some responsibility by virtue of association with the organisation. 
The associative sense of the popular will (la volonte generale) is expressed by the society as a 
single entity abstracted from the individuals who constitute it. To believe in the nation as an 
actor is to accept the idea of the popular will in the associative sense. Admittedly, it is difficult 
to know when one sense or the other is intended. When we discuss the will of “We the People”, 
for example, we could mean the popular will in either the aggregative or the associative sense ... 
As individuals can be guilty, the society as a collection of individuals can also be guilty. The 
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serious challenge in this inquiry is to consider the possibility of collective guilt in the associative 
sense. (Fletcher, 2002) 
 
This view is supported by the following comment: “ Whilst individual criminal 
responsibility can be regarded an emancipation from collective responsibility, this 
does not mean that collective responsibility has become obsolete and irrelevant to 
modern criminal law” (Van Sleidregt, 2006:81). As Berglund stated in his article there 
is great difficulty in approaching the notion of collective guilt: 
… to agree upon a response to the Nazi crimes, one which acknowledged a link between the 
German people and the acts of their leaders, while not admitting to collective guilt, anticipated 
the struggles that the Germans and other nations have had with their histories of ethnic 
violence. As the debates in postwar Germany have shown, the search for a conception of 
national responsibility that does not equate with punishable collective guilt is 
precarious…(Berglund, 2000:239) 
 
If one looks at the ICC in its current form it can be seen that although its legislation is 
designed to deal with individual criminality, it has to deal with crimes that can only be 
completed by collective co-operation by individuals (Fletcher, 2002; Van Sliedregt, 
2006). As outlined by Fletcher: 
The four crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction, aggression, crimes of war, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide are deeds that by their very nature are committed by groups and 
typically against individuals as members of groups. Whatever the pretence of liberal 
international lawyers, the crimes of concern to the international community are collective 
crimes. It is true that as a formal matter only individuals are prosecuted, but they are 
prosecuted for crimes committed by and in the name of the groups they represent. Once the 
collective nature of these crimes comes into proper focus, once we overcome the liberal bias 
that has prevailed since Nuremberg, we should be able to see the influence of collective action 
in domestic law as well. I argue below that the innovation of hate-crime laws in the United 
States reflects a similar turn towards collectivist thinking in the law … My point is to show that 
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although the orthodox view stresses individual responsibility, the heart of international 
criminal law remains collectivist in nature. (Fletcher, 2002:1510) 
 
This is one of my key arguments. Although legally the individual may be the 
preferable unit to deal with, on the issue of moral responsibility it is crucial to take a 
group or organisational standpoint. In this case I would suggest that the Waffen-SS 
has a group or organisational responsibility that is defined and evidenced by the 
previous discussions. This responsibility has a much narrower focus than a broad-
based national responsibility or guilt; the Waffen-SS was a much smaller specific 
group that had specific aims and tasks.  As such I would suggest that the Waffen-SS 
does bear group responsibility for the actions undertaken on the part of the 
organisation. This responsibility is clearly differentiated from collective guilt by 
Schaap: 
… Attribution of collective guilt is unjust because it imputes blame without regard to the actions 
and intentions of individual group members. Attribution of collective responsibility on the 
other hand, is just since it refers only to a liability predicated on the duties of citizenship. 
(Schaap, 2001:750) 
 
 In this case it is liability predicated on membership, membership of the Waffen-SS. 
As a moral concept I see the issue of group responsibility being acceptable. The 
Waffen-SS had much more than just passing or innocent knowledge of the evil acts 
being committed; they had intimate knowledge. They were responsible for the 
concentration-camps, they contributed to the Einsatzgruppen, and they controlled the 
anti-partisan conflict. But more then just mere knowledge, they contributed as an 
organisation to the evil actions undertaken. Indeed, group responsibility becomes 
more applicable in situations where the perpetrators form a significant part of the 
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dominant group and where the victims are chosen for belonging to a different group 
(Radzik, 2001). Certainly this is the case with the Waffen-SS. They were seen as an 
elite of the Nazi state, their victims were predominately chosen on racial and 
ideological grounds. The members of the Waffen-SS could hardly argue that they 
were not aware of its racial and ideological nature, especially given that in the early 
years of the war the formation was all volunteer and the group members self-selected 
themselves.  
 
In the later years of the war where the volunteer concept diminished and conscription 
was introduced there was still a large hard core of committed idealists within the 
Waffen-SS. Even in the later years of the war the new conscripts were still embraced 
into the idealism of the Waffen-SS to some degree. As one veteran of the Totenkopf 
Division recalls: 
When the former Luftwaffe men joined us as replacements they asked what is the spirit of the 
Totenkopf division. The answer must have been – it was just simple and plain – steadfast in 
modesty, the stubbornness and unshakable belief in what we thought was right and we were 
willing to give our lives for.  (Volkner, 2004:150) 
 
Former operations officer of the 12th SS Hitlerjugend Panzer division, SS-
Obersturmbannführer Hubert Meyer, gave the following insight into the late-war 
ethos of the Waffen-SS: 
Into the place of German victory had moved the conviction that one could not unconditionally 
surrender, especially not to the enemy in the East. On the contrary, it was paramount to guard 
the homeland from that in particular. Above all, the spirit of comradeship and espirit de corps 
held the troops together. Even the replacements, which had come from the Luftwaffe and the 
Kriegsmarine before and after the Ardennes offensive, were, in the majority, caught up in that 
spirit. (Meyer, 2001:383) 
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The issue of group responsibility also would seem to apply when one considers that 
the Waffen-SS as a whole was a beneficiary in term of goods and economic support 
from the camp system; a system of terror in which many of the Waffen-SS had 
worked in and had knowledge of. This is despite the claims made by senior officers 
such as Hausser. 
HERR PELCKMANN: Do you consider that the Waffen-SS, in its majority, participated in the 
crimes which indubitably were committed?  
HAUSSER: No. The Prosecution chains the Waffen-SS to the fate of Heinrich Himmler and a 
small circle of criminals around him. The Waffen-SS is taking this quite bitterly for it believes 
that in its majority it fought decently and fairly. It is far removed from these crimes and from 
the man who is responsible for them. I should like to ask the High Tribunal to please listen to 
the accounts and the judgments of the front soldiers on your side. I believe that they will not 
fail to show us respect. Wherever specific incidents occurred they were exceptions. The Waffen-
SS considers it quite unjust that it is being treated differently from the mass of the German 
Armed Forces and it does not deserve to be outlawed as a criminal organisation.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:370) 
 
Many of the Waffen-SS worked in the camp system; undeniably they had knowledge 
of its workings, yet none of the senior officers ever protested against them. They were 
aware of and committed atrocities in combat and during anti-partisan operations. They 
were an integral part of the Einsatzgruppen and their genocide. Yet never did the 
senior officer corps as a group prevent their men for serving in these units or 
committing these atrocities. Never did they as an elite group band together to stop this 
carnage. In fact the only time complaints were made re the ethnic cleansing being 
conducted was when it was seen as not assisting the war effort.  
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It was not the case that the senior officer corps of the Waffen-SS could not have 
protested against the actions Hitler and Himmler were undertaking. After all, many of 
the senior officers went to great lengths after the war to say that Himmler was 
insignificant and that they did not listen to him (Hohne, 1969). In fact, this is the very 
picture Hausser attempted to paint at Nuremberg. 
HERR PELCKMANN: What influence did Heinrich Himmler actually have on the moral 
attitude of the members of the Waffen-SS?  
HAUSSER: Heinrich Himmler most assuredly tried in peacetime to exert his influence on the 
small Verfügungstruppe. During the war this was practically impossible. He did not address 
troops of the Waffen-SS. On occasion he did talk to some officers and commanders of some 
divisions in the field. It was generally known that Heinrich Himmler, who had done only one 
year’s military service, had no conception of the military and underestimated the military tasks 
and the work involved. He liked to play the role of the strong man through exaggeration and 
through superlatives. If someone comes along with big words, the soldier on the front does not 
pay much attention.  Therefore, the influence of Himmler was very insignificant during the war. 
He wore his uniform, of course, but the reputation of the Waffen-SS was established by its 
officers, by the example they set and by their daily work.  
HERR PELCKMANN: Was the influence of Himmler on the commanders perhaps stronger 
than on the masses of SS soldiers?  
HAUSSER: Quite the contrary. The commanders, of course, were under him so far as military 
obedience was concerned. But they had the right to criticise through their own experience of 
life and of the world, and as a matter of fact this criticism was necessary in the face of 
Himmler’s extravagant and romantic ideas. These men had enough experience so that they 
could translate his statements into the language and manner of thought of the soldier. The 
critical attitude toward Heinrich Himmler increased continually during the war. In most cases 
he believed that he could dispense with the advice of an experienced soldier. Objections were 
cut off short with the words, “This is the typical viewpoint of a general” - viewpoints which he 
opposed.   
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:368) 
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They did not challenge him to stop the atrocities. They obeyed orders to send men to 
the camps or Einsatzgruppen. They obeyed orders to conduct brutal cleansing 
operations as part of the anti-partisan effort. They obeyed orders to accept into their 
ranks those who had been part of the terror apparatus. It was not the case that they 
could not choose to disobey orders. In 1943 when the 1st SS Panzer Corps was 
threatened with destruction at Kharkov, Hausser disobeyed a direct order from Hitler 
to hold the town (Darman, 2004; G. Nipe & Spezzano, 2002; Ripley, 2000, 2004). 
Nothing was done to him; in fact he was later awarded the Knight’s Cross. In 1945 
SS-Obergruppenführer Steiner refused to come to Berlin to save Hitler, again nothing 
was done to him (Darman, 2004; Read & Fisher, 1992; Ryan, 1994). It seems that 
when military considerations dictated, the Waffen-SS could resist and disobey orders 
if it suited.  
 
Why then did they not revolt against the genocide and murder being committed? I 
would argue that this was due to the fact that the Waffen-SS held and displayed a 
collective view and attitude that approved of the actions being committed. It has been 
suggested that underlying such attitudes “… very often is a philosophical theory of 
collective virtue, collective spirit, collective significance, that purports to authorise 
the doing of great evils by individuals” (Narveson, 2002). I believe that the evidence I 
have previously discussed shows that the Waffen-SS held such a collective view. As 
such I would argue that the Waffen-SS, should, as a group, be held morally 
responsible for the acts defined in this thesis as evil, committed in its name. 
 
  335 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
An examination of the causation of Waffen-SS actions 
As has been noted there is no evidence to suggest that actions undertaken by the 
Waffen-SS can be attributed solely to “… pathological personalities or group 
psychoses among SS personnel” (Kren & Rappoport, 1976:96). It will be my 
argument that an interactive approach of both personality and situation will best 
explain why the Waffen-SS committed acts that this thesis will define as evil. To this 
end I will argue that the actions of the Waffen-SS were within the definition of evil 
established in the first chapter.  I would argue that the crimes they committed were 
caused by the following factors: 
• The situational influence of a regime that legitimised criminal orders and 
actively devalued the target groups that were to be the victims of genocide. 
• The ready acceptance by Waffen-SS soldiers of this victim devaluation. 
• The situational context of absolute obedience by Waffen-SS soldiers and the 
preparedness of these soldiers to blindly obey orders that would appear to be 
obviously criminal in their nature.  
• The mentality of the Waffen-SS, in particular the aspect of “hardness” both on 
themselves and towards enemies of the Reich.  
• The brutalising effect that difficult life conditions on the Eastern Front had on 
the Waffen-SS, both in relation to the climatic events and the nature of the 
fighting. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine why the Waffen-SS committed the crimes 
they did. This is important for two reasons; first it allows us to objectively discount 
any defences that the Waffen-SS apologists may raise to justify the acts committed. 
  336 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
Second it allows us to fully apply the definition of evil formulated in the first chapter 
to acts to determine if indeed these actions fall within this category. This will help us 
to increase our understanding of why ordinary people are capable of committing such 
heinous evil acts. The previous chapters clearly outlined a number of issues regarding 
the link between evil actions and the obedience or compliance of ordinary people to 
commit such acts. How do these concepts apply in the circumstances of war? 
 
Learning to hate: Seeing the evil enemy  
… every man should be trained to be a fanatical hater … It doesn’t matter which front our 
divisions engage in combat, the unyielding hate towards every opponent, Englishmen, 
American, Jew or Bolshevik, must make every one of our men capable of the highest deeds. 
(Wegner, 1990:207) 
 
These were the words used by SS-Brigadeführer Treuenfeld to describe the conduct 
expected of the troops of the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen in 1943. The term 
highest deeds is suggestive of using whatever means are necessary to achieve the 
military aim. The comments of this Waffen-SS general would seem to fly in the face 
of propositions by apologists such as Theile who argue that, “Ideology never, or 
rarely, played a role on the battlefield” (Theile, 1997:125). First-hand accounts from 
Waffen-SS soldiers would also seem to suggest otherwise. For instance one veteran of 
the Das Reich Division described the hate of one of his fellow troopers, a volunteer 
from Switzerland; “He hated Bolshevism from the depths of his soul, and this hate 
had driven him to our forces” (Gunther, 2004:116). As noted by Williamson: 
“Certainly no effort seems to have been spared to build up a hatred for Bolshevism, 
and so it may be assumed that a hatred of the ideological enemy would play a part in 
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the attitudes of some Waffen-SS men during the campaign in the East.” (Williamson, 
2003:213). This hatred of the opponent’s political system is reflected in the oath of 
allegiance sworn by foreign troops in the Waffen-SS, such as the Latvian 15th SS 
Grenadier Division: 
I swear by God this holy oath, that in the struggle against Bolshevism I will give the C-in-C of 
the German Armed Forces, Adolf Hitler, absolute obedience and as a fearless soldier if it be his 
will I will always be prepared to lay down my life for this oath. (Bender & Taylor, 1975:70) 
 
Himmler emphasised this in a pamphlet called “Die Schutzstaffel als 
antibolschewistiche Kampforganisation” or SS Defender against Bolshevism. In this 
he outlined how, “Many even believe that Bolshevism – this Jewish organised and led 
struggle of subhumanity, is totally new in world history. We believe it is important to 
establish that as long as there has been men on earth, the struggle between humans 
and subhumans has been the historical rule” (Pruess Publishing, 2001:7).  
 
Justification for evil acts can arise from this devaluing of the target group, in this case 
the Russians. A sense of moral right can be seen to arise the criminological concept of 
victim vilification. This concept suggests that when crimes are committed against 
certain target groups (e.g. homosexuals, prostitutes, drug addicts) the victims are 
viewed as worthless or disposable by their very nature (Turvey, 1999). The concept of 
victim vilification or devaluing is one of the three catalysts listed by Waller (1996) 
that allow ordinary people to commit evil acts (the others being learning by doing and 
escalating commitment to the process). This concept of conditioning or socialisation 
of evil allows people to justify to some extent or excuse the crimes committed against 
the target group (J. E. Waller, 1996; Zimbardo, 2005).  
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This issue of victim devaluation flows on to the actions of a soldier in combat. War 
arouses psychological traits within the human psyche. It can make us take the 
approach of “… kill or be killed…” and also raises the issue of obedience to authority 
(Fromm, 1973:241). It is this approach of having to commit evil acts to ensure one’s 
survival that often allows the individual to rationalise the action and apportion blame 
elsewhere (i.e. it was him or me, I did it to save my unit, I did it for my country) 
(Bourke, 1999). Several levels of vindictiveness and hatred during times of war have 
been identified. These include the temporary hatred in the heat of battle, the more 
durable hatred of the enemy in general. This can then be extended to hatred of the 
enemy people, and finally hatred of the enemy system and ideology (Stouffer, 
Lumsdaine, Williams, Brewster Smith, Janis, Star, & Cottrell, 1949:159). All of these 
hatreds were present during Operation Barbarossa.  
 
It has been recognised that there is a necessity for soldiers to be socialised and 
psychologically conditioned for combat in order for them to kill the enemy (Peppers, 
1974). Certainly it has been seen as essential to have soldiers hate and despise the 
enemy, for this reason “… all modern nations have attempted in one way or another to 
instil in their soldiers a picture of the enemy sufficiently repugnant or evil to inspire 
this hatred” (Stein, 1966:127). Waffen-SS veteran Gisberg Pohl justified his 
involvement in the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in the following way; “Being a young 
man one easily made too much of it. We had after all gone to Russia, we wanted there 
to destroy subhumanity – that is, I was strongly convinced of my task, that I was 
right” (Bartov, 2003a:29). The soldier needs to “… dehumanise or demonise their 
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opponents in order to overcome their natural reluctance to kill…” (Glantz & House, 
1995:56). This is necessary because the average soldier, 
… resists the powerful obligation and coercion to engage in aggressive and assertive actions on 
the battlefield, and he dreads facing the irrational hostility and aggression embodied in the 
enemy. (Grossman, 1996:78)  
 
Frequently, however, despite aggressive training or indoctrination, soldiers will come 
to respect or even admire their enemies (Holmes, 1985). Combatants often expressed 
respect towards their opponents and resisted to some extent the attempts by military 
authorities to hate the enemy (Bourke, 1999). Given this there is a need to defuse 
deep-seated psychological resistance to the killing of other human beings, which can 
at times inhibit soldiers from killing the enemy when it is vital or necessary to do so 
(Baumeister, 1999; Holmes, 1985). Indeed military training shifted focus between the 
two world wars from being primarily concerned with drill, to the main focus being to 
prepare the soldier for the operational and psychological realities of war (Haslam & 
Abraham, 1987).  
 
War also brings forward the need to depict your enemy as evil (Baumeister, 1999). To 
see one’s enemy as evil allows the average soldier to justify their aggression and the 
acts this aggression can lead to. This perception of the enemy as “... the other…” by 
demonising or dehumanising the enemy can generate a fear that results in complete 
commitment to the state that engages in total war and its consequences (Strachan, 
2000:356). An example of this is the use of euphemisms in describing innocent 
civilians or racially unacceptable groups as partisans or bandits who were killed in 
counterinsurgency operations in Russia.  For Waffen-SS soldiers undertaking anti-
partisan duties this had the benefit that “… as long as the men believed that they were 
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eliminating a legitimate and viable threat, the chance of any negative psychological 
and morale problems was lessened” (Heaton, 2001:127). Indeed by portraying target 
groups as potential partisans, “… this conceptual integration of Jews and partisans 
was quickly internalised by a receptive SS and by German Army soldiers and 
provided the mass murder of the Jews with the legitimisation of a war against the 
partisans” (Buchler, 1986:14). 
 
 
The soldiers of the Waffen-SS 3rd Panzer Corps received indoctrination in the form of 
a paper “… in which it was stated that the Russian was a mixture of animal and man, 
and that extreme caution should be shown towards Russian prisoners. The reason for 
this was that they were capable of committing every possible cruelty” (Smith et al., 
1999:88). It is this ability to depict the enemy as evil that often allows troops to free 
themselves of normal constraints and to pursue the conflict as an ideological crusade 
on behalf of the regime. American soldiers often regarded their Japanese adversaries 
as less then human during World War II (Stein, 1966). A study of more then 5000 
American soldiers after World War II showed that they had a much greater hatred of 
the Japanese as compared with the Germans during World War II (Stouffer et al., 
1949). Stouffer concentrated on the situational factors impacting on combat attitudes 
rather then personal traits. Of interest was the fact that he found that combat did not 
increase the level of hatred of the enemy among the soldiers that he studied (Stouffer 
et al., 1949). It is worth noting, however, that Stouffer qualifies his findings with the 
following comment: 
We should remember that, compared with soldiers in some other armies, his (the American 
soldier) general level of hatred was probably not very high. He had not, like the Russians, seen 
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his country devastated and his family perhaps wiped out in cold blood … Nor did he have the 
ideological basis for a sustained steady anger … of the enemy system … which lasts until the 
final battle is won. (Stouffer et al., 1949:157) 
  
The above were all factors that were present in the conflict on the Eastern Front. The 
war of the Eastern Front during World War II was a war of ideologies of political and 
racial origins. Such wars are “... fought heedless of the restraints of morality, custom 
or international law, for the combatants are inspired by hatreds born of modern 
ideologies” (Chickering, 1999:16). In this context it was necessary to have the 
Waffen-SS soldier see the Russians as untermenschen or subhumans. The Nazis were 
highly successful in depicting the Russians as evil: 
During the war in Russia the process of dehumanisation of the enemy was probably more 
successful than in any other war in modern history – the Russians, Slavs, Jews, Mongols, all 
had lost any relationship to the human race, and were nothing more that satanic monsters 
trying in vain to appear human, impostors whose identity had to be exposed and whose 
existence endangered everything which civilised men held dear. (Bartov, 2001:83) 
 
This dehumanisation of the enemy works best with an obviously foreign or physically 
different enemy (Bourke, 1999). It is argued that: 
This almost obligatory dehumanisation of the enemy is particularly pronounced when there are 
radical ideological differences between the opponents, differences which ... may portray the 
enemy as the foe of civilisation and the enemy of progress...  (Holmes, 1985:366) 
 
Cultural and racial differences raise obstacles that make it difficult for soldiers to 
interact with the enemy with any affection (Holmes, 1985). This was shown by the 
ability of American soldiers to more readily identify with their German opponents as 
compared to the Japanese (Stouffer et al., 1949; Weingartner, 1996). The enemy can 
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be depicted as evil, by portraying them as being subhuman and preternaturally brutal 
(Weingartner, 1996). It is recognised that “… combat in theatres where the enemy 
was of a different race was portrayed was particularly hateful and liable to involve 
atrocities” (Bourke, 1999:143).  
 
What this depiction of evil allows is an us versus them mentality, in which the enemy 
is seen as being some type of foreign being. It is this them and us thinking that is 
often a precursor to genocidal actions. This thinking can lead to a distinction between 
us (the internal group) and them (the external group), and with this comes a related 
separation of internal and external morals that are applied to each party (Von Trotha, 
1999). Hitler made the following speech to his generals on 30th of March 1941, prior 
to the invasion of Russia: 
… our tasks in Russia: destroy the armed forces, dissolve the state ... We must distance 
ourselves from the standpoint of soldierly comradery. The Communist was not a fellow soldier 
before captivity, neither will he be one afterward. This is a battle of annihilation ... This struggle 
will be very different from the battle in the West. In the East, harshness is gentleness for the 
future. (Bartov, 1999:30) 
 
From the speech above one can see that Hitler was already attempting to show the 
Russian soldier as being outside of the universe of moral obligation and “… therefore 
not deserving of compassionate treatment…”, which in turn helps to remove the 
normal restraints that individuals have against aggression (J. E. Waller, 1996:17). It 
has been argued that the German officers and men had; “… internalised a view of 
humanity that categorised it not only racially into Slav and Jewish untermenschen and 
Aryan superman … depriving them of the right to live” (Bartov, 1997:332). Indeed 
the commander in chief of the army, Field-Marshal Von Brauchitsch, instructed 
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senior officers that the coming conflict on the Eastern Front would be “… a struggle 
between two different races, requiring the troops to act with all necessary harshness” 
(Forster, 1985:308). When interviewed after the war German General Blumentritt 
offered the following opinion of the Russian soldier in the conflict: “The Red Army of 
1941-45 was far harder than the Czar’s Army, for they were fighting fanatically for an 
idea. That increased their doggedness, and in turn made our own troops hard, for in 
the East the maxim held good – You or I” (Liddell Hart, 1975:225). 
 
An evil enemy is seen as not being deserving of the protection of the normal rules of 
conflict. The ideological views of Hitler and the Nazis found their way down to the 
lower ranks of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS where “… many soldiers accepted and 
agreed with the idea that the war against the Soviet Union was to be pursued under 
different conditions and using different methods from those of a normal war” (Birn, 
1997:285). A soldier of the 1st Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler wrote a 
letter to his parents shortly before the invasion, where he talked of the Leibstandarte 
and its coming role: 
… But in the Leibstandarte we think ourselves a cut above the rest. We are the only ones. The 
Führer’s own to do with as he will. This is our creed, that we will go forward over a precipice to 
death if need be, but without question. It is a glorious feeling to be ready to get at the enemy, to 
bash his brains out on his own filthy floor … it will be all right. We must defeat the subhuman. 
(Wykes, 1974:117) 
 
So successful were the Nazis in their indoctrination that the Waffen-SS soldiers’ 
perception of war and society was quite possibly a distortion of reality (Smith et al., 
1999:75). After the invasion of Russia ideological indoctrination was used in the 
Waffen-SS in an attempt to increase the combat effectiveness of the troops (Wegner, 
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1990:206). An increase in indoctrination in 1943 was also coupled with “Hitler’s 
declaration of total war … to reinforce the motivation of front-line troops to fight the 
Slav and Jewish subhumans in the East … they were locked in a life or death struggle 
with their enemies” (Ripley, 2003:272; Wegner, 1990). Members of the 10th SS 
Panzer Division Frundsberg were instructed on being members of the German Volk 
who were involved in a continuing struggle against internal (the Jews) and external 
enemies (the Russians) in an effort to allow the Führer to “… achieve the historic 
unity of all Germans” (Wegner, 1990:206).  
 
Of importance here is that the ideological instruction given to the soldiers included 
both internal and external enemies of the Reich. The SS newspaper, the Das Schwarze 
Korps, regularly ran stories that racially vilified the Jews and other undesirables; “… 
it labels such Jews, degenerate subhumans. Another article classified the Jews in 
Polish ghettos as dirty lousy Eastern Jews and commented about their skinny legs and 
pimpled faces” (Combs, 1986:130). In their study of the Waffen-SS Kren and 
Rappoport found that the Waffen-SS soldiers typically believed the ideological 
messages that were given to them with the result that they had “… no difficulty in 
performing acts that would be regarded as barbaric and atrocious by regular armies” 
(Kren & Rappoport, 1976:95). As one Danish volunteer in the Waffen-SS said in a 
letter to home; “Yes, we’ll eradicate these Jews from the surface of the earth, because 
while there are Jews, there is also war. Now, I can imagine there are some who would 
say that the Jews are humans too. My answer would be that rats are also animals” 
(Christensen et al., 2003:22). This letter serves to illustrate the attitude held by many 
in the Waffen-SS. 
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In this conflict the military actions of gaining additional living space and the police 
and political actions resulting in the extermination of racial inferiors were seen as 
different aspects of the same war (Forster, 1997). This concept of “… extermination 
only became an integral part of the operations because the army command was 
willing to allow the troops to fight the ideological war alongside the SS” (Forster, 
1997:131). This extermination was made possible by the ideology that was held and 
believed at the time. The post-war comments of a veteran of the 5th Waffen-SS Panzer 
Division Wiking show how the problem was Bolshevism and the cause was the Jew. 
This was a connection accepted by many German soldiers (Fritz, 1996; Rees, 1999): 
Jewish Bolshevism, you see, that was the big enemy … and these were the people to fight 
against because they meant a threat to Europe, according to the view at the time … and the 
Jews were simply regarded as the leadership class or as those who were firmly in control over 
there in the Soviet Union (Rees, 1999:51) 
 
This view is one that can be attributed to the worldview held in general by SS men 
who attributed “… at least four typical characteristics to their Jewish victims. They 
were seen as communists, dangerous, spreaders of disease and insolent” (Lozowick, 
1987:230). Even when giving evidence in the Einsatzgruppen trial, SS officer Otto 
Ohlendorf attempted to argue that Jews and communists were synonymous with each 
other. Ohlendorf was a lawyer who was placed in charge of Einsatzgruppe D, which 
was attached to the German 11th Army in Russia: 
It was obvious that the number of Jews in the general population in Russia, in relation to their 
number in the higher administration, was very, very small. The prosecution has submitted a 
report from my Einsatzgruppe to the army. In this report in enclosure No. 2 it explained the 
situation of Jewry in the Crimea. Unfortunately, this enclosure was not available. It would have 
shown that in the Crimea, for example, up to 90 per cent of the administrative and leading 
authoritative positions were occupied by Jews … For us it was obvious that Jewry in Bolshevist 
Russia actually played a disproportionately important role. Three times I was present during 
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executions. Every time I found the same facts which I considered with great respect, that the 
Jews who were executed went to their death singing the “International” and hailing Stalin. That 
the Communist functionaries and the active leaders of the Communists in the occupied area of 
Russia posed an actual continuous danger for the German occupation the documents of the 
prosecution have shown. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:248) 
 
So not only were the Jews involved in Bolshevism, they were the leadership class of it 
according to the SS mentality.  This mentality was reflected in an SS pamphlet titled 
“Bolshevism – Jewish Subhumanity”, which was made available to SS officers It 
stated, “The mask is off. Behind it visible to all, stands the eternal Jew. Rightly one 
does not view Bolshevism as a manifestation of the modern period. It is instead the 
product of Jewish thought…” (Pruess Publishing, 2005:12). 
 
Just prior to the invasion of Russia men of the SS Wiking division were issued an 
instruction which: 
… warned the soldiers that fighting in the East was different, and that all kinds of undercover 
attacks and hostilities could be expected from enemy civilians and POW. Therefore caution and 
quick and ruthless use of weapons was the best way of preventing such events. (Smith et al., 
1999:87) 
 
This clearly implied that the execution of POWs and suspect civilians would be 
tolerated and in fact encouraged. Certainly, as has previously been discussed, the 
Nazis were very successful in portraying the Russians as an enemy to be despised. In 
particular Hitler was adept at entwining his anti-Jewish and anti-communist ideals as 
part of justified military measures. The SS newspaper Das Schwarze Korps “… linked 
its anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism so closely that the two themes became nearly 
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inseparable” (Combs, 1986:138) The Jews and communists were portrayed as the 
backbone of the partisan activity behind the front lines in Russia, which meant that 
“…it did not require Nazified zealots, merely conscientious and politically obtuse 
professional soldiers to carry them out” (Forster, 1985:315). 
 
The Russian soldier was depicted as being an evil individual who raped women and 
destroyed civilised society. This kind of ideological training or propaganda allowed 
soldiers to be “… reassured that the enemy was too evil to warrant survival” (Bourke, 
1999:217). Many German soldiers believed this type of propaganda (Fritz, 1996; 
Schroder, 1997). The Waffen-SS soldiers were fed a continual diet of indoctrination 
in relation to the Russians through the form of training, leaflets and regular 
publications. The result of this being that; “When the enemy is regarded as a repulsive 
and evil animal, an untermensch, a subhuman, the result is an unmatched brutalisation 
of warfare, for the soldier is generally set free from feelings of guilt or remorse for his 
grisly deeds” (Stein, 1966:128).  
 
When Bach-Zelewski, Waffen-SS General and for many years a member of the Nazi 
Party, was asked to explain the phenomenon of the Einsatzgruppen killings, he replied 
“I am of the opinion that when, for years, decades, the doctrine is preached that the 
Slav race is an inferior race, and Jews not even human, then such an outcome is 
inevitable.” (Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:474). So successful was this 
indoctrination that the average German soldier continued to fight vigorously up until 
the end of the war in an effort to “… defend hearth and home against the barbarians 
from the East”, even though all hope of victory was gone (Strachan, 2000:356). 
Bartov (1997) and other authors also comment on the remarkable ability of the 
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German forces to keep fighting to the end. The men of the Waffen-SS were tenacious 
in the defence of the Reich to the end due in no small part to the fact that “… they had 
been taught and believed that…” the Russian soldiers “… were little more than 
subhuman” (Reynolds, 1999:182).   
 
The fact that German forces, in particular the Ostheer,96 were able to maintain 
cohesion to the very end has been attributed to “… the view shared by a large number 
of officers and soldiers regarding their own mission in the war, the character of the 
enemy confronting them…” (Bartov, 1997:333). In his examination of the 1st SS 
Panzer Corps, Reynolds argues that the Waffen-SS soldiers fought hard on the 
Eastern Front due to a number of reasons, which included: 
Their experiences on the Eastern Front had strengthened the resolve of the German military to 
protect their homeland for as long as possible and at whatever cost. Stories circulating at the 
time concerning the fate of German civilians in the territories captured by the Russians were of 
course exploited by Joseph Goebbels and did much to strengthen the resolve of both those who 
had experienced the Eastern Front and the younger members of the Corps who had yet to see 
battle. (Reynolds, 1999:39) 
 
Of interest is the fact that the Germans maintained their ability to inflict heavy losses 
upon the Russians throughout the conflict. Towards the end of the war one German 
tank was lost for every four Russian tanks (Ungvary, 2005) When interviewed after 
the war German General Tippelskirch observed that, “Our infantry lost their fear of 
the Russian infantry in 1941, but they remained fearful of being taken prisoner – and 
sent to Siberia or worse. This fear helped to stiffen their resistance…” (Liddell Hart, 
1975:221).  
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Not all of the Waffen-SS soldiers were happy to die the hero’s death, however. In 
November 1944 reports from the 18th SS Horst Wessel Division describe many of the 
conscripted soldiers fleeing or surrendering to the Russians, with the division having 
little combat value. Other SS Divisions also showed signs of disintegration. The 
commander of the German Army Group South, Colonel-General Friessner, had this to 
say; “In the 4th SS Panzergrenadier Division some commanders have shot themselves 
because their soldiers had run away. The 18th SS Panzergrenadier Division has been a 
total failure” (Ungvary, 2005:18). This illustrates the fact that by the end of the war 
some of the SS Division had very limited combat capabilities, perhaps in part due to 
the dilution of the elite qualities that they possessed at the beginning of the war. While 
units such as the SS Leibstandarte kept the cohesion and combat ability to the end, 
some of the Waffen-SS units formed towards the end of the war were of little if any 
combat value, especially when it is considered that many of the personnel for these 
units had been conscripted into the ranks. 
 
None-the-less, many of the SS Divisions continued to fight in a competent manner 
and commit atrocities up to the very end and past the point when it should have been 
obvious to all involved that the conflict could not possibly be won by Germany. The 
cohesion of the Waffen-SS can be seen to rely on two main factors. The first factor 
being the faith in the Hitler as a leader who would lead Germany to victory despite the 
odds that Germany faced. Indeed after the war when speaking to Waffen-SS veterans, 
Steiner claimed that only a handful out of some 300 claimed not to be affected by the 
                                                                                                                                            
96 Ostheer was the term given to the German forces fighting on the Eastern Front. 
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charisma of Hitler (J. M. Steiner, 1963).  As late as March 1945 one-third of German 
prisoners taken still maintained confidence in the abilities of Hitler (Shills & 
Janowitz, 1948).  
 
Many senior Waffen-SS commanders outlined how the morale of the men was good 
even in the closing stages of the war. Waffen-SS Colonel, SS-Standartenführer Adolf 
Ax commanded the 32nd SS Grenadier Division Januar and was also the chief of staff 
of the 16th SS Corps (A. Munoz, 2001; Westwood, 2001).  Ax had the following to 
say about the 15th SS Latvian Grenadier Division in early 1945: “The personnel of the 
division was of excellent calibre. Health was generally good, morale was high…” 
(Simon, 1949:8). SS-Gruppenführer Karl Brenner, commander of the 6th SS Mountain 
Division Nord, described his men as follows in late 1944; “Morale and fighting spirits 
were outstanding, caused by the successful battles against the Russians and the Finns” 
(Brenner, 1947a:5).   
 
The comments of SS-Standarten-oberjunker Jan Munk during the formation of the 
38th Waffen-SS Division Nibelungen in April 1945 give insight into how soldiers still 
believed in the ultimate victory despite the situation they found themselves in: “ I was 
given a company of Volkssturm97 personnel – boys and old men – who were then 
trained mostly in the use of the new panzerfaust98… We had no materials and morale 
in the ranks was poor. I was, however, still convinced that Germany would win the 
war” (Williamson, 1995b:124). This fanaticism and belief in the leader and the final 
                                                 
97 The German equivalent of a home guard or peoples army. 
98 A mass-produced antitank weapon in the form of a hollow charge grenade launcher that could be 
carried by one man. 
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victory allowed SS soldiers of this division to justify acts like the execution of 16 
German soldiers who had deserted their posts in March 194599 (Ruter & de Mildt, 
2004: Vol 4). This type of blind belief is echoed by Wilhelm Tieke, a Waffen-SS 
officer who in the last days of the war served in SS Panzer Brigade Westfalen. He had 
this to say as to why he kept fighting: 
It was a combination of youthful idealism, of blind trust in the leadership, a sense of duty, the 
execution of an oath, the fear of draconian punishment and a belief in final victory through the 
introduction of new weapons, which were always part of conversation. (Tieke, 2004) 
 
In fact German generals after the war when asked about the morale of the German 
soldier stated that “… they had and kept such extraordinary confidence in Hitler that 
they remained confident of victory in the face of all the facts” (Liddell Hart, 
1975:257). SS General Bach-Zelewski was present at a military conference after the 
failed Ardennes offensive100 in early 1945 where Hitler berated his generals. He 
recalled that “Field Marshal Von Rundstedt thanked him (Hitler101) for his hard but 
just criticism and promised in the name of all generals present to take Hitler’s 
instructions to heart to do his utmost in the coming battles” (Bach-Zelewski, 1946:8).  
 
There was, however, some criticism of Hitler from Waffen-SS officers. For example, 
during the siege of Budapest in which two Waffen-SS Divisions and various army 
units were surrounded and destroyed. One Waffen-SS officer had the following to say 
in relation to Hitler’s refusal to allow them to break out of the encirclement and reach 
the German lines; “Now I know that our men are meant to be sent to the slaughter in 
                                                 
99 GDR case 1156. 
100 Commonly referred to as the Battle of the Bulge, which took place in December 1944 and was the 
last effort by the Germans to win on the Western Front. 
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Budapest” (Ungvary, 2005:172). Of note is that despite the criticism the Waffen-SS 
soldiers followed Hitler’s orders to defend Budapest until it was beyond all hope, 
either to hold the town, or be relieved by other German forces. 
 
The second reason that the Waffen-SS fought on until the end of the conflict was “… 
extreme dehumanisation and demonisation of the enemy, a process which terrorised 
the troops to such an extent that anything, including death, seemed to them better then 
falling into Soviet hands” (Bartov, 1997:336). Indeed after the hard winter of 1941-42 
and the shock of the first Russian counter-offensive, the morale of German troops 
took a battering. However, desertion and surrender were not viable options “… since 
either might lead to unspeakable torture at the hands of a seemingly inhuman foe” 
(Glantz & House, 1995:105). The reality of the situation was that as the Waffen-SS 
had embarked on an ideological war that they were now losing, this in itself created a 
fear of what the victors might do to them. 
 
As the following accounts illustrate there was an inordinate fear among the Waffen-
SS in falling into the hands of the Russians (Halliley, 2003; Hillblad, 2002; Sydnor, 
1990). SS-Oberscharführer Sollhammer of the SS Leibstandarte Division recalls: 
“The Russian tanks divided into two groups, surrounded us on both sides, and then 
advanced on our column from the rear. With that we were hopelessly surrounded … I 
saw Oberscharführer Gratz, Oberscharführer Burgstaller and Oberscharführer 
Gantiola shoot themselves with their pistols” (Lehmann, 1990:310). Sollhammer later 
                                                                                                                                            
101 My insertion and italics. 
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heard shots, which he claimed to be the Russian soldiers shooting surrendered 
Waffen-SS soldiers in the back of the neck.  
 
SS-Brigadeführer and medical officer Oskar Hock outlined how Waffen-SS wounded 
could not be left behind: “We could not risk capture by the Russians, knowing their 
total disregard for the Red Cross. It was better to transport even those casualties that 
were not in a condition to be transported and have them die en route than to have 
them killed by the Russians” (Hock, 1947:10). Eduard Jahnke, of the Das Reich 
Division, outlined the attitude held by soldiers of the Waffen-SS: “We counted on the 
fact, especially we from the Waffen-SS, that they wouldn’t take any prisoners. That 
they would stand us up against the wall, and so we fought until the last bullet” 
(Halliley, 2003). This is perhaps best evidenced by my discussion in the previous 
chapter where a noticeable number of Waffen-SS senior officers committed suicide. 
Large numbers of Waffen-SS soldiers in fact chose to commit suicide rather then fall 
into Russian hands during the siege of Budapest in 1944 (Ungvary, 2005).  
 
This was a fight to the death; surrender was not an option. This fear was supported to 
some degree by the discovery of mutilated corpses of both Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS 
soldiers early in the campaign in Russia, photos of which were made available to the 
troops (Sydnor, 1990:161). Members of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler came 
across murdered German soldiers early in the conflict on the 3rd of July 1941:  
Kurt Meyer came across the gruesome scene of murdered German soldiers for the first time. 
Their hands had been tied and they were all naked. The officers who were nearby had also been 
trampled on and dismembered. The LAH’s official history stated that Dietrich strictly forbade 
any reprisals. (Mooney, 2004:63)  
 
  354 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
SS-Brigadeführer Oskar Hock, chief medical officer of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, 
recalled events in 1941: “The Russians had gained control of the only supply line and 
evacuation route … the Russians attacked small groups of vehicles in particular. Even 
single ambulances with wounded were forced to stop after driver and assistant were 
shot. At times the wounded were shot and sometimes left lying on the road”  (Hock, 
1947:6). This fear of the enemy was not limited to the German side. A veteran of the 
artillery regiment of the SS Leibstandarte division recalls how upon wiping out the 
Russian 962nd rifle regiment, “… the regimental commander and most of the officers 
had shot themselves already” (Fischer, 2004:51). Max Simon, SS-Gruppenführer and 
officer in the Totenkopf Division, had this to say as to the finality of the conflict: 
… the Russian infantryman always fights to the last, each man in his foxhole. Tank crews whose 
tanks were burning continued firing with every available gun as long as there was life in them. 
Our success was never secure until we could be sure that no living enemy was left in the 
position. Even wounded who had lost consciousness picked up their weapons again as soon as 
they recovered their senses. (Simon, 1949:15) 
 
It has been argued that the factors that enabled these killings by the Waffen-SS 
include the demands of authority, the predisposition of the killer, distance from 
victim, target attractiveness of victim and group absolution (Grossman, 2000). Many 
of these factors are similar in nature to factors identified in Chapter 1 in discussing the 
causes of evil. In particular, the factors of a legitimate authority, the concept of 
distancing and the disposition of the individual are all put forward as reasons as to 
why evil acts occur. To expand upon these factors the elements below can be included 
in each of the factors (Grossman, 2000:19).  
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The issue of distance plays a greater role in conflicts of this century given the 
advances society has made in the technical and mechanical way in which the 
slaughter of soldiers and civilians can be conducted so much more efficiently. During 
his evidence at Nuremberg, Einsatzgruppen Commander Ohlendorf made comment of 
the importance of distance in carrying out evil acts: 
OHLENDORF: Some of the unit leaders did not carry out the liquidation in the military 
manner, but killed the victims singly by shooting them in the back of the neck. 
COL. AMEN: And you objected to that procedure? 
OHLENDORF: I was against that procedure, yes. 
COL. AMEN: For what reason? 
OHLENDORF: Because both for the victims and for those who carried out the executions, it 
was, psychologically, an immense burden to bear.  
(The United Nations War Crime Commission, 1946: Vol 4:320) 
 
This perception of distance can be related to both physical distance and psychological 
distance from the enemy (Bourke, 1999). The concept of victim devaluation as 
discussed previously “… ensures a degree of psychological distance between the 
perpetrator and their acts of evil doing” (Ball, 1999; J. E. Waller, 1996:18). 
Psychological distance is referring to the ability of the soldier to identify or empathise 
Factor Elements 
Demands of authority Intensity of demands to kill, legitimacy of authority, proximity 
and respect for authority. 
 
Predisposition of killer Recent experiences, training, conditioning, temperament. 
 
Distance from victim Physical and emotional distance, cultural, moral, social and 
mechanical influences. 
 
Target attractiveness Relevance of available strategies, relevance of victim, killer’s 
gain, enemy’s loss. 
 
Group absolution Intensity of support for killing, number in immediate group, 
legitimacy of group, identification with group, proximity of 
group. 
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with the enemy; the greater this connection the less able is the soldier to hate. The 
converse of course is true; the less one sees a reflection of the self the more one is 
readily able to commit acts of evil without associated feelings of guilt. This links in 
with the previous discussion that differences in race, appearance and culture make this 
connection more difficult between combatants. It is this ability to see an evil enemy 
that allows soldiers to justify and follow criminal orders. 
 
 
Loyalty is my honour: Obedience to evil 
Many atrocities are crimes of obedience, but many more are crimes of agreement and even 
initiative. (Kressel, 2002:169) 
 
The above quote would indicate that the committing of evil acts is interactional. The 
soldier is not only subject to the situation, which requires obedience, but they are also 
subject to their own actions. Obedience is a key factor in any discussion of evil acts 
committed during war where we are dealing with groups of individuals. It was noted 
that “The Waffen-SS … especially those led by old party comrades like Josef Sepp 
Dietrich, commander of the Leibstandarte, could be relied upon to do their duty”, 
when army units may not have proved as reliable (Mackenzie, 1997:135). 
 
It is perhaps the willingness of the individual to submit to the will of the state rather 
than modern effects of weaponry that has led to the experiences of total war in the 20th 
century (Strachan, 2000). Holmes (1985:361) picks up on this theme and states that 
the soldier undergoes a “… disjunction between rationality and moral sensibility of 
individual men and women and the effective political and military process”. This can 
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be expanded to include the notion that many soldiers experience a “...  separation 
from the self... ”(including the moral self) during the heat of battle (Bourke, 
1999:208). Certainly as argued by Huffman “… many Waffen-SS troops jettisoned 
their humanity, severing their accountability and morality” (Huffman, 2005:23). Guilt 
is only something that is felt later, and often this guilt is directed towards their 
comrades (i.e. a perception of having let them down, of a friend getting killed and not 
them), rather than a guilt for actions taken against the enemy (Bourke, 1999). They 
had in fact become morally anonymous. This, particularly in military situations, can 
create potential for people to commit evil acts (Zimbardo, 2005). 
 
I see the surrender of the soldier’s moral responsibility to the state similar to the 
concept of the agentic state and doubling proposals put forward by Milgram (1974) 
and Lifton (2000) respectively in that individuals no longer take responsibility for 
their actions as they have surrendered this responsibility to authority. It is this 
rationalisation of the surrendering of responsibility that allows many soldiers to 
alleviate feelings of guilt or responsibility for their actions after the combat (Bourke, 
1999). After all, the soldiers rely on the claim that they were just following orders, 
and as such are not responsible for the actions they commit. 
 
The whole structure of military organisations leads to a diffusion of responsibility for 
evil actions that are undertaken. Orders are given and followed. There are a number of 
links in the military chain of command, each of which fragments responsibility for the 
human act. This results in the dilemma that “… no one man decides to carry out the 
evil act and is confronted with its consequences” (Milgram, 1974:11). Baumeister 
cites four principles that come into play when talking about group responsibility and 
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the lack of individual guilt and responsibility. They include diffusion of 
responsibility, deindividuation, and division of labour and separation of the decision-
makers from those who carry out the acts (Baumeister, 1999:325). 
 
It was this deindividuation alluded to by Baumeister that allowed the SS soldier to 
reduce their moral prohibition to committing evil acts by relying on the group 
membership of the SS to relieve them of this responsibility (Staub, 1989; Wegner, 
1990). When referring to the ability of the soldier to hate the enemy and obey the state 
it is important for the purpose of this case study to remember that the German soldier 
was influenced  “… not just by German anti-Semitism or Nazi indoctrination, but also 
the traditions of obedience and identification with the state, which characterised 
German culture at least since the late 19th century” (Matthaus, 1996:145).  
 
A high level of obedience and fanaticism were demanded by the SS, and those that 
did not meet the accepted standards were either not admitted or eased out of the 
organisation (Staub, 1989; J. M. Steiner, 1963). Indeed, in a pamphlet titled SS 
“Defender against Bolshevism”, both loyalty and obedience are singled out as 
important virtues for the SS man (Pruess Publishing, 2001). The SS not only 
Factor Elements 
Diffusion of responsibility Responsibility for the group’s actions is divided up among all 
its members. 
 
Deindividuation As part of a group individual loses awareness of themselves and 
their own responsibility. 
 
Division of labour The division of tasks along the chain of events allows the 
individual to reduce feelings of responsibility for the ultimate 
result. 
 
Separation of decision-makers from 
those carrying out the actions 
This can allow the person carrying out the act to believe the 
responsibility for the act lies with the person ordering the act. 
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demanded strict obedience, but also presented the security and refuge found in 
submerging oneself in a strong in-group. This obedience was needed “… because 
without it, there was no guarantee that one would have the necessary discipline or the 
will to struggle to fulfill the commands of the Führer and dictates of National 
Socialism” (Hatheway, 1999:38). It was seen that the obedience was to be 
unconditional “… not upon official matters, but on ideological matters” (Krausnick et 
al., 1965:367). It was for this reason that Himmler could boast that the SS man “… 
hesitates not for a single instant but executes unquestioningly any order coming from 
the Führer” (Ziegler, 1989:4). The individual was freed of responsibility for himself, 
the SS man saw himself as just following orders. He became a tool of the Nazi 
regime, not only carrying out his orders, “… but anticipating them, by virtue of their 
shared ideology” (Birn, 1991:353).  
 
On June 14th 1941 SS-Obergruppenführer Theodore Eicke, commander of the 3rd SS 
Panzer Division Totenkopf, outlined to his officers that the conflict in the East had to 
be “… fought as an ideological conflict, a life and death struggle between National 
Socialism and Jewish-Bolshevism – a fact that would demand the most ruthless and 
uncompromising conduct” (Sydnor, 1990:153). These criminal orders were used as a 
basis for making it clear to German soldiers that “The communist was to be 
annihilated using all means – i.e. particularly illegal ones” (Schroder, 1997:321). 
Indeed  “… the series of directives which surfaced via OKW, OKH and SS circles…” 
before and shortly after the invasion left little doubt as to the ideological nature of the 
coming conflict (Headland, 1989:402). 
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It was a result of these orders that certain sections of the Russian society such as 
Commissars and Jews were singled out for destruction in orders issued by Hitler and 
the High Command (Bartov, 1999; Dallin, 1981). SS-Obergruppenführer Eicke 
instructed his regimental and battalion commanders that the “… principal carriers of 
the enemy ideology, the political commissars attached to Red Army units, were to be 
killed immediately after their capture of surrender, regardless of the circumstances” in 
accordance with instructions from the Führer (Sydnor, 1990:153). A veteran of an SS 
Calvary Regiment outlined how these illegal orders were rationalised: 
We knew that Bolshevism was the world enemy number one … and we were told that the aim 
(of Bolshevism)102 was to overrun Germany and France and the whole of Europe … that’s why 
we had to fight … when we caught any of them  (i.e. Commissars)103 they just had to be killed. 
(Rees, 1999:51).  
 
Indeed the SS was held together by a moulding of the personality and a communal 
sharing of a “… certain mental outlook and a certain mode of life” (Krausnick et al., 
1965:320).  SS-Brigadeführer Otto Kumm had this to say on the attitude and loyalty 
of the soldiers of the Waffen-SS and their commitment when engaged in combat; 
“This is where you have been placed, and this is where you are to stand and if need be 
die. There was no mercy” (Halliley, 2003). His sentiment is echoed by SS-
Standartenführer Leon Degrelle who claims that: “Right through the war the Waffen-
SS never retreated. They would rather die then retreat” (Degrelle, 1983:32). In reality 
the Waffen-SS did retreat. When whole German armies were smashed by the 
                                                 
102 My insertion and italics. 
 
103 My insertion and italics. 
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Russians the Waffen-SS divisions had little choice but to retire with the German 
Army units.  
 
What these comments do highlight is the fanatical zeal with which some Waffen-SS 
commanders were prepared to fight for the Nazi cause. Indeed as one author points 
out that for Danish members of the Waffen-SS who felt “… more or less imprisoned 
as volunteers, the mentally easiest way of coping with the situation was after all to 
identify themselves with the cause they were fighting for” (Smith et al., 1999:89). 
Staub also identified this type of behaviour with SS soldiers who progressively 
identified with the system they were in: 
The evolution of the SS into a system devoted to mass murder in the context of changes in the 
larger system of Germany, and learning though participation, the psychological condition of 
many SS members came to fit the role they were to fulfil. (Staub, 1989:137) 
 
Undeniably it has been recognised that the SS obeyed the orders given to them by the 
Nazi bureaucracy: 
… because their deeds did not violate any deep personal values and because they had merged 
psychologically and socially with the organisation. Large numbers, too, identified with the goals 
of the Nazi Party and more important the person of Adolf Hitler. All probably felt some 
inclination to obey authorities that they wrongly accepted as legitimate. (Kressel, 2002:164) 
 
The reason for this obedience can be seen that “… when the NSDAP and the SS as its 
praetorian guard came to power, the hereto deviant, but politically successful, new 
social methods were legitimised and institutionalised” (J. M. Steiner, 1963:429). 
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One point worth discussing is that ideology by itself may not be the sole or main 
cause why a soldier chooses to fight or commit atrocities (Kellett, 1987; Peppers, 
1974). Rather as was argued in chapter 2 an interactional approach is best used to 
explain why ordinary soldiers such as the above could commit the atrocities that they 
did. The situational aspect of the ideological indoctrination in concert with other 
situational forces (i.e. obedience to authority, difficult life conditions) and personal 
dispositions (i.e. anti-Semitism, sadism, greed) combined to allow actions such as the 
above to occur. The training programs of the SS Junkerschulen were designed to 
ensure that the Waffen-SS officer corps would be capable of carrying out whatever 
orders were given to it: 
Himmler’s armed SS sought to project the image of a disciplined, highly trained racial 
Führerkorps of a New Order … Within this context it was essential that the leadership corps of 
the armed SS consist of professionally trained SS officers who would have the physical, mental 
and moral courage necessary to carry out whatever needed to be accomplished in order to 
further the goals of the National Socialist Revolution. (Hatheway, 1999:10) 
 
It was for this reason that often in SS reports civilians and Jews were referred to as 
bandits, partisans, criminals, etc; it allowed the soldiers to believe that they were 
killing legitimate targets that were a viable threat to them with the associated benefits 
of lessening any negative psychological and morale problems (Heaton, 2001; 
Krausnick et al., 1965; Wilson, 2000b). It has been suggested that soldiers can often 
overcome feelings of personal guilt for combat actions by centring these actions on 
the premise that they were obeying orders from a legitimate authority (Bourke, 1999). 
The argument has been raised that perhaps rather than being seen as committing acts 
of evil, these soldiers were in fact just following orders. After all, “… generally the 
entire code of the German military, and especially the SS, emphasised complete, 
  363 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
unquestioning obedience” (Baumeister, 1999:324). It was this unquestioning 
obedience that many Waffen-SS veterans would argue dictated that they had to follow 
criminal orders. 
 
Just following orders 
The justification for barbarity in conflicts has often been that the issue is resolved 
swiftly and decisively and this in itself is a more humane act (Utley, 1999). This is 
often the evil logic upon which total wars are based upon. Some would argue that evil 
is a necessary part of warfare. “To be sure, there is the moral fact that war is an evil, a 
great evil, and in the eyes of some the greatest evil” (Manent, 2002:140). But does 
this proposition entail that to ensure victory one needs to embrace evil and embark 
upon warfare without restraint? Does one need to unquestioningly follow orders that 
are obviously evil? If one common theme comes out of the episodes of history it is the 
concept of total war, which so often in recent decades has led to the committing of 
evil acts in the name of war.  
 
The concept of total war is of a war that is “… waged by all manner of means, not 
only against an enemy armed force, but against the entire population of a nation, with 
a view to its complete destruction” (Alger, 1985). There are two distinct but 
interrelated parts to total war; first the armed forces and the entire nation are exposed 
to attack, and second the armed forces and the entire nation are mobilised for war (K. 
A. Maier, 1985). “Civilian population centres are targeted…” so as to destroy the 
ability and will of the enemy to continue the conflict (Brennan, 2002:8). Indeed the 
“… distinction between soldier and civilian is lost” (Von Trotha, 1999:418).  
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This targeting of civilians contravenes accepted war conventions and moves the 
conflict into the bounds of evil acts.  Judge Parker highlighted this link between war 
crimes and total war in his judgment of the major war criminals before the IMT: 
The truth remains that war crimes were committed on a vast scale … by every conceivable 
circumstance of cruelty and horror. There can be no doubt that the majority of them arose from 
the Nazi conception of “total war”, with which the aggressive wars were waged. For in this 
conception of “total war”, the moral ideas underlying the conventions which seek to make war 
more humane are no longer regarded as having force or validity. Everything is made 
subordinate to the overmastering dictates of war. Rules, regulations, assurances and treaties all 
alike are of no moment, and so, freed from the restraining influence of international law, the 
aggressive war is conducted by the Nazi leaders in the most barbaric way. Accordingly, war 
crimes were committed when and wherever the Führer and his close associates thought them to 
be advantageous. They were for the most part the result of cold and criminal calculation.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 1:227) 
 
In total war the civilian nation is exposed to attack. As a result of this the whole 
nation is mobilised for warfare (Chickering, 1999; K. A. Maier, 1985). For example, 
during the conflict on the Eastern Front the Russians’ ability to use civilian groups to 
form partisan groups became a serious problem for the German forces. As a result 
mopping-up operations were conducted to eradicate suspected partisan groups. This 
notion of partisan groups or bandits was a loose definition that included unwanted 
elements of society such as Jews and intellectuals and gave the Germans the excuse to 
target civilians as well as the military during the conflict (Heaton, 2001; Wilson, 
2000b).  
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In the area of the Pripet Marshes the 1st and 2nd SS Calvary Regiments104 conducted 
mopping-up or pacification operations (Wilson, 2000b). These regiments were 
combined to form the SS Cavalry Brigade in August 1941 and answered directly to 
Himmler’s staff (Bender & Taylor, 1972; Buchler, 1986; Trang, 2000). The brigade 
came under the control of Waffen-SS General, SS-Gruppenführer Hermann Fegelein, 
who later married Gretl Braun (sister of Hitler’s mistress Eva Braun). In the last days 
of the war in 1945 Hitler had Fegelein arrested and shot as a scapegoat for Himmler’s 
disloyal conduct (Bender & Taylor, 1972; Yerger, 1997). On the 12th of August 1941 
SS-Sturmbannführer Magill of the 2nd regiment reported that: 
Jewish marauders were shot. Only a few manual labourers employed by the Wehrmacht repair 
shops were spared. Driving the women and children towards the marshes did not have the 
desired effect as the marshes were not deep enough to ensure drowning … The total number of 
marauders and others shot by the reitende Abteilung stands at 6526 men. About 10 prisoners 
were taken away … Overall, the operation may be described as a success. (Trang, 2000:32). 
 
Magill went on to serve in the 14th Galicia Grenadier Division (Westwood, 2001). He 
was later convicted by a German court105 of the mass shooting of thousands of Jews in 
the Pripet area, among them at least 4500 Jews from the Pinsk ghetto (Ruter & de 
Mildt, 2004). He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with three other SS 
soldiers.  
 
The infliction of total war has been a strategy of choice by groups, governments and 
individuals as the most suitable means to an end, whether they be personal or 
                                                 
104 This regiment would later form part of the 8th Waffen-SS Calvary Division Florian Geyer. 
 
105 FR case 570 refers.  
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political. These methods can lead to an intensification of the way in which a conflict 
is conducted. This intensification can also be intended to limit the conflict (this can 
seen as a limitation in size and duration of the conflict) (Strachan, 2000). It was 
perhaps ominous that over dinner in August 1942 Hitler likened the fight against the 
partisans in Russia to the American Indian conflict; “The struggle we are waging 
against the partisans is very much like the struggle in North America against the Red 
Indians. Victory will go to the strong, and strength is on our side. At all costs we will 
establish law and order there” (Trevor-Roper, 2000:621). Undeniably some argue that 
by not engaging in the total war philosophy the risks of defeat increase (Brennan, 
2002). When one considers this it is clear that the end in any conflict is victory. Does 
this then justify the contention that victory must be achieved by any means?  
 
This is the same logic used by the German Army on the Eastern Front. Its 
Commander in Chief, Von Brauchitsch, argued that in the fight against partisan 
groups “… the essential rapid pacification of the country can be achieved only if 
every threat on the part of the hostile civilian population is dealt with ruthlessly. All 
pity and softness are weakness and constitute a danger” (Forster, 1985:313). It is often 
the case that evil means are used because they are seen as been more effective than 
other means (Baumeister, 1999). The above examples give rise to the claim of 
military necessity. Military necessity being the pursuit of strategic or tactical 
advantage/disadvantage that can allow “… destructive interests to come to the fore to 
the detriment of individual protection” (Streim, 1997:305).  
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Attempting to use such justifications has led to terrible atrocities, which seek to gain 
validation from claims of necessity or usefulness from a military perspective. The 
result of this being “… that moral and legal constraints on the conduct of war have 
been increasingly ignored” (Wilkins, 2001:87). Such actions, however, fly in the face 
of the law of war and humanitarian considerations and as such are unjustifiable 
actions. The problem of justification re the military action arises when the “… use of 
such tactics, if carried to an extreme … be disproportionate to the military results 
obtained. Strictly speaking the principle of military necessity outlaws useless 
violence” (Peppers, 1974:146). The judgment of the Nuremberg Trials made it clear 
that “… egregiously harmful actions that are not justified by military necessity…” 
were to be seen as war crimes (Wilkins, 2001:51). 
 
During the conflict on the Eastern Front the German forces resorted to brutal tactics, 
which were more than “… a means to an ends, but rather the only way to conduct the 
struggle” (Birn, 1997:287). After all, given the impressive early victories of the 
Germans using their traditional military doctrines, it was hardly a necessary military 
measure for them to kill Russian prisoners or allow the Einsatzgruppen to rampage 
behind the front lines. These type of actions were not necessary for success in the 
Western campaign, so why were they in the Eastern campaign? In the East the aim of 
the conflict was the total destruction of the enemy.  
 
When Hitler invaded Russia he was not of a mind to only go so far then seek political 
finalisation to the conflict. This might have left the communist regime intact. Rather, 
he was intent on the destruction of the communist system of government and the 
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perceived cause of this system, the Jews, and a nation that was racially abhorrent to 
him. Hitler clearly outlined what he expected from the conflict in the East: 
St. Petersburg must therefore disappear utterly from the earth’s surface. Moscow too ... It is not 
by taking over the miserable Russian hovels that we shall establish ourselves as masters in the 
East … As for the ridiculous 100 million Slavs, we will mould the best of them to the shape that 
suits us and we will isolate the rest of them in their pigsties; and anyone who talks about 
cherishing the local inhabitant and civilising him, goes straight off into a concentration-camp. 
(Trevor-Roper, 2000:617) 
 
This quote reinforces the contention that the total war concept not only applies to the 
application of force to the enemy, but also to the notion of blind obedience of the 
citizens of the nation conducting the war. Indeed Hitler was well aware that the war 
on the Eastern Front would “… entail the mass slaughter of Jews and Communists: 
moreover, he was not the only German who knew it” (Forster, 1985:304).  
 
Many soldiers of the Waffen-SS relied on the claim that they were just following 
orders and as such should not be held liable for their actions. For any defence of 
superior orders to succeed the defendant must prove two parts; first that the orders 
were acted on under duress, and second that the person carrying out the order was 
ignorant of their illegality. The illegality of many of the orders that the Waffen-SS 
executed would seem to be beyond argument, so it is worth examining the issue of 
duress and following superior orders. At Nuremberg, Chief SS Judge Gunther 
Reinecke claimed that there was no latitude for members of the Waffen-SS to avoid 
the tasks they undertook when questioned by the defence counsel for the SS. 
HERR PELCKMAN: Was it possible for members of the Waffen-SS to leave the Waffen-SS if 
they did not agree with the tasks which they were given or the orders which were issued? 
  369 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
REINECKE: A possibility of this sort did not exist at all. Service in the Waffen-SS was military 
service, legally established and legally recognised. Even members of the Waffen-SS who had 
joined as volunteers were later subject to general conscription and bound by compulsory 
military service. It was therefore possible to leave the Waffen-SS only by means of desertion, 
and then the deserter would have had to expect the full consequences of the law. 
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 20:445) 
 
SS-Gruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf put this same proposition forward during the 
Einsatzgruppen trial: 
I would like to say the following: The men of my group who are under indictment here were 
under my military command. If they had not executed the orders which they were given, they 
would have been ordered by me to execute them. If they had refused to execute the orders they 
would have had to be called to account for it by me. There could be no doubt about it. Whoever 
refused anything in the front lines would have met immediate death. If the refusal would have 
come about in any other way, a court martial of the Higher SS and Police Leader would have 
brought about the same consequences. The jurisdiction of courts martial was great, but the 
sentences of the SS were gruesome. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:249) 
 
When asked again about the issue of following orders Ohlendorf stated the following: 
DR. ASCHENAUER. The concluding question concerning the set of questions concerning 
Russia — What was your power of decision concerning execution orders?  
OHLENDORF. I do not think I have to repeat this. As to the orders for execution, even if 
applying the harshest standard, I had no possibility whatever to circumvent them. 
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:267) 
 
On the face of it the proposition that soldiers were just following orders may appear a 
valid argument, yet this is exactly the type of contention that the subjects in 
Milgram’s experiment relied upon. That being that they were merely following the 
directions of a legitimate authority (the experiment supervisor) to justify the 
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undertaking of wrongful acts. They relied on the false claim that they had no choice 
but to act as directed by the experimenter (Baumeister, 1999). The exception here is 
that those who joined the Waffen-SS, in the early years at least, did so in a voluntary 
capacity. As noted by Kressel “… unlike the Milgram subjects, many Nazis sought 
out their destructive roles, entering the party, attending rallies and joining the SS” 
(Kressel, 2002:162). Members of the SS were in effect involved in self-selection, with 
a preference for military activities and a belief in Nazi ideology (Staub, 2002). 
 
There is criticism of the principle of obedience to orders absolving the men following 
them. Gewirth (2001) suggests that those who give the orders are guilty of primary 
criminality, while those who obey orders that they know to be wrongful have a 
secondary guilt attached to them. On the Eastern Front the German soldiers were “… 
not mere victims of their own military tradition. The relationship between the 
Wehrmacht and Hitler with regard to the Soviet Union was determined in large 
measure by a consensus on both ideological matters and Germany’s role in Europe 
and world politics” (Forster, 1985:312). In other words, we have the interaction 
between the soldier’s disposition and the situation of the ideological conflict. 
 
The argument has been raised that the failure to follow orders may result in some 
worse punishment for the individual involved. As this study is examining the Waffen-
SS as its case study it will concentrate on this situation as it applies in this context of 
German soldiers during World War II. The example of the soldiers in 101st Police 
Battalion clearly refutes this thinking. They were involved in actual cleansing 
operations on the Eastern Front, yet of those few who refused, none were shot out of 
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hand (Browning, 1998). Wolfgang Filor of the Das Reich Division recounts how he 
was ordered to shoot a fellow SS soldier but refused: 
Today, when someone for the SS says: “If I hadn’t done it, I’d have been shot”, I say: that’s 
simply not true, or else he had a superior officer with no humanity or comradeship. For 
example, in October 1942 in Stralsund, I was ordered to take part in the execution of an NCO in 
the SS. I went to my superior officer and said: “I volunteered to fight at the front. I don’t want 
to execute anyone.” He asked me, “Are you refusing to obey an order?” but he let me go. Twenty 
others did volunteer the next day because they got a bottle of wine and the next day were given 
a pass to walk around Stralsund. (Knopp, 2002:253) 
 
The stories of the SS would have us believe that Filor would have been hauled off and 
shot for his refusal, but he was not. Even Einsatzgruppen officer Otto Ohlendorf was 
forced in his later testimony to admit under questioning from the prosecution that he 
had successfully refused orders from security chief Reinhard Heydrich. 
Q. You were ordered three times to join the Einsatzgruppen, were you not?  
A. Yes.  
Q. And twice you refused?  
A. Yes.  
Q. The order in the first instance came from Heydrich?  
A. Yes.  
Q. The second order for you to become a member of the Einsatzgruppe came from Heydrich?  
A. Yes.  
Q. You refused both the first and the second order?  
A. Yes.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:276) 
 
It is clear that few, if any, German soldiers were shot for failing to obey orders to 
shoot civilians (Baumeister, 1999; Birn, 1997; Blass, 2002; Klee et al., 1988). 
Investigations by the Central Office of the German Lander Justice Department after 
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the war showed that “… there is no known case where refusal to shoot the Jews 
resulted in damage to life and limb” (Birn, 1997:283). When giving evidence at 
various post-war German trials an expert, Hans Gunter Seraphim, declared that the 
“… closest scrutiny of all available SS records does not reveal one single instance 
where some objector to following criminal orders had endangered his own life” 
(Wolfson, 1965:568). In his graphic account of the Holocaust Klee (Klee et al., 1988) 
gives voice to many veterans whose accounts show that the disobedience of criminal 
orders did not and would not result in any kind of draconian punishment. The 
following are just some of the responses in relation to the argument that failure to 
obey criminal orders would have resulted in terrible punishment. “I carried out the 
orders not because I was afraid I would be punished by death if I didn’t … my 
chances of promotion would be spoilt or I would not be promoted at all” (Klee et al., 
1988:79). 
 
When a reservist from a Police battalion refused to shoot innocent victims, his 
commander; “… called me a coward and cissy and the like … Finally he said ‘He is 
not even worthy of that kind of duty’, by which he wanted to emphasise my 
uselessness for ‘tough action” (Klee et al., 1988:79). When asked about what 
disciplinary action would be taken against those who refused to take part in the mass 
executions an SS officer remarked “Not a lot. I never knew of such a case…” (Klee et 
al., 1988:79). 
 
 A top-secret document prepared for the SS and Police courts showed that between 
1939 and 1944 only some 1000 SS men were shot as punishment for various 
infractions (Wolfson, 1965). When one considers that up to 900,000 men served in the 
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Waffen-SS, the number of executions indicate that less than 0.1% were executed by 
the SS courts. Further to this, the SS Statistical Annual gave the figures in relation to 
discharges from the SS.  In 1938 alone some 8033 SS members were discharged out 
of the SS. Of these some 5104 obtained an honourable discharge at their own request 
(Wolfson, 1965).  What this shows is that it was entirely possible to achieve exit from 
the SS if the individual wanted such. The annual records depicting reasons for the 
discharges out of the SS as follows clearly indicates a variety of ways for a member of 
the SS to leave the organisation.106 
 
Note that some 14 SS men were discharged for refusal to obey orders, they were not 
executed. These figures “… strongly rebut the contention of those SS members who 
have argued that release from the SS would have involved punishments, reprisals and 
possibly death” (Wolfson, 1965:566). Indeed, many of the West European volunteers 
                                                 
106 Note this table includes 5104 members who voluntarily discharged from the SS and 357 who were 
discharged due to unsuitability. 
Reason Number of Discharges 
Change of occupation 
 
2074 
Transfer to other Nazi organisations 499 
Transfer to the Army 936 
Sickness 905 
Transfer to the Reich Labor Service 130 
Refusal to accept the marriage decree of the SS 83 
Overseas stays 45 
Various reasons 432 
Inservice Unsuitability including: 
Apathy – 173 
Violations – 24 
Refusal to obey orders – 14 
Nazi Party issues - 68 
Other reasons – 78 
357 
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for the SS were allowed to return to their home countries at the end of their enlistment 
period, they were not forced to stay in the Waffen-SS (Buss & Mollo, 1978).  
 
Even some of the SS doctors involved in the euthanasia of patients in German mental 
institutions were able to “… quit their horrible task…” with no mention of 
punishment (Reitlinger, 1957:274). The salient point raised by Baumeister (1999), 
however, is that many of the soldiers believed or claimed to believe that they could be 
shot and here lies the justification for their actions. Even today the same claim is 
made, as one Waffen-SS veteran stated in a recent documentary: 
We grew up as Nazis, Hitler Youth of course … I was enthusiastic, there was no opportunity for 
employment, but at that time I could not see the connections. Today of course I can see it 
differently. I must say we are guilty, very guilty. Except the individual soldier, as such he just 
did his duty. And if we had said, “We don’t want to do it any more” we would have been shot 
immediately, they did that often enough. (Carruthers, 2001) 
 
This belief can perhaps be equated to the soldiers claiming that they perceived they 
had no choice but to conduct objectionable acts. This belief led many of the killers to 
try and mount a defence under the guise of duress.  
 
For this defence to succeed the soldier must be able to show that the threat to their 
wellbeing must be imminent, real and inevitable (Peppers, 1974).  Many killers 
argued that they held a sincere belief and acted in accordance of this belief that to fail 
to obey an order would lead to death. This thinking falls into difficulty, however, if 
one considers that while: 
… such fears under the totalitarian Nazi regime might sound logical, there is evidence to show 
that several policemen did refuse to obey such repugnant orders and that they suffered no 
punishment. Indeed, some were subsequently promoted, showing that neither their lives nor 
  375 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
their careers were threatened. Once it became clear that no ill befell those who refused similar 
orders, there was little or no excuse for those who did obey and took part in the massacre of 
innocent civilians. (Williamson & Vuksic, 2002:14) 
 
The testimony of SS-Gruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf at Nuremberg is a good example 
of this type of thinking. When questioned as to why orders to kill innocent civilians 
were followed he gave the following responses: 
HERR BABEL: You personally were not concerned with the execution of these orders? 
OHLENDORF: I led the Einsatzgruppe, and therefore I had the task of seeing how the 
Einsatzkommandos executed the orders received. 
HERR BABEL: But did you have no scruples in regard to the execution of these orders? 
OHLENDORF: Yes, of course. 
HERR BABEL: And how is it that they were carried out regardless of these scruples? 
OHLENDORF: Because to me it is inconceivable that a subordinate leader should not carry out 
orders given by the leaders of the state. 
HERR BABEL: This is your own opinion. But this must have been not only your point of view, 
but also the point of view of the majority of the people involved. Didn’t some of the men 
appointed to execute these orders ask you to be relieved of such tasks? 
OHLENDORF: I cannot remember any one concrete case. I excluded some whom I did not 
consider emotionally suitable for executing these tasks and I sent some of them home. 
HERR BABEL: Was the legality of the orders explained to these people under false pretences? 
OHLENDORF: I do not understand your question; since the order was issued by the superior 
authorities, the question of legality could not arise in the minds of these individuals, for they 
had sworn obedience to the people who had issued the orders. 
HERR BABEL: Could any individual expect to succeed in evading the execution of these 
orders? 
OHLENDORF: No, the result would have been a court martial with a corresponding sentence.  
(The United Nations War Crime Commission, 1946: Vol 4:353) 
 
This argument can be soundly rejected. Ohlendorf’s own testimony refutes the 
proposition that one could do nothing but obey orders given. It has been contended 
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that many of the German executioners were fully aware that they did not have to 
conduct the killings as ordered, “… the men simply knew that they did not have to 
kill” (Goldhagen, 1997:380). In fact “… even in the army, enlisted soldiers and high 
officers often could avoid participation in the murder of unarmed civilians” (Zukier, 
1994:429). This proposition is supported by testimony from killers themselves and 
also various studies of units involved in the killing processes (Browning, 1998; 
Goldhagen, 1997; Krausnick et al., 1965; Williamson & Vuksic, 2002). Browning  
(Browning, 1998:170) goes on to argue that there is a clear lack of evidence in any of 
the post-war trials that indicates that soldiers were shot for refusing to obey orders “… 
to kill unarmed civilians”.  
 
Indeed, former Federal German Senior Chief State Prosecutor Alfred Spiess 
conducted a detailed study of SS and Police crimes (Mollo, 1982). He outlines one 
case in which a police reservist refused to carry out the shootings of civilians; no 
punishment was given to the soldier. Spiess was curious about this and spoke to a 
number of SS judges to see why in situations such as this the soldiers were not court 
martialled. The SS judges stated the following to him: 
The explanation is very simple. If these people had been brought before an SS and Police court, 
it would have to establish which order had been disobeyed. What sort of order was it? In one 
case it would have been an order for the mass murder of Jews, and in another the shooting of 
women and children. But these were both criminal orders, and according to the Military Penal 
Code, paragraph 47, clause 3, which was still valid in those days, a soldier was not obliged to 
carry out a criminal order. You see, that meant that this Military Penal Code was also applicable 
to the SS and Police, and so when a man is brought before a court, the court has to ascertain if 
the order was criminal and who gave the order. One would have found the chain of command 
ending up with Hitler himself - and that was simply out of the question, wasn’t it? (Mollo, 
1982:68) 
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Paragraph 47 of the German Manual of Military Law limited the notion of 
unconditional obedience with two moral justifications. First, that the order “… must 
be confined to the pursuit of some military objective…” and second, “… pursuit of 
the military objective is only justified if it serves some higher national purpose and if 
the military organisation as a whole forms an integral part of a wider state 
organisation. If a military command runs counter to the general state system it has 
neither purpose nor justification…” (Krausnick et al., 1965:306). This raises two 
important points, first, many of the orders given and obeyed by the Waffen-SS served 
no military purpose and second, the Waffen-SS was not part of the general state 
apparatus. It was designed to serve “… ideological and extra-state political 
purposes…” (Krausnick et al., 1965:309). 
 
If one examines Ohlendorf’s responses carefully he himself admits that he allowed 
soldiers who found the task unsuitable or who were incapable of performing the task 
to return home, with no mention of any form of punishment. The judges of the 
Einsatzgruppen case also noted this fact and in their judgement stated: 
One may accuse the Nazi military hierarchy of cruelty, even sadism if one will. But it may not be 
lightly charged with inefficiency. If any of these Kommando leaders had stated that they were 
constitutionally unable to perform this cold-blooded slaughter of human beings, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that they would have been assigned to other duties, not out of 
sympathy or for humanitarian reasons, but for efficiency’s sake alone. In fact Ohlendorf himself 
declared on this very subject — “In two and a half years I had sufficient occasion to see how 
many of my Gruppe [group] did not agree to this order in their inner opinion. Thus, I forbade 
the participation in these executions on the part of some of these men, and I sent some back to 
Germany.” Ohlendorf himself could have got out of his execution assignment by refusing 
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cooperation with the army. He testified that the Chief of Staff in the field said to him that if he, 
Ohlendorf, did not cooperate, he would ask for his dismissal in Berlin.  
(The United Nations War Crime Commission, 1946: Vol 4:481) 
 
The judges rejected the SS defence proposition that the soldiers were following 
superior orders under duress. During a killing action undertaken in occupied Russia in 
1941 a number of Order Police “… dropped out because they personally knew some 
of the 201 victims or could not stand the mental pressure” (Matthaus, 1996:136). No 
mention is made of any of these soldiers being disciplined or shot for failure to 
participate in the shootings.  
 
Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and General Blaskowitz, both senior commanders of the 
Wehrmacht, refused to allow or criticised the cleansing operations being undertaken 
in Poland, yet neither were marched off and shot (Zukier, 1994). During the initial 
occupation of Poland, Von Rundstedt forbade Einsatzgruppen to operate in his area of 
control. Himmler gave into this stand against his cleansing actions (Hohne, 1969).  
 
Blaskowitz went so far as to prepare a written list of atrocities committed by the SS in 
Poland and sent such to the Führer demanding that action be taken. “Blaskowitz 
collected reports of SS crimes in Poland and collated them in a memorandum 
dispatched to the C-in C of the Army in mid-November 1939. By 18 November the 
Blaskowitz memorandum was on Hitler’s desk” (Hohne, 1969:306). Part of the 
memorandum requested that executions only be carried out after a proper court had 
delivered a sentence. Hitler rejected this notion outright as “childish ideas” on behalf 
of such generals (Hohne, 1969:306). Blaskowitz was not drummed out the door and 
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shot, rather he was shortly moved to the Western Front, and Poland was put under the 
control of more reliable party and SS elements. This clearly shows that senior officers 
did and could have protested against the cleansing actions undertaken on the Eastern 
Front, and done so without the threat of being shot. 
 
Some soldiers in the 101st Police Battalion refused to commit the killings. None were 
punished for this (although they were ostracised). One officer in fact was transferred 
to a safer assignment in Germany (Browning, 1998). Some members of the Order 
Police when involved in killing actions in occupied Russia in 1941 later “… among 
themselves, raised doubts about the legality of the execution” (Matthaus, 1996:136). 
Matthaus cites an example of a small Gendarme detachment stationed in occupied 
Russia whose actions were observed by a Jewish interpreter. The Gendarmerie were 
part of the German Order Police and is best described as being the “…equivalent to a 
village policeman … In occupied Eastern Europe Gendarmerie personnel were used 
to supervise and control static local native police units…” (Williamson & Vuksic, 
2002:24). The unit referred to by Matthaus was commanded by an individual who 
disliked carrying out killing actions against Jews. As such his men “… were able to 
abstain from participating in the shooting, if they so desired” (Matthaus, 1996:141).  
 
This raises the issue of initiative. Initiative to do or not do the evil act, this was clearly 
a choice that was available to men of the Waffen-SS on the Eastern Front. The 
distances were simply too vast for the top Nazi bureaucrats to personally enforce their 
extermination policies. They had to rely on their subordinates to this on their own 
initiative on receipt of general orders in this regard. SS-Gruppenführer Odilo 
Globocnik for instance decided to kill all the Jews in his area. Later he presented this 
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proposal to Himmler for approval (Lower, 2002). Lower (2002) terms this type of 
behaviour as anticipatory obedience This example leads us back to the interactional 
approach to the explanation of evil acts. In the above case it is clear that despite their 
being a situation that was conducive to evil acts being conducted (the state having 
authorised killing actions of the Jews), much still depended on the individual’s 
disposition as to how and if the action was undertaken. Indeed in military terms one 
could frame the policies of Himmler as a strategic evil (the situation) and the actions 
of the subordinates as tactical evil (the dispositions and actions of the individual). 
 
The testimony of SS-Brigadeführer Franz Six shows that there was clear scope for 
soldiers of the Waffen-SS to question and take responsibility even when involved in 
some of the worst activities on the Eastern Front. Six was convicted in 1948 and 
sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, which was later commuted to 10 years. He was 
released in 1952 (MacLean, 1999b). SS-Brigadeführer Six, a former university 
professor, was attached to Einsatzgruppe B as commander of the Vorkommando 
Moscow, which operated as part of Army Group Centre in 1941-1942 (MacLean, 
1999b). Six served in the 2nd Waffen-SS Panzer Division Das Reich. He was later 
transferred to the Foreign Office and went on to become head of the information 
department there (Klee et al., 1988; MacLean, 1999b). He puts paid to the myth that 
men of the Einsatzgruppen were victims of their situations with no choice but to obey 
orders: 
During the war a person could at least try to have himself transferred from an Einsatzgruppe. I 
myself managed to do this successfully … there were without doubt cases where people who 
were transferred from an Einsatzgruppe suffered disadvantage. I can no longer recall any 
individual cases. Nonetheless, as far as I know, nobody was shot as a result. One could apply to 
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the RSHA107 for a transfer to the front or to be released for service in another field. (Klee et al., 
1988:83) 
 
The testimony would seem to render the claim of Reinecke and other Waffen-SS 
apologists of having no choice but to commit evil acts as not being quite true. Further 
to this, SS–Obersturmbannführer Albert Hartl, an officer attached to 
Einsatzkommando C gave evidence of how it was possible to avoid committing these 
atrocities. The judges in the Einsatzgruppen case made specific reference to it: 
The witness Hartl testified that Thomas, Chief of Einsatzgruppe B, declared that all those who 
could not reconcile their conscience to the Führer Order, that is, people who were too soft, as he 
said, would be sent back to Germany or assigned to other tasks, and that, in fact, he did send a 
number of people including commanders back to the Reich.  
(The United Nations War Crime Commission, 1946: Vol 4:482) 
 
There is a capacity to question orders that appear to be immoral. How does one show 
that the individual soldier does indeed bear moral responsibility for their actions? 
Does the need to obey superior orders justify the individual soldier in surrendering or 
restricting their personal moral judgements and responsibilities? This study would 
argue no. A clear indication of how bankrupt the above argument is can be seen in 
Article 33 of the Rome Statute: 
Superior orders and prescription of law 1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, 
whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility108 unless: 
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in 
question; 
                                                 
107 The Reich Security Head Office, which included the Gestapo, Security Police and Criminal Police. 
The RSHA was responsible for the direct orders for the Einsatzgruppen. 
 
108 My italics. 
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(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and 
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful. 
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are 
manifestly unlawful. 
 
This is unmistakable proof that the international community expects soldiers to 
exercise moral responsibility and judgement when involved in combat duties. While 
the Rome Statute may be a relatively new legal instrument, one can find the same 
principles outlined in more relevant laws of the time. Take for example Articles 43 
and 46 of the Hague Conference of 1907, Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague 
IV); October 18, 1907, which outline the duties of an occupying force: 
Article 43.  The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the 
occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as 
possible, public order and safety109, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in 
force in the country.  
Article 46. Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as 
religious convictions and practice, must be respected.110  
 
The preamble to this convention clearly outlines the objectives sought by the 
conference: 
... These provisions, the wording of which has been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils 
of war111, as far as military requirements permit, are intended to serve as a general rule of 
conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relations and in their relations with the inhabitants. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
109 My italics. 
110 My italics. 
111 My italics. 
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The Geneva Convention of 1929 also set out to ensure that warfare was conducted in 
an orderly manner and resulted in humane treatment of combatants and civilians alike. 
An example of this is Article 2 that dealt with the treatment of prisoners of war: 
Article 2. Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Power, but not of the individuals or 
corps who have captured them. They must at all times be humanely treated and protected, 
particularly against acts of violence, insults and public curiosity. Measures of reprisal against 
them are prohibited.  
 
Of note is that Germany was signatory to both the Hague and Geneva Conventions as 
to the conduct of war and the laws and customs of war on land, yet when it suited 
them the Germans ignored these treaties at will. The formation of the Nuremberg 
Trials at the conclusion of World War II demonstrated a “… decision by the Allies 
that individual officials bear personal responsibility for outrageous conduct towards 
their own citizens and foreigners during wartime” (Ratner & Abrams, 1997:6). To 
step outside the boundaries of what is acceptable military conduct places blame for 
the act clearly on the shoulders of the individual committing the act. There can be no 
reliance on the claim that they were just carrying out a military activity with no room 
for individual moral judgements. Indeed the war crime categories outlined at 
Nuremberg showed that society “… requires individual obedience to higher moral 
principles…” than that of just following orders (Peppers, 1974:133). 
 
The IMT Charter at Nuremberg denounced the defences under the heads of superior 
orders, command of law and acts committed in the name of the state. These principles 
were adopted by later war-crime trials (Peppers, 1974; Ratner & Abrams, 1997). The 
judges in the Einsatzgruppen case made the following comment in their judgement: 
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The Einsatz battalions were not being called upon to face shot and shell. They were not ordered 
to charge into the mouths of cannon. They were called upon to shoot unarmed civilians 
standing over their graves. No soldier would be disgraced in asking to be excused from so one-
sided a battle. No soldier could be accused of cowardice in seeking relief from a duty which was, 
after all, not a soldier's duty. No soldier or officer attempting escape from such a task would be 
pleading avoidance of a military obligation. He would simply be requesting not to be made an 
assassin. And if the leaders of the Einsatzgruppen had all indicated their unwillingness to play 
the assassin's part, this black page in German history would not have been written.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 4:484)     
 
Perhaps the most damning evidence that those committing atrocities knew what they 
were doing was wrong is in their own reactions to the acts they performed. As I have 
previously noted, perpetrators of evil acts often suffer both physically and mentally as 
a result of the actions they undertake. It is of interest that despite claims by some 
perpetrators of atrocities that they were merely following orders, they suffered 
enormous side-effects from the trauma of what they did. This, it could be argued, is 
clear evidence that despite what the perpetrators state, one can perhaps infer their true 
state of mind by the unconscious physical and psychological reactions they had to the 
acts they were committing. It is of interest that of the some 105 Waffen-SS army, 
corps and divisional commanders studied by Yerger, some 11 per cent committed 
suicide at the end of the war (Yerger, 1997, 1999). Another five per cent were 
executed for war crimes on the Eastern Front (Yerger, 1997, 1999).112 This high 
suicide rate could perhaps be argued as a side-effect of the enormous crimes that the 
Waffen-SS commanders were required to undertake. 
 
                                                 
112 Twelve officers committed suicide and five were executed by Russians and Yugoslav war crime 
trails. 
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There are problems associated with calling upon individuals to perform evil actions. 
The committing of atrocities can place “… those who were involved … under 
massive psychological stress” (Schroder, 1997:321). To avoid this SS officer 
Ohlendorf of Einsatzgruppen D gave orders “… for several people to shoot 
simultaneously, in order to avoid any individual having to take direct, personal 
responsibility” (Klee et al., 1988:60). Indeed the search for more efficient killing 
procedures was driven by the need to increase the cleansing of the target groups and 
also lessen the psychological impact on the men doing the killings (Lifton, 2000; 
Rhodes, 2002). The conduct of the killing actions in occupied Russia required the 
perpetrators to have a high level of contact with the victims prior to and while the 
killings took place. This psychological strain placed on the perpetrators was “… thus 
extraordinary and of an altogether different kind than in situations of military combat” 
(Matthaus, 1996:139).  
 
Even one of the main architects of the slaughter found it difficult to deal with. In 
August 1941 Himmler visited Minsk on the Eastern Front, and there requested that 
members of Einsatzgruppen B conduct a cleansing action so that he could witness the 
executions. As a result some 100 prisoners were taken to the outskirts of the city and 
shot. SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, a general on Himmler’s staff, was present 
and gave this account of the incident after the war: 
It was of course inevitable that Himmler had a look, and from these shots, shots to the head, 
bits of brains spurted out and splattered in a high arc on to his coat. He trembled, didn’t he? Of 
course he was nauseated by what he saw. Then he began to stagger and reel. (Halliley, 2003) 
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Himmler’s doctor was called to attend him. So disturbed was he by what he had seen 
that Himmler sought a better way to kill that would involve less stress on the 
perpetrators and also be more efficient. The use of the gas chambers was seen as one 
way of depersonalising the killings and introducing the concept of distance between 
victim and perpetrator (Lifton, 2000; Zukier, 1994). In modern times the increase in 
the types of weaponry available have allowed soldiers to kill from a considerable 
distance, thus making the act of killing quite impersonal (Jones, 2000). This has 
allowed governments to utilise this advance in technology. 
The Germans took full advantage of this for the purpose of genocide in the World War II, 
although the mass bombing of German cities by the Allies and the use of the atomic bombs in 
Japan – if not genocide – at least demonstrated a willingness to engage in mass slaughter for 
the purpose of ‘good’ against ‘evil’. (Jones, 2000:83) 
 
In the concentration-camps individuals experienced in the performance of evil acts 
were in a position to socialise or adjust newcomers to the situation they found 
themselves in (Darley, 1992). However, even after this socialisation process had taken 
place many individuals still found the acts extremely stressful. Both the doctors and 
the men of the 101st Police Battalion utilised alcohol as a means to deal with the stress 
suffered (Browning, 1998; Lifton, 2000). A Wehrmacht neuropsychiatrist who treated 
large numbers of Einsatzgruppen personnel found “… that 20 per cent of those doing 
the actual killing experienced these symptoms of psychological decompensation” 
(Lifton, 2000:15).  At a post-war trial it was described how some members of the 
Einsatzgruppen refused to obey orders, became drunk and suffered psychological 
illnesses. Even the HSSPF for anti-partisan warfare, Waffen-SS General SS-
Obergruppenführer Bach-Zelewski, was hospitalised for stress-related issues as a 
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result of the executions of Jews that he had directed, while a number of other high SS 
leaders also suffered from mental problems (Headland, 1992; Zukier, 1994). 
 
SS-Obersturmbannführer Albert Hartl, a former Catholic priest and university 
graduate, was an officer attached to Einsatzkommando C. He gave evidence at his 
post-war trial that many of the soldiers in the killing units suffered a range of 
psychological repercussions ranging from impotence to mental derangement 
(MacLean, 1999b; Rhodes, 2002). This evidence of mental conflict can of itself be 
used to argue that members of the killing organisations were well aware that although 
their actions were officially sanctioned, they were not morally justifiable. Indeed, as 
Waller surmises, “… this perpetration-induced traumatic stress is consistent with how 
we expect ordinary, psychologically normal people to react to traumatic events 
outside the realm of ordinary experience” (J. Waller, 2002:69). In conclusion it is the 
case that obedience to orders that, embody or cause evil acts to be committed is an act 
of faith, that leaves the individual accountable and liable for the actions committed. 
 
The SS mentality 
The campaign in the East had begun with unspeakable harshness. We were all firmly convinced 
of the necessity of the battle, all believed in our leaders and in our own strength, and we were in 
no doubt that we would emerge victorious from this confrontation. (Weidinger, 1998:71) 
 
These words of SS-Brigadeführer Otto Kumm give some insight into the mentality of 
the Waffen-SS upon their entry into Russia. It shows the belief that the soldiers of the 
Waffen-SS had in their own justification for the battle, the anticipated outcome of 
such, and their faith in the Nazi leadership. This view is reinforced by the comments 
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of a soldier of the 3rd  SS Totenkopf Panzer Division, Georg Kurpiers “We fought in 
the belief of the Führer, Volk and Vaterland” (Huffman, 2005:30). In his study of a 
small group of SS camp doctors, Dicks found that they displayed the central features 
of authoritarianism (Dicks, 1972; Kressel, 2002). In fact, of the SS members studied 
since the war, many have displayed a preference for monarchical or dictatorial forms 
of government, pride in their military achievements, and a high valuation of loyalty at 
the expense of justice or honour (Kressel, 2002; Staub, 2002; J. M. Steiner, 2000). 
Interviews with SS concentration-camp officers after the war showed that they were 
“… enthusiastic about their role in creating a new world order and glad to do 
whatever was necessary…” to achieve such (Staub, 1989:132).  
 
This is also reflected in a study of Waffen-SS soldiers, which revealed that after the 
war the majority of those studied “… thought of their military past with 
satisfaction…” (J. M. Steiner, 1963:442). As one veteran of the Leibstandarte SS 
Adolf Hitler Division stated: “Back then we hadn’t the slightest doubt about the 
rightness of our cause of the certainty of the ultimate victory. That was what we grew 
up with – at home, in the school, and in the Hitler Youth” (Bartov, 1992:113). This is 
how many of the SS soldiers justify the commission of atrocities; they were an elite 
who were capable of carrying out these crimes for the good of Germany.  
 
In essence the end justified the means, this is how Himmler consecrated the actions 
taken by the SS, even if they involved criminality. Steiner had the following to say of 
his subjects, “… even if the costs had been known for playing these roles, the 
majority of the Waffen-SS, the military branch of the SS, would have still participated 
and had no regrets” (J. M. Steiner, 1963:442). The Waffen-SS morality was based on 
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loyalty to the group, that being the us group. For those outside this group, the them 
group, contempt was held for their rights and privileges (Kren & Rappoport, 1976; 
Wegner, 1990). This loyalty to the group can be referred back to my previous 
discussion about the devaluing of the victim and obedience to orders.  
 
The Waffen-SS fostered an esprit de corps among their troops that enhanced both 
their obedience to authority and also their fighting ability (Hohne, 1969; Ripley, 2004; 
Stein, 1966). Indeed the esprit de corps fostered by the Waffen-SS allowed the soldier 
to see himself as “… a soldier of the Führer” (Wegner, 1990:179). In a post-war study 
it was noted that the “… elite SS divisions … had a larger hard core that other 
divisions of the army, so large as to embrace almost the entire group membership 
during most of the war – accounted for their greater fighting effectiveness” (Shills & 
Janowitz, 1948:286).  
 
This hard core being politically, racially and ideologically committed to the Nazi 
cause. To further strengthen this core, officer candidates had to serve two years in the 
enlisted ranks before entering the Junkerschulen. This helped to mould a bond 
between enlisted personnel and officers (Butler, 1978; Hohne, 1969; Quarrie, 1991). 
The strength of the core of these divisions allowed them again and again to be used 
where the fighting was fiercest with little worry of them failing to carry out orders. It 
also allowed the divisions to be rebuilt time after time when they were destroyed in 
battle. According to one Waffen-SS veteran the formation of the 9th and 10th SS 
Panzer Divisions in late 1943 depended on the fact that “… the young soldiers 
watched their Unterführer and officers and listened to them, for these, mostly old 
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soldiers of the Eastern Front, knew Russia and, with their war experience, formed the 
steel framework of the divisions” (Tieke, 1999:19). 
 
Nipe argues that the Waffen-SS were not politically motivated but rather fought for 
their “… commander and their comrades, political ideals having scarce practical value 
in the daily life of the soldier…” (G. D. Nipe, 1996:268). Indeed it has been suggested 
that many volunteers for the Waffen-SS may not have been driven by a burning 
ideological need, but rather simply wanted to use the Waffen-SS for an alternative 
path to the military (J. M. Steiner, 1963; Weingartner, 1974).  Many veterans such as 
Gerd Rommel (10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, also the son of Field Marshal 
Erwin Rommel), Eduard Janke (11th Panzergrenadier Division Nordland), Erwin 
Bartman (1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler) and Freidrich-Karl 
Wacker (16th SS Panzergrenadier Division Reichsführer-SS) claim they joined the 
Waffen-SS because of its status and favourable impressions they had formed by its 
pre-war parades, etc (Williamson, 1995b).  
 
Indeed, in a post-war interview SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, Himmler’s 
adjutant, stated that when he joined the SS he was told that “Well just as there was an 
elite guard in the Kaiser’s time there is an elite guard now in the new movement and 
that is the SS, you should join the SS” (Bloomberg, 2000). To support this view there 
is considerable evidence that “SS members saw themselves as an elite…” (Staub, 
1989:130). Werner Busse, a veteran of the Frundsberg Division, stated that “I choose 
to volunteer for the Waffen-SS because it was known to have a greater atmosphere of 
comradeship and also because it was an elite force, more dedicated to Germany’s 
cause” (Williamson, 1995b:22). Wolfgang Filor, a veteran of the Das Reich Division, 
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saw it as a great honour to join the Waffen-SS due to the stringent selection 
procedures in place in the early days of the organisation. In essence only the best 
human material was accepted (Halliley, 2003).  
 
At the beginning of its life the SS was extremely selective about who was allowed to 
enter, with stringent screening in place in respect to physical ability and racial 
background (Birn, 1991; Keegan, 1970; Reitlinger, 1957; Wegner, 1990; Williamson, 
1995b). Some volunteers, such as Johann Voss, recounted how on hearing of the 
Waffen-SS and its early war exploits and the supposed pan-European nature of the 
force from a young Waffen-SS friend of his he felt “… carried away by his 
enthusiasm anxious to hear more … this … version of the Waffen-SS and its pan-
European dimension had a new and strong attraction” (Voss, 2002:27).  
 
As has been previously noted, those joining the Waffen-SS could scarcely argue that 
they did not know they were joining an organisation that was based on racial, 
ideological and political ideals. As noted by Stein: 
Elite military formations with high standards of physical selection, aggressive leadership, and 
an esprit de corps supplied by either tradition or ideological indoctrination make extremely 
formidable adversaries. The early SS divisions possessed all of these qualities in abundance, 
and this fact is the key to an understanding of their combat performance. (Stein, 1966:59). 
 
This loyalty manifested itself in the fact that Waffen-SS soldiers saw themselves as an 
elite and had a strong attachment to their unit (Kren & Rappoport, 1976). It is often 
the case that the actions of the soldier in battle are governed not by aggressive 
tendencies, but rather by a sense of duty to their comrades, their unit and their country 
(Jones, 2000). It is of interest then that one SS veteran gives the following insight into 
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how they were able to commit atrocities, “Comradeship was everything. It gave us the 
mental and physical strength to do what others were too weak to do” (Staub, 
1989:130). SS-Obergruppenführer Felix Steiner, commanded of the 5th Wiking 
Division, 3rd SS Panzer Corps, and at the end of the war the 11th SS Army. He gave 
this reasoning for the camaraderie among the Waffen-SS:  
An extensive interest in the welfare of the troops, and the cultivation of the feeling of 
comradeship increased the already close feeling of unit between all the ranks, and strengthened 
the spiritual unity of the troops, and the confidence between officers and men. (F. Steiner, 
1947:9) 
 
This loyalty was converted into blind obedience to the criminal directives and orders 
issued by Hitler and executed by the Waffen-SS (Wegner, 1990; Ziegler, 1989). This 
loyalty to the inner group is still reflected in memoirs written today. SS-
Sturmbannführer Ralf Tiemann, who served as chief operations officer in both the SS 
Leibstandarte and Das Reich Divisions, had this to say on comradeship in the 
Waffen-SS: “This chronicle should serve to quell any doubt that to this very day, 
despite all of the disappointment, demonisation and defamation of our great 
experience, that there is one thing that actively remained in us, the camaraderie.” 
(Tiemann, 1998:7). 
 
The Waffen-SS was seen as an elite. To this end Himmler and the SS went to great 
lengths to promote the successes of the Waffen-SS and idolised those soldiers who 
displayed the qualities valued by the SS in the face of the enemy. SS-
Unterscharführer Fritz Christen was just one of the men put forward as an example of 
the Waffen-SS fighting spirit. On the 24th of September 1941 Christen was attached to 
the antitank detachment of the Totenkopf Division, which was fighting in Russia as 
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part of Army Group North (J. W. Schneider, 1993; Simpson, 1990). Christen was cut 
off from his division and all of his comrades were killed. Despite this, when 
confronted by 15 enemy tanks Christen continued to fire his cannon and destroyed six 
of the attacking tanks. Christen continued to fight the Russians killing some 100 
Russians and destroying 13 enemy tanks over a two-day period (J. W. Schneider, 
1993; Simpson, 1990). He was awarded the Knight’s Cross for this action and at that 
stage of the war was the first enlisted man and the youngest recipient of the award in 
the Waffen-SS (J. W. Schneider, 1993; Simpson, 1990). 
 
The image promulgated by the Waffen-SS was that they were an elite who had to be 
hard on those who stood in the way of their objectives, but they also had to be harder 
on themselves (Kren & Rappoport, 1976). For this reason Himmler often went to 
great lengths to emphasis the sacrifice that the SS men were making by committing 
various atrocities. In a speech to a gathering of SS generals at Posen on the 4th of 
October 1943 Himmler had this to say about the extermination of the Jews: 
I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermination of the Jewish race …  Not one of all those 
who talk this way has witnessed it, not one of them has been through it. Most of you must know 
what it means when 100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500, or a 1000. To have stuck it out 
and at the same time — apart from exceptions caused by human weakness — to have remained 
decent fellows, that is what has made us hard.  
(Nuremberg Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 5:251) 
 
Himmler attempted to fortify himself and those called upon to conduct these killings 
by arguing that this was an onerous duty that only the most loyal and dedicated could 
be trusted to conduct. How successful Himmler was in this respect can be seen in the 
comments of an SS sergeant as to why he engaged in mass executions: 
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The reason I did not say to Leideritz (his commander)113 that I could not take part in these 
things was that I was afraid that Leideritz and others would think that I was a coward … I did 
not want Leideritz or other people to get the impression that I was not as hard as an SS-Man 
ought to have been. (Klee et al., 1988:78) 
 
In 1943 soldiers of the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen were told to conduct 
themselves to the following ideals; “The inner affirmation of struggle, also under the 
most difficult conditions. The courage to face up to every eventuality without 
flinching. Determination in the face of all reverses” (Wegner, 1990:207). A member 
of the 4th SS Panzergrenadier Polizei Division wrote in a letter home describing this 
determination: 
With us now are the new replacements that have arrived. They are all splendid youths. With 
double the zeal we enter now on the training. If then the time for us is coming we will with fresh 
strength and the old fighting spirit set out to our new action. On the Eastern Front the hard 
battle of destiny rages further … we remain hard and keep unshakably erect in and through this 
time and I am proud as well to be an SS officer. For us there is only one thing: To fight and to 
win. (Huffman, 2005:80) 
 
It was this determination and toughness that allowed the Waffen-SS to be so resilient 
to the end of the war. SS-Obergruppenführer Eicke imbued in the Totenkopf Division 
with  “… a potent mixture of intense commitment to the political goals of Germany, 
high unit morale and a healthy dose of pride in their toughness, which was carefully 
developed in the men of the original Waffen-SS divisions” (G. D. Nipe, 1996:126). In 
an order to this division, SS-Obergruppenführer Eicke succinctly outlined the 
hardness that he expected his troops to display on the Eastern Front: 
                                                 
113 My insertion and italics. 
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… Officers, NCOs and men! You have had rich opportunities in hard hours to prove 
characteristics and physical hardness. I call on your hearts. Guard the belief and the corps 
spirit. Belief and spirit moves mountains. If you in the next weeks find things hard to handle, 
then think of it, that this hardness has been brought about by war. Hardness saves blood and 
educates the inner psychological discipline. But behind the hardness beats a warm sympathetic 
heart. There lives the comradeship. I ask for the full employment of your strength, ruthlessness 
in person and clear eyes for the political necessities. We are political soldiers of the Führer. We 
have the passionate belief in the Führer and the unshakable will for the Führer. If called for we 
are prepared to give the highest sacrifice. With this attitude we will win. Hunt on! (Huffman, 
2005:93) 
 
 SS-Obergruppenführer Lothar Debes instructed the 6th SS Division Nord to display 
the following traits regarding leadership; “Leadership and formations must by all 
training not only be educated in combat techniques and hardship, but also in crisis to 
be versatile” (Debes, 1947:36). 
 
This was the much vaunted hardness that the SS placed so much emphasis on 
(Krausnick et al., 1965). Indeed, Himmler would often extol the virtues of toughness 
and hardness in dealing with subhumans and the repugnant acts this involved for the 
soldiers. A series of SS pamphlets discussed SS culture and one was titled “Be Hard!” 
(Pruess Publishing, 2004b). An SS correspondent had this to say in relation to the 
military conflict in the East; “The realisation that only a hardness and ruthlessness 
towards one’s own person shaken by nothing solves the military task, this realisation 
is the principle of this war. We must become even harder” (Pruess Publishing, 
2004b:37). These ideals reflected the thinking of Hitler himself, his justification for 
atrocities being “… shrinking from violence showed moral weakness, while 
willingness to destroy showed moral strength” (Victor, 1998:91).  After witnessing a 
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mass execution Wolff recalls that Himmler gave the commanders of the execution 
squads the following speech: 
He could not relieve them of this duty, he could not spare them in the interests of the Reich, in 
this planned 1000 year Reich, in its first decisive great war since the takeover of power. They 
must do their duty. (Bloomberg, 2000) 
 
In correspondence to Waffen-SS General Gottlob Berger, chief recruiting officer of 
the Waffen-SS, Himmler stated, “The occupied territories will be cleared of Jews. The 
Führer has charged me with carrying out this very difficult task. No-one can relieve 
me of the responsibility. I cannot allow myself the luxury of discussing it” (Krausnick 
et al., 1965:69). SS soldiers were extolled in SS pamphlets that “Bolshevism itself has 
taught us the lesson that there can be no half measures in this conflict. We have 
become steel hard ...We know that fate is in our hands and we will master it” (Pruess 
Publishing, 2001:40). Indeed SS bureaucrats “… expressed the feeling that they had 
done a necessary wartime job with great conscientiousness and self-sacrifice” (Koehl, 
1959:123). This need for hardness can be seen to spring from the fact that the Waffen-
SS were political soldiers. As such they were involved in an eternal struggle, which 
required constant vigilance to protect Germany. This vigilance was necessary because 
the enemy was not clearly defined like that of a purely military soldier, the enemy 
could be external or internal. The distinction between peace and war was a grey one 
and civilian life all but disappeared for the SS soldier (Krausnick et al., 1965; Ziegler, 
1989). This eternal struggle would take a harsh physical form in the conflict in Russia. 
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Difficult life conditions 
The claim has been made that Germany was merely responding to the threat of a 
Russian invasion. Hitler’s Luftwaffe adjutant, Von Below, recalled Hitler stating that 
“He thought it was likely that Russia would attack from the autumn of 1941 onwards 
… Hitler stated that his decision to invade the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941 was 
final” (Von Below, 1980:69). Some Waffen-SS veterans still claim the above. For 
example, in the post-war history of the 1st Company Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler this 
argument is continued; “Can one attribute peace-loving intentions to the Soviet Union 
when it had already transferred 100 divisions to its western frontiers in autumn 1940, 
while on the German side there were only 35?” (Quassowksi, 1999:143). SS-
Brigadeführer Karl Herrmann explained how the invasion of Russia came to his 
knowledge; “Peace and tranquillity, and the generous hospitality of the East Prussian 
population were suddenly and rudely shattered by the well-known Führer 
proclamation of 21 June 1941, with it Hitler opened our eyes to the necessity for this 
campaign” (Herrmann, 1947:1).  
 
This type of thinking is important. It clearly allowed the soldiers of the Waffen-SS to 
see the Russians as the aggressors while they could envisage themselves as the 
protectors and defenders of the Reich. This in turn allowed them to blame the difficult 
life conditions they faced during the conflict on the Russians. The judges of the IMT 
rejected this argument of Russian aggression: 
It was contended for the defendants that the attack upon the U.S.S.R., was justified because the 
Soviet Union was contemplating an attack upon Germany and making preparations to that end. 
It is impossible to believe that this view was ever honestly entertained.  
(The International Military Tribunal, 1946: Vol 1:215)  
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A meeting between top German generals, Halder and Brauchitsch, before the invasion 
concluded that Germany would be better off maintaining a friendship with Russia and 
that “Russian intentions … posed no threat” (Megargee, 2000:103). Indeed the 
opinion of senior generals such as Field Marshal Von Rundstedt when interviewed 
after the war was that there was no threat of offensive action from Russia and 
certainly he saw no evidence of it as his forces pushed into Russia (Liddell Hart, 
1975). As tensions between the two countries increased Stalin resisted the urges of his 
military chiefs to adopt plans for a pre-emptive strike against the build-up of German 
forces (Glantz & House, 1995). The analysis of Colonel-General Halder, chief of staff 
of the German Army (OKH)114 in 1941 would make any threat of attack seem 
unlikely as; 
Soviet policy up to then led Halder to consider a large scale offensive by the Red Army at the 
beginning of June 1941 to be “most improbable” and he regarded the deployments (of the Red 
Army) as defensive measures … As no aggressive intentions had been attributed to Stalin, 
Hitler and his military leaders were not disturbed by the ability of the Red Army to fight a war. 
(Forster, 1997:128). 
 
It is generally accepted by military historians that the war on the Eastern Front was 
the scene of the worst atrocities that were seen during World War II (Schroder, 1997). 
It was a war that unleashed barbarity for a variety of reasons including: 
… physical survival and mental attrition, casualties and cohesion, draconian discipline and 
brutality, indoctrination and criminal policies simultaneously constituted a part of the 
individual soldier’s daily front-line experience, moulded his views and directed his actions. 
(Bartov, 1997:327) 
                                                 
114 Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) or Army High Command. 
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As previously discussed, the issue of difficult life conditions can produce the climate 
in which mass atrocities such as genocide are more likely to develop and take place. 
For this reason it is necessary to see what impact the physical fighting conditions 
themselves had on the propensity of soldiers to commit atrocities. Bartov (1997) 
describes the demodernisation of the German Army as the conflict progressed, where 
the armed forces began to suffer from a lack of effective weapons and a manpower 
shortage. To deal with this lack of replacements German infantry divisions were 
reduced from nine battalions to six battalions (Healy, 1993; Winchester, 1998). The 
infantry division in 1939 had a nominal strength of 17,734 men, while in 1943 the 
nominal strength was 12,772 men (Healy, 1993). This lack of replacements increased 
the stresses on combat soldiers as; 
… The supply system reached breaking point. The men at the front had to make do with 
inadequate 
clothing, 
insufficient food 
provisions and 
extremely 
wretched 
accommodation 
facilities for long 
periods of time in 
the height of the 
Russian winter. All 
these factors 
combined to create an acute sense of crisis. Both physical and mental attrition were highly 
prevalent, and the incidence of illness and nervous breakdowns greatly increased. (Bartov, 
1997:327) 
 
Waffen-SS Soldiers in the primitive conditions of 
the Eastern Front, which was often reduced to 
trench warfare reminiscent of World War I.
Waffen-SS Soldiers in the primitive conditions of 
the Eastern Front, which was often reduced to 
trench warfare reminiscent of World War I.
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SS General Max Simon succinctly outlined the manpower problem after the war, “It 
was absolutely impossible to replace adequately the casualties of the Eastern 
campaign. The cadres of efficient NCOs of whom there had been too few from the 
outset, were decimated a few months after the start of the campaign, there was a lack 
of officers in all companies and battalions” (Simon, 1949:11). An example of the 
attrition suffered is that in the first 12 months of the war the 4th Waffen-SS Polizei 
Division lost over half of its 14,588 men (Pierik, 2001).  
 
From the very first months in the campaign the German forces suffered from a lack of 
manpower. By comparison the Russians, although sorely depleted after the losses of 
1941, were able to mobilise a huge reserve of manpower and industrial resources 
(Bartov, 1992; Erickson, 1975, 1983; Glantz & House, 1995; Tiemann, 1998; 
Winchester, 1998). Indeed the fortunes of the respective armies were almost the 
converse of each other, “… even as the German Army began its numerical and 
qualitative decline, the Soviet Army was evolving into an organisation totally unlike 
that of even a year before” (Healy, 1993:23).  This disparity between the two forces 
was evidenced by the fact that: 
The Russian armoured formations were constantly improving in terms of the quality of 
leadership and the use of armour in battle. German combat quality began to decline after mid 
1943, due to unreplaceable losses in trained and experienced men and officers, and the inability 
of Germany to produce sufficient numbers of tanks and assault guns. (G. D. Nipe, 1996:328). 
 
This numerical advantage enjoyed by the Russians is clearly evidenced in the manner 
in which troops were sometimes deployed to attack. The Russian military made 
considerable use of the human-wave attack, in which waves of soldiers would charge 
towards the enemy line (Mattson, 2002; Schroder, 1997; Sydnor, 1990).  Such tactics 
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while successful on some occasions, were “… callous in the extreme – cruel to the 
extent that individual human lives became worthless” (Schroder, 1997:318).  
 
Soldiers of the 3rd Waffen-SS Panzer Division Totenkopf were amazed during the 
initial fighting in June 1941 by the “… Russian infantry’s continued suicidal 
charges…” (Sydnor, 1990:160). Former commander of the division, Max Simon, 
recounted that “If the first attack is repelled it is definitely certain that a second will 
follow and a third, fourth and so on, without the slightest change in the method of 
attack. Human lives play no role…” (Simon, 1953:11). SS-Brigadeführer Karl 
Herrmann commented on the Russian soldier; “The Russian soldier’s clothing is 
scanty, and his personal equipment immaterial. No value is placed on his life. Since 
the casualty rate is considered immaterial the Russian soldier is driven without mercy 
into the heaviest fire. Once he has given his life he is simply dumped in a hole” 
(Herrmann, 1947:4). 
 
The disparity between the two sides only increased as the Germans suffered a 
reduction in equipment while the Russians, with help from America and Britain 
increased its mechanisation (Healy, 1993; Jukes, 2003).  This support helped to 
underline a theme espoused by many German soldiers including those of the Waffen-
SS. The theme essentially being that they were engaged in an unequal struggle against 
a barbaric foe that was supported in every way by the other ally nations. As one 
Waffen- SS veteran stated: 
But the wave from the east rose and rose, and came implacably closer. It was thrown forward 
on tens of thousands of American trucks, and was fed by many millions of tons of American 
supplies. It had already crushed the outer bastions of Western civilisation against the East, and 
its cultural monuments. The fruits of Nordic-Germanic colonisers, after thousands of years of 
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hard work, and after steadfast struggle against the barbaric, ravaging expeditions of the Asian 
hordes, had now been destroyed. (Hillblad, 2002:29).  
 
This lack of manpower forced the Germans to utilise their combat units for long 
periods in the front lines without rest. This had dire results. The account of numerous 
German soldiers highlights that they suffered continuously from  “… never getting 
enough sleep” (Schroder, 1997:314). Veteran of the SS Leibstandarte Division, Ralf 
Tiemann, describes the effect of this type of combat in a letter home from the Russian 
front in July 1943: 
Hard weeks lie behind my company. So hard, like I never experienced before in this war … For 
days we were on the edge in enemy fire from every weapon. For four days and four nights we 
didn’t leave the confines of our panzer. We had to stay awake the whole time. (Tiemann, 
1998:61). 
 
In other words, the Waffen-SS soldiers on the Eastern front were facing difficult life 
conditions and it was all too easy to blame the Russians for the difficulties they faced. 
It has been noted that sleep deprivation can have both psychological and physical 
effects on soldiers that can impair their performance both mentally and physically 
(Haslam & Abraham, 1987). This situation was also recognised by the German 
command. In a post-war interview General Rohricht stated that “On the Eastern Front 
the divisions never got a rest, and that became a debilitating factor” (Liddell Hart, 
1975:257). It has been noted that constant exposure to combat without rest can lead to 
an increase in stress and a decrease in combat performance. Das Reich veteran Hans-
Joachim Lindow describes how after the first winter in 1941 and the Russian counter-
attacks before the gates of Moscow the stress of combat and retreat began to tell: 
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 The term retreat was dishonourable, it just wasn’t done. And therefore for us it was if we had 
made a mess of it, as if we had done something wrong. We were finished, absolutely done for, 
right at rock bottom both psychologically and physically. (Halliley, 2003) 
 
Studies have shown that after some 30 days in combat there is a noticeable decline in 
combat effectiveness. After some 100 days of intermittent combat non-effective 
behaviour became frequent (Manton, Wilson, & Braithwaite, 2000). Indeed “… 
physical fatigue is one of the most evident hardships of campaigning…” and can 
cause soldiers to become careless, take more risks and lower their performance and 
morale (Haslam & Abraham, 1987:221). A medical consultant for the German Army 
stated that stress and other psychiatric symptoms were the result of living in terror, 
having little sleep and living in dirty and wet conditions (Haslam & Abraham, 1987). 
During the fighting in the Demyansk pocket in 1942 a number of German divisions 
were trapped, including the SS Totenkopf Division. After a number of weeks of bitter 
fighting in atrocious conditions the acting commander of the SS division, Max Simon, 
wrote to the authorities in Berlin and stated “... that for the first time since the 
beginning of the war he had lost hope. The hardships of the Russian campaign, and 
the unbelievable suffering and sacrifices of the men … had simply become more then 
he could bear” (Sydnor, 1990:244). 
 
The quality of the fighting troops had also been in steady decline as a result of the 
enormous casualties being inflicted on the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS (Zaloga, 
1996). The Totenkopf division was involved in 10 months’ continuous combat until it 
was taken out of the front line in October 1942 with only some 6000 survivors (G. D. 
Nipe, 1996). When 281 soldiers from the division were later medically examined, an 
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SS doctor found that “… about 30 per cent were not fit for further military service and 
resembled the concentration-camp inmates that he had become familiar with during a 
tour of duty in the camps” (G. D. Nipe, 1996:126). SS-Brigadeführer and doctor, 
Oskar Hock, stated that “The fighting power of the troops was naturally lowered 
because of the meagre fare. While no marked epidemics resulted, many soldiers 
suffered from skin diseases. This was contributed not only to poor nutrition, but  also 
to the necessity of spending a lot of time in filthy field fortifications (Hock, 1947:19). 
 
During the recapture of Kharkov in 1943 the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division 
endured three months of continuous fighting (Lehmann, 1990). In his post-war history 
of the division, operations officer of the division SS-Obersturmbannführer Rudolf 
Lehmann noted that at the end of this period the division had suffered some 167 
officers and 4373 men, or 44 per cent of the division’s strength, as casualties 
(Lehmann, 1990:194). The 2nd Waffen-SS Panzer Division Das Reich fought its way 
to within 16 kms of the Kremlin and entered the suburb of Lenino during the German 
drive on Moscow during 1941. But the human cost of achieving this was high, with 
some 60 per cent casualties or 7000 men being lost, losses that Germany was already 
struggling to replace (Sharpe & Davis, 2003; Williamson & Andrew, 2004a). This is 
clear evidence of the enormous physical cost of the campaign and the devastating 
effect it would have had on the survivors. 
 
This continuous lack of, and turnover in, troops due to casualties, reduced the combat 
effectiveness of those troops available. The Waffen-SS troops faced difficult life 
conditions in the form of the climate, the ongoing combat without rest, the sheer 
distances involved, and perhaps most importantly, the realisation that they were not 
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involved in a short campaign as in the West. Rather they were now involved in a long 
and bitter ideological struggle in a foreign country. As one veteran of the Das Reich 
Division stated, “Now it was clear to every one of us that this Russia would be a very 
hard nut to crack” (Gunther, 2004:101). 
 
The nature of the terrain and fighting caused members of the Waffen-SS to realise that 
“… the war in the East set new and different standards than had been known 
previously” (Fischer, 2004:40). To deal with these difficult conditions the soldiers 
turned more to the Nazi ideology to seek reassurance that they were fighting a just 
and necessary cause and provide rationale for their suffering (Bartov, 2001; Glantz & 
House, 1995).  
 
The German soldiers “... found it difficult if not impossible to accept…” the climatic 
conditions and distances they found forced upon them during the Russian campaign 
(Schroder, 1997:313). The soldiers of the Waffen-SS faced abhorrent weather 
conditions from freezing winters to scorching summers during their combat on the 
Eastern Front as evidenced by a number of unit histories (Husemann, 2003; Lehmann, 
1990; Ullrich, 2002; Weidinger, 2002).  SS-Obergruppenführer Lothar Debes served 
in the 6th and 10th SS Divisions before becoming the Waffen-SS commander in Italy 
(A. Munoz, 2001; Westwood, 2001). He offered the following insight into the 
conditions faced by the men on the northern Russian front:  
Operations in the Polar region are influenced by the long 20-hour day darkness in winter and 
the 23-hour a day daylight in summer, also by the climatic conditions of the particular area, 
which in the north is artic in character with areas of tundra and further south pass over into 
dense forests interspersed with lakes and swamps; these are factors which require diametrically 
opposite combat methods in winter and summer. (Debes, 1947:1) 
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Waffen-SS doctor Oskar Hock outlined the dangers faced by the Waffen-SS soldiers 
in the harsh winter climate: 
The troops were in general poorly equipped for winter warfare in Russia. There was an outright 
want of winter clothing, and especially felt boots. There were hardly enough fur coats available 
to supply the sentries. Therefore frostbite occurred in increasing measure, hands and feet being 
especially susceptible to it. (Hock, 1947:12) 
 
Kurt Sametreiter, a member of the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, recounted the winter 
conditions during the campaign in Russia, “Minus 46 degrees, minus forty six degrees 
and no overcoat, more froze to death than were wounded … I often cried out for my 
mother” (Halliley, 2003). This lack of winter equipment led members of the Waffen-
SS to obtain winter equipment from any source available. Heinz Maeger, a member of 
the Leibstandarte Division, outlines the lengths some would go to; “When Russians 
fell we rushed to get their uniforms off as quickly as possible before they got cold, so 
that we had something warm to put on” (Halliley, 2003). Das Reich veteran Hans-
Joachim Lindow recalls soldiers’ ears falling off in the freezing winter conditions 
(Halliley, 2003). Other soldiers of the Waffen-SS relate, however, that it was not only 
the cold that made life difficult. 
Almost every day we had to deal with grotesque situations. Here is one of many examples. Our 
marching group is enveloped in swirling dust clouds. The encircling dust, which constantly 
infiltrates every cut and gap in our uniforms, down to our boots, with a fine layer, envelops the 
entire column concealingly.  (Fischer, 2004:68) 
 
Jan De Wilde, of the SS Volunteer Legion Flandern, recalled how it was so cold that 
the ground froze: 
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We needed explosives and grenades to dig graves for our fallen comrades. Also, in certain 
positions along the lines we would pile the dead bodies of Russian soldiers on top of each other 
and cover them with snow so that we could lay in some kind of protection since we couldn’t dig 
trenches. (Brandt, 1998:51). 
 
These conditions of climate and terrain have been noted to have strong psychological 
effects on soldiers (Haslam & Abraham, 1987).  
 
The fighting itself was different to that which the German soldier had encountered 
during the Western campaign. One veteran described the fighting as being “… not just 
tough, but brutal in the extreme, it was a relapse into complete barbarity” (Schroder, 
1997:317). The gauge of how brutal the fighting was can be determined that during 
two weeks of non-stop attacks by Russian soldiers against soldiers of the SS 
Totenkopf division trapped in the Demyansk pocket in February 1942 less then 100 
prisoners were reported taken (Sydnor, 1990:220). The harshness of the fighting soon 
became apparent to those involved. At Gusi near Leningrad on the northern end of the 
front, the Waffen-SS Freiwilligen Legion Nederland.115 which was comprised of 
Dutch volunteers, was getting its first taste of this barbarity. A convoy was ambushed 
by Russian soldiers and, 
Six of the legionnaires cut off from the rest of the group were all shot down. Afterwards, at the 
sound of moaning, the Russians appeared. A couple of the Dutchmen died instantly from the 
head wounds they sustained, those that did not were finished off with bayonets and rifle butt 
blows … These confrontations really summed up the problem surrounding the ideological war 
ethic on the Eastern Front. There was no room for romantic notions about the war and there 
was no reprieve. (Pierik, 2001:95) 
                                                 
115 This legion would go on to form the 23rd Waffen-SS Freiwilligen Panzer Grenadier Division 
Nederland. 
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It is my contention that these harsh physical conditions only added to the situational 
influences that allowed the Waffen-SS to commit atrocities. Having examined the 
interactional causes it is time to determine if the actions of the Waffen-SS can be 
considered evil. 
 
The application of Evil to the actions of the Waffen-
SS 
I now intend to discuss if the actions of the Waffen-SS fall within my definition of 
evil. The previous discussion has indicated how the Waffen-SS actions came about 
from interactive causation, in that both situational and dispositional influences played 
a role. We have seen that the atrocities committed by the Waffen-SS cannot be 
isolated to either the influence of the situation or the effect of the personality of the 
perpetrator. Indeed in military terms, one could frame the policies of Himmler and the 
Waffen-SS command as a strategic evil (the situation) and the actions of the 
subordinates as tactical evil (the dispositions and actions of the individual) as 
previously discussed. This can been seen by the fact that not only were atrocities 
implemented from the high command, but they were also instigated from the lower 
ranks on their own initiative. This is clearly evidenced by comments made by Waffen-
SS General SS-Obergruppenführer Erich Bach-Zelewski in his reference to wild 
actions by subordinates and difficulties in controlling them. I have shown that the 
conditions on the Eastern Front were conducive for atrocities to occur from the 
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bottom up and top down. This can be seen by the general nature of the criminal orders 
given and the specific actions taken in response to them. 
 
So do the actions of the Waffen-SS fall within my definition of evil? To answer this 
question let me first say that it is obviously not possible to examine each and every 
individual atrocity and apply the definition to such. Rather, a broad organisational 
approach has been applied throughout this thesis. As we have seen in chapter 1 an 
operational definition was arrived at to determine if an act is evil. An objective 
assessment needs to be carried out by looking for the following elements: an evil act 
can be said to consist of: 
1. A serious intentional act or omission;  
2. Which causes severe mental or physical harm; and  
3. This harm is unnecessary or disproportionate to any instigation or 
provocation. 
 
Clearly it can be seen that the actions of the Waffen-SS were in fact intentional. That 
would seem beyond argument. That the actions caused serious harm is also beyond 
contention as evidenced by the millions of innocent people killed and the evidence of 
victims and perpetrators themselves. Perhaps the most contentious aspect of the 
application of the definition is in relation to the third part, that the harm was 
unnecessary or disproportionate to any instigation or provocation. The apologists for 
the Waffen-SS argue that the Waffen-SS was just part of Germany’s armed response 
to the looming military threat of the Soviet Union. This allows them to argue that the 
conflict was a preventative action to avoid a greater threat, that being the invasion of 
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Germany by Russia. I would argue that I have showed lucid evidence that this was not 
the case in 1941.  
 
Certainly in a broad context I would argue that the brutal military campaign 
undertaken by the Waffen-SS was not in response to any provocation or instigation 
that would have justified such. Rather I would describe their actions as intentional. 
Their actions served no legitimate military goal, but rather an ideological one. This 
becomes even clearer when one considers the anti-partisan and Einsatzgruppen 
actions behind the front lines. Here it would seem obvious that the slaughter that was 
undertaken was at worst nothing less than the simple murder of innocents, at best it 
could be described as disproportionate to the military threat facing the Waffen-SS. 
Certainly the judges of the post-war trials saw the German response as 
disproportionate and unwarranted. When one moves on to the actions undertaken in 
the concentration-camps it would seem that any defence of Waffen-SS actions there 
would seem to fail. The previous research has shown that there would be difficulty in 
raising any claim of provocation or necessity for the genocide that took place within 
this system. 
 
The objective assessment reveals that the actions of the Waffen-SS in totality meet the 
requirements of my definition of evil. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, I see this 
assessment as only the first step in determining if an act or acts are evil.  The next step 
involved determining if one or more of the three emotive agents are present. These 
factors include the perceived senselessness of the act, the perceived innocence of the 
victim of the act, the uniqueness of the act. I would argue that all three of the emotive 
agents are present in the actions of the Waffen-SS.  
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I would argue that the acts were senseless in that the vast majority of the atrocities or 
evil acts committed served no valid military purpose. They did not assist the Waffen-
SS in achieving the military goals they had set. In fact there is clear evidence that the 
atrocities committed increased the resistance to the Waffen-SS. The actions were not 
based on being a functional part of the campaign to achieve a goal; rather I would 
suggest they were intentional acts committed to express and serve the racial and 
ideological goals of the Waffen-SS, and to a large extent the Nazis. In a military sense 
they were senseless, in fact the actions discussed only make sense when considered in 
the context of a genocidal campaign. 
 
There can be no denying that the vast majority of victims of the Waffen-SS were 
innocent of any military justification for the actions taken against them. The Waffen-
SS upon entry into Russia quickly engaged in an orgy of murder and slaughter of 
racial and ideological targets. That they knew these people were innocent is further 
reinforced when one considers how they attempted to conceal these acts behind the 
use of euphemisms that would bring these racial and ideological targets into the 
sphere of military targets. This has been clearly proved by a variety of evidence that I 
referred to in the previous chapters. While the Waffen-SS may have attempted to 
portray their victims as being deserving of their punishment, the facts do not support 
this.  
 
Quite simply the magnitude and systematic way in which the Waffen-SS participated 
in the overall system of the terror that was the SS makes the evil acts committed by 
them unique. The fact that the SS system could kill millions of people contributes to 
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its uniqueness. That the killing undertaken by the Waffen-SS was spread from the 
frontlines to hundreds of miles behind them shows the enormity of the undertaking. 
The Waffen-SS was involved not only in the military aspects of the SS state, but it 
was also heavily involved in the economic pillaging that the SS undertook. It was 
further implicated in the depraved features of the SS system such as the medical 
experiments. I would argue that the systematic actions undertaken by the Waffen-SS 
on the Eastern Front should be considered evil acts.  
 
Conclusion: 
This study was guided by three main questions. The first being, what was meant by 
the concept of evil, in particular how do we define or decide if an act is evil? In 
response to this I have proposed an operational definition distilled from the writings 
of many social scientists. This definition was then applied to a practical case study, in 
this instance the Waffen-SS.  I would argue that the definition withstood scrutiny and 
assisted in determining which acts of human harm should be considered evil. 
 
The second question was how and why do ordinary people commit acts of evil? The 
interactional causation model that I have proposed would seem the most 
comprehensive way to explain how evil actions can occur. The dichotomy of situation 
and personality being responsible for evil actions is a false one; this thesis has shown 
that the vast majority of evil acts are a combination of both the situation and 
personality.   
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The third major question concerned the case study for this examination, the Waffen-
SS. Was the Waffen-SS an organisation that committed evil acts or simply just 
innocent soldiers doing their duty? This study has filled a large void in relation to 
examinations of the Waffen-SS and the horrendous acts they performed. There can be 
no doubt that from an organisational standpoint the Waffen-SS was at the forefront of 
committing what I have defined as evil acts in the name of the Nazi state.  
 
The concept of evil, as suggested by Baumeister and others, is a useful one if it is 
precisely and appropriately defined. However, my definition expands on those 
provided by Baumeister, etc, and I believe provides clear steps to be taken in 
attempting to determine if an act is evil. As noted by Hagan et al: 
Modern criminology possesses the theory and methods to document, describe, analyse and 
explain the crime of crimes and other important violations of international criminal law. The 
denial and neglect of these crimes in modern criminology itself needs explanation. (Hagan et 
al., 2005:556) 
 
This thesis has attempted to confront genocide, the crime of crimes, by describing and 
documenting the evil acts that took place, and then analysing and explaining why they 
happened by using the concept of evil. This analysis has allowed the identification of 
the causal factors of evil acts. Having identified these it gives some ability to classify 
and identify situations in which evil actions may be more prone to occur and thus 
allow remedial action to be taken prior to evil acts taking place. However, even in 
answering the three main questions the subject of this thesis, other questions have 
been raised that have been outside the scope of this thesis. Questions such as how can 
the reoccurrence of massive crimes, such as genocide, be either contained or 
prevented? What actions should be allowable within the confines of “total war”? Is 
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the sudden shift in the parameters of what is a just war (for example, the rise of 
terrorism in defiance of the sanctity of national boundaries) likely to occasion a rise in 
evil actions? Many more questions have also raised themselves. 
 
Even in Australia we are not immune to potentially evil acts. Take for instance the 
Cronulla race riots in 2005, which were activated by a mobile phone text message of 
hate. As a result over 5000 Australian attacked any person of Middle Eastern 
appearance they could find in the Cronulla beach area in Sydney. It bears a chilling 
resemblance to the initial actions taken by the Nazis against the Jews in Germany. 
Key triggers for genocide were present such as difficult life conditions (a perceived 
loss of freedom on Cronulla Beach due to lawless activities of Middle Eastern crime 
gangs), a devalued target group (Australians of Middle Eastern origin), and the 
presence of individuals who were prepared to surrender their moral responsibility to 
the mob mentality. What then was the crucial difference? In Australia the state moved 
against the rise of evil acts, in Germany they encouraged these acts. In essence the 
situation (i.e. the support of the state for persons of Middle Eastern descent) did not 
act in concert with the racial dispositions of the rioters and the causative model for 
greater evil acts was not triggered. This case does serve to illustrate how every society 
is challenged by potentially evil situations, and it poses a number of disturbing 
questions that we as a society must consider. What would have been the result had the 
police stood by or encouraged the rioters, or if the Australian Government had joined 
in criticising Australians of Middle Eastern descent? In this case there were clear 
pointers to the governmental responsibilities of the Federal Government; 
responsibilities that the government met. 
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As identified in this thesis, the proscriptions of national or localised criminal law 
seem to fail when faced with crimes of a national or large scale, such as genocide. It is 
for this reason that the success or otherwise, of international bodies such as the ICC, 
in dealing with these types of evil acts will determine how successful we are in 
combating trends such as, extreme nationalism or ethnic conflict that are often the 
precursors to atrocities. 
 
There will always be acts committed by ordinary humans against other humans that 
seem inhumane in the extreme. These are the acts that I believe society as a whole 
needs to classify as evil. Without this classification it would seem that true horror of 
what mankind is capable cannot be fully comprehended. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russian soldiers displaying captured German 
battle standards including the standard of the 
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (closest to left).
Russian soldiers displaying captured German 
battle standards including the standard of the 
Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (closest to left).
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GL O S S A RY O F TE R M S:  
 
Term Meaning 
Abteilung Section or detachment, usually used to describe 
a panzer detachment smaller than regimental 
size, roughly equal to a battalion. 
Abwehr Intelligence service of the German armed 
forces; taken over by the SS in 1944  
Armee  An army or field formation of at least two 
corps 
Armeekorps An army corps or field formation of at least 
two divisions 
Armeeoberkommando Army headquarters or headquarters staff 
Barbarossa Code name for invasion of USSR  
Freikorps Free corps; illegal military formations 
composed largely of WWI veterans, active in 
post-war Germany 
Führer In general, leader or officer; specifically Hitler 
Führerbefehl  Order issued by Hitler 
Führererlass  Decree or edict issued by Hitler 
Gebirgs Mountain (i.e. division) 
Heer The Army 
Heeresgruppe  Army group, field formation usually composed 
of at least two armies 
Kampfgruppe Battle group 
Landwehr Military reserve of men between 35 and 45 
Lebensraum Living space 
Legion Legion, military formation composed of 
foreigners serving in the German armed forces 
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Luftwaffe German Air Force 
Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) Army High Command 
OberKommando Des Wehrmacht 
(OKW) 
Armed Forces High Command 
Ostland Baltic States and White Russia 
Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) Reich Labor Service 
Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBl) Reich Legal Gazette 
Reichswehr German Armed Forces from 1920-1935. 
Ritterkreuz Knight’s Cross 
Sturmabteilung (SA) Storm Troops; brown shirted militia of the 
Nazi Party 
Volksdeutsche Ethnic or racial Germans; persons of German 
blood but of non-German citizenship, 
considered by the Nazi Party as a part of the 
German “race” or Volk 
Wehrmacht The German armed forces (Army, Navy and 
Air Force) 
SS and Waffen-SS Terms 
Allgemeine SS General SS; main body of pre-war SS, 
composed of part-time volunteers 
Einsatzgruppe Action group; special SS/SD execution team 
responsible for the massacre of persons 
dictated by Nazi racial and political policies 
Einsatzkommando Smaller component of an Einsatzgruppe 
Freiwilligen Volunteers 
GEheime STaatsPOlizei Gestapo, secret state police, a branch of the SS 
Hitlerjugend Hitler Youth 
Kommandostab RFSS Headquarters of the Reichsfuhrer SS while in 
the field 
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Konzentrationslager (KZ) Concentration-camp 
Kriminalpolizei (Kripo) Criminal Police; part of the SS organisation 
NationaliSozialistische Deutsche 
ArbeiterPartei (NSDAP) 
National Socialist German Workers Party 
(Nazi Party) 
Ordnungspolizei (Orpo) Order Police; regular uniformed police, 
incorporated into the SS organisation 
Panzergrenadier Mechanised infantry 
Reichsfuhrer SS (RFSS) Reich Leader of the SS, specifically Himmler 
Reichskommissariat fur die Festigung 
Deutschen Volkstrums (RKFDV) 
SS agency for the “strengthening of 
Germanism”; primarily concerned with ethnic 
Germans 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) Main Office of Reich Security; SS agency 
headed by Heydrich, later Kaltenbrunner 
SchutzStaffel (SS) Protection Squad, Defence Corps; originally 
elite corps of the NSDAP, later all-inclusive 
designation for the components of the complex 
organisation headed by Himmler 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD) Security and intelligence service of the SS 
Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo) Security Police; component of the SS 
organisation 
Standarte SS or SA formation equivalent to a regiment 
Totenkopfstandarten Death’s Head Regiments; armed SS formations 
created at the beginning of the war to handle 
special tasks of a police nature; disbanded in 
1941, and personnel absorbed into the Waffen-
SS 
Totenkopfverbände (SSTV) Death Head formations; armed full-time 
component of the SS during pre-war period, 
tasked with guarding concentration-camps and 
political prisons 
Totenkopfwachsturmbanner  Designation for the Death’s Head guard 
battalions of the Waffen-SS, which guarded 
concentration and extermination camps during 
the war 
Verfügungstruppe (SSVT) Militarised component of the SS in the pre-war 
period; direct predecessor of the Waffen-SS 
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Waffen-SS Armed SS 
Wirtschafts - und 
Verwaltungshauptamt (WVHA) 
SS Main Economical and Administration 
Office; after March 1942 responsible for 
operation of concentration-camps 
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DR A M AT I S  PE R S O N A E: 
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Name Background  
Erich Bach-
Zelewski 
Born in Pomerania on the 1st of March 1899, Bach-Zelewski 
served in the German Army during World War I. He joined the 
Nazi Party in 1930. In 1941 he was promoted to SS-
Obergruppenführer in the Waffen-SS. Bach-Zelewski was placed 
in command of anti-partisan operations on the Eastern Front from 
1942-1944 and was Himmler’s special deputy for anti-partisan 
warfare. 
 
Bach-Zelewski suffered from some psychological illness as a 
result of the effects of having to carry out orders associated with 
the extermination policies carried out in the east. He was 
responsible for the brutal suppression of the Warsaw uprising in 
1944. He led various SS Corps until the end of the war. Bach-
Zelewski gave evidence at the Nuremberg trials in regards to SS 
activities on the Eastern Front. He received a 10-year sentence; 
this sentence was later suspended however, he was arrested on 
other charges relating to offences prior to the war. Bach-Zelewski 
died in prison while serving a life sentence. 
 
 
Gottlob 
Berger 
Born on the 16th of July, 1896 at Gerstetten, Württemberg, Berger 
served as Himmler's main recruiting officer in 1939 and became 
head of the SS Central Office in 1940, but this only added duties 
of overseeing ideological training. His organisational abilities 
contributed to the amazing expansion of the Waffen-SS in World 
War II, but he also became ensnared in typical internecine fighting 
among the SS hierarchy.  
 
Berger volunteered for army service at the outset of World War I 
and rose to the rank of first lieutenant in the infantry by the time of 
his discharge in 1919, having received several wounds and 
decorations of the Iron Cross first and second class. Joining the 
Nazi Party in 1922, he became a member of the SA and entered 
SS service in 1936. Training with the army brought him the rank 
of major in the reserve by 1938, but his initial rank upon entering 
the SS was colonel, based upon his SA service through 1933. His 
various duties on the SS staff centred on sport organisation and 
training. After the war, the Nuremberg Tribunal sentenced him to 
25 years' imprisonment, of which he served 10 years, being 
released in 1951. He worked on the staff of the right-wing journal 
Nation Europa (Coberg), and died January 5, 1975 in his city of 
birth. 
 
Wilhelm 
Bittrich 
Born on the 26th of February 1894 Bittrich served in World War I 
with the army before becoming a pilot. He ended the war with 
several decorations. Bittrich served in the post-war army and 
trained German pilots in the Soviet Union from 1930 to 1932.  
 
In 1932 he joined the Nazi Party and the SS. During the early 
years of the war he was in command of the Deutschland regiment 
and won the Knight’s Cross on the Eastern Front while holding 
this command. He later took command of the 9th SS Panzer 
division Hohenstaufen and led it during the battles on the Eastern 
Front and in Normandy. Promoted to SS-Gruppenführer, Bittrich 
was in control of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps at Arnhem where he 
decimated the Allied forces. Bittrich was praised for the 
compassion he showed to the paratroopers at Arnhem. He was also  
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prepared to confront Himmler by allowing church services to be 
held in his command in defiance of standing orders. The French 
imprisoned him until 1954. 
 
Josef “Sepp” 
Dietrich 
Born on the 28th of May 1892, Dietrich initially worked as a 
tractor driver before World War I. During World War I Dietrich 
served in various artillery formations before ending the war as an 
NCO in one of the early tank formations. He was awarded the Iron 
Cross and several other awards. 
 
Dietrich was commissioned in the German police while at the 
same time being politically active. He joined the Nazi Party in 
1928 and in matter of days joined the SS. Dietrich developed close 
ties to Hitler by being his personal bodyguard and later 
commanding the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, the most famous 
Waffen-SS division.  
 
Dietrich was promoted to SS-Oberstgruppenführer and eventually 
commanded the 6th SS Panzer army during the Battle of the Bulge. 
He was tried at Nuremberg and found guilty and sentenced to a 
period of imprisonment for the massacre of American prisoners. 
 
 
Oscar 
Dirlewanger 
Born on 26th of September 1895 Dirlewanger had an outstanding 
career as a military officer in World War I and was wounded 
several times and received several awards.  He finished the war as 
a junior officer in an infantry division. 
 
He joined the Nazi Party in 1922 and about this time received a 
Doctorate degree from the University of Frankfurt in economics. 
Dirlewanger later served in the volunteer Condor Legion during 
the Spanish civil war. He later returned to Germany and joined the 
Waffen-SS in 1940 after initially being prevented by a number of 
criminal allegations being levelled at him for moral crimes. 
 
Dirlewanger was responsible for the formation and command of 
the Dirlewanger Sonderkommando, which principally operated as 
a security force on the Eastern Front during World War II. It 
consisted mainly of poachers, concentration-camp inmates, 
Waffen-SS and Army penal troops. The Sonderkommando was 
responsible for numerous atrocities and in February 1945 was 
formed into the 36th Waffen-SS Grenadier Division. It is thought 
that Dirlewanger died in 1945, however some uncertainty 
surrounds the circumstances of his death.  
 
 
Theodor Eicke Born on the 17th October 1892, Eicke served in infantry units 
throughout the World War I, earning the Iron Cross and several 
other awards and ending the war as an NCO. 
 
After the war Eicke spent some time at technical college and in the 
police until his political views caused him to be ousted. Eicke 
joined the SS to give expression to his radical views in 1928. 
Eicke was then placed in control of the SS guards of the 
concentration-camp system and developed them into an efficient 
fighting force that was eventually the 3rd Waffen-SS Totenkopf 
Panzer Division. On the Night of the Long Knives Eicke was 
responsible for the shooting of SA chief Ernst Rohm.  
 
During the war SS-Obergruppenführer Eicke was placed in 
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command of the Totenkopf Division of the Waffen-SS until his 
death on the Russian front in 1943 after his observation plane was 
shot down by Russian troops. 
 
Hermann 
Fegelein 
Born on the 30th of October 1906 Fegelein spent some brief time 
in a German Army Calvary regiment in 1925 and later went on to 
join the Bavarian Land Police. He joined the General SS in 1933 
and he progressed through the ranks in the Calvary units of the SS. 
 
In 1940 he was accepted into the Waffen-SS. He commanded the 
SS Calvary brigade on the Eastern Front during 1941/42 where it 
took part in a number of mopping up operations and committed 
various atrocities. He reached the rank of SS-Gruppenführer and 
commanded the Waffen-SS 8th Calvary Division Florian Geyer 
for a time. He was appointed as Hitler’s liaison officer for the 
Waffen-SS where he married Gretl Braun (sister of Hitler’s 
mistress). On the 26th of April 1945 Fegelein deserted the Führer 
bunker in Berlin as the end of the war drew near. Hitler however 
noted his disappearance and had Fegelein located and arrested at 
his house by the SS. Upon learning of Himmler’s attempts to 
make peace with the Allies Hitler sought a scapegoat and had the 
SS execute Fegelein. 
 
 
Odilo 
Globocnik 
Born on the 21st of April 1904, he joined the Austrian Nazi Party 
in 1931 and became a member of the SS in 1934. Between 1933 
and 1935 he was arrested four times by Austrian authorities for his 
activities in the illegal NSDAP and for high treason. Altogether he 
spent 11 months in jail. 
 
Globocnik soon volunteered for the Waffen-SS and served as a 
non-commissioned officer with the SS-Standarte Germania from 
March until November 1939, serving with distinction in the 
German invasion of Poland. 
 
Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler had not forgotten one of his 
most obedient servants: surprisingly enough, on November 9, 
1939, Globocnik was appointed SS and Police Leader in the 
Lublin district of the General Government. After a disappointing 
party career, Globocnik now had a second chance in the ranks of 
the SS and the police. The following years proved what he was 
capable of. 
On October 13, 1941, Globocnik received a verbal order from 
Heinrich Himmler to start immediate construction work on Belzec, 
the first extermination camp in the General Government. The 
construction of two more extermination camps, Sobibór and 
Treblinka, followed in 1942. All in all Globocnik was responsible 
for killing more than 1.5 million Polish, Slovak, Czech, Dutch, 
French, Russian, German, and Austrian Jews in the death camps of 
Operation Reinhard, which he organised and supervised. He 
exploited Jews as slave labourers in his own forced-labour camps 
and seized the properties and valuables of murdered Jews. 
 
After Mussolini's downfall, Globocnik was transferred from the 
General Government to Friuli-Venezia Giulia in the German-
occupied portion of Italy in September 1943 and was stationed in 
his home town of Trieste. He was appointed Higher SS and Police 
Leader of the Operation Zone of Adriatic Coastal Region. His 
main task there was combating partisans, but again, he played a 
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leading role in the persecution of Italian Jews. With the advance of 
Allied troops, Globocnik retreated into Austrian Carinthia and 
finally went into hiding high in the mountains in an alpine hut near 
Weissensee, still in company of his closest staff members. 
 
Tracked down and captured by the British on May 31, 1945, he 
committed suicide the same day in Paternion by biting on his 
capsule of cyanide. 
 
 
 Paul Hausser Born on the 7th of October 1880 Hausser served in various units 
including the infantry and the Imperial Navy as an observer. Later 
during the First World War Hausser served on the General Staff 
and on other staff units. He was awarded the Iron Cross and 
numerous other awards. At the conclusion of World War I Hausser 
remained with the post-war army until he left the army in 1932 
with the rank of Leutnant-General.  
 
He later joined the SA and a short time later was recruited by 
Hitler to assist in solving training issues of the Waffen-SS. 
Hausser developed the training curriculum for the SS officer 
schools. He was later responsible for the formation of the first 
Waffen-SS division during the war in 1939. This division was 
later to become the 2nd Waffen-SS Das Reich Panzer Division. He 
was placed in charge of the 1st SS Panzerkorps. During the battle 
of Kharkov in 1943 he disobeyed a direct order from Hitler by 
retreating in order to save his men. He was promoted to the rank 
of SS-Oberstgruppenführer and went on to briefly command 
various army groups. He was a witness at Nuremberg and a strong 
advocate for former Waffen-SS soldiers. 
 
 
Reinhart 
Heydrich Born on March 7, 1904, Heydrich was an SS-Obergruppenführer in the SS. He was nicknamed The Butcher of Prague, The Blond 
Beast and Der Henker (German for the hangman). 
Heydrich participated in the Freikorps when he was young. In 
1922 he joined the navy, however, he was later dismissed for 
improper behaviour. His behaviour in court was apparently so 
disdainful that the court also rebuked him for insubordination. 
Heydrich was left with no career prospects. However, he remained 
engaged to von Osten, whom he married in 1931. 
1931 was to be a turning point for Heydrich in another, far more 
important way. Himmler wished to set up a counter-intelligence 
division of the SS. Acting on a friend's advice, he interviewed 
Heydrich, and after a 20 minute test whereby Heydrich had to 
outline plans for the new division, Himmler hired him on the spot. 
In doing so Himmler also effectively recruited Heydrich into the 
Nazi Party. 
Heydrich soon built up a fearsome reputation within the party, and 
in July 1932 his division took on the title of Sicherheitsdienst 
(SD). Later he became the boss of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt 
(RSHA) of which the SD, the Gestapo and the Einsatzgruppen 
were parts. Heydrich became one of the main architects of the 
Holocaust during the first years of World War II and chaired the 
Wannsee conference at which plans for the deportation of the Jews 
to extermination camps were discussed. In September 1941 he was 
 
  425 
 T J Goldsworthy – PhD Thesis  
appointed Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, replacing 
Konstantin von Neurath whom Hitler considered insufficiently 
harsh. During his role as de facto dictator of Bohemia and 
Moravia, Heydrich often drove around alone in a car with an open 
roof- a show of confidence in the occupational forces and their 
repressive measures in subduing the population. 
On May 27, 1942 he was assassinated by a team of British-trained 
agents of the Czechoslovak Government in exile in London. 
Despite Himmler sending his best doctors, Heydrich died in agony 
in a Prague hospital at 4:30am on June 4 at the age of 38. The 
retaliation from the Nazis was savage; a stark warning to potential 
copycats. On June 10 all males over the age of 16 in the village of 
Lidice, 22 km north-west of Prague, were murdered a day after the 
town was burnt. Heydrich's eventual replacement was Ernst 
Kaltenbrunner. 
After Heydrich's death, the first three "trial" death camps were 
constructed and put into operation at Treblinka, Sobibór and 
Belzec. The project was named Operation Reinhard in Heydrich's 
honour. 
Heinrich 
Himmler 
Born on October 7, 1900 Himmler was the commander of the SS 
and one of the most powerful men in Nazi Germany. As 
Reichsführer-SS, he led the SS, and all of its combined offices, 
and was one of the key figures in the organisation of the 
Holocaust. Born near Munich, Bavaria, Germany into a middle-
class family, he was the son of a Bavarian schoolmaster and 
attended Landshut High School. After graduation, Himmler was 
appointed an Officer Cadet in 1918 and joined the 11th Bavarian 
Regiment for service in World War I. Shortly before Himmler was 
due for commissioning as an officer, however, the war ended and 
Himmler was discharged from the military without ever having 
seen any combat. 
In 1919, a year after World War I had ended, Himmler began 
studying agriculture at a technical college in Munich. At the same 
time, he became active in the Freikorps, private armies of right-
wing ex-German Army men resentful of Germany's loss of the 
World War I. Himmler in 1923, applied to join the Nazi Party, 
which was recruiting Freikorps members as potential members of 
the new Nazi stormtrooper units, known as the SA. 
Between 1927 and 1929, Himmler devoted himself increasingly to 
his duties as Deputy-Reichsführer-SS. Upon the resignation of SS 
Commander Erhard Heiden, Himmler was appointed as the new 
Reichsführer-SS in January 1929. At the time Himmler was 
appointed to lead the SS, it numbered only 280 members, and was 
considered a mere battalion of the much larger SA. Himmler, 
himself, was only considered as an SA-Oberführer, but after 1929 
Himmler simply referred to himself as the Reichsführer-SS. 
By 1933, when the Nazi Party rose to power in Germany, 
Himmler's SS numbered 52,000 members and the organisation had 
developed strict membership requirements, ensuring that all 
members were of Hitler's Aryan “Herrenvolk” (i.e. master race). 
Now a Gruppenführer in the SA, Himmler next began a massive 
effort to separate the SS from SA control and introduced black SS 
uniforms, to replace the SA brown shirts, in the fall of 1933. 
Shortly thereafter, he was promoted to SS-Obergruppenführer und 
Reichsführer-SS. 
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Both Himmler, and another of Hitler's right hand men, Hermann 
Goring, agreed that the SA and its leader, Ernst Röhm were 
beginning to pose a threat to the German Army and the whole 
Nazi leadership of Germany itself. Röhm had strong socialist 
views and believed that although Hitler had successfully gained 
power in Germany, the real revolution had not yet begun, leaving 
some Nazi leaders with the belief that Röhm was intent on using 
the SA to administer a coup. 
With some persuasion from Himmler and Goring, Hitler began to 
feel threatened by this prospect, and agreed that Röhm must die. 
Hitler delegated the task of administering Rohm’s demise to 
Himmler and Goring, who, along with Reinhard Heydrich, Kurt 
Daluege and Walter Schellenberg, carried out the execution of 
Röhm and numerous other senior SA officials, in what became 
known as The Night of the Long Knives on June 30, 1934. The 
very next day, Himmler's title of Reichsführer-SS became an 
actual rank and he was appointed to the position while the SS 
became an independent organisation of the Nazi Party.  
In 1936 Himmler had gained further authority as the SS absorbed 
all of Germany's local law enforcement agencies into the new 
Ordnungspolizei, considered a headquarters branch of the SS. 
Germany's secret police forces were also under Himmler's 
authority in the presence of the Sicherheitspolizei which would, in 
1939, expand into the much larger Reichsicherheitshauptamt. The 
SS was also developing its military branch, known as the SS-
Verfügungstruppe, which would later become known as the 
Waffen-SS. After the Night of the Long Knives, the SS-
Totenkopfverbände had been given the task of organising and 
administering Germany's regime of concentration-camps and, after 
1941, the extermination camps of Poland. The SS, through its 
intelligence arm the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), was charged with 
finding Jews, Roma, homosexuals and communists and any other 
culture or race deemed by the Nazis to be either Untermenschen 
(subhuman) or in opposition to his regime, and placing them in 
concentration-camps. Himmler now became one of the main 
architects of the Holocaust, using elements of mysticism and a 
fanatical belief in the racist Nazi ideology to justify the mass 
murder and genocide of millions of victims. 
In 1944, Himmler was granted still further power as the result of a 
bitter rivalry between the SicherheitsDienst (SD) and the Abwehr, 
the intelligence arm of the Wehrmacht. 
 
The involvement in the July 20, 1944 plot against Hitler of many 
of the Abwehr leaders, including its head, Admiral Canaris, 
prompted Hitler to disband the Abwehr and make the SD the sole 
intelligence service of the Third Reich. This increased Himmler's 
already considerable personal power. In late 1944, Himmler 
became commander of army group Oberrhein (Upper Rhine), 
which was fighting the oncoming United States 7th Army and 
French 1st Army in the Alsace region on the west bank of the 
Rhine.  
 
Himmler held this post until early 1945, when he was switched to 
command an army group facing the Red Army to the East. As 
Himmler had no practical military experience as a field 
commander, he was quickly relieved of his field commands and 
appointed as Commander of the Home Army. At the same time, he 
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was appointed as the German Interior Minister and was 
considered, by many, to be a candidate to succeed Hitler as the 
Führer of Germany. 
 
By the spring of 1945 Himmler had lost faith in German victory, 
and came to the realisation that if the Nazi regime was to have any 
chance of survival, it would need to seek peace with Britain and 
the United States. Towards this end, he contacted Count Folke 
Bernadotte of Sweden at Lübeck, near the Danish border and 
began negotiations to surrender in the West. Himmler hoped that 
the British and Americans would fight their Russian allies with the 
remains of the Wehrmacht. When Hitler discovered this, Himmler 
was declared a traitor and stripped of all his titles and ranks. At the 
time of Himmler's denouncement, he held the positions of Reich 
Leader-SS, Chief of the German Police, Reich Commissioner of 
German Nationhood, Reich Minister of the Interior, Supreme 
Commander of the Volksturm, and Supreme Commander of the 
Home Army. Himmler next turned to the Americans as a defector, 
contacting the headquarters of Dwight Eisenhower and 
proclaiming he would surrender all of Germany to the Allies if 
Himmler was spared from prosecution as a Nazi leader. In a final 
example of Himmler's mental state at this point, he sent a personal 
application to General Eisenhower stating that he wished to apply 
for the position as Minister of Police in the post-war government 
of Germany. Eisenhower, however, refused to have anything to do 
with Himmler, and Himmler was subsequently declared a major 
war criminal. 
 
Attempting to evade arrest, Himmler disguised himself as a 
member of the Gendarmerie, but was recognised and captured on 
the 22nd of May 1945 in Bremen, Germany, by a British Army 
unit. Himmler was scheduled to stand trial with other German 
leaders as a major war criminal at Nuremberg, but committed 
suicide in Lüneburg by swallowing a cyanide capsule before 
interrogation could begin. Feared by many, but respected by few, 
many historians have argued that Himmler was more made by 
those who worked under him rather than by his own designs. He 
was survived by his wife and daughter Gudrun, who still lives in 
Germany to this day. 
 
 
Adolf Hitler Born on the 20th of April, 1889, Hitler was the Führer (leader) of 
the National Socialist German Workers Party (Nazi Party) and of 
Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945. In that capacity he was 
Chancellor of Germany, head of government, and head of state, 
ruling as a dictator. 
A highly animated, charismatic and gifted orator, Hitler is 
regarded as one of the most significant leaders of world history. 
The military-industrial complex he fostered pulled Germany out of 
the post-World War I economic crisis and, at its height, controlled 
the greater part of Europe. 
Hitler's attempts to create a Greater Germany, specifically the 
annexation of Austria and the invasions of Czechoslovakia and 
Poland, were one of the primary factors leading to the outbreak of 
World War II in 1939. The embrace of total war both by the Axis 
and Allied powers during this time led to the destruction of much 
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of Europe. Hitler is almost universally held responsible for the 
racial policy of Nazi Germany, the Holocaust, and the death and 
displacement of millions occurring during his leadership.  
Hoping to be the founder of a thousand-year Reich, he committed 
suicide in his bunker beneath Berlin with much of Europe, and 
especially Germany, in ruins around him and the Red Army 
closing in 1945. 
 
Otto Kumm Born in Hamburg on the 1st of October 1909 Otto Kumm began a 
career as a typesetter in his early years. He joined the SA in 1930 
and then joined the SS in 1931. 
 
He served in the Der Führer regiment in the early years of the 
war, before going on to become its commander in 1941. After 
working in a corps staff position Kumm was given command of 
the 7th SS Mountain Division Prinz Eugen in 1944.  He 
surrendered to US forces at the end of the war. 
 
Otto 
Ohlendorf 
Born on the 4th of February 1907 Ohlendorf initially pursued a 
career as an economist and a lawyer. He joined the SS in 28th of 
May 1925 and rose to the rank of SS-Gruppenführer. In 1936 he 
accepted a position in the RSHA under the leadership of Himmler. 
 
When Himmler organised the 4 Einsatzgruppen he gave command 
of group D to Ohlendorf, which conducted operations in the 
Ukraine while attached to the 11th Army (commanded by Von 
Manstein). During a 12-month period it is estimated that the group 
liquidated 90,000 people. After the war Ohlendorf was charged at 
Nuremberg and was part of the Einsatzgruppen case. He was 
found guilty and executed on the 7th of June 1951. 
 
Jochen Pieper Born in 1915 Pieper joined the SS-VT as a means of obtaining a 
career in the armed forces. His marks for school precluded him 
from becoming an officer in the army. He was accepted into the 
Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler and was accepted for officer 
candidate school.  
 
He went on to command various formations within the 
Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler and rose to the rank of SS-
Standartenführer commanding the 1st Panzer regiment of the 
Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler. He was the youngest regimental 
colonel in the Waffen-SS. He is remembered for his role in the 
massacre of American Soldiers at Malmedy. He was brought to 
trial after the war and sentenced to hang. This was subsequently 
commuted and he was released from prison in 1956. He later went 
to live in France where in 1976 his house was burnt down and he 
was murdered. 
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Oswald Pohl Pohl was born on the 30th of June 1892, in Duisburg-Ruhrort as 
the son of a blacksmith. In 1920 he was accepted into the Weimar 
Republic's new navy, the Reichsmarine. Pohl was transferred to 
Swinemünde in Poland in 1924.  
One year later, in 1925, Pohl became a member of the SA, and 
then finally joined the re-founded NSDAP. He was appointed 
chief of the administration department in the staff of the 
Reichsführer-SS and given the rank of SS-Standartenführer on 
February 1, 1934, and began to influence the administration of the 
concentration-camps.  
In June 1939, Pohl became chief of both the Hauptamt Verwaltung 
und Wirtschaft (main bureau [for] administration and economy, 
part of the SS) and the Hauptamt Haushalt und Bauten (main 
bureau [for] budget and construction, part of the Reich's ministry 
for the interior). On February 1, 1942, both institutions were 
combined into the SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt (SS-
WVHA, SS main bureau for economic administration) with Pohl 
in charge; among other things, the SS-WVHA was in charge of the 
organisation of the concentration-camps, deciding on the 
distribution of detainees to the various camps and the rental of 
detainees for forced labour until 1944.  
Pohl was made SS-Obergruppenführer and general of the Waffen-
SS on April 20, 1942. In 1944, Pohl was put out of charge of the 
concentration-camps, with the Rüstungsministerium (ministry of 
armament) overtaking; at the same time, the responsibility for 
construction was also taken away from the SS-WVHA. However, 
Pohl remained in charge of the administration of the Waffen-SS 
for the remainder of the war.  
After the end of World War II, in 1945, Pohl first hid in Upper 
Bavaria, then near Bremen; nevertheless, he was captured by 
British troops on May 27, 1946. He was sentenced to death on 
November 3, 1947, by an American military tribunal after the 
Nuremberg trials for crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
membership in a criminal organisation, as well as for mass 
murders and crimes committed in the concentration-camps 
administered by the SS-WVHA he was in charge of. However, 
Pohl was not executed right away. In 1950, Pohl's book, Credo. 
Mein Weg zu Gott, (Credo. My way to God) was published with 
permission from the Catholic church that Pohl became a member 
of again. Pohl was hung at Landsberg Prison on June 7, 1951, but 
he maintained he was innocent to the end, claiming that he was 
only a simple functionary. 
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Max Simon Born on the 6th of January 1899 Simon served as a corporal in 
Leib-Kürassier-Regiment. In 1919 he was a member of the 
Freikorps service in Silesia against the Poles. Between the wars he 
served as a sergeant in the Reichswehr in Cavalry Regiment 16. 
On the 1st of May 1933 he joined the SS. In 1934 he was assigned 
to the Concentration-camp Inspectorate. On the 9th of November 
1934 he was appointed commander of the SS guard unit at 
Sachsenburg concentration-camp. 
 
On the 10th of July 1937 he was appointed commander of SS-
Totenkopf-Standarte 1 Oberbayern. Simon's unit was used for 
police duties (i.e., rounding up Polish Army stragglers and 
murdering political leaders, priests, intellectuals and Jews) during 
the invasion of Poland in the rear area of the advancing German 
Army. In 1943 he was the commander of SS-Totenkopf Infantry 
Regiment 1 of the SS-Totenkopf Division, where he saw combat in 
the Western Campaign of 1940 and in Russia from June 1941. He 
then commanded the Totenkopf Division for sometime on the 
Eastern Front. During 1943-44 he was commander of 16th SS-
Panzer Grenadier Division Reichsführer-SS in Italy and Hungary. 
He finished the war as the commanding General, 13th SS-Army 
Corps on the Western and South-western Fronts. 
 
A veteran of the pre-war concentration-camp system, Max Simon's 
name became linked to war crimes as early as 1943. In November 
of that year, a Russian military tribunal sentenced him to death in 
absentia for his alleged role in the killing of 10,000 Russian 
civilians in the vicinity of Kharkov in the summer of 1943. After 
the war, the British indicted Simon as a war criminal for his 
complicity in the September 1944 massacre of Italian civilians at 
Marzabotta (estimates ranged from 300 to over 2,000 dead) in 
reprisal for partisan activity. Following his interrogation in the 
United Kingdom, Simon returned to Italy where a British military 
tribunal sentenced him to death. The sentence, however, was later 
commuted, and Simon was released in 1954 from Werl prison in 
Germany. 
In October 1955, a German court in Ansbach tried Simon for an 
incident that occurred in the German town of Brettheim on 7 April 
1945. On that date, Simon ordered the court martial and hanging 
of three citizens of the town who had disarmed some local Hitler 
Youth members to keep them from fighting U.S. troops. Twice 
acquitted of the charge (the court ruled he had been following a 
legal order), Simon died before the start of a third trial. 
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Franz Six Franz Six studied at the Realschule, graduated from the classical 
high school at Mannheim in 1930 and then matriculated at the 
University of Heidelberg where he specialised in sociology and 
political science, receiving the degree of doctor of philosophy in 
1934. He then taught at the University at Koenigsberg (where he 
also took up the position of Press Director of the German Students' 
Association). In 1936 he received the doctorate from the 
University of Heidelberg, and became Dozent in the faculty of law 
and political science at Koenigsberg; later, he passed examinations 
for the Venia Legendi at the University of Leipzig. By 1938 he 
was Professor at the University of Koenigsberg, and by 1939, he 
had obtained the chair for Foreign Political Science at the 
University of Berlin and was its first Dean of the faculty for 
Foreign Countries. 
Six became a member of the SA in 1932 and of the SS and SD in 
1935. In SS he attained the grade of SS-Brigadeführer. On June 
20, 1941 he was appointed Chief of Vorkommando Moscow. 
According to Six, the task of this Kommando was to secure the 
archives and files of Russian documents in Moscow when the 
German troops should arrive there. He arrived in Smolensk on 
July 25, 1941 and remained there until the latter part of August 
when he returned to Berlin. The Vorkommando Moscow was used 
in liquidating operations while under the command of Six. Further, 
that the seizing of documents in Russia was done not for economic 
and cultural purposes, but with the object of obtaining lists of 
Communist functionaries who had themselves become candidates 
for liquidation. 
 
Six was tried and convicted at Nuremberg. Sentenced to 20 years 
imprisonment in 1948, he was released in 1952. 
 
Felix  
Steiner 
Born in Prussia on the 23rd of May 1896 Steiner served in various 
infantry units during the World War I and rose to the rank of 
Oberleutnant. He received a number of awards and served in the 
post-war Reichswehr. 
 
He joined the Nazi Party and the SA in 1934 and later joined the 
SS in 1935. He went on to command the 5th Waffen-SS Wiking 
division in 1940. He was later given command of the 3rd SS 
Panzerkorps. He went on to command various army groups with 
the rank of Obergruppenführer.  
 
He was given command of Army group Steiner in which Hitler 
placed his hopes for a last-minute respite from the Russian 
offensive on Berlin in 1945. Steiner refused to commit his men to 
such a futile offensive. He was a witness at Nuremberg. Steiner is 
credited with developing the assault tactics and reliance on heavy 
infantry firepower utilised by the Waffen-SS in small unit 
engagements. 
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Jurgen Stroop Born on the 26th of September 1895. Stroop as a SS-Brigadeführer 
was placed in charge of the suppression of the Warsaw Ghetto 
uprising by the Jews in 1943. He was a SS and Higher Police 
leader and also a member of the Waffen-SS. This action resulted 
in the annihilation of the Jewish population after a fight lasting 
some 28 days.  He was found guilty by an American War tribunal 
and sentenced to death. He was executed in Warsaw on the 8th of 
September 1951. 
 
Karl Wolff Born on the 13th of May 1930 Karl Wolff served as a lieutenant in 
World War I.  Between the wars he held various business posts.  
 
He joined the Nazi Party and the SS in 1931. In July 1933 he was 
appointed adjutant to Himmler. He was promoted to SS-
Gruppenführer in the Waffen-SS in May 1940. Wolff assisted in 
the deportation of Jews to the Treblinka extermination camp. He 
was made HSSPF for Italy and surrendered to US forces there in 
1945. 
 
After the war he was initially tried by a German court and 
sentenced to four years imprisonment, but served only a week of 
his sentence. In 1962 he was again arrested and charged with the 
murder of 300,000 Jews at Treblinka. In 1964 he was found guilty 
and sentenced to 15 years jail. He was again released early after 
serving only seven years. 
 
Note: The information contained in the above biographies has been sourced from various written and web articles. 
 
